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IHTRODUCTIO~

ASSUKPTIOHS AND SCOPE

This study proceeds by analysis and comparison:
analysis 0£ the elenctic method used by the Socrates of
Pla to s early dialogues and comparison of that method with
1

the one used by Euripides in creating his Medea.
Any analysis entails assumptions.

To begin with, it

is assumed, on the basis 0£ the work. of many earlier
scholars, that Pla to s
1

dialogues show a

chronological

progression, and that the dialogues themselves may be
divided into categories of early, middle, and late.

It is

additionally assumed that the Socratic method 0£ the early
dialogues shows certain characteristics which distinguish
it from Plato s later method, and that these character1

is tics

justi£y

the

designation

"Socratic ... 1

A comparison 0£ Socratic and Euripidean method may,
however, suggest a scope to which this study does not

1This designation does not presume to solve the
insoluble, the so-called "Socratic question," i.e., what is
Socratic and what Platonic in the writings 0£ Plato. The
reticence 0£ modern scholars in using the designation
"Socratic," an understandable reaction to the sometimes
reckless daring of their predecessors, seems nevertheless
to exceed the demands 0£ prudence. While the designation
"Socratic," as a short-hand way of distinguishing the
method 0£ the early dialogues £rom that 0£ the later ones,
could cautiously be defended here by an appeal to the well
respected need £or brevity 0£ expression, I nonetheless
maintain that the (albeit scanty) evidence on the
historical Socrates, as well as a commonsense reading of
the vast literature on the development 0£ Plato s method,
justify the use of this designation. Solution of the
Socratic question is, in any event, not essential for this
study•s argument.
1

2

aspire.

This study does not propose, 'following modern

assumptions, to treat philosophical discourse and drama as
two distinct modes 0£ expression, i.e., as the prosaic and
the poetic.

To do so would be anachronistic, £or the

ancient Greeks 0£ the -firth century B. C. did not consider
philosophical discourse and drama as so obviously distinct
as do we 0£ modern times.

Hor was the "prosaic" mode 0£

literary expression, new to Greek. literature in the £i£th
century B. C., at that time so 'far removed 'from the
standard,

the

poetic,

mode.2 .Furthermore,

the

assumption that philosophical discourse and drama are
distinct and diverse modes of expression suggests two
courses £or comparison--one £utile, the other promising-that this study does not take.

It does not attempt to

disclose Euripides' "philosophy," an attempt that has,
despite being fraught with problems, been more than once
made.3

Hor

does

it

consider

the

dramatic elements per

2on these points, see Martha :Nussbaum, The
Fragility 0£ Goodness: Luck. and Ethics in Greek. Tragedy
and Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1986;
hereafter :Nussbaum, Fragility), pp. 122-123.
3see below, Chapter Three, Part One, and Chapter
Four, Part Two, £or attempts to assign a "philosophy" to
Euripides. He has been termed a rationalist,
irra tionalist, sophist, and idealist. He has been accused
both of openly rejecting •socra tic doctrine• in his plays,
and 0£ agreeing with it.
There are at least two methodological errors that lead
to such con-fusion.
First, it is all too easy to extract
sections of speeches made by characters in Euripidean plays
in support of any or these philosophic orientations, but
more di££icult to de£end them in light of an entire play,
Which is, after all, the poet's statement. Consider what

3

se

of

Plato's

dialogues,4

although

such

consideration

is worthy of further pursuit.
Furthermore, this study does not seek to prove what
the progression of its chapters--from analyzing the
Socratic method to demonstrating that method's use in
Euripides' Kedea--may suggest:
Euripides.

that Socrates influenced

Such a claim was, in fact, made by Aristophanes

and various others, but the validity of these claims is
assumed to be the perceived similarity of method which lies
beneath them.

Demonstrating this similarity of method and

illustrating the method's employment by Euripides, and
thereby of£ering a new way 0£ interpreting his work, are
the aims 0£ this study.
Since the study's originality lies primarily in
illustrating Euripides' method of composition, it is upon
this endeavor that the strictest limits have been set.
sort of assessment we would have of Plato's philosophy if
analysis of his dialogues were based on statements made by
certain characters he depicts. Second, even if an entire
play is considered as a philosophic treatise, the rigorous
standards of vocabulary common to (at least) modern
philosophical treatises should not be assumed to be
operational in literary texts. On the first point, see
below, Chapter Three, Part One; on the second, see K. J.
O'Brien, The Socratic Paradoxes and the Greek Kind (Chapel
Hill:
Univ. 0£ Horth Carolina Press, 1967; herea£ter
O'Brien, Paradoxes) pp. 50-5~
4-see, e.g., J. H. Randall, Jr., Plato:
Dramatist
of the Life of Reason (Hew York: Columbia Univ. Press,
1970); cf. Charles H. Kahn, •Drama and Dialectic in Plato's
Gorgias,• in Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, vol. 1,
ed. Julia Annas (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983; hereafter
Kahn, "Gorgias•), pp. 75-122.

Exposing an author•s method requires an exhaustive
examination 0£ the literature, lest details overlooked in a
superficial analysis provide by their omission -false
justification for an impaired hypothesis.

This study

therefore limits its analysis to one play 0£ Euripides,
Hedea,5 so that
thoroughly

the

integrity 0£ its hypothesis may be

tested.

5 Justi£ica tion £or the choice of this
play may be found in Chapter Three, Part Two.

particular

CHAPTER ORE
SOCRATIC ELERCHOS ARD MAIEUSIS IR PLATO'S EARLY DIALOGUES
Part One:

Pla to•s Early Dialogues

Although the chronological progression 0£ Plato•s
dialogues is much disputed,6

the

present study demands

only that dialogues be classi£ied as early, middle, or
late, and does not require establishing exact dating of
each dialogue, or even their relative chronology.

I accept

as convincing the broad characteristics of the three
periods of Platonic dialogues, drafted and used by Richard
Robinson.7
6The highly favored stylometric method of dating
the dialogues, using the Laws as the standard 0£ Plato•s
late style (on the authority of Diogenes Laertius,
3.37.25), has yielded accord mainly, as one would expect,
in the later dialogues. Re la ti ve dating of the early
dialogues (the focus of this study) is hotly debated. For
a table comparing the chronology of the Platonic dialogues
by five different scholars, see Sir David Ross, Plato's
Theory of Ideas (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1976;
hereafter Ross, Plato's Theory>. p. 2.
Scholars who
concentrate on classifying dialogues into three distinct
periods do not use the philological criteria most respected
by those seeKing exact dating, but instead point to
philosophical or literary criteria as a basis £or
classi f ica ti on.
7Richard Robinson, Pla to s Earlier Dialectic, 2
ed. (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1953; hereafter Robinson,
PED2).
My indebtedness to the worK of this outstanding
Platonic scholar will become evident.
Robinson•s criteria
for categorization 0£ the dialogues are not based on an
assumed development of doctrine--a method rightly
criticized by Ross, Plato•s Theory, p. 1, as too
subjective--but instead on evolution of method. For an
ordering of the dialogues that agrees with Robinson•.s, see
1

5

6

Early

dialogues.8

according

to

Robinson.

are

characterized by the presence of Socratic elenchos and
Socratic definition.

The predominance of elenchos itself

is the hallmark of an early dialogue, and elenchos in these
dialogues proceeds along systematically predictable lines:
Gregory Vlastos, "The Socratic Elenchus," in Oxford Studies
in Ancient Philosophy, Vol. 1 (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1983; hereafter Vlastos 1 "Elenchus"). p. 27 n. 2.
Cf. also
Gregory Vlastos, Socrates: Ironist and Koral Philosopher
(Ithaca, NY:
Cornell Univ. Press. 1991; hereafter Vlastos.
Socrates). pp. 45-80, for descriptions of the differences
between the "Socrateses" of the various periods of the
dialogues.
An overview 0£ the debate on ordering the dialogues
and criticism of scholars who do not distinguish "Socratic"
from "Platonic" dialogues may be found in Karl R. Popper,
The Open Society and Its Enemies. Vol. 1: The Spell of
Plato, 5 ed. (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton Univ. Press, 1966),
pp. 306-313, n. 56.
I owe this reference to James G.
Keenan.
8protasoras. Euthyphro, Laches, Charmides, Ly sis.
Republic 1. Gorgias. Hippias Major. Hippias Minor. Apology.
Crito 1 Euthydemus. The dialogues are not listed in any
assumed chronological order.
I follow Robinson s
(PED2, passim) evident classification:
he is
understandably hesitant to attempt strict division in a
corpus that forms an organic whole and was revised.
Robinson boldly lists his middle dialogues (?Keno.
Banquet, Phaedo 1 Republic, Parmenides, TheaetetUs, and
Cratylus) and •certain late dialogues• (Phaedrus, Sophist,
Statesman, and Philebus) in his pre-face (PED2 p. v,
but see p. 49 for Republic 1 as early, and pp--:-70 and 122
-for his qualifications on designating Keno a middle
dialogue). but nowhere gives a complete account 0£ how he
classifies the remaining dialogues.
Some dialogues clearly
-fall for him on the cusp of his divisions. Robinson
includes Euthydemus both in the list o-f dialogues
consulted for a count of direct and indirect elenctic
arguments, which suggests that he considers it an early
dialogue, and in his chapter on "Dialectic." which suggests
that it is a middle dialogue (PED2, pp. 24 1 26 1 74,
87). Perhaps his discomfort in classifying the dialogue
arises from his perception that it is "mainly devoted to
Picturing or exaggerating the eristical temper
"
(PED2, p. 85), and, as such, it obscures the elenchos.
1

7

an interlocutor is asked to define an entity, usually
ethical, and in subsequent cross-examination, his
definition, as a

particular instance, is shown to be

deficient in some way when compared to an assumed "form" of
that entity.
aporia:

Discussion in the early dialogues ends in

both the interlocutor and Socrates admit that they

are at a loss, and they depart with but one fact
established--that they do not know.

The Socratic

character of elenchos (see below, Part Three) gives these
dialogues their ironic, destructive, conclusively negative
tone; the fact of definition makes their subject matter
particular, and the particulars chosen for definition give
the dialogues a thematic compass that is distinctively
moral.9
While elenchos and definition never entirely
disappear in any period of the Platonic dialogues, those of
the middle period10 show a
9Robinson,

PED2
-

.

pp.

gradual trend away from
19,

61.

10Meno, Symposium, Phaedo, Republic (except
Republic 1), Parmenides, Theaetetus, and Cratylus will be
considered middle dialogues. The dialogues again are not
in an assumed chronological order, and again, following
Robinson, PED2, p. v.
He no is for Robinson a dialogue
transitionatbetween early and middle.
See PED2, p.
122. Parmenides seems to waiver between middle and late
for Robinson (see his chapter, "Hypothesis in the
Parmenides," PED2, pp. 223-280) while still being a
strange hybrid of early and middle: an examination of the
theory of ideas via elenchos and, in its later hal£, an
example of hypothesis, the "keyword" of the middle
dialogues. See PED2, pp. 32 and 70.
Gregory Vlastos, "Elench us and Ha thematics: A
Turning-Point in Plato s Philosophical Development," AJP
1

8

depicting

to

discussing

elenchos,11

and

shift

the

focus

of definition from the individual universals to universals
in general.

The tone becomes constructive as the negative

aspects of elenchos are subordinated to a new purpose:
establishing permanent knowledge.

The assumed existence of

109 (1988; hereafter Vlastos, "Elenchus and Mathematics"),
pp. 362-396, argues that the metaphysical outlook which
characterizes the middle dialogues is attributable to
Plato's pursuit of the study of mathematics. Elenchos,
which lacks "indubitably certain termini" (p. 368), was
shed in the middle dialogues without comment by the budding
mathematician Plato, who indicated its shedding "by
dramatic means, pairing Socrates with interlocutors who no
longer give him any fight." {p. 371).
Vlastos similarly
points out (pp. 376 and 380) that the adversative role
elenchos demands of Socrates and "the 'say only what you
believe• rule, which forbids debating an unasserted
premise" are impediments to investigating hypotheses.
UBy establishing this progression as the basis
for his theory of chronology of the Platonic dialogues,
Robinson's criteria are distinguished from the more
subjective criteria criticized by Ross, Pla to•s Theory, p.
1. Any scholar working with interpretation of texts would
do well to read Robinson's strictly formulated "canons of
interpretation," outlined in his first chapter (PED2,
pp. 1-5), from which he derives his operational assumption
that "to possess a single name for an idea is a later stage
than to be able to express it only in a sentence . . ."
{PED 2 , p. 5).
This assumption, which gives rise to
the basis for Robinson's chronology, not only betrays a
sound understanding of the evolution of thought, but has
also been recently supported by the theoretical work of
Eric A. Havelock on the revolution of literacy in fifth
century Greece. For Havelock's theory on the transition
from orality to literacy and its manifestation in forms of
expression (showing an evolution from the concrete and
particular to the abstract), as well as its implications
for the origins of moral philosophy as applied to the
Socrates of the Platonic dialogues, see his recent "The
Orality of Socrates and the Literacy of Plato: with Some
Reflections on the Historical origins 0£ Koral Philosophy
in Europe," in Hew Essays on Socrates, ed. Eugene Kelly
(Lanham, HD: University Press of America, 1984; herea£ter
Havelock, "Orality"), pp. 67-94.

9

"£orms" no longer serves, as it did in the early dialogues,
as a standard against which a particular "£orm" can be
tested and proposed opinion negated, but instead as the
hypothetical basis £or constructing positive doctrine.

As

discussion 0£ particulars recedes behind this larger
program, negative elenchos is "incorporated into the larger
whole

of

dialectic.•12

Method

yields

to

science,

knowledge, not correct procedure, as the goal.

with

Robinson

neatly divides the two periods:
. . . the early gives prominence to method but not to
methodology, while the middle gives prominence to
methodology but not to method. In other words,
theories 0£ method are more obvious in the middle, but
examples 0£ it are more obvious in the early . . .
elenchus changes into dialectic, the negative into the
positive, pedagogy into discovery, morality into
science.13

12Robinson,
PED2,
p.
19.
Robinson
distinguishes between dialectic and elenchos by asserting
that "dialectic is an art or Texv'l'l as well as a
method" (p. 74), while elenchos is presumably a method
only. Both art and method entail an end or purpose, but
"method is, and art is not, a specialization 0£ the notion
0£ .. going•. The .. method• is the description 0£ the
temporal actions in their temporal sequence, by which the
desired end is brought about; whereas the .. art• or
.. science• is the recital of the facts and principles which
prescribe those actions. ..Art• tends toward permanent
knowledge, but .. method• towards changing .. procedure.•• (pp.
62-63).
By being "incorporated into the larger whole 0£
dialectic," elenchos in the middle dialogues changes £rom
unadulterated method to art and method, and thereby gives
up its purely negative tone: ---.tJ:t is harnessed to the car
of construction." (p. 19).
1 3Robinson,

PED2
--

.

pp.

61

and

19.

10
The

late

dialogues1 4

continue

the

trend, and

there emerges in them a sense 0£ discomfort with the
question-and-answer method 0£ even the more positive
dialectic.
as

Late

hypothesis

dialogues

yields

to

tend

to

synthesis

become
and

trea tises15

division.16

In short, Robinson uses evolution 0£ method as the
criterion for classifying the chronological periods 0£
Platonic dialogues:

early dialogues depict elenchos in

operation; middle and late dialogues, despite their
discussion 0£ elenchos, display affiliation with methods
other than elenchos, i.e., dialectic on the one hand and
synthesis and division on the other.

Robinson s
1

classi£ications provide this study with a sure way 0£
discriminating between primary and secondary Platonic
source material.

For analyzing Socratic elenchos,

14Late dialogues include Phaedrus, Sophist,
Statesman, Philebus, Timaeus, Cri tias.
See Robinson,
PED2, p. v.
Robinson does not classi£y Timaeus,
Kenexenus, or Critias, all 0£ which are virtual monologues.
Timaeus and Critias are deemed late by Ross, Plato s
Theory, p. 10. Heither Critias nor Kenexenus is cited by
Robinson, presumably considered in£erior or spurious.
Kenexenus must be either middle or late (terminus post
quem is 390 B. C., according to Ross, Plato s Theory, p.
9).
1

1

Robinson,

PED2
--

.

p.

84.

16For an examination 0£ the similarities,
differences, merits, and limitations of "de£inition• in the
early and "division• in the late dialogues, see George
Hakhnikian, "Elenctic De£initions,• in The Philosophy 0£
Socrates:
A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. Gregory
Vlastos (Hotre Dame, IH:
Univ. 0£ Notre Dame Press, 1980),
pp. 125-157, esp. pp. 140-157.

11

Robinson's early dialogues, with their distinctive
depiction of elenchos, will best serve as primary source
material, while his middle and late dialogues, with their
shift from practicing to discussing elenchos, will serve as
secondary source material which will provide evidence for
Plato's understanding of the method.

Part Two:

The Procedure of Elenchos in Plato s Dialogues
1

Elenchos in the Platonic dialogues is not merely
procedure, but instead procedure given a distinctive
character by its practitioner, Socrates.

Although

separating the method s essence from its character is not
1

entirely possible, analysis of elenchos will begin here
with a description of the method itself, primarily as it is
depicted in the early Platonic dialogues.

Part Three will

proceed with an examination of the method s Socratic
1

character, £or which Pla to s discussions of elenchos in the
1

middle and late dialogues give principal testament.

Part

Four will consider the tragic dimensions 0£ Socratic
elenchos as it is depicted by Plato in the early
dialogues.
The
describe

E:>.eyxw,17

verb
Socrates

procedure

1

by

used
in

the

Plato

dialogues,18

a picture of the method in broad outline.
fourth
>

centuries

,

e>.eyxelv

point

17And

>
,
£~£>.eyxw,

B.
to

c.,19
a

the

uses

procedure,

0£
to

to
gives

In the fifth and
the

verb

"question,"

words
sharing
its
root
>
,
ave>.eyTos,
and
the

>
,
(e~e>.eyTeos.

like).

18The word and its root occur most frequently in
the middle and late dialogues. Robinson cites Gorgias as a
dialogue with a high occurrence 0£ the root E:>.eyx-:
"over fifty times in its eighty pages" {Robinson,
PED2,
p.
15).
19 >E>.Eyxw is a
word whose definition
marked differences in Epic and post-Epic periods.
1.2

shows

13

•cross-examine," and imply its two possible goals, to
•prove" (a positive outcome), or to "refute" (a negative
outcome). 2.0

The

dictionary

definitions

serve

expectations but do not answer all questions:

to

limit

we know to

expect a procedure of questioning and cross-examining and a
goal of proof or refutation, but we do not know the intent
of

the

questioning,21

the

form

it

will take, or how

that form ef£ects either 0£ the procedure's goals:
or refutation.

proof

Plato•s early dialogues, with their

depiction of elenchos, provide answers not obtained from
the dictionary definitions.
The procedure of elenchos in the early dialogues is
largely informed by the intent of Socrates• questioning,
which

is

to

establish

the

definition of a

universa1.22

This intent expresses itself either obviously, in explicit
primary questions, or more subtly, in a persistent emphasis
on definition throughout the course of a dialogue.

Primary

20Henry George Liddell and Robert Scott, A GreekEnglish Lexicon, 9 ed., ed. H. G. L. Hammond and H. H.
Scullard, revised and augmented by Sir Henry Stuart Jones,
Roderick McKenzie, et al., with a supplement ed. E. A.
Barber, et al. (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1968; hereafter
LSJ9),
p.
531.
2 1Properly speaking, the intent of the questioning
falls under the method •s Socratic character, but is
inseparable from the form, which is truly the method •s
essence.
22 The importance of this aspect of Socrates•
method is considered by Hugh Benson, "The Priority of
Definition and the Socratic Elenchus," in Oxford Stud,ies in
Ancient Philosophy, Vol. 8, ed. Julia Annas (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1990), pp. 19-65.

14

questions are expressed in one 0£ two £or ms:
or "Is

"What is X?"

x Y?".23 The dialogues with primary questions

impress the reader both as more clearly intent on
definition, since the focus 0£ definition is maintained
thoughout and the progression of the questioning is
obvious, and as somewhat more artificially arranged, since
under the £irm control 0£ Socrates

1

questioning the topic

does not range widely as ordinary conversation is wont to
do.

Dialogues without primary questions, by contrast,

lack the £ocus and clear progressional form 0£ those with
primary questions, but strike the reader as more nearly
approximating true conversational form.

Thus, although the

intent to de£ine may be observed in all 0£ the early
dialogues, the progression 0£ the questioning is more
easily seen in dialogues that have a primary
question.24
The general form 0£ the questioning in dialogues with
a primary question follows a predictable procedure.

A£ter

eliciting an answer to his primary question, Socrates o£ten
23see Robinson s chapter, "Socratic Definition"
(PED2, pp. 49-60).
Robinson identifies Euthyphro,
Laches, Charmides, and Hippias Major as dialogues dominated
by the "What is X?" question, while in Gorgias, Meno, and
Republic 1 the "Is X Y?" question predominates. Dialogues
lacking primary questions are, according to him, Ion,
Hippias Minor, Apology, Crito, and Protagoras.
-1

24Both using a dialogue that has a primary
question, and extracting the method from that dialogue are
£or the sake 0£ clarifying the procedure s form. This
artificially created clarity should not be construed as
integral to the method s employ.
1

1

15
allows the answerer to elaborate and then expresses
dissatis£action with the answer, not by claiming that the
answer is £alse, but that the question was misunderstood.
He has been given a particular example 0£ practice, he
maintains, when what he wanted was a universal 'form

>
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I.

I
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>

€

a

I

(oua1.a),

essence

<e'l'oos>.

aspect

or

)

A summary 0£ Euthyphro will serve to illustrate the
procedure.

A£ter an introductory prologue, in which

Euthyphro explains his present circumstance and agrees to
the

existence

~01.ov)--that

it

0£
is

the

always

>

I

1.oea

the

•holiness•

0£

same

(To

regardless 0£ action

and that holiness and unholiness are opposites (5d.1-5),
Socrates asks Euthyphro to tell him what he considers
•holiness and unholiness.•

To this Eu thyphro replies,

•. . . holiness is the very thing I am doing now
Cl

(ovep

>

•

eyw

v \) v

.....

1f01.W,

"

5d.8-9).25

Euthyphro elaborates brie£ly by way 0£ proo£, drawing a
parallel between his actions and those which men
believe26

Zeus

committed

against

his

£a ther

(5e.2-

25The text used £or all Platonic dialogues is the
'five volume Ox£ord Plato:
Platonis, Opera, vols. 1-5, ed.
by J. Burnet (Ox£ord:
Clarendon Press, 1900-1907).
26 Euthyphro cites as proo£ the belie-fs o-f his
contemporaries, but Socrates, in his customary way, makes
Euthyphro pro£ess these belie-fs as his own (6b.3-6) be-fore
he will continue his questioning. Euthyphro must thus be
understood as both a 'fictional character in a dialogue and
an "everyman" contemporary 0£ Socrates. See Robinson,
2 • p. 26.
See below, Part Three, £or a discussion

m
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6a).

But Socrates complains that the answer is

insufficient, being grounded in happenstance (6d.l-4).

He

reminds Euthyphro of his former agreement to the
proposition that holiness and unholiness are consistent and
opposite regardless of particular action (5d.l-6), and
requests that Eu thyphro now give him not examples from the
many holy things, but instead "that form itself, by which
all

holy

things

TO'

are

.)

or

deemed
the

holy"

li

>

,...

(E:KE:lVO

"aspect"

'

auTo

(T.fiv

,

.

lc5eav,

6d.10-e.3).
Astutely and definitely, Socrates steers the focus of
definition away from reference to accepted practice and
popular belief to the more rigorous definition of
uni versals.27

Throughout

the

early

Platonic

dialogues

Socrates does not allow particular action, described
through the use of adjectives or verbs related to the
concept, to serve as definition for the concept itself, for
which he regularly uses an articular adjective.

Hor does

he take elaborated belief at face value, but often
discreetly examines its logical consequences.

Eu thyphro

of Plato"s (or Socrates') intent in using this "personal
aspect" of elenchos, and below, Chapter Four, Part Four,
for Euripides" similar practice in creating mythic personae
who exhibit fifth-century B. C. Athenian characteristics.
2 7The subtle but continual collocation of these
two realms of definition (accepted practice and popular
belief on the one hand, and uni versa ls on the other) is the
crux, I am convinced, of elenchos, and in and of itself
goes a long way towards explaining how Socrates is able to
bring about refutation, yet cannot but suggest proof.
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agrees to the rules set by Socrates, and proposes a revised
de£ini tion 0£ the universal:

"What is dear to the gods is

holy, and what is not dear to them is unholy." (6e.107a.1).
The procedure continues with Socrates asking
questions whose answers seem obvious; in effect he is
eliciting agreement to a number of secondary premises,
based both on information provided as proof by the
interlocutor in the elaboration of his original
de£inition, and on logical, commonsense interpretations of
seemingly

analogous

everyday

occurrences.28

These

secondary premises, which sometimes at first blush seem to
have little to do with the universal proposed for
28As Robinson notes, "These secondary questions
differ from the primary one in that, whereas that was a
matter of real doubt and di£ficulty, the answers to all
these seem obvious and inescapable. Socrates usually
phrases them so that the natural answer is yes; and i£ you
say anything else you are likely to seem irrational or at
least queer." (PED2, p. 7; italics added). The
italicized sections explain why it is that these secondary
premises are derived from situations which are only
seemingly analogous. The realm of belief and that of
logic, or enlightened self-interest which informs true
practicality and utility (from which Socrates analogies
are inevitably drawn) are rarely synonymous.
Nietzsche boast£ully exposes the naivete with which we
an approach explanation of belief: "Would anyone like to
take a look into the secret of how ideals are made on
earth? Who has the courage?--Very well! Here is a point
we can see through into this dark work.shop. But wait a
moment or two, Hr. Rash and Curious: your eyes must first
get used to this false iridescent light.--All right!
How
speak.! What is going on down there? Say what you see, man
of the most perilous kind of inquisi ti veness--now I am the
one Who is listening."
F. Nietzsche, The Genealogy of
Morals, in The Basic Writings of Nietzsche, transl. and ed.
W. Kaufmann (Hew York:
Random House, 1968), p. 482.
1
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de£inition,29

inevitably

show

a

de£iciency

in

the

revised de£inition, which is consequently emended.

In

guthYPhro, this part 0£ the procedure begins at 8a and
continues through the dialogue until near its end, at
l5b.7.

Socrates £irst easily obtains Euthyphro•s

agreement to his own previously alleged statement 0£
29Robinson distinguishes three -forms 0£ Socrates•
argumentation within elenchos, which depend on the attitude
o£ the interlocutor. Socrates will merely restate a
position with which the interlocutor is in agreement, and
the interlocutor does not argue at all. I£ it is perceived
as likely that the interlocutor will not agree with a
statement, Socrates• mode 0£ argumentation is adjusted to
how willing he thinks the interlocutor may be to concede
the destruction 0£ a thesis. Hore or less deception is
used in response to the interlocutor•s perceived
willingness: some £ew arguments in de£inition are £airly
direct, and labelled "epagoge" {synonymous with induction)
by Robinson; more are indirect, and called by Robinson
•syllogism."
{For his definition of these terms, see
PED2, pp. 33 and 21 respectively.)
Robinson•s
conclusions about the occurrence of various £orms of
argumentation are as £ollows: "The Socratic elenchus is
nearly always a syllogism. Hore in detail, the simple
refutations are nearly always syllogisms; and in the
complex re£utations the last and main step is nearly
always a syllogism. The probable cause of this is that an
answerer is very unlikely to grant premisses £rom which the
contradictory 0£ his thesis could be obtained by epagoge.
In epagoge the premisses even when taken separately are so
closely allied to the conclusion that we can hardly help
seeing that they go together. . . . It thus appears that
practically the only £unction of epagoge in the elenchus is
to provide some 0£ the premisses for a -final syllogism.
When an elench us is complex, as it usually is, the main
step is always a syllogism; and of the premisses for these
main steps some are admitted at once by the answerer, some
~ syllogized, and spme are obtained~ epagoge . . . .
Probably the commonest structure £or a Socratic elenchus to
have is a syllogism from two premisses one of which is
granted immediately while the other is induced. Very
common variations on this scheme are £or the uninduced
Premiss to be briefly syllogized, or for there to be three
Premisses instead of two."
Robinson, PED2, pp. 38-40
(italics added).
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common belief (5e.5-6c. 7) that the gods quarrel among
themselves.

Then, by analogy to disagreements among men,

Socrates inductively attempts to get Euthyphro to agree
that the gods would not quarrel over anything easily proven
(like mathematics, measures and weigh ts), but instead about
ethical concepts, "justice and injustice, nobility and
shamefulness, good and bad" {7d.1-2).

This inductive

argument points obviously to the refutation of Euthyphro s
1

revised definition, since the gods do not agree among
themselves about ethical concepts, one of which is
holiness.

Euthyphro, however, is as yet reluctant to

abandon his thesis, and argues that the gods really do not
so disagree, whereby Socrates resorts again to inductive
analogy to prove his point about disagreements among men,
whose more observable practice in the law courts he uses to
show that men there do not disagree about punishment per
se, but instead about whether or not a particular act is
wrong or right.

At this point Euthyphro, who undoubtedly

has witnessed such practices himself, must agree to emend
the revised primary definition, so that unholiness now is
defined as "whatever all the gods hate, and holiness is
what they all love• {9d.1-3).

But by analogy again, this

time through syllogism, to passive states and their
corresponding actions {being carried and carrying, and the
like, 10a.5 ff.), Socrates proves the emended definition
deficient,

since

the

essence

>

,

(OUOla)

of

holiness

2.0
:nas not been described, but instead something which happens
to it,

i.e.,

that

it

is

loved

by

all

the gods (Ha.6 ££.).

There follows an interlude on Euthyphro•s
consternation (see below, Part Three).

Socrates then

suggests the definition that all that is holy is just, to
which Euthyphro agrees.

But is all that is just also holy

(in Robinson's terminology, •Is X Y?>?

Led by Socrates

through another analogy (this time on £ear and reverence),
Euthyphro admits that while all that is holy is just, all
that is just is not holy, since justice, like £ear, covers
a range 0£ which holiness is only a part.

Euthyphro

proposes the definition that holiness is the part of
justice which attends to the gods (12.e.5-8).

By

syllogistic analogy to other arts of at tending
(horsemanship, h un tsmanship, etc.), Eu thyphro is made to
admit that attending aims at some good or benefit to the
thing attended, which is clearly preposterous to Euthyphro
when applied to the gods (13a-d.4).

Euthyphro then

proposes that the attention that is holiness is analogous
to the service rendered by slaves to masters.

But by

inductive analogy to other services, Eu thyphro is
encouraged to define the result of this service which,
according to him, is salvation to families and states who
have prayed and sacrificed in a way that pleases the gods.
Socrates deduces £rom this that holiness is then a science
Of asking and giving, which implies, as Euthyphro agrees,
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asking £or and giving what is needed.
need?

But what do the gods

Euthyphro asserts that we give them honor and that

which pleases them but is not beneficial.
At this point Socrates ends the questioning and
begins a syllogistical tabulation of the agreed upon
secondary premises.

It is discovered that together they

entail the re£u ta tion of the answerer s la test definition:
1

for Euthyphro this means admitting that he has come full
circle to a definition which has previously been recognized
as deficient.

The essence of holiness has eluded him

because he is confronted again and again with deficiencies
in his definition which require him to abandon one of the
following:

1) commonsense interpretation derived from his

everyday experience; 2) beliefs he holds concerning the
gods (myths about their quarrelling, the belief that Zeus
is "the best and most just," the belie£ that gods are selfsuf£icient and yet anthropomorphically analogous to humans
in at least some instances); or 3) the en tire conversation
and its discom£orting implication that his belie£s, which
he has used as justification £or his present practice, are
not in accord with what he clearly agrees is sensible.
Euthyphro, like every other exasperated interlocutor,
chooses the third option.

He rushes 0££ to his now

clearly suspect prosecution 0£ his £a ther.
Euthyphro ends with the interlocutor s admission 0£
1

ignorance, yet unwillingness to continue the procedure as
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Socrates requests.

Every definition Euthyphro proposed was

eventually acknowledged by him to be deficient or impaired.
Both Socrates and his interlocutor depart in seeming
ignorance.

Eu thyphro•s earlier self-assurance and

eagerness t.o display his knowledge have been replaced by an
urge t.o escape.
made

He has not. only been refu t.ed, he has been

uncomfort.able.30
But. how exactly has Eut.hyphro been refuted, and in

what arena?

Definition, with which our description of the

method began and which, as was asserted, informs the
procedure, points not only t.o the way in which the goal of
the method, refutation, is accomplished, but also to a more
exact description of the method itself.
that a definition may be refuted:

Consider how it is

"The most obvious way to

refute a definition is to produce a case that falls under
the definition but not under the definiend, or
contrariwise. 11 31

This

suggests

a

neatly

logical

overthrow, which is but one small part of Socrates• art of
refutation, and the least subtle part of it at that.

We

know already the genus of the definiend, for Socrates is
30 This unwillingness is a commonplace in the early
dialogues. How are we to interpret this unwillingness of
the interlocutor when put again and again beside Socrates•
enthusiastic avowal that they must continue, if we do not
say that the interlocutor has been made to feel enough
discomfort that the process has become unpleasant? For
Plato's evidence on the effect of elenchos on the
interlocutor, see below, Part Three.
31 Robinson,

PED2
-

.

p.

24.
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care:ful to di:f:ferentiate it :from any haphazard offering of
bis interlocutor:

the definiend is a

universal.

In

gutbyphro, this means an entity that is unchanging
regardless of circumstance, and, given the insistence in
argumentation on logical cohesiveness, rational.

Producing

a case which "£alls under the definition but not under the
definiend" can mean, strictly speaking, any case which in
and of itsel£ does not fit the designation of "universal"
as Socrates and his interlocutor have agreed.

This is

"refutation by citing the rules of de:finition," that aspect
0£ elenchos which requires the least subtlety and artistry.
The method of defining uni versa ls by. inductive
analogy is open to disruption by Socrates because of the
very nature of the universals as defined by him.
Definition of universals through induction implies that one
can
establish, from a number 0£ observed instances, a
general characteristic 0£ a whole class. . . .
Induction leads to de£inition because a de£inition
consists of a collection 0£ these general
characteristics, selected with certain requirements in
mind: (a) They must be essential to membership of the
class, not accidental attributes of certain
individuals within it. . . . (b) They must be
collectively sufficient to mark. off the class of
objects to be defined 'from all other classes of
objects
whatsoever.32
Socrates has access, then, in his refutation 0£ an
interlocutor's definition, to a

32 w. K.
Univ. Press,

c.

set of agreed-upon rules

Guthrie, Socrates (Hew York.:
Cambridge
hereafter Guthrie, Socrates), p. 109.

1977;

2.4
•hiCh can immediately disquali£y a speci£ic example as "not
'falling under the de£iniend," i.e., not quali£ying as a
universal.

In Euthyphro, this tactic is used at Ua.6-b.6,

and then recalled in the dialogue's syllogistic 'final
re£u ta tion,

at

15c.1-2..

Re£utation 0£ de£inition, however, also allows
producing a case that falls under the definiend, but not
under the de£inition.

The distinction between de£inition

and de£iniend, inferred from Robinson's statement, is
everywhere applicable to the early dialogues where
refutation of definition is the norm.
this distinction

indicates a

The mere £act of

sharp dichotomy33 between

definition and definiend in these dialogues which, when
explored, points to an arena of refu ta ti on beyond the
strictly logical sphere suggested by Robinson's rule for
re£u ting a de£ini tion.

What, then, are the "definitions"

33This long unrecognized dichotomy is, I believe,
the point behind Vlastos's disagreement ("Elenchus,"
especially pp. 2.9-30) with what he terms Robinson's
"invention": that "the consequence which contradicts the
thesis is drawn £rom that thesis, that is, deduced from
it.• Vlastos instead argues, "What Socrates in fact does
in any given elenchus is convict E not 0£ falsehood but 0£
being a member 0£ an inconsistent premiss-set; and to do
this is not to show that p is -false, but only that either p
is 'false or that some or all 0£ the premisses are -false." Vlastos continues by noting that Socrates never undertakes
to prove the truth of the premises: " . . . they have
entered the argument simply as propositions on which he and
the interlocutor are agreed." (p. 30).
Vlastos seems to
have misunderstood Robinson, whose designation 0£
"indirect" re£utation, the pre£erred form, does not allow
for the deduction to which Vlastos protests. See Robinson,
~2 •
pp.
23
££.
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1'hiCh are repeatedly found deficient under the agreed-upon
rules £or defining a universal?
Looking again to Eutbyphro, we £ind that the
definitions proposed by Eu thyphro take two forms:

the

obvious expression 0£ practice justified by belie£, and the
less obvious, but nonetheless insistent, reliance upon that
same justifying system 0£ beliefs.

Eu thyphro•s 'first

attempt at definition is perhaps most revealing, £or the
conflict between definiend and definition has as yet not
been forced below the surface by Socrates• insistence on
certain rules 0£ definition:

Euthyphro at 'first cites as

definition an actual practice that he has undertaken,
justified on the basis of popular beliefs he maintains he
also bolds.

All 0£ his subsequent allegations do not, at

least on their £ace, challenge that justifying system 0£
beliefs.

In fact, when any facet 0£ that system of

beliefs is offered up by Socrates as a minor premise,
Euthyphro readily agrees to the premise and re-fuses to
abandon it, even at the eventual expense of his revised
definition.

Euthyphro•s operational belie£s are thus

integral not only to the primary definition he offers; they
also form the basis of several of the premises which lead
to the overthrow 0£ his revised de£initions.

And, although

Socrates never openly at tacks Eu thyphro•s beliefs, it is
Precisely those beliefs which are overthrown by Socrates•
seeming assumption and then collocation 0£ them with
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another set of operational beliefs, subtly suggested in his
choice of analogous situations.

This system of beliefs is

clearly more logical, more consistent with enlightened
seH-interest, and yet totally foreign to Euthyphro and the
other fifth-century B. C. Greeks with whom Socrates
conversed.
rt is, then, through judicious choice of the
secondary premises that Socrates is able to refute
definitions in the second way, by producing cases which
fall under the definiend, but not under the definition.

If

the definition is in essence the interlocutor•s set 0£
operational beliefs, and the uni versa! is some as yet
unknown which must fulfill only certain rules in its
definition, the search for the definiend quickly centers on
the need £or consistency and exclusivity in definition.
The interlocutor, perhaps seduced by the need to produce
appropriately analogous cases which do not of£end the
rules of definition, is easily led a way £rom the as yet
unstated but soon-to-become manifest inconsistencies in his
system of beliefs.

The analogous cases he is inductively

led to affirm form a belief system that is clearly more
logical and consistent, albeit unwitnessed.

The secondary

Premises, then, so willingly conceded by the interlocutor,
are in fact often cases which would, upon reflection,
clearly be rejected in practice based on the belief system
Of the interlocutor (the definition), but acceptable as
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universals (the definiend), given the rigorous rules agreed
upon bY Socrates and the interlocutor for defining
universals. 34
This establishment of certain of the secondary
premises, whereby one "reaches the demonstrand without at
any time or in any way assuming the contradictory of the
demonstrand" is what Robinson terms "direct
establishment," and is a crucial counterpoint to what he
claims is the preferred method of refutation, the indirect
method, i.e., showing that "· . . the thesis entails a
consequence which is so repugnant to you that you would
rather abandon the thesis than keep it and the consequence
along

with

dictionary

it."35

For

if,

as

according

definition

of

eAf:yxw,

the

to

the

method

is

equally capable of proof as it is of refutation, it should
be asked not only what is refuted by Socrates, but whether
anything has withstood this process of cross-examination.
The emotional response to this preferred method of
argumentation, apparent in Robinson s use of "repugnant" in
1

the above quotation, supports the contention that the
341t is here that the reader familiar with the
Socrates of the early Platonic dialogues will begin to
sense the presence of the well-known "Socratic paradoxes."
See the discussion below, Part Three.
35 Robinson,
PED2,
p.
23,
i ta lies
added.
This
"indirect argument," by Robinson s count, accounts for
approximately three-quarters of the arguments in nine of
the early dialogues (both refutations and establishments 0£
Premises).
1

SF.·
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refutation involves more than simple logical overthrow of a
proposed definition, which clearly would not elicit such a
strong

emotional

response.36

The

conversation

becomes

36James Haden, •socra tic Ignorance,• in Hew Essays
on Socrates, ed. Eugene Kelly (Lantham, HD: University
Press of America, 1984; hereafter Haden, "Socratic
Ignorance"). pp. 17-28, sees the process 0£ inquiry as the
goal of elenchos, a process • . . . in which prior
assumptions and especially feelings related to those
•
assumptions are brought into the open and tested
Movement is toward "the integration 0£ 'feeling and
thought,• not 'final definition (p. 27).
Socrates•
ignorance, according to Haden, is in how to effect such an
integration. Michael Soupios• response to Haden in the
same publication, "Reason and Feeling in Pia to,• pp. 137141. does not. to my mind at least. argue persuasively
against Haden•s thesis. Soupios accuses Haden of taking an
existentialist perspective on feeling among the Greeks, and
cites two texts as evidence that the Greeks (even Socrates)
thought that 'feeling must be subordinated to reason: 1)
the Republic's theory of the tripartite soul, and 2)
Diotima•s encouragement in the Symposium to purify •crude
eroticism• (p. 140).
Soupios likewise cites Aristotle's
Politics as evidence that the Greeks believed that "[Horal
feeling] took shape only when raw human sentiment was
ordered and disciplined by reason . . . .• Soupios seems
to be confusing Socrates• early inquiries and honest
confusion about the relationship between thought and
feeling with the later solutions of Plato and Aristotle.
The failure to take account of elenchos• emotional
component is an oversight in Vlastos• fine interpretation
of elenchos. Vlastos thus must posit a •super Socrates•
whose self-confidence comes from an assurance that he can
logically overthrow any shift in argumentation the
interlocutor may make ("Elenchus,• p. 50).
See also pp. 40
and 49, where Vlastos• oversight may be the source of his
perplexity at the conviction allotted to premises that are
•1ogically unsecured,• and p. 48, where he argues that the
only means to "'compel' [an] adversary to affirm what he
denies• are "logical." Thomas c. Brick.house and Nicholas
D. Smith, "Vlastos on the Elenchus,• in Oxford Studies in
Ancient Philosophy, vol. 2. ed. Julia Annas (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1983), p. 191, argue against Vlastos but
Preserve his oversight. They do argue that elench tic
refutation sometimes requires that •true non-moral beliefs•
be brought into conjunction with •true moral beliefs•; this
~uggests, but does not make explicit, the attempt to
integrate feeling (moral beliefs) and thought (non-moral
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repugnant to Euthyphro because Socrates

1

art in elenchos is

the astute collocation 0£ two separate worlds, the world 0£
the interlocutor's practice and belie£, one in which the
interlocutor has an emotional investment, with the world
£rom socrates

1

analogies, a

world where consistency, logic,

and enlightened self-interest prevail.

The collocation is

astute precisely because it is never made clear until the
£inal moments:

the world of Eu thyphro s practice and
1

belief is assumed in the indirect refutation, and yet never
openly contradicted in either the direct or the indirect
beliefs). Nonetheless Brick.house and Smith cannot imagine
on the basis of what Vlastos Socrates came to believe that
his own moral views were consistent (p. 193), since no
logic can argue for their consistency.
The oversight continues in Richard Kraut, •comments on
Gregory Vlastos, 'The Socratic Elench us,... in Ox£ord
Studies in Ancient Philosophy, vol. 1, ed. Julia Annas
(Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1983; hereafter X:ra u t,
•comments"), pp. 62-67. Al though X:ra u t argues that not
being able to give a reason for everything one believes
does not deprive one of proo£ (p. 62) and describes
Socrates as using premises that are •psychologically
compelling• (p. 66) and as assuming that interlocutors have
•a certain amount of psychological and moral fixity• (p.
67), he nonetheless does not make the leap to describing
the interlocutor s dilemma as partly emotional. See,
however, as an example of someone who does make this leap,
l'.:ahn, "Gorgias, • p. 106, who describes Callicles defeat as
in part due to •moral emotion•: "Why cannot Callicles be a
consistent hedonist?
First of all, because of his
aristocratic pride and his moral contempt for actions and
persons that he regards as vulgar, disgusting, and
unmanly.•
Vlastos response to Kraut, "A£terthoughts on the
Socratic Elenchus,• in Oxford Studies in Ancient
Philosophy, vol. 1, ed. Julia Annas (Oxford:
Clarendon
Press, 1983), p. 73, does begin to speak. of premises that
for interlocutors are •well-entrenched" in their systems of
beliefs, and Socrates as having "moral intuitions."
Vlastos does not, however, seem to sense the emotional
subtext of his own use of •entrenchment" and "intuition.•
1

1

1

1
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establishment of the secondary premises.
Plato indicates his awareness of the potency of this
collocation in a

late dialogue, Sophist.

By

way of

differentiating elenchos from another type of education,
Plato has a "stranger" explain elenchos in broad outline:
. . . some men appear to have reached the conclusion
that all ignorance is involuntary, and that no one
will ever learn anything if he thinks he is already a
wise man in that respect, and that the admonitory form
of education involves great labour and achieves little
result. . . . So they aim at the removal of this
opinion by another means. . . . They question a man on
those matters where he thinks he is saying something
although he is really saying nothing. And as he is
confused they easily convict his opinions,~
bringing them together and putting them side by side
[auvayoVTES
T075
AoyOlS
E~S
Ta~TOV
, 6~
Tl0£aal 11ap> aAA'l')AasJ, and thus showing that
they are contrary to each other at the same time in
the same respect about the same things. {Sophist

.

.

230a.5-b.8)37

The effect of this refutation by collocation is
betrayed

in

the

Epic

definition

"disgrace," "put to shame."

)

of

.

to

EAEYXElV,

Socratic elenchos derives the

potency of its refutation from the fact that it confronts
not only the logical basis of beliefs, but the believer s
1

emotional investment as well.

There is disgrace in

publicly abandoning the system of beliefs that has guided
1

one s actions, in admit ting that one s en tire basis for
1

decision-making has been faulty--which would of course
necessitate a drastic change in the conduct of one s
1

37 The

translation
is
Robinson s,
The italics and Greek. are added.
1

PED2
- '

p.

12.
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life,38 but who would choose instead to deny that which
is clearly sensible?
least queer"?

Who wants to appear "irrational or at

Who but Socrates could consistently apply to

his own life the rigorous moral standards implicit in the
proposed analogies?

For it is these standards that alone

survive, and they survive the rules 0£ de£inition, the
reluctance 0£ the interlocutor, and the relentless scrutiny
o£ socra tes.

The only thing they do not survive is

translation into the world 0£ men, where consistency and
enlightened self-interest are not the sole informers of
action.

38Tolstoy perhaps best indicates the reason for
the reluctance to abandon a belief: "I know that most men,
including those at ease with problems of the greatest
complexity, can seldom accept even the simplest and most
obvious truth if it be such as would oblige them to admit
the falsity o"f the conclusions which they have delighted in
explaining to colleagues, which they have proudly taught to
others, and which they have woven, thread by thread, in to
the fabric of their lives.• Quoted by the physicist Joseph
Ford, in James Gleick, Chaos (Kew York: Penguin Books,
1987), p. 38.
Ernest Becker, following Otto Rank, describes the
defeat of beliefs as a sort 0£ death. "'Every conflict
over truth is in the last analysis just the same old
struggle over . . . immortality." If anyone doubts this.
let him try to explain in any other way the life-and-death
viciousness of all ideological disputes.
Each person
nourishes his immortality in the ideology of selfperpetuation to which he gives his allegiance; this gives
his life the only abiding significance it can have. Ho
wonder men go into a rage over fine points of belie£: if
your adversary wins the argument about truth. you die.
Your immortality system has been shown to be 'fallible, your
life becomes fallible."
Ernest Becker, Escape from Evil
(Hew York:
Macmillan, 1975), p. 64, quoting Otto Rank,
Psychology and the Soul (Hew York: Perpetua Books edition,
1961), p. 87.
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In summary, then, the procedure 0£ elenchos in the
earlY Platonic dialogues consists 0£

these essentials:

1)

the intent to define, whether expressed through explicit
primary questions or a persistent emphasis on definition;
2 ) establishing the rules of definition:

differentiating

between a universal, an entity that is consistent and never
changing, and a mere list 0£ particular instances; 3) a
primary attempt to de£ine by explicit citation 0£
particular instance 0£ common practice o£ten justi£ied by
personal and popular belief; 4) rejection of the primary
definition by reference to the agreed upon rules of
definition; 5) subsequent attempts to define which,
al though they do not explicitly cite particular instances,
revea139

the

interlocu tor"s

reliance

on

the

system 0£

beliefs used to justi£y the primary definition; 6)
argumentation, whose essence is the subtle collocation 0£
the interlocutor•s persevering belie£ system with another
system 0£ belie£s, consistent and rational, with which the
interlocutor agrees because establishment is accomplished
either by re£erence to particular instances which are
seemingly analogous and appeal to what could be termed

3 9This revelation is apparent 1) in the
interlocutor's persistent willingness to acknowledge
certain statements assumed by Socrates in his argumentation
and 2) in the interlocutor"s unwillingness to abandon
certain unstated but manifest beliefs regardless of the
consequence of their espousal to his proposed de£inition.
?n "overt/explicit" vs. •covert/tacit" belie£s 0£ the
interlocutor, see Vlastos, "Elenchus," p. 51.
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•common sense,• or by eliciting agreement to positions
which appear unrelated to the interlocutor's tenets 0£
belie£; 7) £inal re£utation:

the synthetic breakdown 0£

the interlocutor's position achieved by Socrates•
syUogistically re-evoking the two systems 0£ belie£s
embodied in the interlocutor•s ready assumptions on the one
hand, and the premises painstakingly established in
argumentation on the other; 8) agreement by both parties
that they are at a loss and need to start all over again;
9) reluctance 0£ the interlocutor to continue elenchos, a
reluctance perhaps attributable to the shame he £eels at a)
his original profession 0£ knowledge become mani£est
ignorance and b) the dawning recognition that there exists
a system 0£ belie£s which, al though it has not been re£u ted
and is clearly pre£erable to his own, would require that
the interlocutor change his whole operational belie£
system, and thus his way 0£ li£e; 10) continuation 0£ the
status quo, with the interlocutor returning to life as he
has always conducted it, albeit with a new sense 0£
uneasiness.
The procedure may be broadly described, then, as
indirect re£utation of definition become blatant
refutation 0£ the interlocutor's belief system, and
establishment 0£ premises become intimation of a system of
beliefs which would withstand another round of elenchos.
The terminus of elenchos, refutation combined with implied
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proof, simultaneous blatant overthrow of one belief system
and implied establishment of another, perhaps suggests a
method whose aspirations do not extend beyond the narrow
boundaries 0£ winning.
elenchos

1

dispel,40

Nevertheless, this impression of

aim is one which Plato was careful to
for

it seems

he was aware

of the

potential

for misinterpreting the aim of elenchos, especially given
the distinctive character it acquired from its
practitioner, Socrates.

40 Plato designated to eristic, rather than to
elenchos or to his own dialectic, the aim of winning. See
Sophist 225 and Robinson s discussion of Pla to s seeming
defensiveness about the distinction between dialectic,
eristic, and antilogic (PED2, pp. 84-88).
On the
distinction, see also G. B. Kerferd, The Sophistic Hovemen t
(Cambridge:
Cambridge Univ. Press, 1981; herea£ter
Kerferd, Sophistic Movement), pp. 59-67.
1

1

!l'F

Part Three:

The Socratic Character of Elenchos

Analysis 0£ the Socratic character 0£ elenchos
requires a definition of its preliminary aims (reversal,
recognition, and ka tharsis) and description of their
effects as well as a consideration of its tone in relation
to its distinctive subject matter.

Plato's discussions 0£

the method in the middle and late dialogues will serve not
only to complete the description of elenchos in the early
dialogues, but also to in£orm a final consider a ti on of
elenchos in Part Four, o:f its ultimate aim of moral
improvement and the sense o:f tragedy produced by its lack
of success in achieving this aim.

Elenchos' Preliminary Aims and Their E££ects
Plato sees elenchos" ultimate aim as the moral
improvement o:f the soul which is realized through a series
of preliminary steps:

1) the interlocutor must undergo a

reversal, which is usually termed by the interlocutor
aporia, con:fusion; 2) he must recognize his ignorance; 3)
he will have one or more reactions to this recogni tion--he
Will feel either shame or wonder; 4) he must be "purged" o:f
his former opinions; and 5) the truth must be brought to
birth.41

At

this

4 1Ky use
"reversal" and
terms 'from the
study, justified

point

the

ultimate

aim

of

elenchos,

certain English words {e.g.,
"recognition"), suggestive o:f Aristotelian
Poetics, were, in an earlier version 0£ this
not only on the basis of a commonsense

0£
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the moral improvement 0£ the soul, -finally becomes
possible.
It is the re£utation 0£ the interlocutor•s
de£initions (and thus his belief system) that serves to
e££ect the -first two aims 0£ elenchos:

the interlocutor

goes £rom being one who claims to know something to one who
cannot help but admit that he does not know.

Euthyphro,

for example, begins his discussion with Socrates with the
boast that he has exact knowledge about holiness (5a.1-2),
but is so "reversed" by the dialogue•s close that he can do
no more than -feebly agree with Socrates" allegation that

interpretation 0£ the text 0£ Plato, but also by a
comparison 0£ that interpretation with the words peripeteia
and anagnorisis as they are used in Aristotle. Robinson,
who uses the words as well but nowhere connects them to
Aristot1e•s terminology, serves as an observer 0£ the
method whose interpretations cannot be said to be
conveniently prejudicial to terms £rom the text of
Aristotle.
Robinson's one word descriptions 0£ a process
are presumably Justi£ied on the basis 0£ one 0£ his study•s
assumptions, i.e., that "the history of human thought is
'evolutionist/" and that that evolution is detected in
part £rom the £act that "to possess a single name £or an
idea is a later stage than to be able to express it only in
a sentence" (Robinson, PED2, pp. vi and 5).
Havelock
supports such assumptionsas these in his writings on the
effects of the advent of literacy, whereby narrative
description 0£ agents acting is replaced by the use of
impersonals £or the agents, and only later becomes
analytic, i.e., more abstract.
See Havelock, "Orality,"
pp, 72-75. The £act that we do have in Plato one of the
Aristotelian terms, namely katharsis, should not
nevertheless lead us a way £rom a careful analysis 0£ the
term in both texts, which is the only way that a credible
claim of comparable usage can be made. The dangers of
declaring the correlation 0£ ideas solely on the basis of a
linguistic observation that the same words recur in two
texts are clearly outlined by o•Brien, Paradoxes, pp. 39-53
:e_assim.
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tbeY were either wrong in their -former argumentation or are
•rong now.
12).

In either case, they must begin again (15c.8-

And while Euthyphro is pondering the implications 0£

being wrong in their 'former argumentation where some things
he took. as givens without argumentation (his own belie£
system) and other things he agreed to a£ter having been led
through argumentation to logical conclusions he cannot now
easily disavow, Socrates indulges in what has been called
irony.42

He

recalls

Euthyphro s
1

earlier

confidence

in

his k.nowledge, alludes to the consequences this confidence
has on Euthyphro s current lawsuit, and begs Euthyphro,
1

who Socrates assumes is still every bit as knowledgeable,
to continue their conversation.

This wrenching

counterpoint to his dawning realization 0£ how untenable
are his positions is too much £or poor Euthyphro:
has he been thoroughly trounced, but Socrates

1

not only

con£idence

in the "all-knowing" Euthyphro mak.es the Euthyphro, who now
obviously does not k.now, £eel shame that he was first
"drawn into a parade 0£ knowledge," and then su££ered a
"violent

reversal

claiming

the

0£

press

the

of

situation. 11 43

unspecified

'll'Ot.,

,
Kat.

1-L Ot.

Cl

>

,

a 11't.£vat.,

>

(£t.S

'
yap

o1teuch>

Euthyphro

15e.2-3).

V\1V

wpa

escapes,

commitments

,
TOt.VUV,

He

42 r do not agree with Robinson and many others
that Socrates• "irony" is a sham. See the discussion
below, Part Three, second section.
43 Robinson,

PED2
- ,

p.

18.
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This interlocutor's sudden eager desire to escape,
accompanied as it is by excuses which are vague and thus
suspicious-sounding, can perhaps alone be used to defend
Robinson's description of such an experience as a •violent
reversal,• although Plato himself nowhere describes it so
In Plato's

succinctly·

text, interlocutors describe their

own experience and term it aporia.

Can their subjective

perception be brought into consonance with Robinson's more
objective perspective on their experience, which leads him
to designate it a

•reversal•?

Plato's text suggests the

validity o:f this interpretation, for even as the
interlocutors

proclaim

their

confusion,44

they

profess

the sudden and total reversal of their circumstances.
The reversal is apparent when one contrasts, for
example, Heno•s initial bravado--his incredulity that
Socrates does not know what arete is (Meno 71b.8-c.1) and
his claim that, for him, defining arete is no problem

(a AA'

>

OU

xaAevov,

>
"'
eL'lfeLV,

Meno 71e.1)--with his later report of the •1oss of way• he
is experiencing and how he describes it:

4 'lHenry Teloh, •The Importance of the
Interlocutors• Characters in Plato•s Early Dialogues,• in
Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient
Philosophy, Vol. 2, ed. John J. Cleary (Lanham, HD:
University Press of America, Inc., 1987; hereafter Teloh,
•Interlocutors• Characters•>. p. 32, argues that the
confusion visited upon Euthyphro is evidence of Socrates•
use of ad hominem arguments in elenchos: •Eu thyphro .is a
dogmatist, and it makes good educational sense to confuse a
dogmatist.•

,,
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Socrates, I heard before I met you that you never do
anyt~ing but puz~le yol1rself a!ld oth~rs to~
(<XU!OS. >
TE:,..
alfopE:lS
KQl
TOUS
a).).ous
11'0L£L5. avop£Lv]; and now it seems to me that
you are bewitching and drugging and completely
spellbinding me,
that I hay-e be~ome ,saturated with
puzzlement
[WOT£
µ.eoTov
avopLas
yeyovE:val].
In fact, i f I may make a little joke,
you are absolutely like the broad electric ray of the
sea, both in appearance and otherwise. That fish
benumbs anyone who comes near and touches it, and that
is what you seem to have done to me now; for really I
am numb in mind and, mouth, and I do not know how ...--to
answer
you
[ouK
exw
oTL
alfoKpLvwµ.aL
om].
Yet I have discoursed on virtue thousands of
times and to many people; and done it well too, as I
thought at t1!e time._ But now I cannot even~ what
it
is
[vuv
6e
OTL
eoTL v
To
, " ou6> (Meno
vapavav
exw
t:l1f£LV].
79e.7-

;:o

~

~

8 0 b . 4 ) 45

A man who has travelled the humbling road 'from confident
self-assurance to the doubt and insecurity expressed here
may perhaps be excused for attributing his condition to
magical expertise practiced against him, or to the narcotic
e'ffect of some aquatic creature he has haplessly
encountered; but the vividness of the similes that express
the profundity of his confusion suggests not merely that
source which is common to all confusion--disloca tion (which
even his use of the term aporia concedes).

Meno has not

only "lost his way"; he feels bewitched and benumbed
because, like the sleeper who suffers a similar depth of
confusion upon finding darkness when expecting light or
vice versa, Meno finds himself in a place where before he

45 Guoted
9-10.

and translated by Robinson,
The italics and Greek. are added.

PED2,

pp.

40
adamantly

was

not.46

And

since

his

former

location

is

the exact opposite of his previous one, may we not say,
along with Robinson. that he has undergone "violent
reversal"?
Socrates affirms this interpretation.

In response to

Meno•s comparison of him to the electric ray, Socrates
continues the simile and clari£ies its implications for
Meno•s present state:
pro-found degree.

Meno has, indeed, lost his way to a

He is in £act now in the position 0£

Socrates, a position so recently the subject 0£ Heno•s own
incredulity:

Meno, who previously knew, now knows not.

As

Socrates describes it, Meno has su£fered what is tantamount
to

total

reversa~

As £or me, if the electric ray is itself benumbed and
thus also numbs others, I am like it, but not
otherwise. For it is not that I, who know the way,
'
>
'""'
ca use
others
to
become lost (ou>
yap
e:u11opwv
>
'
'
,,
>
"'
aUTOS
TOUS
a>.>.ous
1f0l.W
avop£l.V),
but
rather that I am more at a loss than anyone, and in
>
'
this way also cause others to be lost (a>.>.a
ll'aVTOS
µ.a>.>.ov
a~TOS
a1fopwv
OUTWS
KaL
'
,,
......
>
......
Tous
a>.>.ous
vo1.w
avope:1.v).
Even
now
I
myself do not know what arete is; whereas you, who
perhaps (Laws) knew be-fore you came in con tact
with me, now however likewise do not know. (Meno
80c.6-d.3)
46Jacqueline de Romilly, Magic and Rhetoric in
Ancient Greece (Cambridge, HA: Harvard Univ. Press, 1975;
hereafter de Romilly, Hagie), pp. 36-37, asserts that
"[Interlocutors] do not understand what happens to them,
but we do: they are just con£ron ted with unyielding logic.
· · . Socrates" magic rests on the obstinate destruction 0£
au illusions.
It is the magic of implacable truth; and
certainly it is not just by chance that those who describe
that magic spell 0£ Socrates are young men or laymen,. not
used to thorough reasoning, men such as Meno and
Alcibiades."
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socra tes hedges here on Keno s knowledge prior to
1

~enchos

(he "perhaps knew before"), but later deems the

condition of the interlocutor prior to elenchos more
e:x:plici Uy ignorance in reference to the boy who is
subsequently examined.

The simile of the electric ray is

continued by Socrates, who describes the boy s progress
1

after reversal as a kind of recognition:
At 'first he 'falsely thought he knew . . . and
answered confidently as if he knew, and did not feel
at a loss; whereas now, though he knows no more than
he did before, he does at least £eel at a loss, and no
longer thinks he knows. . . . Then did we do him any
harm in puzzling him and numbing him like the electric
ray? --I think not. --At least it seems that we have
made him more likely to £ind out the truth. For now
he will be glad to search £or it because he knows he
does not know it, whereas formerly he might easily
have supposed on many occasions that he was talking
sense . . . . And do you think he would ever have
tried to discover the truth, or to learn what he
thought he knew though he did not, i£ he had not
'fallen into puzzlement and come to believe that he did
not know and desired to know? --I do not think so,
Socrates. --Then he was benefited by being numbed?
--I think so.
(Meno 84-a.3-c.9)47
This lengthy text has been quoted not only be ca use it
again illustrates the first aim of the method, the reversal
caused by elenchos, in combination with the second aim, a
recognition of ignorance, but likewise because it is an
important witness to the fourth aim, the birth of the
truth.

After considering this passage, Robinson concludes,

The elenchus changes ignorant men from the state of
falsely supposing that they know to the state of
recognizing that they do not know; and this is an

u.

47 Quoted and translated
The i ta lies are added.

by

Robinson,

PE!D2,

p.

'l-2
important step along the road to knowledge, because
the recognition that we do not know at once arouses
the" desire to know, and thus supplies the motive that
lacking before. Philosophy begins in wonder, and
the assertion here made is that elenchus supplies the
wonder . . . . Elenchus is thus a method of teaching,
of instilling intellectual knowledge in other
persons·.
It does not, however, actually increase
knowledge, but only prepares the ground for it.'l-8

was

Plato

could,

according

to

Robinson,49

justify

the

•violent reversal• caused by elenchos because the
recognition resulting from it is a necessary precursor to
attaining knowledge.
Refutation does not, however, extend its effect in an
uninterrupted line through reversal and recognition to
katharsis and the birth of truth.

At the point of

recognition there is a pa use for reflection and the
interlocutor responds in one of two ways--he either
experiences a sense 0£ wonder or he £eels shame.
Robinson's above assertion that •philosophy begins in
wonder• is a translation from Theaetet us, where Socrates
declares that Theaetet us

1

wonder at the topic under

discussion is evidence of his nature--Theaetetus, according
to Socrates, is a

true philosopher:

By the Gods, Socrates, I am in wonder (8auµ.atw)
about what these things are, and sometimes when I
consider them I truly feel dizzy (aKo'TocSlVlW).
--It appears, my friend, that Theodoros rightly
divined your nature. For this experience of wonder
('To
aauµ.atelv)
is
truly
that
0£
the
Philosopher. There is not any other beginning 0£
'l- 8 Robinson,
4 9Robinson,

PED2
-

.

PED2
-

pp.

.

p.

11-12,
18.

italics

added.
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philosophy than this
Theaetetus

1

. . . (Theaetetus 155c.8-d.4)

sense 0£ wonder, an expression 0£ doubt,

Dlar:K.s him as Socrates

1

spiritual twin as surely as his snub

nose and protruding eyes (Theaetetus 143e) mark his
physical resemblance to the man.

Socrates, Pla to s
1

paradigm 0£ the true philosopher, is shown both expressing
and engendering doubt, wonder, and amazement throughout the
dialogues.

The allegations 0£ his interlocutors cause

Socrates to wonder:
taught?

What is a sophist?

Can virtue be

Are all the virtues part 0£ a whole or separate

entities? (Protagoras 312c; 326e; 329c); Why

would Gorgias

pride himsel£ in teaching persuasion when clearly the
persuasive are the more ignorant? (Gorgias 458e); Can
injustice really be in the same class as virtue and
wisdom? (Republic 1.348e); Is there no such thing as a
£alsehood? (Eu thydemus 286b-c); Why would Protagoras
allege that "man is the measure 0£ all things"? (Theaeteus
161b-c).

Socrates likewise £inds his

•amazing":

interlocutors

Polus and Callicles are causes 0£ wonder to him

(Gorgias 470a; 489d), as are the sophists and their bread th
of knowledge {Eu thydemus 2.71c and 2.88b), or even
Thrasymachus as he perspires pro£usely upon agreeing with
Socrates

1

argumentation (Republic 1. 350d).

Socrates

1

Of elenchos is likewise a cause 0£ wonder, not only to
himself {Gorgias 496a-b and Theaetetus 150d), but to
others (Theaetetus at Theaetetus 157d and 193d;

art
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'l'hrasymach us at Republic 1.337 c; his prosecutors at
Apology t7a; Cebes at Phaedo 95a; Euthyphro, who should

-

ratner wonder at his own abilities to "make arguments walk.
aboU t," at Eu thyphro 15b; Alcibiades, who compares his
abilities with words to the wonders 0£ £lute players like
Karsyas at Symposium 215b).
wondrous:

Finally, Socrates himseH is

to Cri to, who is amazed at his peace£ul slumber

(Cri to 43b); to Alcibiades, who is in a we 0£ his true inner
beauty and abilities to endure cold and strong drink. and
who calls him a "marvellous wonder" (Symposium 217a, 220a,
and 219b-c); to those who witnessed him lost in thought
£rom dusk.

until

dawn

(Symposium

220b).50

50citations 0£ words with the root 9auµa- in
the Platonic corpus, £rom which all 0£ the above testimonia
are drawn, provide by their sheer number a vertigoproducing experience £or one attempting to categorize the
evidence they a££ord. I count over two hundred and £i£ty
citations, £or which see Friederich Ast, Lexicon Platonicum
sive Vocum Platonicarum Index, vol. 2 (Bonn: Rudol£
Habelt,
1956),
under
eauµa,
eauµatw.
eauµaal05,
8auµaaT05,
8auµaTo11'o&.La,
8auµaT011'0&.&.Ko5,
8auµaTovo1.os,
eauµaToupy~a.
and
aauµaToupyw.
I
am indepted to Stephen Halliwell's discussion 0£ wonder in
his Aristotle s Poetics (Chapel Hill:
Univ. 0£ Horth
Carolina Press, 1986; herea£ter Halliwell, Poetics), pp.
74-76, £or the impetus 0£ this discussion, but cannot here
undertake the closer study he rightly suggests this topic
in Aristotle and Plato deserves. A preliminary examination
0£ evidence £rom the early and middle dialogues indicates
that Socrates, not surprisingly, more consistently than his
interlocutors expresses wonder, while his interlocutors see
him as o£ten as his statements or the progression 0£ the
discussion as a cause 0£ wonder. It is not uncommon £or
interlocutors to attribute the several ef£ects 0£ elenchos
to the person 0£ Socrates rather than to his method.
The inability to separate the speak.er £rom what is
spoken is, according to Havelock., "Orality," p. 76, a
h~llmark. of the preliterate. For the allegation that a
kinship between knower and object known is an essential
1
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wonder,

-ro

in

aau1-Latetv,

the

sense

0£

doubt,

felt so consistently by Socrates, by his spiritual twin
'l'heaetetus, and sometimes by other interlocutors, is in
thiS sense the -first positive step beyond the loss-0£-way,
the aporia regularly experienced by Socrates' respondents
in the early dialogues.

Protagoras, at Protagoras 326e,

nearly equates the two experiences when he asks "· . . do
you

wonder, Socrates, and

.

ii::at

'l'o

,

,..

a1fOP€l5.)

aau1-Latetv

in

are

whether

its

sense

you

virtue
as

at a
can

doubt,

loss {9au1.1atets.
be

the

taught?"
doubt

0£

the true philosophers, Socrates and Theaetetus, however,
has in it a willingness to go 'forward with elenchos,
whereas, as has been shown, the recognition of ignorance
termed aporia by the interlocutors in the early dialogues
regularly produces in them a desire to escape rather than
to continue.

How are we to account £or this unwillingness

to continue elenchos?
Thea tet us' sense 0£ vertigo, which he proclaims
accompanies his wonder, provides a clue.

Vertigo is

produced when one sees things move that normally one
perceives to be stationary.

As every child who has turned

round and round to experience dizziness knows, such a
sensation can be invigorating to one who enjoys it.

Prerequisite £or the success of elenchos, see Kenneth
Seeskin, Dialogue and Discovery {Albany: State Univ. 0£
:ew York. Press, 1987; herea£ter Seeskin, Dialogue), pp. 41
'f. and passim.
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'fheaetetus, who has experienced the movement caused by the
progression of elenchos, the necessity of discarding
assumptions he formerly perceived as fixed, is so
tnvigora ted.

He, like the child who no sooner recovers

stasis than he turns himself round and round again, wants
to continue.
vertigo, however, is not so pleasant for one who is
discomfited by movement.

In elenchos, this means one who

is unwilling to discard his assumptions because of his
investment in them as validators of his actions.

Such a

man is Eu thyphro. 51 Eu thyphro senses the movement of
the argument:

•

. somehow our propositions walk about;

no matter where we put them they do not want to stay."
(Euthyphro Ub.7-8).

Euthyphro is eager to assign

responsibility for this movement to Socrates, or rather to
some magical ability he imagines Socrates possesses.
Thrice Socrates denies the comparison of himself to
Daedalus, who could make seemingly fixed objects, statues,
move about (twice at Euthyphro Ub.9-e.1; once again at the
dialogue' s

closing,

15b. 7-c.3).

It

is

not

himself,

Socrates undauntedly claims, but Euthyphro who is the
Daedalus, for the propositions are not Socrates'
inventions, but Euthyphro's.

51 And the vast
according
to Vlastos
.
carried . . . kicking
that contradicts the

.

.

And like Proteus, the master

majority of interlocutors who,
"Elench us,• p. 29, have to be
and screaming• to the conseqence
thesis.
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quick-change artist, Euthyphro must be detained until he,
who knows the truth, will tell (Euthyphro 15d.1-4).

charges, like Eu thyphro's, that Socrates makes use 0£
some sort 0£ magical ability are not hard to £ind in the
dialogues.52

It

accused the man:
spellbind

me"

will

be

remembered

that

Meno

similarly

"you bewitch and drug and absolutely
(YO'fJT€U£LS

aTt:XVWS

Meno

.

KQL

80a.2-3).

.

KQL
Likewise,

Alcibiades in Symposium (215a.4 ££.) attributes to Socrates

a quasi-magical ability.

Socrates' words,

Alcibiades

claims, are more the cause 0£ wonder than the £lute-playing
of Marsyas, and like the Sirens, Socrates could have
transfixed Alcibiades at his -feet, had Alcibiades not £led.
Alcibiades then gives a first-person account 0£ one who,
like Euthyphro, has fled.

In this account he reveals why

interlocutors like Euthyphro, intolerant of the movement
they perceive occurring in elenchos, choose first to accuse

52p1a to is care£ul to distinguish Socrates'
wondrous abilities from those 0£ the average enchanter.
The sophist is a "wonder-worker" (8au11aT01foLLKOS, see
Sophist 224a and 268d; c£. 9au11aT01fOLWS at 235b), and
the tragic poet is "wondrous" (9aup.aaTit, Gorgias
502b), but the e££ect 0£ their word-juggling ends with the
mere production 0£ amazement and pleasure respectively.
Socrates' wondrous ability with words, on the other hand,
is ostensibly able to lead the interlocutor, by the agency
0 £ shame, through katharsis to the birth 0£ truth and,
Ultimately, to moral improvement. For Socrates as the
•counter-magician" and physician, who uses both the
emotions and puri£ying powers 0£ elenchos to ef£ect his
Positive aims, see Elizabeth Bel£iore, "Elenchus, Epode,
and Magic:
Socrates as Silenus," Phoenix 34 (1980), pp.

128-137.
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socrates of bewitchment and then to flee.
The testimony of Alcibiades in Symposium supports the
claim that a sense of shame in the interlocutor, derived
from an unwillingness to alter the beliefs he holds as
verifiers o:f his actions, causes his accusations of
bewitchment, which now begin to ring false, and then his
flight.

After his description of the magical abilities of

socra tes, Alcibiades describes his own sense of shame,
which he claims comes upon him when he is faced with things
to which he has formerly agreed:
I have experienced at the hands 0£ this man alone
that of which
no > one would imagine me capable--being
o
shamed
(To
at.axuvea9at.)
by
anyone;
I
:feel
>
shame (at.axuvoµ.at.)
before him alone.
For I
know well that I am not able to answer his arguments
that I, who whenever I depart am seduced by the esteem
of the masses, must do as he bids. So I skulk away
like a runaway slave and £lee him, and then when I see
him, I :feel shame
at the agreements
to which
we'd
,
,
'
c
,
come
(at.axuvoµ.at.
Ta
wµ.oAoy'f)µ.eva).
(Symposium 216a.8-b.6)
I

I

The shame that Alcibiades £eels results from being
confronted with the disparity between beliefs whose
validity

he

has

a vowed

(Ta

C

I

wµ.oAoy'f)µ.eva)

in

conversation with Socrates on the one hand, and the acts he
nonetheless

continues

to

perform

on

the

other.53 He

attributes his desire to £lee the presence of Socrates to
this shame.

We can now with more assurance assert that

53 see Teloh, "Interlocutors' Characters," p. 34:
•shame occurs when an interlocutor admits that he is wrong,
~r When he concedes some element 0£ morality.
I£ an
~terlocutor cannot be shamed, then Socrates cannot refute

h im."
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guthYPhro•s £light is motivated by a similar sense 0£
shame.

Eu thyphro hesitates to express his shame, £or he,

unlike Alcibiades, is neither drunk nor in the sympathetic
company 0£ those who have su££ered similarly at the hands
of

socra tes

(Symposium

217 e.1-218b. 7).

For Euthyphro, then, it is £air to assume that it is
less shame£ul £or him to say "I am lost• than to admit "I
am totally wrong, whereas I previously thought I was right.
Hy actions are based on belie£s which I now see are

contradictory."

This interpretation seems especially valid

when one recalls how, just be£ ore Eu thyphro £lees, Socrates
reminds him in no uncertain terms of the connection bet ween
his knowledge and his actions:
1£ you had not clearly known what holiness and
unholiness were, surely you would not have ventured
£or the sake 0£ a servant to prosecute your aged
£ather £or murder. You would have feared to risk
angering the gods, lest you were acting, incorrectly,
,
and you would have felt shame (!IOXuv9"1S)
be£ore men. (Euthyphro 15d.4-8)
It seems clear that Socrates here pinpoints the source 0£
the shame that makes Euthyphro, who now realizes he in £act
does not know, suddenly remember some urgent, unspecified
commitment.

Better to leave than to stay and witness the

complete demise of his validating system of beliefs.
According to Plato, however, the shame is necessary,
for it is shame, combined with refutation, that will ef£ect
katharsis 0£ opinions which are the reluctant soul's
impediment to £uture learning.

Robinson cites a large
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section 0£ the late Sophist, where elenchos is -first
described in broad outline and then compared to medical
purging:
For just as the physicians 0£ the body believe that
the body cannot bene£it £rom the nourishment it
receives until the internal hindrances are removed, so
do those who perform this puri£ication believe about
the soul. She cannot pro£it £rom the knowledge
of£ered her, until the elenchus is applied and the man
is refuted and brought to shame ['ll'PLV
~AE:yxwv
1'l5.
1'0V
~Aeyxoµ.EVOV
ds.
aioxuv•riv Ka1'ao1'.ftoas.J, thus puri£ying him from
opi~ions that, hinger learJ?ing [1'a,s. ,.~»l's.
µ.a9'fllJ.aOlV
€1J.1l'Ochous.
doi;aS.
Ei;£Awv,
Ka9apOV Q1fOcpTJV~] and causing him to think. he
knows only what he does know and not more. . . . For
all these reasons, Theaetetus, we must say that
elenchus is the greatest and most sovereign of the
puri£ications [Ka9apoewv]; and the man who has
not been subjected to it . . . must be regarded by us
as
su£fering
£rom the greatest impurities
,
,
>I
[aKa9ap1'ov ov1'a],
and
as
uneducated
and base
>
>
[a1fal6Eu1'ov
1'E
Kal
aloxpov]
in
the
respects in which the truly happy man ought to be
purest and noblest [Ka9apwTa1'ov K«L
KCcAAlo1'ov].
(Sophist
230c.4-e.3)54-

av

I

I

'

But katharsis, the result of shame caused by the
recognition of the reversal of refutation, is still not,
according to Plato, the ultimate aim of elenchos.
E:atharsis is conducted for a purpose:

so that the soul can

•profit from the knowledge offered her"; the newly learned

5 4-Robinson,
PED2,
pp.
12-13.
The
transl a ti on
is Robinson's, italics and Greek. are added. For the base
meaning 0£ katharsis as "clari£ication" (from which the
religious "puri£ication" and the medical "purgation" are
derived) in Aristotle's Poetics, see Leon Golden,
•catharsis," TAPA 93 (1962), pp. 51-60; "The Clari£ication
Theory 0£ Ka tharsis," Hermes 104 (1976), pp. 4-37-4-52;
•x:atharsis as Clari£ication: An Objection Answered,". CQ 23
~973), pp. 4-5-4-6.
Golden's theory is criticized by
aUiweu, Poetics, pp. 354-355.
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Dian iS ostensibly transformed from being "uneducated and
}>ase• to •purest and noblest."

A-fter citing Apology for

evidence concerning the method's ultimate aim of moral
181

provement, where Socrates proclaims the method's purpose

is, •to shame5 5

people

into

putting

first

things

first,

and that the first thing is the virtue of the soul" and
• . . . to put men to shame for living wrongly" {29d-30b

2 assim), Robinson concludes:
The Apology, like the Meno and the Sophist, regards
elenchus as a way of convincing men that they are
ignorant of things they thought they knew; but it
places this procedure in a strongly moral and
religious setting of which the other two works show
little trace.
It tells us that the elenchus arose out
of a divine oracle, and that Socrates continued it
because he felt divinely commanded to do so. It
represents the ultimate aim of the elenchus not as
intellectual education but as moral improvement. Its
purpose is, as it is expressed at the end of the
Apology, to make men better men, to give them more of
the highest virtue of a man; and in practising it
Socrates is a moral reformer.56
At this point Robinson raises the hypothetical doubt
of "many persons" about the suitability of Socratic
elenchos, with its apparent "logic-chopping" and
•paradoxical intellectualism," as an instrument for moral
education.57

Can

this

instrument

influence

character?

55socra tes claims that he customarily asks the
>
Athenian
citizens • "Aren't you ashamed {ou1e.
>
,
aioxuv'tl) to care more for acquiring wealth and
repu ta ti on and honor . . . ?" {Apology 29d.8-e.1).
56 Robinson,

PED2
-

.

pp.

13-14.

57 Robinson is convinced, like his own discomfited
Plato, 0£ the purely destructive potential 0£ elenchos, and
thus dismisses or rather gives short shrift to that part of

52

80.., can Socrates proclaim that he proposes to make men
better, virtue being knowledge, i£ he does nothing other
than, through reversal, recognition, and shame, to remove
ignorance? 58
The answer to these questions lies in a££irming that
elenchos as it is depicted by Plato shows evidence 0£ a
second possible terminus beyond re£u ta tion, the proo£.
Although proo£ is never admitted in the early dialogues,
which end in a vowed aporia, Plato nonetheless at tests to
this positive aspect 0£ elenchos.

A second passage on

katharsis, which Robinson does not cite, gives important
evidence on the transition from the emotional investment of
the interlocutor in his belie£s, which causes him to
choose flight over endurance 0£ another round of elenchos,
elenchos which establishes premises and effects proo£ or at
least suggests a way out of aporia. This interpretation 0£
the method seems to belie Robinson's own assumed "evolution
of thought," unless he perhaps thinks that Plato•s original
contribution to philosophy, the theory 0£ forms, was
£abricated out 0£ whole cloth instead 0£ synthesized from
the work 0£ Socrates. Robinson is at times forced by his
interpretation to represent a Plato whose depiction 0£
Socrates is in part dictated by a desire to accommodate his
problematic mentor to his own greater philosophic
sophistication.
If this is so, Plato's accuracy as a
witness to even the destructive aspect 0£ elenchos is
called in to question.
58 The

primacy to Socrates• mission of examining
men•s lives (not merely propositions) is rightly argued by
Thomas C. Brickhouse and Hicholas D. Smith, "Socrates•
Rlenctic Mission,• in Ox£ord Studies in Ancient Philosophy,
Vol. 9, ed. Julia Annas (Ox£ord:
Clarendon Press, 1991),
PP. 131-159. Brickhouse and Smith show how elenchos can be
a reliable vehicle for moral improvement, both for Socrates
and his interlocutors.
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to the truth that awaits him i£ only he would not £lee.
~aedo

At

67-69, Socrates and Simmias discuss the true

philosopher and his attainment 0£ virtue.

It is agreed

that the only road to virtue and wisdom lies in the
puri£ication 0£ the soul from the body and its emotional
impediments to truth (67a-b).

So-called virtuous men

dif£er from the truly virtuous in that they, lacking
wisdom, exchange one emotional investment for another,
while the true philosopher, puri£ied like the initiated
mystic, Knows that the only coin that can buy true virtue
is wisdom:

.

.

. . . [T]ruth is in fact a sort of a purification
(Ka9apoLs.
TLS.)
from
all
these
things
[i.e.,
the emotional investments), and moderation and justice
and courage and wisdom itsel£ are a kind of
purif ica ti on (ica9apµ.os.
TLS.).
[T]he mystics
. . . are, in my opinion, none other than those who
have truly engaged, in
,.. philosophy (oL
11'EcpL.>.ooocp'l'IKOTES.
op9ws.).
(Phaedo
69b.8-d.2)

.

Elenchos' purgative powers, then, lie in its ability
to separate the interlocutor from the emotions which impede
him so that he can reach the truth, which in and of itsel£
renders him pure and receptive to moral improvement.

It is

here that the role of shame in katharsis becomes manifest.
In elenchos, the belie£s 0£ the interlocutor become as
PUblic as his actions which they have previously only
Silently informed.

By publicly showing the interlocutor's

beliefs to be sel£-contradictory, Socrates can counter the
interlocutor's emotional investment in his false opinions
With the most powerful instrument 0£ social control Known
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to the ancient Greeks, the feeling 0£ shame.

Socrates thus

uses one emotion, shame, homeopa thically against those
which tie the interlocutor to his false opinions, and
effectively clears the emotional field for the attainment
of truth, which is a necessary precursor to the ultimate
aim of moral improvement.
Plato represents Socrates metaphorically discussing
the next step in elenchos• aims, the attainment 0£ truth,
in one

dialogue

of

the

middle

period, Theaetetus.59

There (148e.6-151d.3) Socrates likens his own techne to the
art of

the

midwife

Phaenarete, his

mother.60 Like

the

59Robinson doubts the historical validity of the
midwife (whether metaphor only or metaphor based on
mother), and claims that it is "a purely Platonic
invention, made long after Socrates• death; and it serves
the unconscious purpose 0£ enabling the elenchus to
preserve a good standing in an otherwise very un-Socratic
mind" (PED2 p. 84).
For the avowal that the
similarities between Socrates• usual pose of ignorance and
the barrenness 0£ the midwi£e support the contention that
the midwi£e -figure belongs to the historical Socrates, see
Guthrie, Socrates, p. 77 n. 1.
Guthrie likewise sees
reference to the midwifery of Socrates in Diotima•s
discussion of "the notion of the union of minds, resulting
in pregnancy and parturition in the realm of ideas," which
she claims even Socrates could understand, at Symposium
206b. 7-209e.
6 0Gu thrie, Socrates, p. 58 n. 1, speculates on the
veracity of the name Socrates attributes to his mother,
Which means "she who brings virtue to light," and
concludes, on the basis of Theaetetus• recognition of it
here, its recurrence at First Alcibiades 131e where the
mention of the name has no special point, and its extraPla tonic existence as an At tic name, that it is an at least
Plausible, if fortuitously meaningful, name for Socrates•
mother.

55

JDidwi£e,

he

is

past

the age 0£

bearing himself,61 can

discern who is pregnant and who is not, is a cunning
atchmaker who cari tell which unions will have the

111

strongest

issue,62

and

pangs 0£ childbirth.

is able to arouse and allay the

His art differs from midwifery in

that he treats men, not women, and attends souls, not
bodies, in labor.

And while the midwife•s triumph is her

ability as matchmaker, Socrates feels his is the ability
to test thoroughly whether the thought 0£ a young man
has given birth to a phantom and false idea or to one
that is viable and true (paoavtr;£lV
ll'aVTl
Tpo'ltct>
>

1tOT£pov

I

a1tOTlKT£l
,
,

yovq1ov

'°'

t:'rowAov
I

,

yt:uoos

Kai
C

TOU
' V£0U
,"'
T£
Kat.
aA"19£S.)

I

OlQVOla

~

"'

(Theaetetus

150c.1-3).

If we are to give credence to this last statement,
which implies at least the possibility of "viable and true"
ideas surviving the touchstone of Socrates• examination, we
must first ask why it is that interlocutors in the early
dialogues ever recognize only the miscarriage of a sorry
61Teloh, "Interlocutors• Characters," p. 26,
avoids problems in the midwife metaphor by describing
Socrates• practice of dialectic as having two aspects:
"· . . elenchus and psychagogia. In the former Socrates
refutes the accounts of others, in the latter he leads the
psyche to some view without directly saying what it is."
As the quote illustrates, Teloh•s depiction 0£ Socratic
psychagogia implies that Socrates• profession of ignorance,
supported by the midwife•s barrenness in the metaphor, is
feigned.
6 2He claims to have sent many "who seemed not yet
Pregnant• to Prodicus •and other wise and inspired men,•
ostensibly for impregnation. Prodicus, it is assumed, was
the man 0£ choice because he could instruct them in the art
of de'fini tion.
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es:cuse £or the truth, a stillborn idea which Socrates, like
the 1<.nowledgeable midwi£e, has been able to recognize as
dead while it was yet in the womb, and merely at tended to
the necessary abortive procedure (149d.3).
suggests the answer:

Socrates

the compelling nature 0£ the pangs 0£

a soul in delivery 0£ an idea.
Socrates introduces the midwife metaphor by claiming
that his practice of this art is unrecognized by others;
they merely say that he is "really strange/paradoxical"
(ln·o'll'wTaTos)
(a'll'OPElV,

and

he

makes

Yet

149a.9).

men

this

"be

state

at

a

0£

loss"

aporia,

the

description men tender 0£ his art, is merely the birth
travail 0£ the souls his midwi£ery attends, not the art
itself:

"They labor and day and night are £ull 0£

perplexity, much more than women in childbirth."
>

,

...

.

151a.6-8).

>

Ka l'

'
yap

(W6lVOUOl

Men,

,

a11'optas

>

,

eµ.1rtµ.1l'AavTat

a ft er deli very, it seems, remember

only the pain 0£ aporia, and cite it as the total procedure
of Socrates.

Nonetheless, many have in £act given birth

out 0£ their confusion to children of truth, but have
deserted Socrates.

Why?

They, in their ignorance of his

part in their delivery, either credit themselves and are
disdainful
>

,

OlTtaaaµ.evot,

0£

him
>
eµ.ou

>

,

(ayVO'l'IOOVTES

KOl'

<
'
eaUTOUS

Ka Ta• p ov"1aa v Tes),

or

are wooed away by the persuasion of others (150e.1-3).
Both groups are accused 0£ esteeming falsehoods and

phantoms

.

than

more

,

....

,

....

a>.'1')9ous,

"l'OU

11'0L"'l<JQµ.£VOL

1f}.£LOVOS

.

KQL

11'£pl

150e.6-7).

The truth-children delivered by Socrates are lost to poor
nurturance, and all promise of future viable birth is
aborted unless men are willing to submit again to
socra tes

maieu tic art.

1

It is dif-ficult to continue to maintain that this
metaphor of the midwife is merely "a curious example .
of the subter£uges adopted by the notion of elench us to
maintain its home in Plato s alien mind"; that elenchos is,
1

after all, a "purely destructive instrument" capable of
producing

only

"wind-eggs,•63

unless

one

£eels

no

discomfort at discrediting our primary "philosophically"
inclined ancient evaluator of Socrates
Plato.64

Perhaps

Robinson,

analysis 0£ Socra tes

1

in

his

method,

otherwise

astute

elenctic refutation, has, as a

witness like so many other 0£ Socra tes

PED2
-

63Robinson,

1

.

pp.

1

close

attendees to the

83-84.

6 4xenophon s portrait of Socrates, the product of
a "prosaic commonsense" need not be discredited or
dismissed when compared to Pla to s testimonia, according to
Guthrie, Socrates, pp. 15-17:
"When . . . we find in the
Socrates of Plato something far less commonplace, far more
paradox, humour and irony and above all a greater
Profundity of thought, it would be wrong to suppose that
these were foreign to Socrates simply because they do not
~PPear in Xenophon s portrait."
In fact, as Guthrie
illustrates by citing the text of Xenophon, even this
Prosaic observer gives us "the Socratic method in a
nutshell, question and answer, 'mental midwifery and all."
Likewise, see Aristotle's claim that the two innovations
ascribable to Socrates are "inductive reasoning and general
definition" (Metaphysics 1078b).
1

1

1

1

57

58

force of the labor pains, forgot ten that a child of truth
~ay

bave issued forth as a tiny second twin to the

ponderous child of aporia, the wind-egg, whose arrival is
announced and acknowledged all round.

Yet even if, as

Robinson contends, the midwi£e metaphor is a Platonic
invention,65

we

must

at

least afford Plato

the

respect

be deserves as an observer 0£ Socratic method, and ask. on
what basis Plato perceived the metaphor to be accurate.
The answer lies in the arena of the premises established by
Socrates and admitted by the interlocutors during the
course of the elenchos.
Treatment of Socra tes

1

secondary premises by Platonic

scholars is the touchstone whereby one can determine the
orientation of a particular critic.

Those who are more

philosophically oriented tend to view the secondary
premises as a system whose latent logical cogency only
needs be discovered to reveal a consistent philosophic
doctrine.

The critics who take a more literary approach

tend to stress the importance 0£ analysis 0£
characterization and the like in rendering the dialogues
meaningful, sometimes at the expense of their philosophic

65Robinson s position is advocated by M. F.
Burnyeat, "Socratic Midwifery, Platonic Inspiration," BICS
24 (1977; hereafter Burnyeat, "Midwifery"), pp. 7-16, who
differs from Robinson in his defense of elenchos positive
Potential.
Vide contra Julius Tomin, "Socratic Midwifery,"
CQ 37 (1987), pp. 97-102, who argues that the midwife
metaphor belongs to the historical Socrates.
1

1

59

content.66

Seeskin,

in

his

book

Dialogue

and

filscovery, makes an admirable attempt to present an
interpretation 0£ the early dialogues that takes both their
philosophic and literary aspects into account, but he
nonetheless at times takes on the somewhat reactionary
stance 0£ the literary critic.

Sees kin argues against the

tnterlocutor 1 s and reader 1 s optimistic impression that "he
has only to fiddle with the premises 0£ the argument to see
what Plato is trying to say"; that there is nothing wrong
with the subject matter, but instead that "· . . once the
£og clears, all the pieces will £it together like a
puzzle."

By appealing to the "centuries 0£ Platonic

scholarship," where Grote s interpreters vainly "si£t with
1

microscopic accuracy the negative dialogues 0£
Plato,"67

and

to

"the

£act

that Socrates never claimed

to have cleared up all the 'antecedent

66see, £or example, the near apology 0£ Teloh,
•1nterlocutors Characters," p. 25, £or his literary
approach. Aryeh Kosman, "Commentary on Teloh," in
Proceedings 0£ the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient
Philosophy, Vol. 2, ed. John J. Cleary (Lanham, HD:
University Press 0£ America, 1987), pp. 40-41, criticizes
Teloh £or placing the "drama 0£ re£utation and psychogogy,
a represented process 0£ philosophical therapy and
enlightenment" above philosophical issues and questions.
Teloh s view 0£ the early dialogues is, according to
Kosman, "radically Socratic" in that it ignores Pla to s
intent in writing these dialogues £or readers.
1

1

1

67 G. Grote, Plato, and the Other Companions 0£
Socrates, Vols. 1 and 3, 3 ed. (London:
John Hurray,
1875), pp. 291-292.
Quoted by Seesk.in, Dialogue, p. 12.
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60
difficul ties/"6 8

See skin

denies

the

validity

0£

claims

aaade by such as Koyre, who alleges, "one must conclude

...

that every dialogue carries with it a

conclusion.

certainly not a conclusion -formulated by Socrates; but one
that the reader-auditor is in duty bound and is in a
position

to

£ormulate."69

The strong words, "duty bound," applied to the
reader-auditor who "is in a position to -formulate" ICoyre"s
alleged conclusions, are suggestive 0£ something which
eludes the £ear£ul interlocutors, who :flee in horror :from
the pain 0£ delivery and the stillborn it has produced, who
refuse to do Socrates" bidding, namely, to look at the
whole

,,

apa

question
c

,..

'11 JJ.L v

again

£rom
I

O"KE1fTEOV,

the

beginning

Euthyphro

>
(E~

>

apX'l'IS

15c.11),

assuming that either they were wrong before, or are wrong
now.

This duty--to take up whence the interlocutor has

68seesk.in, Dialogue, pp. 11-12.
Seeskin believes
that elenchos does have a positive aspect, in that it
transforms several interlocutors. It is here that we may
see the method•s salutary, i£ nonetheless temporary, effect
(p. 127).
His allegation, based partly on Pla to"s Seven th
Epistle (344b, "ICnowledge never takes root in an alien
nature."), that there must be a kinship between the knower
and the object known, goes a long wa·y towards explaining
the theory 0£ knowledge as recollection as well as the
mixed success Socrates has in the early dialogues with
interlocutors whose "arrogance, vanity, and cowardice"
impede the progress of elenchos, which demands "honesty,
reasonableness, and courage . . . : the honesty to say
What one really thinks, the reasonableness to admit what
one does not know, and the courage to continue the
investigation." (pp. 41 and 3).
6 9 Alexandre Koyre, Discovering
Columbia Univ. Press, 1960), p. 6.

Plato

(Hew

York:

61

fled and look at the whole question again--is accurately
assigned by Koyre to the reader-auditor, £or we are indeed
•in a position• to formulate the conclusion.

How so?

First, because it is not our reputations or our lifestyles
that are publicly on the line, which £act a££ords us a
greater degree 0£ emotional detachment than that allowed
hapless interlocutors.
which

presses

so

We can perhaps forgo the shame

many

interlocutors

to

£lee.70

And,

second, because in this state 0£ less emotional
involvement, we are perhaps able to see more clearly the
forest £or the trees that have been 'felled, to discriminate
between the unexamined assumptions 0£ the interloeutor and
those premises which have been examined and proven to the
satisfaction 0£ both interlocutor and Socrates.

And it is

in this forest that we may £ind the children 0£ truth whose
birth Plato witnessed and £elt_ c.ompelled to proclaim by
means 0£ the drama tic dialogue:
Pia to could teach by suggestion and by silence. . . .
instead 0£ advancing the argument to the limits 0£ his
understanding 0£ it, [Plato] was content to play the
dramatist and lead his characters into conflict
without result. This appears to be an adaptation 0£
the Socratic method to the written word. The reader
cannot be questioned like the slave in the Meno, but
he can be asked to watch a discussion in which lines
0£ inquiry are opened and not exhausted. The alert
student is expected to pursue the inquiry further.
. . . This method, by which Pia to, as it were,
pretends ignorance in order to a waken the mind 0£ the
reader, is his own version 0£ Socratic irony.71
70see, however, below (next section), £or the
admitted emotional investment 0£ the reader-auditor and its
necessity to arriving at the ultimate aim 0£ elenchos.
Paradoxes,

pp.

108-109.
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The above quotation, like 1Coyre s allegations on the
1

role of the reader-auditor, points beyond Socratic method
se to the problem of Pia to s in terpreta ti ve
1

per

intervention in the method, by indicating as it does a
shift away from depiction 0£ the method to the ultimate
intentions 0£ the depictor.

Regardless 0£ whether it can

:t>e proven that Plato was the creator 0£ the midwi£e
metaphor, it must nonetheless be admitted that the
metaphor s sole occurrence in the middle dialogue,
1

Theaetetus, is nowhere matched in the early dialogues by
occurrence 0£ its re£erent, a proclaimed birth 0£ truth.
Likewise, the necessary katharsis which precedes it,
discussed in explicit re£erence to elenchos only in the
late Sophist, is also unwitnessed in Plato s depictions 0£
1

the method

in

the

early

dialogues.72.

And, although it

has been and will continue to be argued that Plato s
1

understanding 0£ the method is not alien to its more subtle
aspects, we must nonetheless distinguish between the aims
and their effects which are accomplished between Socrates
and his interlocutors (reversal, recognition, and shame)
and the aims which Plato leaves to be completed by his
7 2.seeskin argues persuasively that elenchos does
have a salutary effect, albeit temporary, on the titl_e__
characters 0£ the Meno, Cri to, and Theaetet us, as well as
Thrasymachus in Rep:ui)lic 1. Put, however, in the context
Of what the reader knows about the subsequent career 0£
someone like Meno, this momentary transformation serves
only to heighten the tragic e££ect of elenchos potential.
S~e See skin, Dialogue, pp. 12.5-12.7, 14, and 130, and the
discussion (below, Part Four) o:f tragedy in the dialogues.
1
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audience of reader-auditors (ka tharsis, the birth of truth,
an d , ultimately, moral improvement).

But before

recognizing the role of Plato as creator of drama tic
dialogues, and proclaiming the tragic force with which he
depicts elenchos

1

lack of success in attaining its ultimate

goal of moral improvement, it is essential to discuss at
some length the tone and distinctive subject matter of the
early dialogues, both of which give indication why Socrates
found it so difficult to purge his interlocutors of their
false opinions, to bring the truth to birth, and,
ultimately, to achieve in his interlocutors the moral
improvement requisite for 1iving well.

Socratic Character 0£ Elenchos:

Its Tone Considered in

Relation to Its Distinctive Subject Matter
There is evidence in the dialogues themselves that
either Plato or Socrates himself was aware of the
potential £or misunderstanding that the interlocutor s
1

emotional investment might produce, and took steps to
remedy the impediment created by the negative reaction of
flight in response to the shame 'felt a£ter reversal and
recognition.

The evidence is to be 'found in two peculiar

attitudes 0£ Socrates towards the elenctic process:

in the

interplay between what Robinson designates the "personal
Character" 0£ el enc hos and the much discussed Socratic
"irony.•
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socra tes in the early dialogues will not accept £rom
biS interlocutors a statement 0£ hypotheticals to be used
in argumentation.

The classic example 0£ this is at

f_rotasoras 331c, where Socrates re£uses to discuss
protagoras

proposed hypothesis that justice is holiness.

1

BY this insistence on discussing only what the interlocutor
bimsel£ believes, Socrates sets up a situation wherein the
inter1ocutor s emotional investment is assured:
1

"At stake

are the moral intuitions which underlie everything one
stands

£or.•73

The

emotional

investment

0£

the

interlocutor is that aspect 0£ elenchos which Robinson
deems its "personal character," and it is this investment
that he acknowledges as essential to the method's 'first two
aims:

reversal and recognition.

For i£ the interlocutor

either does not believe his primary statement, or remains
unconvinced by the argumentation, or does not accept the
premises, "the re£utation . . . will not convict him 0£
thinking he

k.new when

he did not."7 4

The personal character 0£ elenchos is a de£ect,
according to Robinson, because it thereby "takes on
particularity and accidentalness," aspects which make it
73 seeskin

•

Dialogue,

p.

2.

74 Robinson,
PED2.
p.
15.
Cf.
Vlastos,
lench us," pp. 36-37. who argues that Socrates serves
three objectives in not allowing hypothetical argument: 1)
to test honesty in argument; 2) to test seriousness in the
P~rsuit of truth; 3) to accomplish elenchos• therapeutic
aim of changing lives to accord with the truth.

•E
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"in£erior

to75

the

impersonal and

universal

and

rational march 0£ science axiomatized according to
Aristotle's

prescription."76

This

"particularity

and

accidentalness" renders elenchos closer to the realm 0£
myth, perhaps, than to the realm 0£ "treatise philosophy,"
with its axioms, its prescriptions, and its inevitable
tramp towards the conceit 0£ modern "science.•

And, given

that this aspect 0£ elenchos is more mythic than
scienti£ic, we might with more assurance assign it to
Socrates himsel£ than to the artistic intervention 0£
Plato.

The -fallacy in Robinson's "pre£erence £or the

impersonal march 0£ science" when applied to Socratic
philosophy is brought out by Seeskin, who counters:
The £irst line 0£ response to Robinson is to point out
that the subject matter 0£ Socratic philosophy does
not lend itsel£ to axiomatization. To put it bluntly,
Socratic philosophy tries to reason to axioms rather
than £rom them. The -fundamental quest 0£ Socratic
751 pre£er to think that Robinson's value judgment
is su££iciently quali£ied here by the latter part 0£ his
sentence.
Nonetheless, the statement begs the
clari£ication be made that particularity and accidentalness
are not perceived as in£erior modes 0£ "philosophic"
expression until a£ter the time 0£ Aristotle. See the
discussion 0£ Nussbaum which addresses i tsel£ to "our
conventional grouping 0£ texts" which "[takes] the
distinction between philosophy and literature £or granted"
and contrasts this with the views 0£ the ancient Greeks:
"epic and tragic poets were widely assumed to be the
central ethical thinkers and teachers of Greece; nobody
thought 0£ their work as less serious, less aimed at truth,
than the speculative prose treatises 0£ historians and
Philosophers. Plato regards the poets not as colleagues in
another department, pursuing di££erent aims, but as
dangerous rivals." {Nussbaum, Fragility, p. 12)
76Robinson,

PED2
--

.

p.

16.
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philosophy is to answer the question "What is it?"
. . . If we were to compare •a Socratic dialogue with
an axiomatized science, we would find more than a
difference in presentation. . . . [T]he point of
Socrates asking his "What is it?" question in the way
he does [is] to bring about serious revision . . . .
Socrates neither was nor claimed to be a scientist.
His overriding concern was practicai.77
Robinson, however, also recognizes what might be
called a
socra tes

totally "impersonal aspect• of elenchos, that is,
1

insistence that neither he, nor the

interlocutor, has anything whatsoever to do with the
refutation which occurs:
And we must now observe some other curious
disclaimers. Hot merely does Socrates sometimes deny
by implication that it is the answerer who is refuted
('It is the logos that I chiefly examine
he says,
Prt. 333c); at other times he even denies that it is
Socrates who is doing the refuting. He speaks as if
the logos were what was doing the refuting. and as if
the logos were a person over whom he had no control,
refuting not merely the answerer and himself but even
the whole company with equal impartiality and
inexorability. He denies that he resembles Daedalus,
who made statues move; for the logoi run away without
his agency, and he would rather they remained
(Euthyph. Ud). His language implies that he himself
did not foresee the course the argument has taken, but
was led along by it blindfold; and that for all he
knew the argument might have turned out a proof
instead of a disproof of the original thesis. He even
implies at times that there is no refutation at all,
of anybody or by anybody or anything. There is only a
company of persons engaged in determining the truthval ue of a proposition, engaged in an impersonal
elenchus in the wider sense.78
1

,

77 Seeskin, Dialogue, pp. 145, 26, and 43.
For
Seeskin s insistence that Robinson s lack of appreciation
of the personal aspect of elenchos renders the paradoxical
connection between virtue and knowledge unnecessarily
ludicrous, see his pp. 145-146. ~ Vlastos, "Elenchus and
Mathematics,• p. 380, points out ··that elenchos personal
aspect forbids what investigating scientific hypotheses
requires: "debating an unasserted premise.•
·
1

1

1

78 Robinson,

PED2
--

.

p.

8.
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Robinson's apparent incredulity arises from his belief
that Socrates• "curious disclaimers• are not a sincere
attempt to represent a perceived reality, but instead
evidence

0£

"Socratic

irony

or

slyness.•79

Socrates•

disclaimer may at £irst seem to hinge on the meaning 0£
one

word,

logos,80 but

given

that any

meaning we

assign to the word can never be conclusively ascertained to
be the one that Plato or Socrates in these instances had in
mind, another tack may prove more e££icacious.
Taking as our clue the £act that Robinson describes
Socratic "irony" as the removal 0£ all personalities £rom
the method, and that he designates the apparent opposite 0£
79Robinson,
PED2,
pp.
8-9.
That
Socrates•
"irony" is thinly veiled lying is taken as a commonplace by
many scholars.
See, e.g., Peter Smith, Nursling 0£
Mortality: A Study of the Homeric Hymn to Aphrodite
(Frank£urt am Hain:
Peter D. Lang, 1981), p. 49:
"the
Greek sense of fairness did not require one always to tell
the whole or literal truth. Odysseus lied, Apollo
equivocated, Socrates pretended an ignorance never quite
real
"
Gregory Vlastos, "Socratic Irony," CQ 37 (1987;
herea£ter Vlastos, "Irony"), pp. 79-96, argues that
Socrates• irony does not admit 0£ any intent to deceive and
is "complex," i.e., Socrates "both does and does not mean
what he says." Socrates has, in short, no certainty in the
domain 0£ morals, but does have true belie£ justi£ied by
elenchos (p. 86).
Thomas C. Brickhouse and Nicholas D. Smith, "Irony,
Arrogance, and Sincerity in Plato's Apology," in Hew Essays
on Socrates, ed. Eugene Kelly (Lanham, HD: University
~ress 0£ America, Inc., 1984), pp. 29-46, claim that
interpreting Socrates• remarks in the Apology as ironic
requires one to doubt the sincerity 0£ Socrates• moral
commitments. Perhaps this doubt is understandable, given
the paradoxical nature 0£ these commitments.
s.v.
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tbiS, tbe •personal" aspect 0£ elenchos, as responsible £or
method's

"particularity

and

acciden talness,•81

we

might, on the one hand, profitably consider Socrates'
disclaimers as his, or Plato's, at tempt to "depersonalize"
the method and thus bypass both the interlocutor's first
attempts to deny recognition (his attempt to blame Socrates
personally £or the confusion that abounds), and the
personal investment of the interlocutor assured by
elenchos'

"personal aspect.•

on the other hand, by removing both himself and the
interlocutor from the procedure, Socrates likewise propels
the discussion out 0£ the domain 0£ the particular and
accidental (the interlocutor's old refrain, his definition)
and thereby nearer the domain of the universal and constant
(the

"definiend").82

By

his

insistence

on

the

primacy

of the process, not personalities, Socrates simultaneously
moves his interlocutors one step a way from the emotional
involvement that inevitably impedes them, and one step
81Robinson,
PED2,
p.
16.
Robinson
likewise
credits irony with causing "the bewilderment of the
answerer" (PED2, p. 9).
Vlastos, "Irony," p. 93,
argues that the irony merely allows the interlocutor to
deceive himself, i.e., to believe what he wants to believe.
8 2Robinson imagines that "Plato might urge .
that elenchus is the means by which the irrational and
accidental individual is brought to the appreciation of
Universal science, brought out of his individual
arbitrariness into the common world of reason" (PED2,
p. 16), but he nowhere attributes this accomplishment to
the "irony,• which he in £act finds di£ficult to de£end and
Whose sincerity he doubts.
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away £rom the particular and accidental ideas that cannot
withstand the rigorous rules £or defining universals.

The

interlocutors are likewise moved nearer to an objectivity
that makes it possible £or them to accept the established
premises, which are a hair s breadth away from the
1

definition of universals, those viable truths whose birth
e1enchos

1

re£u ta tion portends.

Whether or not Socratic

"irony" is an intentional ruse, and whether or not it is a
Platonic invention, it can nonetheless be defended as
requisite for the method s penultimate aim:
1

the

acquisition 0£ truth.
Even i£ the "irony" is assumed to be a Platonic
fabrication, one must admit that it serves the readerauditor just as well as it was perhaps intended to serve
the interlocutor within the dialogue.

Plato•s reader-

auditor, £or whom above was posited a greater emotional
distance than that afforded the interlocutor, would
nevertheless also have need of a device that would increase
objectivity both in thought and feeling, a device like the
"irony" described above.

Why is this so?

Because

repeatedly in the early dialogues the in terlocu tor s
1

position is claimed to be one which "anyone" would
share.83

Plato s
1

reader-auditor,

then,

would

likely

8 3 As Callicles, for example, claims at Gorgias
48tc that the position 0£ Socrates is one which would "turn
the whole of human life upside down," and at 513c cites his
consonance with the "experience of the many" as reason for
his inability to agree with Socrates argumentation. Polus
1
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identi£Y with the belie£s the interlocutor espouses,
undergo a vicarious reversal and recognition, and £eel a
shame similar to, but perhaps less than, the
interlocutor's.

Seeskin asserts that shame is a natural

by-product £or any reader, even a modern one, 0£ Plato's
dialogues:
It is impossible £or the reader not to be aroused by
the optimism generated by the inquisitive process but
simultaneously to be dismayed by the realization that
like so many others, she will resist the conclusions
to which it leads her. We saw be£ore that the
knowledge already present in the soul requires courage
to recover. To the extent that we do not recover it,
we, too, are made to £eel shame.84
The "irony"--able as it is to di£fuse the emotional
response 0£ shame which leads to flight, and likewise
serving to "depersonalize" the reversal and encourage the
objectivity required for sorting the surviving secondary
premises from the interlocutor's proposed de£initions--is
an absolute necessity for Plato's reader-auditor, in whom
alone 0£ the witnesses to the early dialogues the elenchos
can realize its goal 0£ tru th-aquisi tion.
Socrates') use 0£ "irony" is defensible, astute, and to the
point.
had earlier confidently appealed to any of those present
£or verification of his own position, and claimed that his
were views shared by "any other man" (473e and 474b).
Crito likewise argues the "opinion of the many" against
Socrates• position (Crito 44 ££.). These are but a few
'from many examples. Socrates' position, when compared with
that 0£ his interlocutors, strikes even the modern reader
as something unwitnessed and strange.
84 seeskin,

Dialogue,

p.

16.
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It is also comic.

One suspects that there is not a

single reader of the dialogues not guilty of sniggering at
what appear to be Socrates' shenanigans and his interlocutors' squirmings.

Vlastos notes that humor is one of

the purposes to which irony can be put, but he assigns to
socra tes' irony instead the purpose of riddling and
dismisses

its

apparent

humor.85

Eager

to

defend

Socrates against the charge of making butts of his
interlocutors, Vlastos fails to note that humor is
regularly

effected

by

objectification,86

and

that

thinking objectively is a sine qua non 0£ thinking
philosophically.87

Socrates,

it

has

been

argued,

by

his use of irony, urges his interlocutors to philosophic
objectivity.

Irony, then, even if its purpose is humor, is

natural for Socrates the philosopher.

But one suspects

that the humorous aspects 0£ Socratic irony were lost on
the hapless interlocutor, and perhaps reserved £or the
reader-auditors of Plato's dialogues.

Was irony, then, a

Platonic rather than a Socratic invention?
It is hard to believe that Robinson's Plato, not
above fabricating the midwi£e metaphor to assuage his
85 v1astos

•

•irony,•

p.

79.

86 see the discussion 0£ comedy's use of
Objectification, below, Chapter Two, Part One.
87 Michel Despland, The Education of Desire:
Plato
and the Philosophy of Religion (Toronto: Univ. of Toronto
Press, 1985; hereafter Despland, Education), p. 241.
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guiltY attachment to what he felt was a profoundly
destructive method, would hesitate to eradicate the
obviously problematic posture 0£ irony, unless 0£ course
that posture was so historically verifiable that he felt it
,,.ain to attempt its censure.

1£, then, the irony can be

defended as historical £act, and yet Socrates is considered
insincere in his disclaimers, we must then accuse him 0£
regularly perpetrating a knowing untruth, and this in the
,,.ery man whom Plato depicts as primarily concerned with
truth's

acquisition.88

be di££icul t

Although

these

disclaimers

may

to explain, they nonetheless may well be

Socrates• honest evaluation 0£ a perceived reality.

Taken

as sincere, they can inform our understanding both 0£
Socrates• place in the development 0£ philosophic thought
and 0£ the subject matter distinctive to elenchos.
To go a step further:

i£ we take Socrates•

disclaimers as a sincere attempt to represent a perceived
reality, we must answer why it is that Socrates finds this
method he wields with such apparent de£tness89 to be
88 v1astos, Socrates, pp. 132-156, similarly argues
that Socrates• divinely commanded mission to seek the right
way to live precludes his "cheating" in elenctic
argumentation.
It does not preclude, as Vlastos notes,
Socrates• leaving his befuddled interlocutors to the
discomfort of their ignorance.
89 socra tes• deftness, as well as the homogeneity
Of focus found in certain dialogues {which would seem
Peculiar if encountered in extemporaneous conversation),
are likely the result 0£ Pla to•s artistic organization of a
Procedure which was much less structured in real life. For
Havelock.'s assertion that the exposition of even early
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solDething which seems sel£-propelled, as i£ its outcome
,,ere as hidden £rom him as 'from the interlocutor who
su'ffers reversal.

The answer is to be 'found in the subject

1Datter distinctive to the elenchos 0£ the early Platonic
dialogues--the Socratic ethical "doctrine," or rather in
the nature 0£ that doctrine:

both in the manner in which

the doctrine is expressed and in the content 0£ the
doctrine and its e££ect on the interlocutor.

It will be

shown £irst that the historical position 0£ Socrates in the
development 0£ philosophic thought and the form in which
his "doctrine" is expressed in the dialogues support the
hypothesis that his "irony" was an honest expression 0£ his
perception 0£ his own ignorance when £aced with the
prospect of defining a universal or abstraction, something
consistent and bearing no relation to particular action.
Second, it will be shown that the substance 0£ Socrates'
ethical "doctrine," when set side-by-side with the
interlocutor's {and the interlocutor's contemporaries')
system 0£ belie'fs, creates a state 0£ paradox that not only
succinctly restates the historical position 0£ Socrates in
the development 0£ philosophic thought, but also produces
in the interlocutor the two opposing reactions common to
an states 0£ paradox:

at traction and repulsion.

"Socratic" dialogues betrays "a manner thoroughly
characteristic 0£ the way language is managed when it. is
documented" which the "orality" 0£ Socrates could never
Produce, see Havelock., "Orality," p. 87.

74
The historical position of Socrates in the
de"Yelopment of philosophic thought is first discussed by
Aristotle, who claims that while Socrates sought after the
definition of moral virtues and inquired into the essence
of things, it was Plato and "the idealists" who first
sought to define that which is not in the realm of the
•sensible," who first separated universals from particulars
(Metaphysics 987b, 1078b, and 1086a-b).

It has long been

accepted that Plato's contribution to the development of
philosophy was the theory of "forms," and yet only
recently has the ability of Plato to mak.e such a
contribution to his mentor's legacy been studied as a
£unction of the development of language, and, in
particular, of that development as it was influenced by the
advent of literacy.
Eric

A.

Havelock.•s

many

inquiries90

into

this

90By far the most controversial of Havelock's
work.s is his earliest, Preface to Plato (Cambridge, KA:
Harvard Univ. Press, 1963). The Literate Revolution in
Greece and Its Cultural Consequences (Princeton, HJ:
Princeton Univ. Press, 1982) is a collection of essays
reprinted from other sources, including what I found to be
a largely disappointing piece, "The Oral Composition of
Greek. Drama," pp. 261-313.
Havelock's final book., The Huse
Learns to Write: Reflections on Orality and Literacy £rom
Antiquity to the Present (Hew Haven and London: Yale Univ.
Press, 1986; hereafter Havelock, Huse) is a generalist's
overview 0£ orality· and literacy, with little new to offer
besides bibliographical citations. The most useful, for
the Purposes of this study, is the 1984 "Orality," cited
above and extensively below; but see also "The Socratic
Problem: Some Second Thoughts," in Essays in Ancient Greek
Philosophy, Vol. 2, ed. John P. Anton and Anthony Preus
(Albany: State Univ. of Hew York Press, 1983; hereafter
Havelock., "Socratic Problem•), pp. 147-173.
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aspe C

t

of the evolution of thought have led to a greater

understanding of the ef£ect 0£ the transition £rom orality
to literacy

on

the

development

0£

moral philosophy.91

In one o-f his most recent articles, Havelock. proposes that
. . . moral philosophy. . . is a creation 0£
alphabetic literacy . . . [which came] into existence
in the last hal£ of the £ifth century and the £irst
half of the £ourth century B. C., in the city 0£
Athens. . . . [T]he effectiveness o-f . . . the mental
process we identi£y as £orming a moral judgement .
depended upon a prior ability 0£ the human mind to
conceptualize the rules of behaviour as moral
universals, an ability which emerged at that time and
place. Such mental ability depended in turn upon a
linguistic ability to devise a suitable language £or
the expression 0£ such universals.92
In tracing the development 0£ the language 0£ moral
thought through the transition -from orality to literacy,
Havelock. marks, among other things, the progression -from 1)
narrative in which agents are described performing action
91For re£erences and criticism 0£ theories on the
effects of literacy, see Rosalind Thomas, Oral Tradition
and Written Record in Classical Athens (Cambridge:
Cambridge Univ. Press, 1989; herea£ter Thomas, Oral
Tradition), pp. 24-28.
C£. also William V. Harris, Ancient
Literacy (Cambridge, KA:
Harvard Univ. Press, 1989;
hereafter Harris, Ancient Literacy), pp. 40-42.
While
Thomas criticisms are though t-provok.ing, Harris are
openly hostile and dismissive. Thomas argues mainly
a1ainst Goody, while Harris target is Havelock.. Heither
cites in their bibliography A. R. Luria, Cognitive
Development: Its Cultural and Social Foundations, trans.
Hartin Lopez Korillas and Lynn Solotaro££, ed. Michael Cole
(Cambridge, KA:
Harvard Univ. Press, 1976; hereafter
Luria, Cognitive Development), though both have seen Walter
J. Ong, Orality and Literacy:
The Technologizing 0£ the
!!>r,J! (London and Hew York.: Methuen, 1982; hereafter Ong,
ralit.z), Which makes extensive use 0£ Luria s study on pp.
1

1

1

1

9-57.

92 Ha velock.,

•orality,•

pp.

68-69.
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to e) •states 0£ being• or names 0£ •impersona1s• replacing
uie agents in the descriptive narrative to 3) the
discussion 0£ •states 0£ being" or •impersonals" as
abstract

en ti ties

removed

from

the

action.93

Havelock is likewise care£ul to distinguish between
the moral thought 0£ preliterate and literate societies.
Before the advent of literacy, he maintains, criteria for
governing and judging behavior were
. . . settled by custom and habit. The wrong thing to
do was not the immoral thing, but the non-customary
thing; actions were judged by their propriety, which
within certain limits could £luctuate. The canons of
law and right were therefore identical with what the
structure 0£ any given society could accept.94
A£ter the revolution 0£ literacy, however, which made
possible the abstraction of thought, Havelock proclaims:
The rules of human behavior are no longer proverbial
or particular or pragmatic and flexible, no longer
suggested by examples of behavior. Previously
expressed only in specifics, they are now stated as
universals. Ceasing to be customs, which are acted
out, they become absolutes by which an custom is
judged and categorized as either good or bad, right or
wrong.95
Havelock, then, holds that the transition £rom
oralism to literacy is witnessed in language as a
progression away £rom speci£ics towards universals, and in
moral thought as a development away £rom the hegemony of

pp,

9 3 Havelock,
101-106.

•orality,"

pp.

71-79;

9 4 Ha velock,

•orali ty ,•

p.

69.

95 Ha velock,

"Orali t y."

p.

91.

cf.

also

Huse,
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custom to that of absolutes.

He locates the historical

Socrates on the cusp of the transformation which was
occurring in his lifetime:

" . . . he was and remained an

oralist, yet paradoxically [he was] involved in a
transition

from

orality

to

literacy.•96

we can perhaps never know for certain to what extent
Socrates

was

literate.97

We

have,

to

be

sure,

no

writings of his and little evidence that he could
write,98

but

absence

of evidence is

not

proof of

absence.

In any case, inability to write does not preclude

the ability to read, and both Plato and Xenophon seem to
depict Socrates as able to read.

Plato has Socrates

describe himself as seizing upon the books of Anaxagoras
and reading them as fast as he could (Phaedo 98b);
Xenophon's Socrates speaks of perusing writ ten works of
ancient

sages

8"1aaupous

together

>

>

friends

......
TWV

>

KOlV!)

96Ha velock,

.
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"Orality,"
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dlEpxoµ.al)

TOlS

p.

85.

97Thomas, Oral Tradition, pp. 17-19, has an
excellent discussion of the difficulties of defining
literacy in general.
98xenophon, Memorabilia 4.2.13, describes Socrates
W:riting the letters alpha and delta as headings under which
~e and his interlocutor place various actions they deem
Just or unjust.
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and

extracting

whatever

is

good

(Memorabilia

1.6.14).99

'l'hiS activity does not require that Socrates himself read,
for his :friends could have read passages aloud to him, a
common

practice

of

the

time.100

Yet

these

bits

of

evidence are tantalizing, :for i:f Socrates had in fact been
introduced to writing or reading, part of his difficulties
with his interlocutors--and even his difficulties in
arriving at universals--may in this fact :find explanation.
The e:f:fects on cognition o:f even a moderate degree o:f
literacy are, according to the work. of A. R. Luria,
profound.

When testing a wide range of subjects, :from the

illiterate to the newly and minimally literate to the fully
literate, Luria found that illiterate subjects showed a
remark.able inability to make generalizations, arrive at
abstractions, and use deduction and inference in solving
syllogisms.

Instead,

these subjects consistently reverted

to practical, particular, situational thinking and did not
seem able to understand syllogisms.

In addition, the

illiterate subjects :found many o:f the tasks imposed upon
them to be either perplexing, mildly annoying, ridiculous,
or completely uninteresting.

At times they seemed to

consider their interviewers peculiar for posing such
99 Ancient sources :for Socrates writing and reading
are cited by Harris, Ancient Literacy, pp. 85 n. 95 and 91
n. 124. I owe this reference to James G. Keenan.
100 see Thomas, Oral Tradition, pp. 20-21, for. a
discussion 0£ the extent to which the Athenians conducted
ed uca ti on, literary critic ism, and politics orally.
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questio
·
When one looks at even a £ew of the many examples
Luria gives, the parallels--between Luria's interviewers
and their subjects on the one hand, and Socrates and his
interlocutors on the other hand--are astounding.

In the

following interview, for example, one can almost hear
socra tes trying--unsuccessfully--to wrest from an
interlocutor the definition of a universal:

--Try to explain to me what a tree is. --Why
should I? Everyone knows what a tree is, they don •t
need me telling them.
--Still, try and ex plain
it. --There are trees here everywhere; you won•t
find a place that doesn't have trees. So what's the
point of my explaining? --But some people have
never seen trees, so you might have to explain.
--Okay. You say there are no trees where these people
come from. So I'll tell them how we plant beet roots
by using seeds, how the root goes into the earth and
the leaves come out on top. That•s the way we plant a
tree, the roots go down . . .
--How would you
define a tree in two words? --In two words? Apple
tree,
elm,
poplar.102
Incredulous though he is at being asked a question he
believes anyone can answer, this subject finally makes an
honest effort to define "tree."

In his responses, £rom his

initial wariness-cum-self-assurance to his {to our ears)
naively particular and experiential answers, one can
recognize Euthyphro's initial bravado at knowing exactly
101Luria, Cognitive Development, passim, esp. pp.
48-99.
See also Havelock, "Socratic Question," p. 167, who
suggests that Socrates' distinctively oral technique of
asking "interrupting" or "disruptive" questions was his
contribution to the 'formulation of "a vocabulary and syntax
for conceptual discourse."
i02Luria,

Cognitive

Development,

pp.

86-87.
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,,hat holiness is (5a.1-2) and first attempt at definition:

.. .

. holiness is the very thing I am doing now .

(Sd.7-9).

"

And yet Euthyphro never does arrive at a

satisfactory definition; he thinks, essentially, like a
preliterate.

He, like

Luria s
1

illiterate subjects, is

the

product of an essentially oral culture, and, as Walter J.
ong asserts,
an oral culture simply does not deal in such items as
geometrical figures, abstract categorization, formally
logical reasoning processes, definitions, or even
comprehensive descriptions, or articulated selfanalysis, all of which derive not simply from thought
itself but from text-formed though t.103
Luria s subjects had similar difficulties
1

comprehending syllogisms.

Recall that Socra tes

1

syllogistic adding together of the secondary premises is
what led to the interlocutor s realization that the
1

secondary premises together entailed the refutation of his
thesis.

1£ we can theorize that Socrates was more literate

than his interlocutors, and there-fore able to syllogize
While his interlocutors were at best inept at it, we can go
a long way toward explaining why the interlocutors seem so
dense and gullible in the face of what seem to us such
obvious logistic traps.

Luria 1 s interviewers indeed faced

illiterate subjects who, when confronted with a syllogism,
could only resort to their own particular experience.
syllogism made no sense to them:

103ong,

Orality,

p.

55.

The
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--In the Far North, where there is snow, all bears
are white. Novaya Ze.mlya is in the Far North and
there is always snow there. 'What color are the bears
there?
--There are di££erent sorts 0£ bears. [The
syllogism is repeated.]
--I don't know; I've seen a

black bear, I've never seen any others . . . Each
locality has its own animals: i£ it's white, they
will be white; i£ it's yellow, they will be yellow.
--But what kind of bears are there in Novaya
zemlya?
--We always speak only 0£ what we see; we

don't

talk

about

what

ong, in discussing

we

Luria's

haven't

seen.104

illiterate subjects'

responses to syllogisms and requests £or de£ini tion,
argues that a person £rom an oral or residually oral
culture would react to such queries ". . . not by
answering the seemingly mindless question itsel£ but by
trying to assess the total puzzling con text

"

Ong

goes on to imagine the con£usion under which such subjects
are obviously laboring:
You £ind what color bears are by looking at them.
Who ever heard 0£ reasoning out in practical li£e the
color 0£ a bear? . . . What is he asking me this
stupid question £or? What is he trying to do? 'What
is a tree?' Does he really expect me to respond to
that when he and everyone else has seen thousands 0£
trees7105
That such an attitude echoes that 0£ Socrates'
interlocutors is obvious.

From such a perspective, the

only reasonable explanation is that the questioner is
really odd, which is exactly what Socrates' interlocutors
thought 0£ him.
In short, there is evidence that the Socrates 0£ the
104 Luria,
105ong,

Cognitive

Orality,

pp.

Development,
53

and

56.

pp.

108-109.
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ear ly

dialogues lived at the time in the evolution of

thought when the cognitive e££ects 0£ literacy were just
1>eginning to be felt.

We can see the conflict brought upon

l>Y these e£fects in the problems Socrates has communicating
with his interlocutors, £or Socrates shows the signs of one
who has at least been introduced to literacy.

Havelock

maintains, however, that • . . . [Socrates] was and
remained an oralist, yet paradoxically [he was] involved in
a

transition

from

oralism

to

literacy.•106

But what evidence is there that Socrates himself was
stuck in oralism?

The £orm the Socratic ethical

•doctrine• takes in the early dialogues.

For we nowhere

find a Socrates who is able to o£fer up to his
interlocutors anything that even approximates an
abstraction which would survive the rules of definition
agreed upon by both parties.

Instead, the secondary

premises, the only things to survive the rigors of
de£ini ti on and the touchstone of elenchos, impress the
reader as being logically cons is tent but no 'further removed
from the particular than any definition offered up by the
interlocutor a£ter his abortive initial attempt.

It will

be remembered that the secondary premises most o£ten take
the 'form 0£ analogies, wherein a particular action is
described and its logical or sensible cogency is assessed.
In Euthyphro, £or example, Socrates examines one
106 Ha velock

•

•orality,•

p.

85.
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definition proposed by Euthyphro by drawing an analogy
between attending to the gods and other arts of attending.
SY calling Eu thyphro's attention to the particular art 0£
attending horses, he elicits his eventual agreement to the
premise that attention always aims to accomplish bene£it
(EU thyphro

12e-13c).

In short, Socrates himsel£ displays at least some 0£
the di££iculties experienced by the preliterate:

he can

begin to define, but he cannot arrive at true abstraction.
Socrates is able to of£er something which can withstand the
logical rigors of elenchos, but nonetheless cannot serve as
the de£inition 0£ a universal.

His premises instead merely

aim at an elastic approximation of the definiend by
supplying seemingly

analogous

instances,107

but

they

107His establishment of premises is thus similar
to the modern-day lawyer's attempt to establish precedents
by discovering analogies between cases. The comparison
between legal reasoning and Socrates' establishment 0£
precedents is especially informing when one considers the
arena from which Socrates regularly draws his precedent
cases: the arena of technai. Edward H. Levi, in his An
Introduction to Legal Reasoning (Chicago: Univ. 0£ Chicago
Press, 1949), defines legal reasoning and indicates the
influence 0£ precedent cases on establishment of law: "The
basic pat tern of legal reasoning is reasoning by example.
It is reasoning £rom case to case. It is a three-step
Process described by the doctrine of precedent in which a
Proposition descriptive of the first case is made into a
rule of law and then applied to a next similar situation.
The steps are these: similarity is seen between cases;
next the rule of law inherent in the 'first case is
announced; then the rule of law is made applicable to the
second case. This is a method of reasoning necessary for
the law, but it has characteristics which under other
Circumstances might be considered imperfections. . . .
[C]ase-law reasoning . . . is not truly inductive, but the
direction appears to be from particular to general. It has
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cannot and do not serve as the de£iniend i tsel£.
The dialogues end in actual ignorance £or both
Socrates and the interlocutor, and the "irony" Socrates
practices is best understood as his perception that the
proclaimed goal 0£ de£ini tion has not been reached.

In

arguing against interpretations, like that 0£ Robinson, 0£
socra tic irony as a ruse, Seeskin states:
[W]e [should not] be misled into thinking that
Socrates has the necessary information but has
decided to :keep it to himself. The Socratic
dialogues are spurs to inquiry in the sense that they
engage the reader and encourage her to think £or
herself. But they are not like mystery novels where
the author leaves a trail 0£ clues pointing to a
single conclusion.
"What is justice?" cannot be
answered in the way we answer "Who :killed the butler?"
We have the entire text 0£ the Republic as proof. So
there is nothing insincere in Socrates• professing
ignorance even though he has spent a lifetime
examining the relation between virtue and :knowledge.
To complete his search, he would need logical,
psychological, and metaphysical insights
unav[a]ilable to any person in the £i£th
century.108
Havelock would probably argue that such insights were
unavailable to persons in the £i£th century because they
had not yet experienced the transition to full literacy.
Such insights would have to await the fourth century and
Plato.
been pointed out that the general finds its meaning in the
relationship between the particulars. Yet it has the
capacity to suggest by the implication 0£ hypothetical
cases Which it carries and even by its ability to suggest
~ther categories which sound the same." (pp. 1-2 and 27,
i.talics added.
I owe this reference to James G. Keenan.)
108 seeskin,

Dialogue,

p.

45.
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Socrates nonetheless continually displays a sense or
sel:f-assurance about his ability eventually to arrive at
knowledge o:f a universal.

This seH:-assurance, which seems

to suggest the interpretation of the •irony• as a
ruse,109

may

in

-fact

come

-from

Socrates•

willingness

to

submit to yet another round or elenchos, for he does not
experience the shame common to the -fleeing interlocutors.
WbY?

Because, his life was led, as far as our evidence

gives witness, in consonance with the •doctrine•
extractable from the analogies he proposes in the
secondary

premises.110

And

yet,

there

is

a

sense

which Socrates, as will be shown, is a tragic hero.

in
The

tragedy belongs, however, not solely to him, but also to
the interlocutors, and vicariously, to the readerauditor.111
Removing ethical principles from the context in which
Socrates gives them tends to create an artificial sense of
•doctrine,• whose concreteness belies both the residual
109This in terpreta ti on would doubtlessly be less
formidable in its appeal if we had access to transcripts or
elenchos as Socrates actually conducted it on the streets
of Athens, stripped of the artistic arrangement and
synthetic focus Plato has given it.
UOFor full discussion of this point, see Thomas
C. Brickhouse and Nicholas D. Smith, •what Hakes Socrates a
Good Han?," Journal of the History of Philosophy 28 (1990),
pp. 169-179.
111For the contrast between Socrates and the old
tragic heroes, see Seesk.in, Dialogue, pp. 78 and 91, and
the discussion below, Part Four.
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orali ty 0£ Socrates defended above as well as the very
particularity of the context.

Nonetheless, even as we

create a doctrine by extracting and perhaps concentrating
concepts described at length in narrative form, the
commonplaces of Socratic ethical doctrine loudly declare
their position in the development of philosophic thought by
attesting the foundation 0£ their substance in the
description 0£ action.
The "commonplaces" form a group whose interrelation is
grounded in the correlation between knowledge and action:
1)

virtue is knowledge; 2) all wrongdoing is involuntary in

as much as it results from ignorance;
soul is requisite for living well.

3)

the care 0£ the

These doctrines have

been deemed "paradoxes," primarily because their
translation into the real world seems to £ly in the £ace of
experience.

Even Aristotle was troubled by their apparent

inconsistency with the facts of human existence:

"The

effect of his [sc. Socrates s] making the virtues into
1

branches 0£ knowledge was to eliminate the irrational part
of the soul, and with it emotion and moral character
'

KQl

Koralia

'R'aaos

'

KQl

,,

£805]."

(Magna

lt82a.20).112

In his analysis of the Socratic paradoxes, H. J.
11 2Quoted and translated by Guthrie, Socrates, p.
131 (Greek added), who avows that he is sparing in his
quotations from this text "owing to the widespread view
that it is a product 0£ the Peripatos after Aristotle's
death" (p. 130 n. 3).
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O'Brien recognizes in their phrasing both the capacity to
•surprise and shock Greek common sense" as well as their
latent appeal, given the origins he proposes for them:

1)

the ancient ethic of self-interest, 2) the fifth-century
conception of politics and virtue as an art, and

3)

the

Delphic maxim {"with the irony that is its formal
expression"),

"Know

thyself ... 113

Socrates'

constant

questioning is unpleasant in that it is "an at tack on the
pretensions of Kan the Artisan," the fifth-century
assurance that humans could control their destinies, and
yet it appeals, through the paradox that virtue is
knowledge, to the very pretensions it attacks:
Socratic doctrine that virtue is knowledge
fusion of opposites.

"[T]he
. is a

It unites the passion for intelligent

control of human life with the belief that man's
intelligence is weak and puny compared to the
God's."114
O'Brien's hypothesis of the latent appeal of the
Socratic paradoxes is supported by the text of Plato, for
only the brash Callicles of the Gorgias even comes close to
accusing Socrates openly of complete denial of reality.
This is not because, as Callicles on the one hand suggests,
interlocutors are {like Polus) too modest to proclaim aloud
their "natural" inclinations when con-fronted with the
113o'Brien,
1 14-o'Brien,

Paradoxes,
Paradoxes,

pp.

56

pp.

and
80-81.

82.

88

dictates of "tradition," but instead, as he likewise
ilDPlies, because they are not sharp enough to follow the
penduluJD of' Socrates
arena

to

1

argumentation as it swings from one

another.115

Callicles

at

one

point

comes

close to pinpointing how it is that Socrates is able to
sliP undetected from one arena to another, when he
coJDplains that Socrates is always "inappropriately talking
about cobblers and fullers and cooks and doctors, as if our
discussion had anything to do with these things." (Gorgias
The secondary premises do, in £act, quite

491a.1-3).

regularly involve description from the arena of various
technai, in which arena, it must be noted, equation 0£ the
good and the useful seems obvious, given the fact that the
object of such technai is clear and unimpeded by the
conflicting desires which regularly visit human beings in
all situations where moral choice is required.

Socrates

1

analogies from human practice of crafts, skills, and arts
are not strictly analogous, then, for human beings making
moral decisions, or at least for human beings unlike
himself who do not live solely on the basis of enlightened
self-interest.

This is precisely why Socrates is able to

"surprise and shock" his interlocutors with his paradoxical
115 Callicles thinks he detects the rapid transport
of Socrates argumentation between the realms guided by
"nature" and "tradition," wherein Socrates attacks from
Whichever position is the opposite of his opponent s.
CaUicles assessment is colored by his own division of
reality into these two rather narrow positions, as the
dialogue s subsequent progression shows.
1

1

1

1

89
.
116
allega t ions.
Yet most interlocutors do not openly accuse Socrates
of denying reality, as Callicles so boldly does.

Why not?

Because "[w]hat separates the paradoxes from nonsense is
that, instead 0£ denying common human experience, they
simply

re£ormula te

i t."117

By

his

analogies

from

116An in-depth consideration 0£ the problems
inherent in the era-ft analogies used by Socrates may be
found in Terence Irwin, Plato's Moral Theory: The Early
and Middle Dialogues (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1977;
hereafter Irwin, Moral Theory), pp. 37-101.
Irwin locates
the source 0£ tension in elenchos in two unexamined
assumptions: 1) that virtue must always be beneficial (p.
39), and 2) that virtue "prescribes instrumental means or
components" to the determinate end 0£ happiness (p. 84).
These assumptions guide the elenchos and determine its
paradoxical issue.
Edward Warren, "The Craft Argument: An Analogy?" in
Essays in Greek Philosophy, Vol. 3:
Plato, ed. John P.
Anton and Anthony Preus (Albany: State Univ. 0£ Hew York
Press, 1989; hereafter Warren, "Craft Argument"), pp. 101115, likewise sees the era-ft argument, which fails as an
analogy, as a statement 0£ the paradox that knowledge is
virtue.
117o•Brien, Paradoxes, p. 92.
C£. Kraut,
"Comments," p. 63, who criticizes Vlastos• "Elenchus• £or
its "a priori assertion that a surprising and unorthodox
conclusion cannot be derived -from a premiss-set that
consists 0£ nothing but humdrum, orthodox truths.•
Another way 0£ looking at the paradoxical issue 0£
elenchos is to consider it the natural product 0£ the
tension in human psyche, which has opposing and mutually
exclusive aims. Maynard Mack, "The Jacobean Shakespeare,"
quoted in Howard W. Clarke, The Art 0£ the Odyssey
(Englewood Cli££s, HJ:
Prentice Hall, 1967), p. 62,
describes this tension as •a confrontation 0£ two 0£ our
most cherished instincts, the instinct to be resolute,
autonomous, free, and the instinct to be 'realistic,•
adaptable, secure."
C£. Haden, "Socratic Ignorance," p.
25, Who similarly claims • . . . £or human beings there are
two equally fundamental but radically di££erent life
factors:
intelligence and the sense 0£ group solidarity.•
The ancient Greek manifestation 0£ this tension can be
seen, according to A. w. H. Adkins, Merit and
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benefit in technai to benefit :for humans making moral
decisions, Socrates discreetly "reformulates" the process
of making moral decisions so as to incorporate into it a
doctrine 0£ bene£it that looks to the end, not the
Dleans.118

The

potentially

virtuous

individual,

like

the artisan practicing his techne, must now look. beyond the
particularity 0£ each action to the -finished product
ahead.

By his analogies to technai, then, Socrates sets up

a situation in which virtue, the definiend, is designated
as a desired goal.

The paradox that "no one does wrong

voluntarily" becomes in this context the statement o:f an
obvious truth, in that only a :fool would admit to doing
soDlething voluntarily against his own desires.

This

Responsibility: A Study in Greek. Values (Clarendon:
Oxford Univ. Press, 1960; reprint ed., Chicago and London:
Univ. of Chicago Press, 1975; herea£ter Adkins, Merit),
esp. pp. 30-60, in the conflict bet ween competitive and
cooperative virtues, which Irwin, Koral Theory, pp. 15-18,
terms respectively the "Homeric" virtues and the •postHomeric law-conception.•
Elenchos covertly supports community claims over those
of the individual, and this is why, as notes Warren, "Craft
Argument," p. 108, the cra£t analogy does not apply to
competitive skills such as warcraft and boxing: it assumes
Without ever making explicit benefit of community.
The presupposed existence of this tension perhaps
explains, better than anything else does, why interlocutors
feel shame: they are confronted in elenchos with their
cherished beliefs in community benefit which, i:f indulged,
would overthrow pursuit o:f sel£-interest. See Kahn,
"Gorgias," p. 115, who claims that the interlocutor's sense
Of shame can be attributed to Socrates' bringing "moral
concerns" into play, which support claims of the community
over those o:f the individual.
11 8on benefit and
Theorx, pp. 39 and 76.

teleology,

see

Irwin,

Koral
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•desire," variously denoted in Plato's text by the verbs
pou>.eoOaL,
cognates, 119

" 1
cpLA£LV

is

at

the

>

or

epav

very

heart

and
of

their

Socrates'

paradoxes, for it succinctly describes the precarious
position of the interlocutor who is confronted by the
choice between the actual and now obvious (his current
belie£ system) and the possible but still unknown {a belie£
system based in enlightened sel-f-interest, suggested by
analogy to various technai).

By set ting up a comparison

between two things which are simultaneously di££erent and
yet somehow similar, Socrates as he "reformulates" creates
metaphor, which invites the de-finition of the coincidence
and, ultimately, demarcation o-f the system o-f beliefs which
silently informs each action.
Anne Carson, in her book Eros the Bittersweet:

An

Essay, quotes and translates Aristotle's de-finition o-f
metaphor a -from Rhetoric 1405a.34:

"To give names to

nameless things by transference [metaphora] -from things
kindred

or

similar

in

appearance."120

The

"nameless

things," whose name Socrates• metaphor urges but never
accomplishes, are of course the universals, the belief
119o•Brien, Paradoxes, pp. 90 and 225-227.
O'Brien sees Plato's choice o-f terminology as dictated by
". · . the associations he wants to create, the -field of
experience he wishes to include, the intensity of emotion
he hopes to suggest." (p. 226).
120Anne Carson, Eros the Bittersweet:
An Essay
{Princeton, HJ:
Prince;.;..t-'o'--n~-U-n_i_·v-.-P"""r_e_s_s"""",~1-9_8_6_;_h_e_r_e_a_f_t_e_r......
Carson, Eros), p. 73.
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systems which, at his time of history, silently informed
action and were described only by reference to the action
theY informed.
The crux of elenctic procedure, the collocation of the
action derived from analogy to technai with the action of
the interlocutor, sets up a situation in which the
interlocutor is made simultaneously to view his actual
practice and the theoretical or possible practice {which he
has agreed is both beneficial to the proposed end as well
as logically consistent).

Since the two are contradictory,

the interlocutor is faced with the excruciating choice of
denying the validity of his actual practice or of denying
that of enlightened self-interest, whose desirability and
logical consistency he has already affirmed.

The moment is

charged with a tension that is almost unbearable as the
interlocutor stands face to face with the choice between
what he does and what he has proclaimed is desirable and
logically consistent.
true paradox:

He is confronted with the essence of

•what is a paradox?

A paradox is a kind of

thinking that reaches out but never arrives at the end 0£
its thought.

Each time it reaches out, there is a shift

of distance in mid-reasoning that prevents the answer from
being

grasped.•121

Socrates' habitual construction of paradoxical mental
situations, in which the goal of definition seems just
12 1carson,

Eros,

p.

81.
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1'itllin reach but is never attained, caused those with whom
}le conversed to £eel simultaneously attracted to him and
repelled.

As is the usual practice 0£ the pre-literate,

Socrates' interlocutors cannot separate the agent -from the
action, Socrates -from the procedure he practiced, elenchos.
As a result, the con£licting emotions aroused by the
paradoxical nature 0£ the situations elenchos creates are
said to be ca used by Socrates the person, not his
procedure.

Alcibiades' wrenching delineation 0£ the

extreme measures to which he -felt drawn in a vain attempt
to £ind consummation 0£ his erotic at traction to Socrates
is so well known that it needs no -further description here.
But witness, in addition to this, his statement of a
simultaneous yet opposing passion, repulsion, which
Socrates evoked in him in similar excess:

"Many are the

times I would gladly £ind him no longer among men on earth,
but if this were in £act to happen, I k.now that I would
suffer greater distress than ever; the result is that I
have no idea what to do with this man at all." (Symposium
216c.l-3)
Since the Alcibiades who is attracted to Socrates
cannot tolerate the thought of a Socrates "no longer among
men on earth" and yet cannot abide being in his presence,
he chooses -finally to £lee.

A similar expression 0£

repulsion is to be £ound in every interlocutor who £lees
Socrates and his request to continue elenchos.

Yet the

r
94

. re at least £or Alcibiades, remains.
deS 1 '

What ca uses it?

Socrates• practice 0£ elenchos is essentially
.

•erot1c.

.122

By

using

analogy,

metaphor,

paradox,

and

l>Y engaging in the quest £or knowledge, Socrates creates
nearly every £orm 0£ •erotic• situation Carson describes in
her

boo k .123

In

his

attempt,

nowhere

in

the

early

dialogues accomplished, to de£ine universals, Socrates
engages his interlocutors in •an action 0£ reaching out
toward a meaning not yet K.nown. •

By using analogy to

technai to make the attainment 0£ virtue a desired goal,
socra tes encourages the •reaching out £rom what is known
and present to something else, something di££erent,
something desired.•

Through metaphor, benefit in technai

is made to suggest but never specifically to name the
•nameless• uni versa ls which are the true informers of
virtuous action for those whose practice is informed by
enlightened self-interest.

By constructing paradox which

is never resolved, Socrates places his interlocutors at one
of the points in what Carson calls the •three point
circuit• requisite £or eros, wherein may be communicated
•the di££erence between what is present/actual/known and
i22For a discussion 0£ Socratic, as opposed to
Platonic eros, see Vlastos, •Irony,• pp. 90-92.
It should
be noted that the current discussion is about neither of
these, but instead about elenctic eros.
12 3carson hersel£ identifies Socrates• eroticism
as evidenced by his quest £or K.nowledge, but designates
analogy, metaphor, and paradox •erotic• in respect to other
texts.

95
,,nat

is

11124

lacking/possible/unknown

Alcibiades• at traction and repulsion now become more
understandable.

For interlocutors like him the pull

between the actual and the possible is too excruciating.
for although the possible has been made desirable, it will
never win out in the end.

Alcibiades shows his preference

for the actual by his return to the adulation of the crowd,
just as Eut.hyphro betrays a similar preference by choosing
to return to the prosecution 0£ his -father that he can no
longer justi£y.

Alcibiades and interlocutors like him

resist the "kinetic . . . action of eros" and choose
instead action of another sort:
by shame.

flight that is mo ti va ted

Alcibiades• sense of shame betrays his

preference for the actual, for. according to Carson. "
the static electricity 0£ erotic 'shame• is a
way of

marking

124carson,

that
Eros.

two are

not

one."125

pp.

86,

73,

166,

and

very discreet

169.

125carson. Eros. pp. 97 and 21 1 italics added.
Carson•s dif£erentiation between the kinetic engagement in
~ and the static refusal to participate is reminiscent
of the above discussion of Theaetet us• sense of vertigo as
he undergoes elenchos. and Eu thyphro•s sensation of
movement which he -finds so unpleasant as to require escape.
The discussion of static and kinetic emotions in James
Joyce•s A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man, in The
Portable James Joyce (Hew York: Viking Press, 1946 and
1947) p. 471, is an instructive parallel to Aristotle's
designation of the role of emotions in tragedy: "Pity is
the feeling which arrests the mind in the presence of
Whatsoever is grave and constant in human sufferings and
unites it with the human sufferer. Terror is the feeling
Which arrests the mind in the presence of whatsoever is
grave and constant in human sufferings and unites it with
the secret cause. . . . The tragic emotion, in £act, is a
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For others, however, like Theaetetus, this •. . .
kinetic, triangular, delightful and disturbing action o-f
eros•126

is

an

exhilarating

experience.

Theaetet us

is

not discomfited by the movement of elenchos into the
unknown, and, like Socrates, is a true lover of wisdom, a
true philosopher.

Carson cites Socrates• double

proclamation {Symposium 177d; Theaetetus 128b) that •his
knowledge, such as it is, is nothing but a knowledge of
'erotic things• (ta erotika),• and explains what he means
by deduction from the facts of his life:
He loved to ask questions. He loved to hear answers,
construct arguments, test definitions, uncover riddles
and watch them unfold out of one another in a
structure opening down through the logos like a
spiralling road {Phdr. 274-a; cf. 272c) or a vertigo
{Soph. 264-c).
He loved, that is, the process of
coming
to
know.127
Pla to•s depiction of a Socrates who knows only ta
erotika again at tests to a Socrates who was a fellowsearcher and not a sly seasoned traveller on the road to
face looking two ways, towards terror and towards pity,
both of which are phases of it. You see I use the word
arrest. I mean that the tragic emotion is static. Or
rather the dramatic emotion is. The feelings excited by
improper art are kinetic, desire or loathing. Desire urges
us to possess, to go to something; loathing urges us to
abandon, to go :from something. These are kinetic emotions.
The arts which excite them, pornographical or didactic, are
therefore improper arts. The esthetic emotion (I use the
general term) is therefore static. The mind is arrested
and raised above desire and loathing.• I am indebted to
James G. Keenan for this reference.
126 carson,

p.

127 carson,

pp.

97.
170-171.
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the Knowledge 0£ "nameless things."

For the Socrates whose

alleged Knowledge is merely o:f "erotic things" is one who
itnows only the £irst hal£ 0£ the necessary duo 0£ drawing
abstraction £rom experience--he knows how to set up by
analogy the "three-dimensional space" in which collocated
•images :float one upon the other without convergence"
with •something in between, something paradoxical:
gros."128
O'Brien sees in Pla to•s declining use 0£ the £orm o:f
the Socratic paradoxes a tempering 0£ "the will to
astonish,

inherited

£rom

Socra t~s.•129

And

yet,

while

he does not explici Uy attribute the paradoxes to Socrates,
O'Brien does acknowledge that the paradoxes and the
doctrine 0£ the tripartite soul are
two di££erent ways 0£ presenting the complex and
original ethics which Plato built upon the
intellectualism o:f Socrates.
In short, they are
alternative pedagogic techniques. The paradoxes are
the a££irmation 0£ the rational unity 0£ human nature
and human action; the partition 0£ the soul is an
acknowledgement o:f the irrational multiplicity o:f
both.130
Havelock's hypotheses on the orality 0£ Socrates support
the designation 0£ the paradoxes as Socratic, while the
above quote from O'Brien suggests that the tripartite soul
12 8carson

•

p .

145.

l29o•Brien, Paradoxes, p. 197.
He notes here that
"[t]he ethical paradoxes survive to the end in substance,
and occasionally in form . .
"
13 0o·Brien,

Paradoxes,

p.

198.
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,,as Plato's answer to the problem he perceived in Socrates'
paradoxical a££irmation.

Development of this doctrine in

dialogues a£ter Robinson's early period likewise supports
the designation.

Carson, in her analysis 0£ the "erotic"

Socrates, does not differentiate between Socrates and
Plato, but we may now with more assurance proclaim that it
1'ould take a Plato to arrive at abstraction, to "divide
things up by classes, where the natural joints are," to
engage in "division."

For it is by "collection" and

"division" that we are able to arrive at abstraction:
•. . . [W]e think by projecting sameness upon di££erence,
by drawing things together in a relation or idea while at
the same time maintaining the distinctions between
them.•131
Plato could doubtlessly see and chose to depict the
tendency in his mentor's accustomed procedure; he could see
the abstractions waiting behind the collocated particulars
for an interlocutor able to withstand elenchos to its true
terminus.

But Plato was a

true "lover 0£ wisdom," willing

to withstand the procedure 0£ elenchos, and perhaps
impatient £or its penultimate goal of truthacquisition.132
As it has been described above, elenchos as practiced
131carson,

Eros,

pp.

145

and

171.

132carson, Eros, p. 173, concludes her chapter on
Socrates with the claim that "
he was in love with the
wooing itsel£.
And who is not?"
Plato, I submit.
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l>Y Socrates in the early dialogues is a procedure seemingly
destined to reach £or something it never could attain,
1fhether that be the de£inition 0£ universals or the moral
iJDprovement 0£ those with whom Socrates conversed.

A brie£

suJDmarY 0£ this study s conclusions on Socratic elenchos
1

1fill serve both to indicate why the method failed to at ta in
its goals as well as to inaugurate the £inal consideration
o£ elenchos:

the tragic dimensions of its failure as

depicted by Plato in the early dialogues.

Part Four:

The Tragic (and Comic) Dimensions
of Socratic Elenchos

Elenchos as practiced by Socrates in the early
Platonic dialogues purports to have two distinct but
ultimately related goals:

to establish definition of

universals on the one hand, and to effect moral
improvement on the other hand.

Although neither goal is

accomplished, the two are joined in what may be termed the
true issue 0£ elenchos:
knowledge is virtue.

the paradoxical doctrine that

The doctrine is paradoxical not

because it is unrealistic, but because to gain knowledge,
Plato assures us, one must undergo elenchos--but to undergo
elenchos, one must, we are shown, be committed to virtue at
all

costs.
Plato is everywhere insistent that elenchos is able to

accomplish its goal of defining universals.
is clearly laid out:
birth of truth.

The procedure

reversal, recognition, ka tharsis, the

And, al though truth's birth is never

witnessed in the early dialogues, its genesis is strongly
portended in the secondary premises which survive the
touchstone of elenchos.

By eliciting agreement that

situations derived from the arena of technai are analogous
to the subject 0£ virtue under discussion, Socrates
establishes his secondary premises.

Elenchos as practiced

by Socrates thus suggests that particular action must be
informed by the end it professes to achieve, and this end
100
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nalogy to technai has established as something
tbe a
ficial and there£ ore desired. The truth is there to be
1>ene
bad in the secondary premises, as is at tested by the £1igh t
of ·every discom£ited interlocutor and the confidence of
everY modern reader tempted to "fiddle with the premises."
sut the truth must be born--and birthing is painful.
The procedure 0£ elenchos as depicted by Plato is not
a cut-and-dried logical progression.

Elenchos is

everywhere shot through with the interlocutor's emotional
reactions.

The reversal elenchos effects is the source 0£

confusion.

Confusion clears, however, when one comes to

recognize and accept one's ignorance.

Acceptance 0£

ignorance elicits wonder in the sense of doubt, and can
lead to katharsis and to the birth 0£ truth.

But katharsis

necessitates the willingness to let go 0£ that which is to
be removed, and it is here where most interlocutors are
foiled.

Instead 0£ accepting ignorance, they 'first at tempt

to blame Socrates £or their con-fusion.
So 'far the procedure sounds pain£ul.

An antidote to

the interlocutor's con-fusion is administered:
Socratic "irony."

the

This irony provides a much-needed

humorous interlude to the painful engagement.
functions on many levels.

It

First, it removes personalities

from the process and di'ffuses the blame.

Then, by removing

Personalities, irony allows the interlocutor a more
Objective perspective on the discussion.

Objecti'fication
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provides an antidote to the interlocutor's emotional
investment in his belie£ system, which can, i£ it is too
strong, cause him to be unwilling to let go 0£ his £ormer
beliefs, rendering him not susceptible to the bene£i t that
shame, his next emotional reaction, can con£er.
Shame, it has been argued, is a homeopathic remedy to
the emotional investment 0£ the interlocutor.

As the most

power£ul emotional tool 0£ social control, it is capable 0£
producing

alterations

in

behavior.133

But

when

the

emotional investment is strong, the reaction of the
interlocutor is flight to avoid further shame, by which he
shows himsel£ so emotionally invested in his beliefs that
he is unwilling to let go 0£ them.
Elenchos teeters, then, between 'failure and success,
between tragedy and comedy.

Its emotional power, however,

is not derived entirely from its oscillation between these
two poles, nor does it end with the interlocutor's escape
£rom the presence 0£ Socrates.

Al though the pain

experienced during the process may keep the interlocutor at
a distance, the lure 0£ its potential success remains

13 3For shame as an instrument 0£ social control,
see Alvin W. Gouldner, Enter Plato: Classical Greece and
the Origins 0£ Social Theory (Hew York: Basic Books, 1965;
hereafter Gouldner, Enter Plato), pp. 81-90. On shame
cultures see Ruth Benedict, The Chrysanthemum and the
§_word: Patterns 0£ Japanese Culture (Boston: Houghton
Hi££1in, 1946), pp. 222-224.
Benedict de£ines shame as •a
reaction to other people's criticism" and deems it "a
Potent sanction," whether the criticism is real or
imagined (p. 223).
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strong.

A desire has been implanted by the agency of the

analogy to technai, and the interlocutor is left in a
position where he feels simultaneously attracted to what he
nas been shown is desirable, virtue, and yet repelled by
the only way he can acquire it:

through knowledge, which

b.e now senses, having recognized through elenchos his
former ignorance, this painful process can provide.
seeskin argues that the real tragedy of elenchos is
its failure to persuade:

its failure to attain the goal of

altering the behavior of Socrates

1

respondents, of

effecting a moral improvement that is more than temporary.
He seems to place the blame for this failure not primarily
on Socrates, but instead on the interlocutors, none of whom
in the early dialogues has the "honesty, reasonableness,
and courage" requisite £or elenchos:
. . . the honesty to say what one really thinks, the
reasonableness to admit what one does not know, and
the courage to continue the investigation. Kost of
Socrates respondents are lacking in all three.
Protagoras becomes angry, Pol us resorts to cheap
rhetorical tricks, Callicles begins to sulk, Cri tias
loses his self-control, Keno wants to quit.
While
their reactions leave much to be desired, Socrates•
respondents do emerge from the pages of the dialogues
as
real
people.134
1

Sees kin extends the tragedy beyond the limits of Pla to s
1

depiction of elenchos to the audience, who can identify
With the shame of the "real people" interlocutors because
134seeskin, Dialogue, p. 3.
Cf. Teloh,
"Interlocutors• Characters," p. 34, who cites Gorgias 487a
for the character traits of interlocutors necessary for a
fruitful elenchos:
"knowledge, good will, and frankness.•
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tne reader, too, senses that "she will resist the
conclusions to which [elenchos] leads her."

And, quoting

Jlussbaum, Seeskin claims that the tragedy is ours, £or
wanting both what Alcibiades represents in Symposium and
tnat

which

Socrates

represents.135

Seeskin

maintains

tnat the real-li£e interlocutors depicted by Plato
increase the sense of tragedy 0£ elenchos• inability to
persuade, for although one may sense the salutary effect 0£
elenchos on Meno, who "has become 'gentle towards others,'"
or Crito, on whom "elenchus has a soothing e££ect," or
Thrasymachus, who at "the end 0£ Republic I . . . becomes
gentle towards Socrates," the reader "knows that the
difference

will

be

short-Ii ved ":136

[Socra tes•J closest associates, Cri tias and
Alcibiades, became a disgrace to the city. Keno went
on to a li£e 0£ treachery in Asia Minor and was
executed. Laches and Hicias both met with
misfortune. Heither Gorgias nor Protagoras was moved
to abandon sophistry and pursue philosophy. Worst 0£
all, his longtime companion Cri to accused him 0£
cowardice for not breaking the law (Crito 45c ££.)-thereby proving that he missed the whole point 0£
Socrates 1 speech to the jury. Callicles sums up the
feeling of most respondents when, after hearing
Socrates discourse on how to live a life, he says
(Gorgias 513c): "I don•t know why but somehow what
you say strikes me as right, Socrates, and yet I feel
as most people do: you don t quite convince me."
1

Seeskin develops at great length the theme 0£ the
13 5seeskin, Dialogue, pp. 16 and 148, where he
quotes Martha Hussba um, "The Speech of Alcibiades: A
Reading 0£ Plato•s Symposium,• Philosophy and Literature 3
(1979), pp. 167-169.
This article is an earlier version of
the sixth chapter 0£ Nussbaum, Fragility, pp. 165-199.
136seeskin,

Dialogue,

pp.

127

and

130.

105

tnterlocutors' responsibility £or elenchos• £ailure and
use S

hiS argument to support his contention that elenchos

iS essentially circular:

virtue.137

But

i£

we

it both requires and leads to
:follow

Socrates

in

his

insistence

tbat virtue is knowledge, we must protest along with
callicles that Socrates does not quite convince, and :follow
up on the implications 0£ Seeskin's claim that Socrates•
failure to persuade is the real tragedy o:f elenchos.
And yet there remains the suspicion, certainly £or
reader-auditors and probably even for interlocutors like
Alcibiades, who cannot keep himsel'£ away :from Socrates,
that success lurks somewhere beneath the apparent 'failures.
For reader-auditors, the suspicion is based on the
conviction that interlocutors are less well-equipped, both
emotionally and rationally, to spar with Socrates than they
themselves would be.

The humorous aspects 0£ Socratic

irony, no doubt lost on exasperated interlocutors, are a
sign that reader-auditors are a:f:forded an objectivity
greater than that a£forded interlocutors.

For

interlocutors, there is doubtless the sense that, i:f only
they could give up their investment in their belie£s, they
would be able to withstand elenchos to its success£ul
terminus.
13 7 See skin, Dialogue, p. 112.
Sees kin uses this
argument to support his convincing theory on the origin 0£
Plato•s theory 0£ recollection:
that it is a derivative o:f
the necessity in elenchos 0£ virtue £or its own attainment.
See especially his pp. 8 and 149.
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It must, however, be admitted that the 'failure 0£
nchOS is not entirely attributable to the weak-willed

1
~

tnterlocutors with whom Socrates converses.

While it is

true that they £ail to have the moral 'fiber requisite £or
participating in elenchos in good £ai th and enduring it to
its end, Socrates himself £ails to provide in his analogies
anything that can withstand the rules for defining
uni versa ls.

As has been shown, the analogies of the

secondary premises that withstand elenchos are nonetheless
as grounded in the particularity of action as anything
proposed by interlocutors and refuted during the course of
elenchos.

Socrates

1

"irony" may be his honest perception

of his inability to arrive at definition of uni versa ls, and
his at least residual orality, his position in the history
of philosophic thought, may provide the reason for his
failure to arrive at abstraction, but it is a failure
nonetheless.
Elenchos, then, hints at comedy, but is shot through
With tragedy.

But that is not all:

in its tragic dimensions.

It is likewise heroic

See skin argues that the tragedy

does not properly belong to the "· . . one person in the
city who does not profess wisdom, [the] one person who goes
about proclaiming his ignorance," Socrates, whom he
contrasts with the old tragic heroes "who claim to
something no mortal can have . . . , [who] have become so
enamored of their accomplishments that they have lost sight
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of their limitations."
111

Socrates is likewise, Seeskin

aintains, successful in elenchos, where •success is judged

l>Y the degree to which the respondent can abide by his own
adroissions, which is to say the degree to which he can
es:aroine

his

life

without

feeling

ashamed."138

But despite Socrates• knowledge of his
epistemological limitations, and despite the greater moral
fiber he brings to elenchos, his failure continues to
assert itself in the paradoxical equation that knowledge is
virtue.

Even if, as Seeskin argues. Socrates does have the

requisite human knowledge of his own limitations. he
nonetheless does not impart even this knowledge to his
interlocutors, all of whom go back to their former lives
and conduct them as if they know what they are doing.
Socrates, in his inability to define universals, with his
knowledge that is human, not divine, both contributes to
the tragedy that is the lack of moral improvement in the
interlocutors, and embodies the all-too-human tragedy in
that "he put before us an ideal of inquiry whose
ultimate

success

may

be

beyond

human

capabilities."139

Although Seeskin is correct in seeing the tragic
overtones of elenchos, he misses its comic undertones.
For it is precisely the reassertion of the limits of
"human capabilities," which nonetheless do not stop people
l38seeskin,

Dialogue,

pp.

78

and

141.

139seeskin,

Dialogue,

pp.

78

and

150.
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froDl bungling through their lives, that is essentially
co01ic.

And the impersonal aspect of elenchos, Socratic

•irony," can afford reader-auditors the comic objectivity
to see the humor in the situation, provided they are not
overly concerned with defending Socrates against charges of
insincerity and mockery.
~enc hos,

Play can be dead-serious, and

with its tragic overtones and comic undertones,

was dead-serious play.
In short, Socrates• practice of elenchos tragically
fails because of human limitations, whether these be
Socrates• epistemological or his interlocutors• moral
Umi ta tions:

elenchos does not arrive at the definition of

universals which can inform action.

And yet humans, both

Socrates and his interlocutors, continue to act and to
live, for all of their misinformed beliefs.
comic.

And this is

Elenchos• potential for achieving its goal is

strongly asserted, while the limitations 0£ its
participants are made pain£ully evident.

It is the

collocation of potential, limitation, and survival in spite
0£ it all that makes Plato's depiction of elenchos
essentially

tragic,

but nonetheless comic.

Socrates

settles comfortably between tragedy {Agathon) and comedy
(Aristophanes) in Symposium no less than he regularly does
in his elenchos, for it is there that philosophy can be
born:
Tragic plays make human beings conscious of their
condition and of the dimensions of powerlessness
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implicit in it:
tragedies elicit wonder, awe, fear,
even a sense of scandal. They hit us with a strong
sense 0£ our limitations; they feed a hunger for
understanding. There is so much for us to think.
about, and what we have to think. about gives us so
much to think. And yet human beings seem to think. so
rarely--and then so poorly: they keep coming up
against walls they have failed to see. . . . There is
nevertheless a redeeming feature in the tragic
religious awe:
insight into our initial inability to
learn and our subsequent opportunity to learn through
su££ering brings some relief.
Comedy has a counter-message . . . . Of course
human beings do not learn: but all can laugh at the
silliness of others and occasionally at their own.
And laughter brings relief and occasionally some cure.
Comedy shows that the ideas we have in our
heads are more foolish than the performances of our
bodies. . . . If tragedy articulates the seriousness
of life, comedy by having fun casts a cooling glance
on the games we play and restores a grasp of some of
the simplicities of lire. Comedy enhances the power
to think objectively (if not passionately) about our
problems. The tragic hunger £or justice, and
understanding together with the witty levity and
ironic resources of comedy jointly give birth to
philosophy.140
There are ellipses in the above quote because, in
Plato's depiction 0£ Socratic elenchos, only tragedy comes
into 'full bloom; comedy is an occasional intrusion on an
essentially tragic course.

We do not see, in elenchos, the

•repetitious pursuit of simple pleasures" Despland refers
to; nor do we, at least -from our historical perspective,
have the feeling that "[i]n any case, no one gets killed
for ignoring his or her limits; the consequences 0£
stupidity turn out to be lots of ridicule or a few
blows. •141

It

may

b e,

then,

merely

l40nespland,

Education,

pp.

141nespland,

Education,

p.

from

an

2.40-2.41.
2.41.

historical
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perspective, that elenchos becomes a tragedy and Socrates
tts hero.

But this is the case only if one chooses not to

1>elteve the dead-serious intent behind Socrates' play.

To

do this, however, one must ignore Plato's depiction of the
uian and his method.
In his depiction of potential and limitation, of the
possible and the actual, Plato makes his paradoxical
socra tes of the early dialogues a tragic hero.

For the

ancient Greeks, to be a hero meant to confront the paradox
that •to aspire to be like the gods was a hopeless piece of
dangerous presumption," and yet this same aspiration "was a
necessary

and

inevitable

spiritual

urge."142

In

his

insistence that knowledge may be born through elenchos and
his simultaneous failure to achieve it, the Platonic
Socrates continues to aspire--and continues to fail.

He is

heroic in his potential, in his continual aspiration, and
tragically limited only in the sense that all humans are
(comically) limited, at least according to the ancient
Greek view.

His interlocutors, by contrast, are

tragically limited in their heroic abilities to aspire, and
yet (comically) au-too-human because of their failure.
By showing his audience Socrates' limitations in the
realm of knowledge and his interlocutor's limitations in
the realm 0£ virtue, and putting both in a situation where
t42cedric Whitman, The Heroic Paradox:
Essays on
!!_omer, Sophocles, and Aristophanes (Ithaca and London:
Cornell Univ. Press, 1982), p. 22.
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ne

insists that the limitations can be overcome, Plato

constructs the essentially tragic interaction 0£ potential
and limitation.
reached.

Virtue is knowledge, but neither can be

This tragic interaction between potential and

limitation is at the very core 0£ the Socratic paradoxes
and the paradox that was the historical Socrates.

Plato

gives us both in his early dialogues.

Plato's tragic depiction 0£ Socrates' method is not,
however, the only depict.ion 0£ t.he method to survive £rom
antiquity.

For, even though it has rarely been perceived

as such, Aristophanes in t.he Clouds also depicts Socrates
following his usual procedure.
however,

t.rans~orms

Aristophanes' perspective,

the method into something primarily

comic; it will there£ore take an adjustment 0£ vision to be
able t.o see that Plato and Aristophanes have, in £act,
taken as their subject the same method.

CHAPTER TWO:

ARISTOPHANES OH SOCRATES AHD EURIPIDES:
ELEHCHOS COMICALLY DEPICTED

part One:

Evidence Linking Socrates and Euripides:

An Overview and an Apologia £or Aristophanes
Evidence connecting Socrates and Euripides, while not
abundant, is not lacking.

It is claimed, £or example,

that Euripides studied philosophy under Socrates, and was
unpopular because he admired Socrates.

Socrates is said to

have helped Euripides write his plays.

Socrates, although

he was not an habitual theater-goer, is averred to have
made a point 0£ attending new Euripidean productions and to
have approved 0£ certain sentiments expressed on stage, but
is described as leaving when he heard what he considered
objectionable sentiments expressed in Euripides•
plays.1
This evidence is, £or the most part, however,

lFor an inventory and citation 0£ the ancient
evidence, see Robert J. Yankow, Socratic e11'taT.fiµ'T)
in Two Plays 0£ Euripides: The Medea and Hippolytus (Hew
York:
diss. Fordam Univ., 1978; herea£ter Yank.ow, Socratic
>
,
£11'lOT'IJIJ.'I)),
pp.
39-43.
A
collection
of
biographical
evidence on Socrates in English translation can be £ound in
John Ferguson, Socrates: A Sourcebook (London and
Basingstok:
Macmillan and Co., Ltd., £or The Open
University, 1970). For the evidence on Euripides analyzed
and a bibliography, see Mary Lefkowitz, The Lives 0£ the
Greek Poets (Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins Univ. Press,
1981; herea£ter Le£kowitz, Lives), pp. 89-103 and 163-172.
See also P. T. Stevens, "Euripides and the Athenians," JHS
76 (1956), pp. 87-94.
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untrustworthy.

Much 0£ it is written a£ter the £i£th

century B. C. by men who did not know Socrates and
guripides, and whose sources, historiographical methods,
and intentions in writing are either unknown or, when
Known, are such that they render the in£orma tion -furnished
suspect.

Mary Le£k.owitz, in her Lives 0£ the Greek. Poets,

has demonstrated that "

. virtually all the material in

all the lives is £iction"; that the material was derived
from the poets• own works and £rom characterizations 0£
the poets £ound in comedy, was written with an intent more
often to entertain and delight than to in£orm, and was
molded with an eye to the readers• expectations, i.e. that
poets .
should have lives like those 0£ heroes,
involving con£rontations, requiring isolation and,
o£ten, violent deaths; but unlike heroes, poets could
be portrayed as ordinary or even foolish men, so that
their creativity would not seem mysterious or even
particularly
di££icult.2
Doubts about the reliability 0£ the biographical
tradition do not dispel what is more important for this
study, namely, that even in ancient times a methodological
similarity between Socrates and Euripides was perceived.
Moreover, there is a contemporary witness, not 0£ the
biographical tradition, who also at tests to a perceived
methodological similarity between Socrates and Euripides.
As any reader 0£ Aristophanes• comedies knows, Socrates and
Euripides are depicted by the comic playwright as sharing

2Le£k.owitz,

Lives,

pp.

vii-ix.
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similar practices.

A striking illustration comes £rom the

end of the Frogs, where the Chorus censures habitual
association with Socrates as a corrupting influence on
guripides• poetry:
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It is smart, then, not to sit beside Socrates
chattering, throwing away music and the greatest
remnants of the tragic art. Only a deranged man
passes idle time in solemn words and trifles of trash.
(Frogs
1491-1499).3
The above quotation is the most explicit and least
ambiguous evidence from Aristophanes" plays, which in other
ways forcefully suggest that Socrates" customary way of
speaking with his fellow citizens was detectable in
Euripides• dramatic poetry.

Aristophanes, then, as a

contemporary of Socrates and Euripides, stands the chance
of being the only witness to a methodological similarity
shared by the philosopher and the poet.
Aristophanes, a trustworthy witness?

Aristophanes,

who depicted Socrates" "thinkery" gleefully put to torch at

3The text used for all of Aristophanes except the
Clouds is F. W. Hall and W. K. Geldart, eds., Aristophanis
Comoediae, vols. 1 and 2, 2 ed. (Oxford:
Clarendon Press,
1906 and 1907). The text used for the Clouds is the one
established by K. J. Dover, ed., Aristophanes, Clouds
(Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1968; hereafter Dover, Clouds).
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nd o£ his Clouds?
tb.e e

Whose Frogs showed Dionysus, the

patron god of tragedy, forswearing and casting his vote
against retrieving Euripides from death in Hades?
tb.iS man a hostile witness?

Isn't

Yet, even i£ Aristophanes is

not considered hostile, mustn't one wonder along with
how reliable a

Lefkowitz, "·
who was not a

source is Aristophanes,

historian but a

comic poet ?"4

I£, however, it can be argued that Aristophanes is a
trustworthy witness, then his depictions 0£ Socrates and
Euripides can be examined for the evidence they give on
methodological similarity.

The perception of this

similarity is, in fact, the one constant in the history of
criticism of Aristophanes as a portrayer of Socrates and
Euripides.

The critical literature for the most part,

however, denounces Aristophanes' representation of the two
men, and of Socrates especially, as profoundly distorted.
The reasons cited for this distortion are two:

either

Aristophanes was maliciously hostile, or else he chose to
serve the muse of comedy at the expense of truthful
representation.

Each of these will be considered in turn.

The assessment that Aristophanes was motivated solely
by hostility in portraying Socrates and Euripides is not
Widespread, but has had, nonetheless, as will be argued
below, an insidious effect on most of the critical
literature.

The assessment of hostility seems to take its

4Lefk.owitz,

Lives,

p.

viii.
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illlpetus £rom a sense 0£ righteous indignation at what is
considered the gross misrepresentation 0£ (primarily)
socrates and (secondarily) Euripides and the imagined
iegacY 0£ this misrepresentation in the lives 0£ the two
111en.

wasn t
1

Aristophanes, a£ter all, answerable in part

for the opinion 0£ Socrates that led to his being charged
and ultimately put to death?
much at

Plato has Socrates say as

Apology 19a.7-c.5:

I will take up -from the beginning and ask what is the
accusation -from which has arisen slander 0£ me, and
upon which Meletos relied when he wrote this
indictment against me. Well, then, what is it the
slanderers say? One must read their statements just
like the a££idavit 0£ the accusers: "Socrates acts
unjustly and is a meddler who seeks things under the
earth and in heaven, makes the weaker argument the
stronger, and teaches these things to others." Such
is the accusation. You yourselves have seen these
things in the comedy 0£ Aristophanes, a certain
Socrates there born a lo-ft, claiming to walk the air
and babbling many other absurdities, 0£ which I
understand nothing whatsoever.5
Even the habitually jud.icious K. J. Dover, although he
never overtly accuses Aristophanes 0£ malicious intent in
regard to Socrates, nevertheless suggests only
incriminating explanations £or Aristophanes

1

portrait 0£

the Philosopher--that Aristophanes was either politically
motivated, or callously interested in playing to the
gallery, or inexcusably oblivious

to

all-too-predictable

consequences:
I£ Clouds made li£e hard £or Socrates, did
Aristophanes care? I£ he entertained a genuine moral
5see

also

Apology

18b.
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indignation against the subversion of custom and
traditional beliefs, he would have welcomed such an
outcome; if he was not so very indignant, but wanted
to raise all the laughs he could and enlist the
sympathies of the average member of his audience, I
doubt whether he would have hesitated to buy success
at the price of Socrates• security. One simple
consideration suggests, at any rate, that the play is
not good-natured fun which Socrates• friends could
enjoy as much as anyone else: people really were
prosecuted and outlawed or killed for alleged injury
to the community, and this makes all the di££erence
between the burning of Socrates school and some
modern fantasy depicting the boiling of a politician,
for we no longer boil people (or even discommode them)
for errors of political judgment.6
1

Martha Nussbaum cites "our reverence £or Socrates" as
primarily accountable £or the Clouds
an

"irritating

work."7

being experienced as

1

Similarly,

indignation

is

6K. J. Dover, Aristophanic Comedy (Berkeley and
Los Angeles:
Univ. 0£ California Press, 1972), p. 119.
See, however, Dover, Clouds, p. lvi, £or a recti£ication 0£
the assumption that Aristophanes• culpability is increased
by the fact that he should have known of what the Athenians
were capable: "We can only observe that the Athenians did
not necessarily do what Ar. told them to do . . . ."
Similarly, see Cedric H. Whitman, Aristophanes and the
Comic Hero (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press, 1964;
hereafter Whitman, Comic Hero), p. 15, for Aristophanes
imagined delight at being taken, in general, so seriously.
1

7Martha Nussbaum, "Aristophanes and Socrates on
Learning Practical Wisdom," YCS 26 (1980; hereafter
Nussbaum, "Practical Wisdom•r.-pp. 44-45.
C£. Whitman,
Comic Hero, p. 143, who cites Socra tes remarks in the
Apology as the source 0£ the di££iculty 0£ accepting
Aristophanes• caricature in the Clouds as "a highly
distinguished comic creation," but argues against any
animosity £el t by Plato for Aristophanes. Whitman
maintains that the testimony of the Symposium "far
outweighs the passing remarks in the Apology," and
concludes, "Had Plato really felt an enemy in
Aristophanes, he certainly possessed the articulateness to
say so clearly." Whitman in any case considers it
"dubious" that the Clouds "may have engendered a degree of
PUblic prejudice against Socrates, nearly a quarter-century
after the play•s abysmal failure." (p. 8).
1
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soJDetimes £elt at Aristophanes' depiction 0£ Euripides
aJ:>andoned at the end 0£ the Frogs, a scene that becomes
tantamount to a betrayal when considered in light 0£ what
,,ere presumed to be :facts about the dramatic poet's li£e.
guripides• supposed unpopularity becomes the imagined
reason £or his £inal departure £rom Athens, and the poet's
JDiserable li:fe--the seemingly logical precursor o:f his
final

and

dispirited

exit8--get

laid,

like

against Socrates, at Aristophanes• :feet.
of Medea
8see

292 :ff., where
P.

T.

Stevens,

Medea

and

charges

In his discussion

attributes

"Euripides

the

the envy9 o:f
the

Athenians,"
pp.

JHS 76 (1956; hereafter Stevens, "E. and Athenians"),
~94, who assesses in:formation concerning Euripides•

unpopularity :from the ancient biographical tradition, the
rarity o:f Euripides• dramatic victories, and the impression
of the poet derived :from his treatment in Aristophanes. He
concludes that the picture of the increasingly unpopular
and isolated poet is probably exaggerated, and not in any
case :founded upon undisputed evidence. Stevens anticipates
Lefkowitz•s work by recognizing that Satyros• Lif'e of'
Euripides "· . . is partly based on the acceptance of' the
jests o:f Comedy as historical :fact, and on the assumption
that autobiographical allusions can be discerned in
numerous passages from the plays of Euripides himself." (p.
87).
9The
word
she
uses
is
cp8ovo5.
See
Lefkowitz, Lives, pp. 95-96, for the same word used in the
biography of Euripides to explain the comic poets' at tack,
the attribution of Cephisophon as his coauthor, the
generalized hatred of the Athenians, and a young man's
Offensive remark that the poet had bad breath. Le:fkowitz
does not suggest that the word points to Medea 292 f:f. as
the origin of these remarks, but maintains instead that the
characteristic Greek ambivalence toward extraordinary
achievement became, in the case of Euripides, who
"Presumably was somewhat arrogant and kept away from
ordinary people and had no interest in appealing to his
audiences," the cpOovos invited by a superior stance.
The biographer's description of Euripides' arrogance and
isolation, however, likewise suggests Medea as a source;
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tile citizens to their reaction against her reputation as
one 'Who is clever, Denys Page gives a poignant description
of guripides as the unappreciated genius and 0£
Aristophanes as the heartless cad 0£ a comic poet who
contributed to his already considerable distress:
Foreshadowed, too, already in Medea is the great
burden 0£ unpopularity which was to oppress the poet
throughout his lire. The sequel was the ridicule and
hatred which Aristophanes re-fleets: the climax was
his voluntary exile to Macedonia in sorrow and
disillusion. Euripides was not the only teacher whom
the Athenians persecuted, though they returned to him
again and again, admiring while they hated, moved
while they mocked and slandered . . . History traces a
single undeviating line 'from this passage 0£ Medea
(lines 2.92 ££.] through the bitter pages 0£
Aristophanes to the 'final scene 0£ an old man
wandering out into the world 'friendless and
embittered.10
Yet the assessment 0£ Aristophanes as a bitterly
hostile witness, while it carries the scapegoat •s boon 0£
the emotional purge, is nonetheless un£ounded, not only
because it relies £or the most part on historical evidence
shown by Le£kowitz to be 0£ uncertain value, but also
because it assumes that the plays in question admit 0£
obvious interpretations:

I£ Aristophanes in his plays

shows Socrates• school ablaze and Euripides abandoned in
see Medea's remarks to the Corinthian women at Medea 214
££.
10nenys L. Page, ed., Euripides, Medea (Ox£ord:
Clarendon Press, 1961; hereafter Page, Medea), pp. xiiXiii.
See also his comment at lines 292 sqq., p. 94:
"A
famous passage: we seem to hear Eur. himself speaking, who
SUf£ered much unpopularity at Athens. At last 'mortified
by the hostility o-f his fellow-citizens", as his biographer
relates, he retired to the court o-f Macedon."
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Jlades, then Aristophanes must be the one who condones and
recoJDmends such actions.
sho1fS socra tes

1

1£ Aristophanes in his plays

school ablaze and Euripides abandoned in

flades, then the plays ipso £acto are criticisms 0£ Socrates
and

Euripides.11

Such

interpretations

0£

the

plays,

ho1fever, as will be suggested, are no more able to stand
1fben put to close scrutiny than are the quasi-historical
biographies with which they have association.

Only when

emotional bias against Aristophanes and obvious
interpretations are abandoned can the complexities and
subtleties 0£ his comic vision begin to be appreciated.
The rewards 0£ such an appreciation can be discovered
in much 0£ the critical literature assessing Aristophanes
portrayal 0£ Socrates and Euripides.

1

Yet this literature

is, £rom the perspective 0£ this study at least, both
b~ssed

and cursed by a reactionary stance against the

assessment 0£ Aristophanes as maliciously hostile.

In an

attempt to exonerate Aristophanes £rom the charges 0£ being
either small and mean or else stupid, this literature
regularly cites comic convention as the reason behind the
distortion, and this is a

blessing, because such a stance

inspires examination 0£ the nature 0£ Aristophanes

1

comic

genius, and obvious interpretations 0£ the plays are not
111ronically enough, such obvious interpretations
may in £act be the only source £or the assessment 0£
Aristophanes as a hostile witness, since the ancient
biographers relied on the comedies to make many 0£ their
seemingly plausible claims.
See Le£k.owitz, Lives, passim.
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able to endure the consequences of this examination.
cur Se

The

of this reactionary stance--the denial that the comic

poet's depictions contain any significant element of
biStoricity--is, it seems, the enduring byproduct of a
resistance to accepting the vexing implications behind the
obvious interpretations of the plays:

that there was

perhaps every reason why Socrates and his school should be
incinerated

and

Euripides

left

to

rot.12

In an attempt, then, to address the £elt need to
rehabilitate Aristophanes, it is often argued that
Aristophanes himsel£ bore no overwhelming hostility £or
Socrates and Euripides, but that he nonetheless confused
his audience and readers; that his depiction distorts the
truth with no £orethought 0£ malice, but simply by its
service to the needs of comic exaggeration and
simplification.

From this perspective, Aristophanes comes

into his own; he is exonerated as comic poet.

Ho one

better pronounces an apologia £or Aristophanes than Cedric
Whitman, who discerns the shadow of truth Aristophanic
comedy mirrors, albeit sometimes darkly:
Whether or not Old Comedy is a sound historical source
for the study of £ifth-century Athenian society, in
12Aristophanes• comedy in £act re£lects, it will
be argued below (Parts Two and Three), the fifth-century B.
C. Athenian sentiment that the method employed by both men
led only to con£usion and disruption. Comedy, objective
Where reverence £ears to tread, gives a view of elenchos
from the outside: renouncing awareness 0£ elenchos•
Ultimate goals 0£ moral improvement and the birth 0£ truth,
comedy presents elenchos as chicanery.
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Aristophanes• hands it is a powerful refractor of that
society, more truthful, perhaps, about the passionate
inner drives and aspirations than about the political
or economic details; more concerned, at its best, with
spiritual wholeness, as all true classic art is, than
with moralizing about parts. Its mode is one of
bursting generosity; it seems to use anything that
comes to hand. Large sprays of wit, satire,
slapstick., lyric, whimsy, realism, obscenity, and
sheer nonsense come tumbling out in bacchanalian
abundance, and in the midst of the cheer£ul tumult, it
is vain, not to say absurd, to try to catch the poet,
unmask. him, and make him say his moral catechism. The
ef£ort to do so always leads to the same maddening and
irresistible 'figure who avers that he is the best
influence in Greece, constantly improving his 'fellow
citizens by de-fending them 'from demagogues, sophists,
and Euripide~ and 'feeding them on the 'finest comic
£are conceivable, in contrast to the vulgar and
poverty-stricken o££erings 0£ his less fortunate
rivals.13
And yet, even as some of the critical literature
grants Aristophanes his comic license and identifies the
locus 0£ the truth he speaks in the audience whose drives
and aspirations he mirrors, most of this same literature
still assumes that Aristophanes• depiction 0£ the Socrates
and Euripides is, in all 0£ its signi£icant details,
pro£oundly distorted; and there is a sense in this
literature that neither Socrates nor Euripides deserved
such roughshod treatment at the hands of a comic poet who
did not even have the decency to draw them accurately.
Aristophanes is 'frequently charged with wrongfully
amalgamating the two men and with failing to distinguish
them from broad categories of individuals held up for easy
ridicule.

In this vein is the remark. 0£ Bruno Snell:

13Whi tman,

Comic

Hero,

pp.

14--15.
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Whatever the differences between Euripides, Socrates,
and the Sophists, in Aristophanes they are
indistinguishable; their only activity consists in
cleverly lining their pockets through the teaching of
.,,arious tricks which are destined to wreck the healthy
morality of the solid Athenian citizen, and to subvert
the traditional structure of the state.14
SiPlilarly, Dover, in his attempt to understand
Aristophanes• reasons :for misrepresenting Socrates in the
mouds, suggests that the philosopher is made to conform to
the genus o:f the "intellectual," or even is more broadly
drawn as the "abnormal man":
The abnormal man is essentially parasitic on the
normal; he does no real work, he undermines the
loyalties on which the city"s continued existence
depends, and he casts a shadow over the ordinary
pleasures of life by the unspoken implication that
there may be other, secret pleasures accessible to him
alone.15
Even Whitman, who has such a keen appreciation :for
Aristophanic comedy, is :firm in maintaining that
Aristophanes• portrayals 0£ both Socrates and Euripides are
14Bruno Snell, The Discovery of the Mind:
The
Greek Origins 0£ European Thought, trans. T. G. Rosenmeyer
(Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1953; Harper Torchbook
ed., Hew York:
Harper and Row, 1960; hereafter Snell,
Discovery), p. 114.
15nover, Clouds, p. liii.
See also Dover•s
Aristophanic Comedy (Berkeley and Los Angeles: Univ. 0£
California Press, 1972), pp. 116-120, where he maintains
that "To suppose . . . that Aristophanes decided to treat
Socrates as the paradigm of the sophist and attached to him
any attribute of the whole genus which lent itsel-f to
ridicule is not particularly difficult." For the untenable
argument that in depicting Socrates and Euripides,
Aristophanes drew on the stock character 0£ "The Learned
Doctor," see F. M. Cornford, The Origin of Attic Comedy
(London:
Cambridge Univ. Press, 1914; hereafter Cornford,
Attic Comedy), pp. 154-163.
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.

.-1rtU

allY a-historical:

is his own, not history's; his Euripides is his

trounces
o•n:
cor r

·

hJ.S

"The Cleon whom Aristophanes

Socrates is his own."

Dismissing as trivial any

espondence to reality in Aristophanes• Socrates,

Whitman describes the portrayal as a virtuoso's
conglornera te 0£ many men, rolled in to the physically most
amusing pacK.age at hand with a recognizable name:
It is less important . .
to trace the genuinely
socra tic touches in the Clouds, than it is to
recognize the composite image 0£ the intellectual
climate, under the name 0£ Socrates. The poet might
have called it by a di££erent name, but Socrates•
local pre-eminence entitled him to £irst
consideration. . . . There could never have been any
question 0£ representing him seriously and accurately.
Had there been, Aristophanes would scarcely have
accredited him with practically all the intellectual
accomplishments 0£ the whole sophistic movement--plus
the doctrines 0£ Diogenes, which cannot be called
sophistic.
Rather, this was an inspired piece 0£
poetic invention to gather together the WeaK.er
Discourse 0£ Protagoras, some 0£ the rhetorical
claims 0£ Gorgias, the air physics 0£ Diogenes, the
linguistic studies 0£ Prodicus, and the ethic 0£
Antiphon, or some one 0£ his predecessors, into one
character. A dash 0£ sheer crooK.ed quacKery was added
and then the mixture was molded into an image 0£
lo£ty, unscrupulous, and cloudy versatility--which
itsel£ suggests Hippias 0£ Elis.
The total brilliant
imposture was staged under the name 0£ the £unniestlooK.ing man in Athens, the £at and pug-nosed
Philosopher whose £ace itsel£ was a comic masK.16
Whitman liKewise perceives Aristophanes• Euripides as
a type, having little in common with the historical
tragedian.

In the Frogs, Euripides represents

16 Whi tman, Comic Hero, pp. 57 and 142.
P.
Kara vi tes, "Socrates in the Clouds," CB 50 (1973-1974), pp.
65 -69, argues that Aristophanes• Socrates di££ers £rom
Plato's because Aristophanes• only concern was to parody
Socrates• physical appearance.
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. . . the divisive and centrifugal forces of
relativism, irresponsible rhetoric, and in general the
new education. . . . Euripides appears as the
embodiment of talk., both trivial and shifty, a
quibbling immoralist concerned on the one hand with
verbal exactitude, and on the other with morally
ruinous equivocation.
t Whitman protests, the image 0£ Euripides in the Frogs,
BU.
who "serves as a symbol £or the ruinous present, and is
identified with every form 0£ public or private corruption
and decay" is
. . . so distorted and the caricature so much the
comedian's invention, that to take it literally comes
close to humorless pedantry. . . . Euripides is the
eternal spoof artist, the long-haired hoax, made
funnier than usual by the addition 0£ the name and a
few 0£ the idiosyncrasies, 0£ a great living
tragedian.17
These arguments that Aristophanes depicts broad types,
perceptive

as

they

may

be

in

certain

particulars,18

nonetheless indicate a de£ensi ve undertone by their
stringent denial that these are anything other than mere
types, betraying little 0£ importance about the historical
Socrates and Euripides.

Granting Aristophanes his comic

license is clearly not enough; it does not entirely dispel
the need to sa£eguard Socrates and Euripides 'from
misinterpretation.
17whitman,

Such an over-zealous policy 0£

Comic

Hero,

pp.

232,

241,

and

220.

18rt will not be argued that there is no
distortion in Aristophanes' portraits 0£ Socrates and
Euripides, but instead that these distortions can be
recognized, in large part, as the reaction to and
assessment of the elenctic method, which both men used.
See the discussion below, Parts Two and Three.
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pro

tectionism, however, by anxiously pro:f:fering evidence o:f

the "types" that the Aristophanic Socrates and Euripides
supposedly represent, begs the question why Aristophanes
used Socrates and Euripides.

Was it merely that their

notoriety, a :few idiosyncracies, and a :funny :face made them
easY marks?

Are we to grant so little integrity to

Aristophanes• parodies?

Or is it rather that our

"reverence" blinds us and our indignation still rankles;
that we perhaps want in some way to chastise Aristophanes
:for even an artistically pardonable misrepresentation, that
we are hesitant to throw these two men once again to the
critical wolves that have :for centuries worried their
reputations?

If Aristophanes• depictions 0£ Socrates and

Euripides are allowed any credibility, a

breach will be

torn in carefully considered defenses of the two men.

If

it is granted that Aristophanes in any way accurately
describes their practices, can it continue to be denied
that the ef:fects 0£ those practices shown in the plays have
validity?

The distance seems short to a reassertion that

Socrates and his ilk. brought about the £all of Athens; that
Euripides personally was to blame :for the death of tragedy.
But it is not just the possibility that the critical
literature has been dominated by an unhealthy over-reaction
to the past that suggests a reason :for reevaluating these
Portraits:

a

less prejudicial assessment 0£ Aristophanes

begins on its own to make the need £or reeval ua ti on
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apparent.

The logic o-£ the "type" begins to crumble under

tbe weight o-£ instances in Aristophanes• plays that
demonstrate how uncannily accurate he can be in certain
particulars of his portraits of Socrates and
guripides.19

How

are

we

to

explain such perspicuity

in

a man who insists on drawing broad and inaccurate types?
Hust we return to the hypothesis of malicious hostility or
tbe possibility that condemnation is justifiable?
Likewise, as comic convention is used to exonerate
Aristophanes from the charges of malice and ignorance, the
more obvious interpretations of the two plays in question,
the Clouds and the Frogs--interpretations which suggest
full-blown condemnation of Socrates and Euripides--begin to
lose their conviction when the plays are seen as more than
the mere progression of their plots.

In turn, an

understanding both for the genre of comedy in general and
the context required for appreciating its meaning release
the plays from being considered simply remonstrative.
Tone, characterization, and the poet s own methodology
1

begin

to

19see

be

taken

below,

into

Parts

consideration.20
Two

and

The

burning

of

Three.

20rn the Clouds it comes to be recognized, for
example, that Aristophanes censure of Socrates is
untenable when one considers that Strepsiades is shown to
be a swindler before he enters Socrates• school; that
Socrates own interests are almost entirely harmless (if
not purely nonsensical); that the absenting of Socrates
from the agon between Right and Anti-Right needs
explanation; that Anti-Right is peculiarly prurient for all
his praise of chastity. In the Frogs, it is observed that
1

1
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soc r

ates' school and the abandonment 0£ Euripides in Hades

acquire the sinister undertone 0£ poetic sanction, after
all.

onlY when extracted -from their context; as Le-fk.owi tz

b.as noted, "·

. without perspective humour turns into

. . sm .. 21
cri ti.ci.
·

Finally,

the

assumption

that

Aristophanes is an arch-conservative and champion against
anything that is new, including Socrates and Euripides, is
called

to

question

and

put

to

task..22

In conclusion. Aristophanes' legitimacy as a

witness

to a methodological similarity between Socrates and
Euripides can only be accurately assessed when the
the most damning criticism 0£ Euripides comes -from the
mouth 0£ the obviously biased Aeschylus; that Dionysus, who
decides in -favor 0£ Aeschylus, does so not on any
discernibly rational grounds, i.e., on the basis 0£
Aeschylus' poetic merits or morality, but instead on the
basis 0£ whim.
For discussion 0£ these considerations, see
below, Parts Two and Three.
21Le£k.owitz, Lives, p. 98.
See also the excellent
brief discussion of the distortion possible when comedy is
taken out of context in Gilbert Murray, Aristophanes: A
Study (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1933; hereafter Murray,
Aristophanes}, p. 86.
Cf. Havelock.. "Socratic Problem.''
pp. 169-171, for hostility and inaccuracy in representation
as antithetical to comedy.
22see especially A. W. Gomme, "Aristophanes and
Politics," CR 52 (1938), pp. 97-109.
For conservatism as a
comic convention, see, e.g., Whitman, Comic Hero, pp. 1314; for the characteristic temperament 0£ the comic poet,
see Dover, Clouds, pp. lvi-lvii; for Aristophanes' possible
involvement in and sympathy with many 0£ the new trends 0£
the £i£th century B. C., see R. E. Wycherley, "Aristophanes
and Euripides," G&R 15 (1946), pp. 98-107, and Lowell
Edmunds, "Aristophanes• Socrates." in Proceedings 0£ the
Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy, Vol. 1, 1985,
ed. John J. Cleary (Lantham, MD: University Press 0£
America, 1986; herea-fter Edmunds, "Socrates"), pp. 227-2.2.9.
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coroplexitY and subtlety of his comic vision begin to be
respected, when the examination of his work is unburdened
both of the indiscretion caused by ignorance or
preconception and of the reactionary vigilance which is its
obverse; when the censure, ridicule, and blame that are the
custom of Athenian Old Comedy are accepted as a mirror of
what the poet's audience recognizes, not of the poet's own
thoughts and -feelings or 0£ an unassailable truth; when the
plays of Aristophanes are considered as wholes, not
preconceived parts to be mined for evidence of the poet's
attitudes and beliefs; in short, when critics stop
opera ting from the primary premise, ironically the mod us
operandi of the comic poets themselves, that "the man was
his

work."23
This chapter, then, in Part Two will confirm what has

recently

been

only

fractionally

argued,24

that

Aristophanes• portrayal 0£ Socrates is an acute parody 0£
many facets of the elenctic method (analyzed above in
Chapter One), the method Socrates is shown using in Pla to•s
early dialogues.

In Part Three it will further be proposed

that Aristophanes insistently represents Euripides• methods
as similar to Socrates', a
23Lefkow i tz,

Lives,

similarity that the Chorus•
p.

ix.

2 4 Hussbaum, "Practical Wisdom," pp. 43-97; Eric A.
Havelock, "The Socratic Sel£ as it is Parodied in
Aristophanes' Clouds," YCS 27 (1972; herea£ter Havelock,
"Socratic Self"), pp. 1-18.
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IPoni ti on at Frogs 1491-1499 {quoted above) makes explicit.
'l'bere is every reason, it can be argued, to look to
guripides' plays £or evidence of' the Socratic elenchos
Aristophanes parodied, a method that Aristophanes•
comedies suggest was an all-too-evident f'eature of
guripides' drama tic art.

Part Two:

Aristophanes• Comic Elenchos:

Socrates' Character and Strepsiades• Predicament
It may be that historical hindsight has £orever kept

posterity from unrestrained enjoyment of the humor in
Aristophanes' portrayal 0£ Socrates; the Clouds, with its
gleeful incineration of the school 0£ Socrates, perhaps
master
B.

c.

and

au, 25

eerily

anticipate

the

events

of

399

Nonetheless, an inability to laugh need not

constrain us from accepting Aristophanes• portrait as
humor, and, as will be argued below, humor with its gaze
directed unblinkingly at its target:

Socrates and the

method he visited upon his unsuspecting fellow citizens.
For although it is quite possible to de£end Aristophanes•
depiction 0£ Socrates as a type-portrait, some 0£ the humor
is lost in the process.

1£, then, we pause, drop our

indignation at the martyred Socrates blasphemously put to
torch nearly a quarter century before his time, and instead
for a moment consider what it must have been like £or the
fifth century B. C. Athenian--about his own business,

25 Tha t the ending 0£ the Clouds shows Socrates
burned to death, and as such is evidence that Aristophanes
foresaw, and indeed advised, a "final solution" £or the
Athenians• problematic relationship with the philosopher,
is argued, although not persuasively, by E. Christian Kopf£
in his article "Rubes 14-93 fr.:
Was Socrates Murdered?,"
GRBS 18 (1977; herea£ter Kop££, "Hubes 14-93 ££."), pp. 113122.
F. D. Harvey, "Rubes 1493 ££.:
Was Socrates
Murdered?," GRBS 2.2 (1981; hereafter Harvey, "Rubes 1493
ff."), pp. 339-34-3, o££ers rive sound arguments against
K:opf£'s interpretation.
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colDforta b

le in the assurance that he knew :full well what he

..,.ante d

and was about to do--to have been accosted on the

stree t

bY an elenchos-wielding Socrates, it becomes

possible to accept that what Aristophanes gives is
socrates' method objectified :from the interlocutor's
perspective.
Objecti:fica tion is one o:f comedy's primary tools:
insider's

view

tends

to

be

serious

i:f

not

the

tragic.26

But for the insider who steps back a :few paces, the
momentous and significant suddenly appear ludicrous.

Neil

Simon gives a delightful description o:f the comedian's
objective

perspective:

Not long a-fter we were married, my wi-fe and I
stood toe to toe in the kitchen, exchanging verbal
punches that were as devastating and as painful as any
thrown in a championship heavyweight match. Each
accusation, each emotional blow :found its mark, and we
both reeled from the awesome destructive power o:f the
truths we hurled. Then suddenly, because there were
no adequate words left to express her hurt,
:frustration and anger, my wife did what now seems to
be the only sensible and rational thing she could have
done. She picked up a :frozen veal chop recently left
out on the table to defrost, and hurled it at me,
striking me just above the right eye.
I was so stunned I could barely react; stunned
not by the blow nor the intent, but by the absurdity
that I, a grown man, had just been hit in the head
with a :frozen veal chop. I could not contain myself,
and a :faint :flicker o:f a smile crossed my :face.
Suddenly the anger and hostility drained :from me and I
:found myself outside the situation looking in, no
longer involved as a man in conflict, but as an
observer, an audience so to speak, watching two people
on a stage, both 0£ whom cared :for each other, but
26see the contrast o:f tragic and comic viewpoints
in Despland, Education, pp. 240-241 (quoted above, Chapter
One, Part Four).
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were unable or unwilling to yield or to submit without
having £irst gained some small vicious victory.
Add to the scene the £act that, like the two
policemen in a Roald Dahl short story who ate the
frozen mutton leg murder instrument £or dinner, thus
depriving themselves 0£ their single piece of
evidence, I wo.uld soon be eating the object that
nearly destroyed my marriage. And I hate veal
c h o p s . 27
As the chop follows a projectile away from Simon's wi£e's
hand, its intent as weapon is confronted by its aspect as
food.

At the moment when it beans Simon on the forehead it

becomes totally ridiculous:

it is suddenly again food and,

as such, no weapon to use against a grown man.

The chop

can no longer lay claim to the exalted status as weapon,
just as the argument can no longer be taken as truly
destructive:

£or if the argument is serious, the chop is a

weapon and th us crucial evidence which should not be
eaten.

But eaten it will be, and, in the £inal tally, it

is deemed substandard even as food.
I£ a passionately and pointedly hurled veal chop can,
by being extracted £rom its context, lose all the
seriousness of its intent, imagine, then, how ludicrous
Socrates and his elenchos could appear to one who, like
Simon from the argument, has retreated from intense
involvement.

Retreat allows £or the £ading of the

2 7Neil Simon, "I, a Grown Han, Hit in the Head
With a Frozen Veal Chop," Introduction to The Comedy of
Heil Simon, repr. in Arthur H. Eastman, et al., eds., The
Horton Reader.
An Anthology of Expository Prose, 3 e~
(New York:
W. W. Norton & Co,. 1973), pp. 67-68.
I am
indebted to James Keenan £or calling my attention to this
essay.
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perceive

d object's motive and meaning, which are not

·dent on the surface.

e\fl

With distance, integrity of the

,,hole gives way to conspicuous parts that, out of context,
become idiosyncratic and beg exaggeration.
comic objectification, which can transform a weapon
into a bilious main course, a serious incident into a
ludicrous one, does not, however, fully explain the comic
transformation elenchos undergoes in Aristophanes' Clouds.
Aristophanes, a£ter all, was competing £or a prize and was
therefore eager to gain the belly-laugh that comes alone
-from a knowing recognition.

Aristophanes does not

there-fore depict, and £or good reason, the Socrates and
Socratic method of Plato's early dialogues.
merely that Plato's Socrates, a

It is not

man passionately concerned

with virtue, knowledge, and the relentless examination of
himself

and

others

is

not

at

all

funny.2.8

Rather,

it

is that in Plato's Socrates we see one extraordinary man
viewed by another; this was hardly the Socrates experienced
by the majority of Athenians.

Aristophanes, then, gives us

a Socrates who serves as an antidote to the one portrayed
by his devoted disciple Plato; Aristophanes gives us

2.8one need not, however, resort to the hypothesis
that Aristophanes• counter-depiction is either a type
Portrait that so grossly distorts Plato's Socrates as to
have very little in common with it, nor even that it is a
Portrayal of the pre-Platonic Socrates, as A. E. Taylor
argues in Socrates: The Han and His Thought (Garden City,
HY:
Doubleday and Co., 1953; herea£ter Taylor, Socrates),
PP. 70 ff.
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soc ra

tes as he was seen by the man on the street.
The perspective 0£ man on the street was that 0£ the

pre-literate. 2 9

And

when

this

man

It is di££icul t

..,orldS collided.

met

Socrates,

two

£or us, living as we do

in an age 0£ literacy, com£ortable with linear, logical
modes 0£ thought and abstraction, to imagine what kind 0£
experience it must have been £or the average Athenian to be
con£ronted by Socrates.

Aristophanes gives us insight into

this experience, and it is hilariously £unny.

Scholars

have long argued about who is this Aristophanic Socrates,
this £loating, babbling lunatic,

this oily shyster, this

aggravating trouble-maker who begs to be brought down to
earth and £inally is:

this is the Platonic Socrates, £rom

the perspective 0£ the eternally perplexed, be-fuddled, and
worsted,

i.e.,

the

long-su££ering

interlocutor.

We should not wonder, then, to see Pla to s
1

metaphysical view 0£ Socrates and elenchos made physical.
In Aristophanes• play, abstractions are made concrete,

uni versa ls become particulars, and, in Strepsiades•
experience, the interlocutor's experience 0£ elenchos is
disclosed:

his initial high con£idence and wonder, his

growing con£usion and frustration, his pain£ul recognition
and reversal, his true desires laid bare with all of their
disconcerting and unforeseen consequences, and what was, in

2 9see

Three.

the

discussion

above,

Chapter

One,

Part
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d the interlocutor's -final wish:
to be rid 0£ this
tb.e en '
unding pest; to escape, to get back, somehow--anyhow-con fo
to hiS com£ortable world where everything once seemed so
so

simple,

concrete,

so secure.

In Aristophanes, then, one can see Socrates practicing
elenchos, but elenchos stripped 0£ the seriousness 0£ its
~-

intent30

and

revelling

in

its

aspect--in

short,

comically at play in the light that is refracted 0££ its
surface.

And viewed from the interlocutor's perspective,

socra tes and his elenchos are totally befuddling and
begging for a
Clouds
bungles

both

fight.
the

his way

Strepsiades, start to finish in the

comic

hero,

to dubious

"Hr.

Twister,•31

triumph,32

and

who

the

30see Nussbaum, "Practical Wisdom," pp. 85-86:
"It would not be un-fair to say that most of Socrates'
concern for virtue remains in the realm of personal choice
and good intentions for others. Aristophanes' portrait
ignores the good intentions . . . ."
But Nussbaum's
assessment 0£ the Clouds, as will be argued below, brings
the play precariously near the realm 0£ tragedy by assuming
that Aristophanes• main intent is critical rather than
comic.
31The name is Reckford's delight£ul rendering of
"Strepsiades"; see Kenneth J. Reck-ford, "Father-Beating in
Aristophanes• Clouds," in The Con£lict 0£ the Generations
in Ancient Greece and Rome, ed. Stephen Bertman (Amsterdam:
B. R. Gruner, 1976; herea-fter Reck-ford, "Father-Beating").
p. 92.
32The comic triumph is always one o:f dubious
merit; see Whitman, Comic Hero, p. 56: "Comedy makes life
'work'.
All it takes is imagination, and an unwillingness
to be hampered by scruples, consistency, and other kill-joy
limitations."
We should not, therefore, allow our delight
at Strepsiades' audacious, and comically appropriate
solution o:f arson to be dampened unduly, so that we are
tempted, with Nussbaum, "Practical Wisdom," p. 77-79,
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un S

uspecting "mark."--the guileless interlocutor who is

n,i 111 sel f

tne man
run

"twisted" on Socrates' rack. of elenchos--is just
to give Socrates and his method a rip-roaring comic

for

~enneth

tbiS is a

their

money.33

RecK£ord

so

I£

we

rightly

cannot

la ugh,

maintains,34

it

our

is,

loss,

as
£or

deliciously funny play.

Accordingly, it will be shown here that what
Aristophanes gives is a Socrates practicing elenchos, but
objectively viewed from the perspective of the
interlocutor.

The Clouds will serve as the primary text,

but time does not permit nor does this study require a full
analysis 0£ this or of any other Aristophanic play.
Instead, Aristophanes• depiction 0£ Socrates will be
drearily to posit that the play ends on a "note 0£
anguish," possibly with Pheidippides unwittingly consumed
in the fire his father lighted. Cf. also Edmunds,
"Socrates," pp. 209-230.
Edmunds' interpretation 0£ the
Clouds, which builds on that 0£ Nussbaum, leads him to
conclude, ". . .
the consequences (0£ this comedy] are
grave, uncomical for our view 0£ Aristophanes as well as 0£
Socrates. I say this because Aristophanes seems, in the
course 0£ his comic destruction [of] Socrates, to have
tarred himseH with his own brush." (p. 227).
As antidote
to Edmunds and Nussbaum, read Reck.£ord, "Father-Beating,"
especially the hilarious pp. 101-103.
33The similarities between the run-of-the-mill
comic hero in Aristophanes and his depiction 0£ Socrates in
the Clouds and of Euripides elsewhere are suggestive and
intriguing, but cannot be considered at length here. See
Whitman, Comic Hero, pp. 21-58, on the comic hero as the
master 0£ poneria and as "grotesque"; pp. 139-140, on
Socrates as poneros and alazon.
34x:enneth J. Reck.ford, Aristophanes' Old-and-New
Comedz:, Vol. 1:
Six Essays in Perspective (Chapel Hill and
London:
Univ. 0£ North Carolina Press, 1987; herea£ter
Rec:K£ord, Old-and-Hew), pp. 392-393.
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con S

idered strictly for the evidence its comic

objectification gives of elenchos as analyzed above in
chapter One.

It will be argued that although Aristophanes

1

comic vision yields an elenchos disjointed and, because the
inter1ocutor s perspective drags it onto the plane of the
1

physical, largely ridiculous, the disjointed parts
nonetheless give sufficient indication of Aristophanes
familiarity with the method.

1

But this first requires a

brief recapitulation of elenchos as analyzed in Chapter
one:

its procedure, its potential and tragic dimension,

and the interlocutor s experience of it.
1

It will then be

shown that Aristophanes is aware of each of these aspects
of elenchos.

The comic poet, however, as would be

expected, plays to his audience:

he gives greatest play to

the interlocutor s perspective 0£ elenchos, and there-fore
1

parodies only the most conspicuous features of the
procedure, while merely suggesting his familiarity with
elenchos
that

1

proclaimed potential and uncommon attainment of

potential.

The procedure of elenchos, it will be recalled, shows
a rapid departure from questions that seek to define an
ethical principle, to seemingly unrelated questions whose
answers, obvious and inescapable, establish minor premises.
Interlocutors answer initial questions by giving particular
action as de£ini tion, which is pronounced unsatisfactory
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an d

subsequently revised.

The initial de£inition, although

formallY abandoned, is in£ormed by a system 0£ belie£s to
W'hiCh the interlocutor cleaves tenaciously.

These belie:fs

are never openly at tacked, but are nonetheless in the end
refuted.

In establishing minor premises, Socrates elicits

agreement by using sometimes these belie£s, sometimes
common-sense interpretations 0£ analogous everyday
occurrences whose rel a ti on to his thesis the interlocutor
cannot discern, but with whose interpretations the
interlocutor cannot help but agree.

Minor premises are in

the end summed up to the pre£erred "indirect" £orm 0£
refutation:

a

thesis is established that entails

consequences repugnant to the interlocutor himsel£.
Elenchos, however, does not aim to achieve mere
refutation.

According to Plato, by bringing the

interlocutor to aporia, a

reversal 0£ his initial claim to

knowledge, elenchos can ideally lead the interlocutor to
recognize his ignorance and to experience wonder, the
beginning 0£ philosophy.

The interlocutor then, with

Socrates as midwi£e at his side, ideally would be willing
to endure the pain£ul birthing 0£ new ideas, and
Ultimately would be morally improved.

But -few

interlocutors choose to withstand elenchos to its terminus,
and there£ore elenchos in Plato's early dialogues reveals a
tragic dimension.

Elenchos holds -forth the promise 0£

Universals but £ails at their de£inition.

It £ails because
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·nterlocutors do not have the moral £iber it takes to

its ]..

en d

ure elenchos.

ilDPr O
can no

Both epistemological success and moral

vement lie at elenchos' end, but its true terminus

t be reached by ordinary human beings.

It takes an

otner-worldly creature like Socrates to endure its rigors.
The experience of elenchos is intolerable £or many
interlocutors; the reversal it devises--highly personal,
unforeseen, and total--is thoroughly unsettling.

The

interlocutor's emotional investment is assured by elenchos'
personal aspect:

Socrates' insistence that interlocutors

never argue hypothetically.

Socrates, however, in what has

been termed irony or elenchos' impersonal aspect, denies
his own personal involvement:
he, does the refuting.

the logos, he claims, not

But Socrates' denial contradicts

the interlocutor's sense 0£ what is happening, for his
experience of elenchos becomes most unpleasant precisely at
the point 0£ summing up the minor premises, which the
interlocutor cannot help but notice Socrates was the one to
propose.

Suspicion 0£ Socrates grows as the interlocutor

squirms at the prospect of having to abandon either common
sense or the beliefs that inform his actions, belie£s he
Proclaims are held by all.

Recalling his initial bravado

concerning the consonance of his actions and beliefs, the
interlocutor experiences his current recognition 0£
ignorance as a

total dislocation, which he sometimes

describes as a numbing or dizziness.

The sensation is
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discomfiting, and the interlocutor is wont to accuse
socrates of practicing against him some sort 0£ magic or 0£
dealing with him in an underhanded way.

The interlocutor

regularly £lees, unwilling to go £orward with elenchos,
which has revealed to him not only his ignorance, but his
shame:

he is shown to be morally de£icient.

The

interlocutor's realization 0£ his moral de£iciency is
facilitated by the paradoxes to which elenchos leads.
Reformulating experience a£ter the pattern of Socrates'
analogies, the paradoxes look to ends rather than to means,
join virtue with knowledge, and expose an end that is
desired but unpursued.

Elenchos is thus in one sense

erotically attractive, £or it reveals the end that is
desired and yet just out 0£ reach.

The interlocutor,

however, realizes that pursuing this end would require him
to give up his previous belie£s, beliefs that the many are
said to share.

Abandoning these belie£s would make him

just like Socrates, who is a "wonder" from the true
Philosopher's perspective, but £rom an "every man's"
Perspective,

a

first-class

oddball. 35

Elenchos

is

therefore in another sense repulsive, £or it bares the
interlocutor's unwillingness to be propelled away from the
comforts of the familiar and the normal in pursuit 0£ an
end that he nonetheless agrees is desireable.

The

35 see especially Nussbaum on Socrates• oddness,
~ragUi tY:, p. 184 (quoted below, this section).
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interlocutor's £light -from Socrates' request to continue
nchos is understandable:

1
~~

he prefers to pursue--albei t

no• uneasily--actions in which he has invested his
emotions, even actions whose in-forming popular beliefs have
been soundly refuted.

Elenchos promises the birth 0£ truth

and moral improvement, but these desired goals are lost to
the interlocutor who is unwilling to pursue them.

In the

final analysis, elenchos attracts by what it promises and
repels by what its uncompleted process demands, and these
feelings 0£ at traction and repulsion often get displaced
on to

Socrates.

As unlikely as it may at first seem, it can be argued
that Aristophanes shows solid familiarity with elenchos as
it is described above.

Scholars have not in-frequently

called attention to aspects of elenchos evident in the
Clouds.

As early as 1966, Leo Strauss proposed that the

contest

between

the

two

logoi,

Right

and

Anti-Right,36

at Clouds 889 ££., is an elenchos 0£ Right by AntiRight;37

Martha

Nussbaum

has

recently

explored

and

3 6r follow the suggestion of Nussbaum, "Practical
Wisdom," p. 50 n. 15, in choosing these names £or these
characters, variously elsewhere termed "Right" and "Wrong"
or "The Weak.er/Just Argument" and "The Stronger/Unjust
Argument." For designations in the ancient text, see
Dover, Clouds, pp. lvii-lviii.
3 7 Leo Strauss, Socrates and Aristophanes (Chicago:
Univ. o:f Chicago Press, Midway reprint, 1980), p. 31.
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argued

in

£avor

0£

Strauss'

proposai.38

It

is

wrong,

no•ever, to remove the contest 0£ the two logoi from the
context of the play and suggest that Aristophanes
criticizes elenchos be ca use 0£ the e£fects of elenctic
arguments in that scene on Strepsiades' relationship with
hiS son; an analysis based on this acceptance renders the
Clouds--as does Nussba urn's analysis--a gloomy piece
preoccupied with serious intent, more concerned with
criticism 0£ Socrates' method than it is with comically
playing up its superficial features.

Instead, the whole

play--Strepsiades' entire experience with Socrates and his
school--can be argued to be elenchos from the
interlocutor's perspective, but it must be admitted that
the elenchos served up by such an analysis is comically
disjointed.

Such an analysis succeeds, however, in giving

comic antidote to Nussbaum's dreary assessment of
Aristophanes• purpose in writing the Clouds, and it
likewise reveals that Aristophanes is quite familiar with
the method's procedure, with its proclaimed but rarely
realized potential, and with the elements of elenchos so
disconcerting

to Socrates'

interlocutors.

That Aristophanes was familiar with the procedure 0£
elenchos is evident when one takes Strepsiades' entire
experience with Socrates' school as the whole 0£ elenchos.

38 Nussbaum,
PP.

50-67.

"Practical

Wisdom,"

passim,

especially
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'l'hiS is justi£iable, £or Strepsiades hardly ceases to be
affected by Socrates' method a £ter he is unceremoniously
expelled at lines 789-790.

To be sure, even Strepsiades'

short tenure at the school shows some 'features 0£ elenchos'
proced ure: 39

Strepsiades'

preliminary

conversations

with Socrates betray the customary rapid shi£t £rom matters
of particular action with which the interlocutor is

immediately concerned, to the realm 0£ uni versa ls whose
attempted de£inition betrays the interlocutor's belie£s.
strepsiades no sooner announces his desire to learn how to
cheat his creditors (239-246) than he finds himsel£ 'first
being introduced to the only true gods, the Clouds (247363), and subsequently involved in a discussion concerning
the existence 0£ Zeus (364-411).

Just such a

radical swing

from the particular to the universal can be found, for
example, in the beginning of the Euthyphro, where Euthyphro
no sooner announces his intention to prosecute his father
for impiety than he £inds himsel'f embroiled in a
conversation about the gods (Euthyphro 2-6).

39Hussbaum, "Practical Wisdom," pp. 69-70,
acknowledges that procedures 0£ the Platonic Socrates are
recognizable in the procedures of the Socrates 0£ the
Clouds, but she gives this acknowledgement little
consideration:
"Socrates is a midwi'fe o:f ideas (136£.).
He begins with the present situation and thoughts of his
interlocutor (695) and reduces him to a state 0£ aporia
(cf. 702-5, 743-5) by teaching him the depth 0£ his own
ignorance (842).
As Strepsiades says to his son, '(you
Will learn) as many things as are wise (sopha) among men;
You will know yoursel'f, how ignorant and thick you are'
(841f.)."
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Although it is true that it is not Socrates, but
strepsiades, who asks the questions in this scene,
strepsiades' questions are nonetheless indicative 0£ the
eagerness and sense 0£ real doubt that surround questions
in the early rounds 0£ elenchos.

Socrates, however, does

offer proof £or his points in the customary ways, by
appeal to common sense and logic (Clouds, not Zeus, cause
rain, which only occurs when the sky is cloudy, 369-371;
zeus doesn't cause lightning, as is evidenced by the £act
that perjurers escape lightning bolts while innocent
shrines and oaks are destroyed, 398-402), and by analogy to
mundane and readily recognizable experience (thunder's
rumbling in full clouds is analogous to stomach gas ca used
by

food

consumed

at

a

-festival,

385-393).40

The

scene

ends with one 0£ elenchos' familiar features, the
interlocutor's revision 0£ the way things are:

Strepsiades

is now convinced that Zeus' potency has been usurped by the
Clouds and that his throne has been taken by Dinos,
"Revolution."41

What

this

scene

gives,

then,

is

an

40Nussbaum, "Practical Wisdom,• p. 74 n. 64, cites
lines 385 ££. as a "use 0£ earthy examples" characteristic
of Socratic elenchos, while referring the reader-mistakenly, it seems--to lines 314, 340, and 342 as
examples 0£ Socrates' •practice of arguing by illustration
and analogy.•
41Reck£ord's translation, "Father-Bea ting,• p. 92.
Peter Green, "Strepsiades, Socrates and the Abuses 0£
Intellectualism," GRBS 20 (1979; hereafter Green,
"Strepsiades"), p. ~argues that dinos, as "vortex," was
a notion familiar to Aristophanes' audience from the
thought 0£ the pre-Socratics, and that Strepsiades
1
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objectification of two parts 0£ elenchos' procedure:

soc r

ates' leading the interlocutor :from the particular to

tb.e universal, and his eliciting agreement to minor
premises that will later have a telling impact on the
interlocutor's

initial

position.

The

signi£icance o:f

strepsiades' compliance with these minor premises, which
now seem to have no relation to his assurance that
defaulting his debts will solve his problems, will come
home to roost :for him--and then quite l i terally--only later
in the play when all premises are summed up by his cockily
brazen and truly revolting son.
The second scene between Socrates and his aged pupil
(627-790) shows Socrates in his more accustomed procedural

role as questioner, and vividly portrays elenchos'
fluctuations between seemingly unrelated issues and the
interlocutor's intended action.

Socrates :first proposes

that Strepsiades be taught measures or rhythms (639) and
later undertakes to teach his dull-witted student the
rudiments 0£ grammar (658 :f:f.), but Strepsiades rigorously
objects that these subjects have no discernible bearing on

personification 0£ dinos would cause the audience to
snicker at the old man, who cannot conceptualize the
abstract, but instead opts :for anthropomorphism.
Similarly, Green points out (p. 19), the Cloud-chorus, to
Strepsiades' mind, must either be composed 0£ real clouds
or real women. For dinos as borrowed :from natural
Philosophers and Dinos as a pun on "Zeus" in the oblique
cases, see J. Ferguson, "ALvos. on the Stage," CJ 68
(1973),
pp. 377-380, and "Al'vos. in Aristophanes and
Euripides,• CJ 74 (1979), pp. 356-359.
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tne roa t ter that concerns him:
What good will rhythms do me in getting my bread and
cheese? (648) . . . But I don't want to learn any of
these things, you dreary man! (654-655) . . . Why must
r learn things that we all know? (693) . . . You've
heard a thousand times what I want! About my debts,
how I can welch out of them! (737--738).
strepsiades

1

exasperation is that of the pre-literate,

vainly trying to follow Socrates' radical divergences in
~enchos

from the particular and the concrete to the

universal and abstract.

Aristophanes in this scene reduces

this -feature 0£ elenchos' procedure to delight-ful
absurdity, for in fact Strepsiades' perception is right:
Socrates' divergences not only seem irrelevant, they
actually

are

totally

irrelevant.42

In the Platonic dialogues, where divergences always
betray their relevance at elenchos' terminus, interlocutors
express a

similar impatience at Socrates' choices 0£

subjects, whose significance to the conversation they can
in no way fathom.

Callicles, for example, quickly becomes

42This is not the case, however, with the
secondary premises pertaining to the gods in the
Preliminary scene; see below, this section.
Green,
"Strepsiades," pp. 17-20, points out that Strepsiades, who
is "anti-conceptual" and "utilitarian," in vain tries to
make Socrates' instruction relevant: "Strepsiades is not a
Plain fool; he is fundamentally old-fashioned, and as such
evinces archaic thought-processes which tend, inevitably,
towards the specific, concrete' and physical. When any
ver-bal ambiguity arises, Strepsiades will always pick. a
Pr-actical interpretation, preferably--since he is also a
country peasant--connected with money, food or sex." For
this reason, Green continues, talk 0£ "measures" and
"r-hythm" turn Strepsiades' thoughts to the sale of grain
and to sex, respectively, rather than to music.
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intolerant:
You're talking about meats and drinks and doctors and
other gibberish; I'm not talking about these things .
. . . What's this about cloaks? . . . What's this
about shoes?
You persist in talking nonsense. . .
I
swear, you really never stop talking about cobblers
and fullers and cooks and doctors, as if this had
anything to do with our argument. (Gorgias 4904 9 1 ) . 43
To the interlocutor in elenchos, whether he be
canicles or Strepsiades, Socrates' procedure Of drawing
analogy in establishing minor premises and thus raising
discussion of seemingly unrelated issues makes Socrates
appear to be a babbling 1una tic.

And so it happens that in

the text of Aristophanes Socrates is called the •highpriest of most subtle nonsense" by the Cloud-chorus
<

I

359),

Le:pe:u,

(A€11'TOTa TWV

and

that

Socrates prays to "tongue" (424), and that Strepsiades in
the end alleges he was deranged by Socrates' prattle

c€µou

I

vapaVO'llO"aVTOS

>

,

a<So.>.e:axq:x,

1480).

Similarly, in Plato's text, by drawing analogies whose
significance the interlocutor does not see, Socrates
appears to be concerned only with irrelevant minutiae.
Witness further complaints of Callicles in Gorgias:
This is always the way Socrates is, Gorgias; he asks
about and puts to proof small and worthless things
>I
(OJ.1.ll(pa
Kat
o.>.tyou
a~la).
You
go
ahead, then, [Socrates], ask about these small and
43 Cf. Alcibiades at Symposium 221e:
"He talks
about pack-asses and smiths and cobblers and curriers, and
he always seems to say the same things about the same
things, so that any inexperienced or foolish man would
laugh at his words."
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petty
1au1a>.

Kal'
01"€VQ'
(Gorgias 497b-c).

things
(Ta
oµ.lKpa
Te
since Gorgias approves.

In the Clouds, then, we see elenchos• practitioner,
socrates, as a man whose interests are con£ined to things
of diminutive proportion, things normally considered
splinters

insigni£ican t:
83 1),

gnat

guts

(156

(130),

£lea

Indeed,

££.).

£eet

the

(144

byword

££.,

c£.

£or

socra tes' concerns and practices in the Clouds is
>.ell' I OS,
(153,

something

230,

320,

359,

ground
741;

c£.

'
Tecppav,

sprinkles

down

to

177-179,
"fine

its

finest

where

ash,"

on

form

Socrates
a

table

and

£eigns a geometrical experiment to cover his filching a
cloa:K,44

and

Strepsiades
"the

260,

where

under

his

finest

Socrates
tutelage

promises
will

that

become

11'al1raA'r),

£lour").45

Socrates' discussions 0£ seemingly extraneous topics
in the Clouds are the comic representation 0£ analogies
regularly used in elenchos to establish the minor premises
that, when added together, will ultimately refute the
interlocutor's position.

And it is through their agency

that the interlocutor's ignorance becomes manifest.
4 4see below, this section, £or thievery as the
comic representation 0£ elenchos' ability to befuddle.
45 For
the
evidence on
A€11''TOS.
as
subtle,
see
the note on line 153 in Dover, Clouds; c£. also his notes
at line 320, where he cites Gorgias 497c £or evidence on
the meaning 0£ 01evol..eoxel V, and at line 130, where
he cites Hippias Major 304a £or a complaint against the
triviality o:f Socrates• argument.
1
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strepsiades' tenure at the school ends abruptly when
socrates loses patience with the old man's stupidity (789190) and ousts him.

This forces Strepsiades to take his

son in hand and send him, despite his protestations, to
socra tes' school.
strepsiades,

And while Socrates may be finished with

elenchos

hardly

is:46

Strepsiades

has

yet

to be brought at least temporarily to his knees and to the
procedure's customary end when his cheeky brat of a son
comes home "educated" in the way the old man requested but
never

fully

envisioned. 47

Strepsiades, however, has no inkling that he is still
in the clutches of elenchos; that the minor premises to
which he formerly agreed are waiting to be added up with
others by his son.

Strepsiades never envisioned that

having his son educated by Socrates to cheat his creditors
would entail something emotionally unacceptable.

Upon the

return of his son, therefore, Strepsiades brings his
intended

action

to ef:fect on

stage

(1213-1302).

And,

as

Haney Sherman has pointed out, Strepsiades' con£ident
confutation o:f the creditors is a parody 0£ Socratic
46 The disassociation of Socrates from elenchos may
be Aristophanes' representation 0£ elenchos' "impersonal
aspect" (Chapter One, Part Three); see below, this
section.
47The contest between Right and Anti-Right, which
comes between Strepsiades' ejection and Pheidippides'
return home, is an objecti:fication more 0£ what may be
called elenchos' character than o:f its procedure per se,
and will be considered below.
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questioning:

at 1286, his gleefully impudent retort,
,
,
.,,
>
c
d >
9'1')pLov;"
E09,
0
Tl
TOICOS,

recalls the "what is x?." question posed by Socrates in

-

eienchos;
stock

"a

at

1289,

reply."48

Socratic

is

confident

his

joy

His

is

short-Ii ved,

nowever, £or he is no sooner shrift 0£ the agony his
creditors have caused him than he is visited upon by the
agony 0£ being beaten by his own son.
strepsiades
J

'

lO\J

he

begins

cries

the

here

play
at

with

line

As Reck-ford notes,
the

132.t.49

same

>

•

lO\J

There

he

called on Zeus in his distress, but Zeus is no longer in
power, by Strepsiades' own repeated and willing admission
( 424-425,

827.

12.40-12.41).

Strepsiades

is

now

treated

once

again to the elenctic procedure 0£ drawing analogies to
establish minor premises, and is conclusively shown, in the
adding up 0£ all minor premises, how truly re vol ting can be
the reign o-f the new god he previously acknowledged, Dinos,
"Revolution."
The old man -first gives an accounting o-£ what went on
48Nancy Sherman, Aristotle's Theory o-f Koral
Education (diss. Harvard Univ., 1982.; hereafter Sherman,
Koral Education), pp. 22-2.3.
Sherman is not alone in
noting the occurrence 0£ the vocabulary and phraseology 0£
Plato's Socrates in Aristophanes.
Besides Havelock,
"Socratic Self," passim, see, e.g., {pace Dover, Clouds,
Pp. Xlii-xliii), R. Philippson, "Sokratische Dialektik in
Aristophanes• Wolken," RhK n.£. 81 (1932.), pp. 30-38; R.
Stark, "Sokratisches in den Vogeln des Aristophanes," RhM
n.£. 96 (1953), pp. 77-89; Nussbaum, "Practical Wisdom,"
E.._assim; Green, "Strepsiades," p. 19.
49Reck£ord,

"Father-Bea ting,"

p.

92..
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inside (1353-1390), and
iS

50

Reck.ford •s

description

delightful as to bear repeating:

of

the scene

"It happens all the

The son comes home :from college; the proud :father

tinie.
Kills a

:fatted cal:f, all is good cheer; but eventually,

froni some trivial point, a
tenipers

:flare,

a

heated discussion arises,

:fright:ful

hostility

is

bared. 11 50

Although Strepsiades• :first inclination is to try in vain
to call back. Zeus along with the debt-inducing horsy
habits o:f his son (1406-1407), there is no turning back. in
elenchos once one has stated one's true opinion and agreed
to minor premises.

Strepsiades has no choice but to hear

his son out.
Pheidippides
50Reck.ford,

argues--not
"Father

as

much

Bea ting."

p.

lik.e

a

sophist51

97.

51The intent o:f this chapter is not to deny any
similarity between Socratic and sophistic argumentation-Plato's special care in making distinctions bet ween his own
dialectic and sophistic argumentation (e.g .• Sophist 2.2.5)
indicates he is not defending against straw men. Even in
modern critical discussion o:f the undeniable similarities
between elenchos and the methods used by rhetoricians in
general and the sophists in particular, however, one may
find the insistence upon distinction.
See, e.g., G. E. R.
Lloyd, Magic, Reason and Experience: Studies in the Origin
~ Development o:f Greek. Science (Cambridge:
Cambridge
Univ. Press, 1979), pp. 86 and 2.52.-2.54; de Romilly, Magic
(Cambridge, KA:
Harvard Univ. Press, 1975), pp. 36-37.
Lloyd argues (p. 86) that "Socrates• distinctive
contribution was to turn the searchlight o:f his scrutiny on
current moral and political assumptions to expose--as he
saw it--their shallowness and incoherence." According to
de Romilly, sophistic "magic" di:f£ers in k.ind -from that 0£
Socrates: "Whereas the magic o:f the sophists aimed at
Producing illusion, Socrates' magic rests on the obstinate
destruction of all illusions.
It is the magic 0£
implacable truth . . . " (pp. 36-37).
For the widespread
use of sophistical antithesis in the Periclean Age, see
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iKe Socrates in elenchos--that it is right £or him to
as l
beat his £ather.

In this scene, Aristophanes parodies

socra tes' habit 0£ drawing analogies that look to ends
rather than to means, as well as the interlocutor's £atal
reliance on commonly accepted wisdom:

Pheidippides £irst

argues

beaten

£rom

analogy

0£

bene£it52

to

sons

that

John H. Finley, Jr., Three Essays on Thucydides (Cambridge,
KA:
Harvard Univ. Press, 1967), p. 89.
The intent 0£ this chapter is instead to argue £or
Aristophanes• £amiliarity with Socratic elenchos.
Pheidippides' argument, whether or not one may discern in
it standard sophistic tacks, can nonetheless likewise be
argued to reveal aspects undeniably Socratic. See the
following note and Havelock, "Socratic Problem," pp. 169170.

52strepsiades readily admits having beaten
Pheidippides, de£ending the act by his claim, "I meant the
>I
>
"""'
best and cared
£or you {EYWYE o>, EUvowv
IE
Kal
K'l')<5oµ.Evos.,
1409)."
For
Socrates•
habitual
argument £rom analogies to technai, which look to ends
rather than means, see above, Chapter One, Part Three. See
also, e.g., Euthyphro 13-15 for arguments £rom bene£it.
The sophists, especially Antiphon, argued £rom
expedience
or
sel £-interest,
10 ouµ.cpepov, which
could likewise be translated as "bene£it." The di££erence
between this and Socrates' argument £rom bene£it, at least
as it is presented in Eu thyphro, is that Socrates
understands bene£it as therapeutic in a holistic sense; £or
humans this means it is synonymous with moral improvement
and care 0£ the soul {as at Apology 29e). Such tender
nurturance is what both Strepsiades and Pheidippides
Profess here. Sophistic "bene£it" breaks down into
something much less laudable and more obviously sel£serving, something we would rather term expediency. For
sophistic expediency as cold-blooded opportunism, see John
H. Finley, Jr., Thucydides {Cambridge, MA:
Harvard Univ.
Press, 1942; reprint ed., Ann Arbor:
Univ. 0£ Michigan
Press, 1963; herea£ter Finley, Thucydides), pp. 51-54,
209, and 227.
Even if one were able to defend Pheidippides•
argumentation here as more sophistic than Socratic, the
elenctic progression of the Clouds in its entirety still
argues for Aristophanes' familiarity with Socratic
~enchos.
It must be remembered that even in Plato's
I
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1>eating bene:fits :fathers, and bolsters his argument with
popularized

belie:f

(1407-1419).

Then,

by

analogy

to

cocks,

p:neidippides reiterates his position, and con:fidently cites
the great analogy-drawer himsel:f, Socrates, as ultimate
arbiter when his :father gets o:f:f a plucky reply (14271432).

Pot-shots are the de£ense 0£ the truly desperate,

and strepsiades is clearly in their number.

The answers to

tbe questions his son poses are those -familiar -from the
later stages o:f elenchos--they are both obvious and
inescapable--and in addition, the cone! us ion that a :father
should be beaten by his son is a predictable aspect o:f the
new reign o:f "Revolution," whom Strepsiades himsel£, in his
eagerness to learn how to de:fault his debts, readily agreed
bad dethroned Zeus.

Strepsiades cannot now help but

acknowledge that Pheidippides was right to beat him:
:friends, it looks to me like he's got a

"Gee,

point; even to me

what's reasonable strikes an accord with these things he
says.
do

It's only :fair that we should be beaten i:f we don't

right."

(1437-1439).

We may be surprised that Strepsiades would acquiesce
to being beaten, but it must be remembered that he has a
lot at stake.

A :few blows at the hands o:f his son perhaps

can be considered a small price when compared to the debts
he has cancelled under the reign o:f Dinos.

Furthermore,

dialogues one is shown sophists trot ting out their Sundaybest in argumentation.
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tne old man's acquiescence to the beating puts him squarely
in tne company 0£ interlocutors in elenchos, who readily
accept and re£use to abandon minor premises which embrace
and thus do not challenge their belie£s.
When, however, Pheidippides subsequently uses the
recently established minor premises to de£end beating his
mother, he takes Strepsiades to what in the early dialogues
is the terminus 0£ elenchos• procedure:
refutation, the establishment 0£ a

to indirect

thesis entailing

consequences repugnant to the interlocutor himsel£.
strepsiades ostensibly has what he claimed he wanted:
son who can cheat his £a ther s creditors.
1

a

Alas, he never

realized that this son would also be capable 0£ beating his
own mother.
its tracks:

Strepsiades chooses to stop elenchos dead in
if this intolerable position can be argued,

clearly something is wrong with the whole argument.
Incredulity and repugnance are mani-fest in Strepsiades'
reaction

to

his son's suggestion:

What are you saying? What's that you say? Now this
is far worse than the other. . . . What's next?
If
you can argue this, 1"'11 tell you what's next:
there's nothing stopping you from throwing yoursel-f
off a cliff--you, and Socrates, and that weaker
argument with you! (1448-1451).
Strepsiades is appalled at the thesis that has just
been established; he would rather put Zeus back on the
throne--Zeus whose reign would bring back punishment of
Per- jurers like Strepsiades himsel£ (cf. 396 ££. and 12.32.)-than admit to the revolting realities 0£ the reign 0£
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~·

But once one has stepped into the whirlwind of

l enchos, return to the old world is nearly impossible, for

~-

tb.e beliefs that buttressed that world have been
overturned.

And so Strepsiades, like so many

interlocutors before him, seeks escape from Socrates and
tb.e method that has brought forth a thesis that seems both
repugnant and yet incontrovertible.

The drastic solution

of burning the school can be viewed as an exercise of the
comic hero's imperative:

al though Strepsiades, like any

interlocutor, has been refuted and cannot return with
comfort to his old world, we nonetheless cannot expect him,
like Eu thyphro and other refuted interlocutors, to slink
off mumbling flimsy excuses.

Such a retreat is unthinkable

for any self-respecting comic hero.

As Reck.ford puts it,

. . . we know perfectly well that a good clown (think
of Laurel and Hardy) is never really hurt. Hore
important, he can't be kept down £or very long.
Strepsiades' theme-note emerged in the £irst scene: "I
may have £allen, but I won't just lie here." He
always bounces back, like a large rubber ball or Bobo.
Knock him down, and he will rise again; murder him,
and his death, like Falstaf£'s, will prove only
another
"counter£eit."53
Strepsiades' own explanation for his behavior,
however, gives compelling testimony of Aristophanes'
familiarity with one of the £eat ures of elenchos that Plato
maintained was necessary £or moving the interlocutor toward
53Reckford, "Father-Beating," p. 96; cf. F. D.
Harvey, "Kubes 1493 ff.," p. 339:
"people do not get
killed in Old Comedy.
Insulted, humiliated, beaten, yes;
threatened with death . . . ; even . . . wounded; but not
killed."
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tne ultimate goals 0£ the birth 0£ truth and moral
unprovement, £or the con£lagration brings a pointed comic
justice to bear on the £irst step toward attaining that
potential:
as

well

reversal.

"The Clouds

reversals

as

is

£ull 0£ inversions,
proclaims;54

•" Reck.£ord

clearly the most memorable is Strepsiades' hoisting 0£
socra tes with his own petard:

"Mr. Twister" goes £rom

passive object to active subject as he takes torch in hand
and puts the heat on Socrates.
doing?

What in the world is he

Only throwing into reverse the one who has so -fully

reversed him, as is clear from Strepsiades' brazen, bawling
replies to the cries and queries 0£ Socrates' students and
0£ the master himsel£:
>

'

>

,

Oh!
Oh!
(lO\J
lOU)
What
are
you
doing, man? --What am I doing? Nothing but arguing
the splinters (<ha1.£11'To.>..pyouµ.al) out 0£ the
beams 0£ your house! --Argh! Who's minding the £ire
put to our house? --The same guy you stole the cloak.
£rom! . . . --You there, up on the roo£!
What are
you doing? --I'm walking on air, and putting the sun
>
"'
•
under
circumspection.
(aepofJaTw,
teal
"
Cl
ll'Eplqipovw
Tov
'r)hov.)
(1493-1503).
Strepsiades
)

ca uses

someone

to

cry
>

I

lOU,
)

now

Strepsiades,

whose

own

recent

l 0

>

•

lO'U

•

'U

I

Lou

announced

the

reversal

0£

the

his

ill-considered

solution £or what in the play's opening moments had
originally

elicited

racing debts.
to

-finest

>

•

lO'U

>

I

lO'U

him--his

£rom

son's

Similarly, Strepsiades, the one pulverized

£lour

54Reck. £ord,

by

Socrates,

master

"Father-Bea ting,"

0£
p.

1.£11'1"05
102.

and
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scnolar or splinters, now turns the -figurative
litera155

as

he

reduces

the

roo£

finest :form, splinters and ash.
socrates

1

0£

the

school

Strepsiades

1

to

its

repetition 0£

opening salutation--as the master was lowered to

the stage with all the majesty 0£ a god--puts Socrates on
notice that he is get ting exactly what he dished out, and
~

machina to boot, as i£ Strepsiades the reverser is

b.imselr becoming a new god, the successor to the sorecently-enthroned Dinos.

Strepsiades the perjurer now

becomes the de-fender 0£ the gods he himsel£ so readily cast
aside in de£ense 0£ his swindling ways.

Like an angel -from

Zeus, who incinerates perjurers with his lightning bolt
(394-397), Strepsiades brings £ire :from on high to destroy
those who would insult and cast aside the gods.

He reduces

to ashes those who through their teaching reduced heaven to
a

stove

and

its

inhabitants

to

ashes

(95-97).56

In

good comic 'fashion, Strepsiades conquers by returning tit
for tat:

reversal £or reversal.

For Strepsiades has su££ered a pro-found reversal:
55strepsiades persistence in making the abstract
concrete de-fines him as a true pre-literate. See Green,
"Strepsiades," especially pp. 16-22.
1

56 Arrowsmith, in his translation 0£ the Clouds,
suggests that Strepsiades burning of the think.ery is a
return to the metaphor 0£ the universe as a charcoal oven
(95-97).
As such, it could be seen as another aspect 0£
Strepsiades reversal of Socrates.
See Aristophanes, The
Clouds, transl. William Arrowsmith (Hew York.: Hew
-American Library, 1962; herea£ter Arrowsmith, Clouds), pp.
136-137.
1

1
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0

ri·ginallY so intent on swindling others, he now identi£ies

nimself solely as the one swindled 0£ a
50

Initially

cloak..

determined that sending his son to Socrates' school was

tb.e ideal solution £or his debts, Strepsiades was treated
to a dramatic exhibition 0£ exactly what having such a son
in one's home entails, £or his son's education, which
granted Strepsiades the impunity to threaten and beat his
ere di tors

(1256-1258,

1299-1300),

also

granted

Pheidippides

tb.e impunity to beat his -father, and--what was to
strepsiades unendurable--the audacity to propose beating
his mother.
Elenchos' reversal regularly

is,

according

to Plato,

closely attended by recognition, and Aristophanes likewise
shows that he is -familiar with this -feature 0£ elenchos.
Strepsiades is brought to a blatant, comic twist on the
recognition of ignorance -familiar -from Pla to•s defenses 0£
the method.

In Plato's dialogues,

the interlocutor's

ignorance is not openly confronted; instead the
interlocutor slowly begins on his own to sense his dri£t
from knowing, and terms it aporia.
Aristophanes

does

signal

In the Clouds,

-familiarity

with

aporia,57

5 7socrates twice uses words with the stem apor-:
at 629, he labels strepsiades "lost" (alTopos); at 7 43
he tells Strepsiades to abandon any though ts in respect to
~hich "you should £ind yoursel£ at a loss"
(alTop~s).
At 702, the Chorus encourages nimbleness
~n Strepsiades should he fall "into loss" (eLS
~vopov);
c£., however, 629, where the Chorus uses
avopov in a context clearly unrelated to elenchos.
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}>U t

he shows, as should be expected, no subtlety or dainty

restraint in presenting the interlocutor s dawning
1

a1fareness o:f his own ignorance.

The student who answers

tne door o:f the Thinkery rudely christens Strepsiades
)

tb.e

old

I

(aµ.ae,,s,

•stupid"

man•s

135);

Socrates

ignorance,58

and

repeatedly

this

happens,

curses
tellingly,

1fi th the greatest frequency in the scene at 62.7-790, where
tb.e shi:ft is radical :from the irrelevant issues o:f
measures, rhythms, and grammar to the direct consider a ti on
of Strepsiades•

a:f:fairs:

I have never seen such a bumpkin, nor one so lost
st up id,
and
absent-minded.
(62.8-62.9)
. . . You are clownish and gauche. (655) . . . Perish,
wretch! (72.6) . . . Why don•t you die and go to hell,
you extremely absent-minded, inordinately stupid old
coot?
(7 89-790).

(a 11'opo5),

A:fter this abrupt expulsion, Strepsiades, down but
never out, determines to coerce his son Pheidippides into
attending Socrates• school:

"You will

know yoursel:f,"

Strepsiades reassures his son, "how stupid and thick you
are."

(842.).59

Strepsiades

naively

assumes

that

Pheidippides• lessons will have the same result :for son as
58For a de:fense of Strepsiades' understanding as
representative o:f that o:f the popular fi:fth century B. C.
Athenian mind, which tended toward the literal and the
physical rather than the metaphorical and the abstract, see
Leonard Woodbury, •strepsiades .Understanding: Five Hotes
on the Clouds," Phoenix 34 (1980), pp. 108-12.7.
1

59see Hussba um, "Practical Wisdom," pp. 69-70,
and 74, who in addition points out (p. 72.) that this
YvwoeL
oau-rov
is the :famous Delphic maxim.
Cf. Havelock, "Socratic Self," p. 14 n. 38.

de

72.,
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tn.eY had for father, that Pheidippides will likewise
discover his own ignorance.

But Pheidippides will learn no

such thing, for he is not the interlocutor in this comic
~enchos,

and the procedure is not to benefit him, but

instead is reserved for the benefit of his father, the only
true

interlocutor

in

the

Clouds.60

however, merely an interlocutor.

Strepsiades

is

not,

He is first and foremost

a comic hero.
After his reversal and recognition should ideally
come, if Plato's claims concerning elenchos are correct,
katharsis of false beliefs and the birth of truth for
Strepsiades.

But, as was argued in Chapter One, these

features of elenchos are not seen in the early dialogues,
and it has been suggested that the idea of purgation as
well as the midwife metaphor may be Platonic
invention.61

It

is

perhaps,

then,

not

surprising

that

Aristophanes gives evidence only suggestive of his
familiarity with either of these features in the Clouds.
6 0Pheidippides is never shown in the role of
interlocutor, and it may be that Aristophanes' care in
concealing the boy's tutelage under Socrates is directed
Precisely to the point 0£ establishing Strepsiades as sole
interlocutor.
Dover, Clouds, p. xciv n. 2, proposes that
Pheidippides' tutelage would merely duplicate that of his
father, and for this reason Aristophanes wisely omits a
super£luous and potentially boring scene. Rosemary K.
Harriott, Aristophanes:
Poet & Dramatist {Baltimore, MD:
J'ohns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1986; hereafter Harriott,
Aristophanes), p. 185, suggests that Pheidippides• conceit
would have ruined the comic possibilities of the scene in
the school.
6 1Burnyea t,

"Kidwi£ery,"

pp.

7-16.
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'l'lle scene 0£ Strepsiades

1

initiation (254 ££ .) may have in

it a hint 0£ katharsis in the sense 0£ •puri£ication•:

strepsiades is dusted with £lour (260-262), commonly used
on initiates into the mysteries in the process 0£ their
compulsory
re£erence,

puri£ica tion.62
it

has

long

similarly

A

been

argued,63

is

slight
made

to

the

rnidWi£e metaphor at line 137, where one 0£ Socrates

1

students, who uses terminology reminiscent 0£ that used at
'l'heaetetus 149, accuses Strepsiades 0£ causing miscarriage
of

thought

a

>
,
t:E;"IUP'l'll..LEV'l')V;

139).

K.

J.

(cppovTLcP

a 1so

see

Strepsiades

repetition

1

at

Dover implies that the late and sole

appearance 0£ this metaphor in Plato marks it as Platonic
rather

than

Socratic

invention.64

This

consideration,

when combined with the £ew allusions to other authentic
Platonic
spread

terminology

in

metaphorical

the

use

Clouds,65
,

0£

TLKTELV

62see Dover s notes, Clouds,
for bibliography and commentary.
1

and

the

widely

and

lines

254

and

256,

63see, e.g., A. E. Taylor, Varia Socra tica
(0x£ord:
J. Parker, 1911; repr. ed., Hew York:
Garland
Publishing, Inc., 1987; herea£ter Taylor, Varia), pp. 148150, and Wol£gang Schmid, •nas Sokratesbild der Wolken,•
Philologus 97 (1948), pp. 219 ££.
6 4nover,
65see,
18.

Clouds,

however,

pp.

xlii-xliv.

Havelock,

"Socratic

Sel£,"

pp.

1-
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yevvav,

66

leads

Dover

to

consider

it

implausible

to accept Clouds 137 as an allusion to a metaphor employed
l>Y socra tes.

And yet while both Dover's and A. E. Taylor's

discussions of this possible allusion refer to a comparable
metaphoric use of birthing terminology in the earlier
symposium,67

where

Socrates

tells

of

Diotima's

description o:f the intent behind philosophical inquiry as a
in

"birth

beauty"

(TOK OS

>

ev

Symposium

206c), neither remarks that Aristophanes in the Clouds uses
this very birthing terminology to suggest the
transformation afforded Strepsiades by his experience with
elenchos.
A pun reveals the disparity between what Strepsiades
falsely assumes is his paramount concern, and what Socrates
treats and elenchos shows Strepsiades is his proper
interest:
owed,

or

,

TOKOS,
"birth,"

which
or

can

mean

"interest"

"o:f:fspring."68

For

on

money

Strepsiades,

66Pace Taylor, Varia, p. 148:
"In a language so
chary of its metaphors as the Attic > o:f :> the :fifth century,
~uch -,an
expression
[cppov-rt.6
E!;'l'll.J.JD.wKas
E!;"lUP'l'll.J.EV'l'}V] is more vigorous and unnatural than it
would, unfortunately, be in a language like our own, which
has been debased by the journalistic style o:f which the
abuse o-f metaphor and the inability to say a simple thing
in simple words are so :familiar a symptom."
I

p.

67Taylor,
Xliii Il. 1.

Varia,

pp.

149-150,

I

and

Dover,

Clouds,

68LSJ. 9
s. v.
DOV4;r,
Clouds,
p.
234,
commenting on
TOKOL
TOKWV
at
line
1156, notes,
"There is good word-play here (as in Pl. g. 506E-507 A) on
TOKos in its ordinary sense 'interest' and its poetic
sense 'child'," but takes the suggestion no -further. That
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1'0KOS

c1ouds

always
18,

34,

means
240,

"interest"
739,

7 47,

on

1156,

money
1285,

owed
1286).

(see
It

is,

~

however, evident that Strepsiades' "offspring"
pheidippides, an irresponsible, lazy brat, is the true
cause of Strepsiades' problems, and should be the old man's
real "interest," not the money he owes on his son's
behalf.69

Socrates,

however,

ignores

Strepsiades'

concern over money, and treats him instead as if he is in
need of a personal re-"birth," by insisting upon
strepsiades' initiation, which will ostensibly allow him to
join the company of the wise "souls" who populate
Socrates'

schooi.70

And,

as

Reck.ford

has

shown,

in

the

scene between Strepsiades and his son, the old man is again
the pun occurs in Plato is intriguing, to say the least;
discussion in the Republic is on the "offspring of the
good." For the word elsewhere in Aristophanes, cf.
Thesmophoriazusae 843 and 845; Lysistrata 7 42 and 754.
,
69nover, Clouds, pp. 97-98 at line 34, argues that
ToKos. in Strepsiades' sit ua ti on does not mean merely
"interest"; instead, it refers to securities to be taKen as
a substitute for interest due.
If he is right,
S~repsiades in fact willingly gives up as security his true
TOKos.,
his
only
son.
7 0Green, "Strepsiades," pp. 15-16, sees in the
Clouds' references to the mysteries evidence for defining
Strepsiades as "the classic aµouoos.,
the "nonintellectual" described at Theaetetus 155e and Sophist
246a-b and 259e.
A. W. H. AdKins, "Clouds, Mysteries,
Socrates and Plato," Antichthon 4 (1970), pp. 13-24, argues
that Aristophanes in the Clouds deliberately ridicules
Socrates' habit of using the language of initiation into
the mysteries.
See the note on line 143 in Dover, Clouds,
for a brief summary of Socrates' metaphorical use of
~ni tia tion in to the mysteries.
For psyche in the Clouds as
l.Ildica ti ve of Aristophanes' awareness of Socrates' doctrine
Of the soul, see Ha velocK, "Socratic Self," pp. 1-18.
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re-"born" as the "offspring" who must now, for his own
beaten.71

good,

When

it

is

suggested

that

strepsiades must, with childlike impotence, submit to the
intolerable beating of his wife at the hands of his son,
the elenctically

induced re-"birth"

is -finally

rejected.

The :focus o:f Strepsiades' concern suddenly changes -from
"interest" to his "o£fspring's" unendurable moral demise,
and he determines, in good comic -fashion, to get the upper
hand over those whom he deems responsible:
his

Socrates and

school.
What is being argued, then, is that by extending a pun

on

the

word

,
TOKOS.

through

the

use

0£

the

moti£

of

rebirth of Strepsiades as o££spring, Aristophanes subtly
suggests that Strepsiades, in his experience with Socratic
elenchos, is encouraged to bring to birth a truth, and
himself is in some -fashion "reborn."

Socrates' insistence

that Strepsiades take to bed as he undergoes the most
rigorous part 0£ his elenchos makes sense i£ we understand
that Socrates intends him to be at "labor"--although
Strepsiades takes advantage 0£ the opportunity by
masturbating.72
Nonetheless, it cannot be denied that in the course of
the play the old man at the very least undergoes a change
7 1Reckford, "Father-Bea ting," pp. 101 :f:f ., is
excellent on the ironies 0£ Strepsiades' re ju venation.
72see

Dover,

Clouds,

p.

191

at

line

734.
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of neart.

At the play's terminus Strepsiades, -formerly so

eager to swindle and so ready to abandon even his lip
service belie£ in the gods, suddenly decides that those who
taught him and his son to swindle must be destroyed,
suddenly realizes with great clarity that the gods must not
be dishonored and spurned (1476-1477; 1506-1509).

The old

man takes the control that is his birthright as a comic
hero, and gives an alarmingly e££ecti ve display 0£ his
regained potency as -father.

Whether or not he realizes it,

whatever his intentions, and regardless 0£ the fact that he
has perhaps misplaced the prime cause £or his son's
degeneracy upon those he himsel£ will-fully employed £or
just such a purpose, Strepsiades has nonetheless taken one
step away -from his -former misplaced "interest."
Strepsiades now is capable 0£ taking action (undoubtedly
vicious, probably vain, perhaps too late) that £or the
first time shows at least some concern over the progressive
moral decline 0£ his "o££spring" Pheidippides, who -from the
beginning, like his -father, showed an appalling lack 0£
moral

£iber.73

We would be disappointed, however, if Aristophanes
Polluted his comedy with the actual moral improvement 0£
its hero; Strepsiades must, a£ter all, continue to be the
rogue and, in the end, get the upper hand.

But the play

7 3Nussbaum, "Practical Wisdom," pp. 67-69, gives
good general overview 0£ Strepsiades and Pheidippides.

a
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does not, as Nussbaum contends, end on a "note of anguish,"
nor is Strepsiades' burning of the school meant to be tak.en
as the old man's attempt "to reassert the lost authority of
nomos by committing what would be, by any nomoi, a horrible
~

. e"74
cri.m
·

The

gleefully

set

conflagration

is,

as

has

been argued, the comically appropriate reversal Socrates so
deserves--but it may be more.

It may be that the birth of

truth afforded the old man by elenchos is suggested by
Aristophanes' use of light imagery, perhaps even in
antiquity an already hack.neyed symbol of Knowledge.

The

blaze from the torches Strepsiades and his slave wield at
the play's end give glaring contrast to the play's
beginning, where the old man's meager financial and
intellectual resources were shown by his slave's inability
to sustain one lamp's flame.

Whereas Strepsiades at the

play's beginning found himself totally in the dark., he now,
after his experience with elenchos, is surrounded by light.
Of course Strepsiades' act would be appalling in real
life, and is the stuff of which tragedy could be made.
this is no tragedy, it is comedy:
out of this con-flagration.

no corpse is trundled

Socrates was not burned in this

fire, but tried and put to death nearly a quarter o-f a
century later at the hands of those who could no longer
endure their elenchos-wielding gadfly.
It has been argued, then, that Aristophanes in the
74 Nussbaum,

But

"Practical

Wisdom,"

pp.

78-79.
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ciouds gives subtle evidence of his familiarity with
~

Socrates' profession as midwife of truth, and perhaps even
hints at elenchos"' possibility for a££ording moral
iroprovement.

And while it must be admitted that the

subtlety of such a device could easily be lost on an
audience, Havelock rightly points out that Aristophanes'
own lament in the play's second parabasis (510-626)
indicates that the comic poet considered his -first Clouds
quite

sophisticated

and

subtle.75

Aristophanes

claims

that many of what he considered the play's finer aspects
were overlooked by an audience that did not meet his
expectations.

He denies--humorously intended -false boasts

of avoiding cheap shots not to the contrary--that his
current revision is any less subtle; in fact, he seems
instead to challenge his audience to rise, this time, to
the

occasion. 76
Still, it must be acknowledged that Aristophanes'

depiction 0£ Socrates admits of some morally questionable
elements.

In our eagerness to show Aristophanes"'

familiarity with Socrates and his method, the disparity
between the Socrates of the Clouds and the Socrates of
75Havelock, "Socratic Sel-f," pp. 16-18.
See also
A. W. Gomme, "Aristophanes and Politics,• CR 52 (1938),
PP. 108-109, for Aristophanes as the poet laureate of
Athenian intelligentsia.
76see Dover, Clouds, pp. lxxx-xcviii, £or evidence
on the two versions of the play, which need not be
considered in this study.
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piato's early dialogues cannot be overlooked, for it is a
disparity that scholars have found quite disturbing.
Kenneth Reck ford deems it understandable that modern
scholars and teachers find unenjoyable the characterization
of socrates, "a patron saint of philosophers and
intellectuals," as "an archvillain and imposter, a
practitioner of scientific humbug, and the enemy of
religion, morality, and good old-fashioned education
generally." 77

Nussbaum

similarly

remarks

on

the

discrepancy between the Socrates in Aristophanes and the
one

in

Plato:

Plato's Socrates tirelessly exhorts those he meets-whether citizens or sophists--to pursue virtue and the
heal th of the soul rather than worldly success. The
Aristophanic teacher helps students trick their
creditors, win court cases, gain fame and power; he
says nothing about virtue or the soui.78
It should be noted that Nussbaum•s observation
contains a

shift:

what Plato's Socrates exhorts is

contrasted with that which Aristophanes' Socrates
accomplishes.

The contrast, in short, is between the

intended goal of elenchos and its actual effect.

In

Chapter One it was argued that, even in the dialogues of
Plato, there is a discrepancy between what elenchos
Proclaims as intent and what it is seen to effect.

For all

the reader of Pla to•s earlier dialogues is able to see, the
77 Reckford,

Old-and-New,

78 Nussbaum,

"Practical

p.

392.

Wisdom,"

p.

45.
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rooral improvement at which elenchos aims was lost on the
IiKeS

of

exception

Meno,
0£

Euthyphro,

the

and

Alcibiades.79

later Theaetet us80

and

With

the

the

perpetually

silent Plato, one is hard pressed to come up with names 0£
those who can be considered unquali-fied successes.
Martha Nussbaum in -fact argues that the Clouds is in
large part concerned with o££ering acute criticism of
socra tic ed uca ti on through elenchos, a criticism which
"current com-fortable acceptance, even adulation" 0£
Socrates and his method--both 0£ which, she notes, were, as
late as the nineteenth century, still considered
potentially subversive and dangerously negative---finds
unacceptable.

Nussbaum claims that the Clouds'

assimilation 0£ Socrates to the sophists and other 0£ his
contemporaries "suggests an interesting criticism 0£
[Socrates'] thought" which "anticipates the main lines
along which Plato, in the Republic, modi-fies the Socratic
program

0£

moral

education."81

79see Seeskin, Dialogue, especially pp. 3, 6, and
125-132, for the discrepancy between the type 0£ character
elenchos demands and the character of early interlocutors,
and for the method's limited salutary e-ffect.
80r. F. Stone, The Trial 0£ Socrates (Boston:
Little, Brown, and Co., 1988), p. 72, brands Theaetetus
". · . the least wide-a wake of all the submissive yes-men
given Socrates in the Platonic canon."
81 Nussba um, "Practical Wisdom,"
pp. 4-4--4-5 and 50.
Hussbaum•s discussion 0£ Plato's modi£ications 0£ Socratic
education in the Republic (pp. 79 ff.) offers compelling
support for her thesis but cannot be considered here.
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Nussbaum's assessment, however, is based on her
assertion that the contest between the two logoi
constitutes an elenchos in its entirety.

The acuity of

manY of her observations on that contest will be
acKnowledged below; here, however, it must be recognized
that concentrating only on that part of the elenchos found
in the Clouds' contest of the logoi not only allows room
for misrepresentation of Aristophanes' intent in depicting
the method, it likewise yields a

Clouds that is painfully

humorless if philosophically perspicacious.

To be sure,

the negative aspects 0£ Aristophanes' depiction could be
defended as comic in the sense that comedy deals with the
conspicuous, and nothing is more conspicuous than elenchos'
potential for failure of its intent.

But if Aristophanes'

depiction of Socrates as the slimy, morally irresponsible
sophist is taken as serious critic ism, the play once more
becomes

quite

dreary.82

This

study,

however,

aims

to

defend Aristophanes' depiction not only as comic, but to
restore the play as one meant to be considered good fun; it
therefore becomes otiose to reduce Aristophanes in the very
Process of this defense to such a dour, if nonetheless

82 Even Nussbaum seems to recognize that her
assessment has taken the play too far out of the realm of
the comic; see "Practical Wisdom," pp. 78-79, for her
suggestion, which she immediately rejects, that
Aristophanes may hint at the play's close that young
Pheidippides' life is lost in the conflagration.
Cf.
Kopff, "Nubes 1493 ff.," pp. 113-122.
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potentially

accurate,

critic

of

Socra tes.83

It should -further be noted that Kussbaum•s assessment
depends heavily on the supposition that Aristophanes•
comedY shows little awareness of the possibility of moral
improvement that elenchos claims to offer.
fact the case?

But is this in

It has already been claimed that Socrates•

treatment o-f Strepsiades as a

potential initiate, one in

need of rebirth, hints at Aristophanes• awareness of
elenchos' potential for moral improvement of its
interlocutors.

Such a claim gains support -from Eric

Havelock.'s 1972 article, "The Socratic Sel-f as
Parodied

in

Aristophanes•

it is

Clouds."84

Havelock. claims that the Clouds betrays Aristophanes•
familiarity

with Socrates'

"doctrine

of

the

soul,"

i.e.,

Socrates• belie£, as reported by Plato in the Apology, that
83Nussbaum, "Practical Wisdom," especially pp. 79
ff., suggests, as was noted above, that Aristophanes'
conflation of Socrates with the Sophists is part of his
pointed criticism of elenchos and its practitioner.
It
could be argued with Nussbaum, then, that Aristophanes'
depiction of Socrates is comic genius again at work, an
intentional exaggeration in characterization which serves
to illustrate in no dainty fashion the tragic dimension 0£
a method that fails of its potential, much as the blatant
ridicule of Strepsiades• stupidity was claimed above to be
the comic representation 0£ the interlocutor's growing
sense of uncertainty. Nussbaum is perceptive in
identifying many of the play•s elenctic aspects, and her
observations will be used below.
Nussbaum fails to
consider, however, that the negative aspects of
Aristophanes• depiction could be anything other than the
comic poet's own reservations about elenchos. This study
Will argue that these aspects represent the view of the
admittedly befuddled and exasperated interlocutor.
27

(1972),

pp.

1-18.
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eV'eryone's -first priorities should be thinking, truth, and
improvement

tne

o-f

one's

,
'ljrUX'f).

•

By

analyzing

passages -from the Apology, Havelock. marshals impressive
,,.erbal evidence in support of his thesis.

He argues that

tne doctrine is represented in the Apology primarily by the
recurrence o-f certain "think-words" that take as their
objects either
pronoun.

psyche, "soul/ghost," or the re-flexive

The interchanging use o-f psyche with that o-f the

reflexive pronoun in the Apology suggests, Havelock.
contends, that Socrates used the noun psyche in what must
have· been -for his contemporaries a '.startling new sense:
mean

to

"sel-f."85

Havelock. notes that the Clouds admits o-f occurrence o-f
"think-words" in -formidable numbers, and calls attention
both to incidents where these words are paired with
reflexive pronouns as their objects, and to the play•s
extensive use throughout o-f the re-flexi ve pronoun.
Havelock.'s evidence reveals a Clouds that is truly
ensconced in this vocabulary of thinking and attention to
the "sel-f":

Socrates asks Strepsiades, "How comes it that

you, unaware o-f yourself, fell

into debt?" (242); the

Philosopher persuades his student by claiming, "I will give
85 cf. Taylor, Socrates, p. 137.
Dover, Clouds, in
llis commentary at line 94, dismisses as "lame" the
Scholiast •s suggestion "that the Socratics were called
•uxai because Socrates believed in the immortality o-f
the soul--as i-f no one else did."
Dover makes his point,
but misses, as did the scholiast, Aristophanes• humor.
C-f.
his pp. xxxiii-xxxi v.
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instruction £rom yoursel£ . . . " (385); during his

intensive course 0£ study, Strepsiades is encouraged by
socrates to "Think through one of the procedures 0£
yourself." (694), and by the Chorus to "Think, yes think,
and scrutinize.

By all means condense your (own) sel£ and

mal<.e it spin." (700-702); Socrates repeats that his
reticent student must "Keep thinking," must "Cover up and
Begin with yoursel£; discover what

start thinking
you

want

and

then

express

it."

(727-728).86

but a £ew of the examples Havelock offers.

These

are

The humor is,

as Havelock himself readily admits, quite sophisticated,
relying as it does "on the device 0£ parodying a verbal
syntax which, i£ contemporary and posthumous records are
compared, can be identified as in all probability
Socratic."87

As

humor

demanding

£rom

its

audience

a

keenness and an appreciation for subtlety, Havelock's
evidence supports what this study has already argued and
what Aristophanes himself contends, that the Clouds is a
highly

sophisticated

piece.

But sophistication is not its only suit.

The Clouds

also offers, as Havelock points out, evidence for
Aristophanes• awareness of the Socratic doctrine of the
soul in the form of humor that is delightfully reductive
86 see Havelock,
trans la lions are his.
87 Ha velock,

"Socratic

"Socratic

Self,"

Sel£,"

p.

pp.
15.

10-14-.

The
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and that exploits the superficial and concrete.
and his cohorts are introduced as "ghosts":

Socrates

"Here you see

the think-tank, inhabited by intelligent ghosts" (94),
strepsiades intones.

Aristophanes continues the visual pun

on the Socratic concern for the psyche by depicting the
occupants of the thinkery as "ghost-like, i.e. pale and
underfed." 88
So much Havelock perceptively observes, but the pun on
psyche as the locus of Socrates• concern is likewise
continued by the poet in the motif of initiation and
rebirth, mentioned above in conjunction with Socrates• role
as midwife of truth.

Socrates• insistence that Strepsiades

undergo ini tia ti on is an insistence upon symbolic death and
rebirth, which would qualify the harried old man as one of
the number of psychai, "ghosts/souls."

Support for this

contention can be found in a passage from the Birds, where
Socrates is described as a conjuror of souls visited by the
notorious coward, Peisander:
At a lake in the vicinity of the Sciapodes,89
unwashed Socrates was conjuring up spirits
{'vuxaywyet).
Peisander came there,
wan
ting to
,
>
that
see
the
spirit
(deoµe:vos
'ljl'UX'r)V
ldE:t V)
~

8 8Havelock,

"Socratic

Self,"

p.

15.

8 9LsJ9
translates
"Shade-footed"
or
"Shadyfeet," and explains that these are "a fabulous people in
the hottest part of Libya, with immense feet which they
used as sunshades as they reclined," citing as one
authority the scholia at Birds 1553. For the Sciapodes
here as a mushroom used in the Eleusinian Mysteries, see
C. A. P. Ruck, "Mushrooms and Mysteries. On Aristophanes
and the Necromancy of Socrates," Helios 7 (1981), pp. 1-28.
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deserted him in li£e.
Then just like Odysseus,
holding as victim a camel-lamb, he cut its throat, but
he went away. Up £rom below towards the camel's blood
then came £or him the bat, Chairephon. (Birds 15531564).
The passage clearly pokes £un at Socrates• doctrine 0£ the
"soul";

here

he

is

the

psychagogos,90

the

conjuror

and

persuader, who £ails to e££ect moral improvement.
Peisander

remains

the

coward

he

always

was,91

and

only

the likes o-f the bloodless Chairephon hearken to Socrates•
call:

a

"soul" is indeed conjured up, but one that is

ghoulish and other-worldly.
An expansion on the pun on psyche may even be
recognized in the Clouds' location 0£ Socrates and his
"gods," the Clouds themselves, in the realm 0£ the
etheriai.92

Al though

relation

o-f

psyche

to

the

verb

90For the use o-f "i'UXaywyn v
and its cognates
to describe tragedy's and rhetoric's magical ability to
beguile, see de Romilly, Magic, p. 15, who cites
Aristotle's Poetics 1450a and Plato's Phaedrus 261a.
91Taylor, Socrates, p. 39, po in ts out that
"philopsychia, concern for one's psyche, meant the
cowardly hanging on to 'dear li£e' which leads a man to
'funk' in the field."
Socrates, then, who himsel-f is
concerned with the psyche, logically cannot, by punanalogy, cure Peisander•s cowardice.
92socra tes• position aloft has invited much
comment.
Nussbaum•s assertion, "Practical Wisdom," p. 70,
that "[Socrates'] initial appearance dangling in a basket
(223ff.) indicates his remoteness from the interlocutor,
h.is detachment £rom such 'earthly' matters as moral
habituation and the management of the passions," is merely
an extension of the regularly argued position that
Socrates' air-treading underscores his difference from the
common man, and suggests either an assumption of
superiority or else the vaporous nonsense he regularly puts
forth.
See, e.g., Dover, Clouds, pp. 125-126, and Whitman,
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•'-'xw

is

contested,93

certainly

association

of

the

"ghost/spirit" with the "air" is one that can be witnessed
as far back as Homer, where psychai are by simile compared
with bats flit ting through the air (Odyssey 24-.1-7), and
are seen to elude the grasp like so much smoke (e.g.,
Iliad 23.100).

It

is

not

surprising, then,

that

the "wise

:;.....----

ghost" Socrates treads the air and mingles his thoughts
with it, that, as an eternal "soul" he considers
strepsiades

"ephemeral"

(223),94-

that

he

is

with the "half-dead" (504-), and "soul-drinking

associated
bugs" (712)

and "bats," who, like the psychai brought up from the
underworld, drink life-blood and flit about (Birds 1564-,
cf. 1296); that he invokes Aer and Aither (264--265) and
swears by Brea th and Aer (627), and that he recognizes the
air-treading

Clouds

as

deities

(252-253,

365).

This

airborne Socrates, then, can as easily be argued to be the
Socrates whose concern was only for the psyche and, by
Comic Hero, p. 139.
For the air-treading Cloud-chorus as betraying
"triteness, inflation, and pervasive lack of point" in
their opening song, see Michael Silk, "Aristophanes as
Lyric Poet," YCS 26 (1980), p. 107.

--·

I

93LSJ 9
and
s.v.
1"\JXW
Nevertheless, as Edwin Menes pointed out to me, "the
absence of an etymological relationship does not preclude a
si~nifican t
punning relationship, e.g., owµa
O'l'JIJ.a."

9 4 Nussba um, "Practical Wisdom," p. 75, cites this
line as evidence that the Socrates of the Clouds considers
himself, as did the Platonic Socrates in the Apology, the
servant of powerful deities, here the eternal Clouds; in
this line he proclaims his association with their permanency.
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comic extension, with all things 0£ the "air," as it can be
argued to be a Socrates who has been misconstrued as an
inconsistent a theist, or as one who is mistakenly shown as
a physicist cut from the same cloth as, say, Diogenes 0£
. 95 or
Apouonia,

one

who

has

been depicted

as

the

typical intellectual, -full of "hot air," with his head "in
the

clouds."
This last interpretation 0£ the Clouds' up-in-the-air

imagery--whether applied to Socrates himsel£, the Cloudchorus, or the new "god" Dinos--is one popular with the
play's

many

interpreters,9 6

and

£or

good

reason.

Entailing as it does the sense of con-fusion that "every
man" £eels when confronted by the abstract world 0£ the
intellectual, Aristophanes' use 0£ the image to depict a
type is apropos.

But using this imagery to depict Socrates

practicing elenchos is a

stroke 0£ genius.

To the pre-

literate interlocutor 0£ Socrates, the abstract uni versa ls
Socrates urges them to de-fine in elenchos are as di££icult
to grasp and pin down as is the "ghostly" Socrates

95Dover, Clouds, pp. xxxv and 127, n. on line 230.
According to the latter, Diogenes 0£ Apollonia believed
that the soul is air, and used the adjective .>..£11'To5
to describe both.
96see
e.g., Dover, Clouds, pp. lxvi-lxx; Whitman,
£.2mic Her~, pp. 127-128; Reck-ford, "Father Beating," pp. 93
and 115 ££.
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nimsel£. 97
floating

In

Aristophanes'

"ghost," then,

it is

depiction
possible

0£

Socrates

to recognize

as

a

not

onlY the philosopher's alleged concern with the "soul," but
also, more generally, the odd £igure such a man must have
cut among his £ellow Athenians.

Martha Nussbaum has given

a striking description 0£ the Socrates 0£ Plato's
symposium, the disturbingly other-worldly creature:
Socrates is weird.
He is, in £act, 'not similar to
any human being'. We £eel, as we look at him, both
awestruck and queasy, timidly homesick £or ourselves.
We £eel that we must look back. at what we currently
are, our loves and our ways of seeing, the problems
these cause £or practical reason.
We need to see
ourselves more clearly be£ore we can say whether we
would like to become this other sort of being,
excellent
and
dea£.98
We see this oddball Socrates all over Aristophanes'
Clouds, not only in his stat us as psyche, or in his
£amiliar role as the distracted think.er--here comically
shat upon by a lizard--but also in young Pheidippides'
horror at the prospect of joining the ranks 0£ Socrates'
students, which caste would catapult the boy fully out 0£
the realm 0£ normalcy, as he himsel£ recognizes (102-120).
Pheidippides' reaction recalls that 0£ the Alcibiades 0£
the Symposium, whose attraction to the philosopher was ever
cancelled by the repulsion he felt at what Socrates' way 0£
97Green, "Strepsiades," pp. 23-24, connects the
"hot air" imagery with vapidity 0£ abstraction to one who,
like Strepsiades, understands only the concrete and
Situational.
98Nussba um,

Fragility,

p.

184.
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life demanded.

Tenure in the ranks of the "wise souls"

demands as prerequisite a Kind of death, which even the
eager Strepsiades dreads and finds scary (504; 507-508):

a

death of all that is -familiar and normal and cozily
s e c u r e . 99
For the pre-literate -firth-century B. C. Athenian,
talking with Socrates was, in short, like stepping into a
whirlwind.

Recall the sense of vertigo experienced during

elenchos by interlocutors such as Theaetetus (Theaetetus
t55c):

this in Aristophanes• play is the reign 0£ Dinos,

"Revolution," established by the agreement of Strepsiades
himself shortly after he has been in the thrall of
Socrates.

RecK-ford is especially insight-ful on this point,

although he does not relate it to elenchos:
This earth, which
Our lives are shot
holds, neither Law
as in all times 0£
the dizzy brinK o-f
absurdity.100

seemed so solid, is floating on air.
through with illusion; nothing
nor Nature. We have clearly come-personal or cultural transition--to
the abyss o-f meaninglessness and

99sherman, Horal Education, pp. 23-24, taKes a
negative view or this aspect of elenchos, and misses, it
seems, all o-f Aristophanes' humor: "Thus, the elenchus is
a painful and debilitating process that sucKs dry the
spirit . . . from its victims.
At 723, Strepsiades wails
to the Chorus: Not only have my clothes and complexion
vanished at the hands 0£ the Socratics. but my life has
vanished . . . . The implication is that in banishing
customary beliefs and values--beliefs about god, piety,
and respect, the Socratics perhaps rupture the emotional
fiber 0£ li£e.
They destroy a person's well-being and
moral stability."
lOORecK£ord, "Father-Bea ting," p. 115.
RecK£ord
sees the Cloud-chorus, with its constancy 0£ change,
expressive 0£ the persistence 0£ illusion, as connected
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rn

Aristophanes• up-in-the-air, ghostly Socrates, who

communes with the clouds and encourages the succession 0£
zeus bY Dinos, we can detect the historical philosopher
whose way of life, values, beliefs, and methods amazed,
astounded, and ultimately repelled his -fellow citizens.
Who but Socrates is willing to "die" £or the truth, willing
to give up the body and its desires to become a "ghost,"
however wise?

It is no wonder, then, that rinding onesel£

in this etherial realm of abstraction would be perceived as
dizzying; or that placing onesel£ willingly in the
admittedly seductive clutches 0£ such a man would
ultimately be perceived as an experience in which one had
been duped, tak.en as an easy mark., hoodwink.ed, and robbed
of one's everyday garb.
This brings our discussion to the previously mentioned
negative aspects of Socrates' characterization in the
Clouds.

For in seeming contrast to Socrates-the-ghost we

have another Socrates in Aristophanes' play:
shyster.

Socrates-the-

Can it be that Aristophanes set these two

depictions side-by-side and never noticed the con-fusing
discrepancy?
true, a

Hardly.

Socrates in this play is, it is

detached, spiri t-lik.e ascetic, and yet also a

rogue

and a thie£, one who steals with the -finesse and aplomb 0£
the pro£essional.

Furthermore, under Socrates•

With the idea behind Dinos.
See also K. J. Reck.£ord,
"Aristophanes• Ever-Flowing Clouds," Emory University
9_uarterly 22 (1967), pp. 222-235.
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instruction Strepsiades gains his desired end 0£ cheating
nis creditors, and he is encouraged in this by the Clouds
socrates worships, Clouds who in the end self-righteously
censure the old man £or the very practice they had
previously urged.

Strepsiades' son is thoroughly corrupted

bY tne two arguments in Socrates' employ, one 0£ which
urges moral license, the other of which is exposed as
nypocritic.

The old man in the play's -final moments is

driven to the point where he realizes that the true
corruptors 0£ his son are Socrates and his cronies, and it
is this realization that impels him to set £ire to the
school.

Are we then driven to argue that Aristophanes'

intent is to impart harsh criticism of Socrates and his
method?

Not necessarily.

The negative aspects of Socrates' characterization,
the way his associates, the Clouds and the Logoi, are
depicted, and even the -final burning 0£ the school can be
appreciated as an uncannily perceptive rendering 0£ the
interlocutor's experience of Socratic elenchos, put into a
comic perspective which both exaggerates and objecti£ies.
Aristophanes' view 0£ elenchos is indeed perspicacious, but
not

£or

all

that

necessarily

censorious.101

We

can

101Arguing that Aristophanes is not critical of
Socrates is shadowboxing -from a defensive position, and
Yields predictably unconvincing results.
See, £or example,
Murray, Aristophanes, pp. 87-105; Thomas Gelzer,
"Aristophanes und sein Sok.rates," MH 13 (1956), pp. 65-93;
Harmut Erbse, "Sok.rates im Schatten der Aristophanischen
Wolk.en," Hermes 82 (1954; hereafter Erbse, "Sok.rates"), pp.
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never Know what Aristophanes thought 0£ Socrates, but we
can recognize that in his portrayal 0£ the philosopher,
Aristophanes was as -fully aware 0£ the enigma that is
~enchos

as he was 0£ the enigma that was its practitioner.

Aristophanes could give vent to harsh criticism when
occasion called £or it.

Whitman recalls Aristophanes'

rantings against the likes 0£ Cleon to make this point, and
further notes that, although Aristophanes describes
Socrates with what would normally be considered censorious
385-420.
Murray admits that there is a likeness to
Socrates, but denies that his honor is attacked; instead
the play is a joke on bumpkin-meets-scholar, a "clash 0£
'humours:• as Murray puts it {p. 95).
Gelzer removes
culpability £rom Socrates by making him the symbol 0£ the
new education and eristic; Erbse considers Aristophanes'
Socrates a creation the poet uses to provide his play with
a £ocus £or all its disparate elements. The current study
no more denies than it asserts that Aristophanes in the
Clouds is critical 0£ Socrates.
Instead, it merely argues
that the portrait is comically accurate. That Socrates and
his elenchos are disruptive and discomfiting is as obvious
£rom Aristophanes' play as it is £rom Plato's early
dialogues, but that the two are culpable £or the moral
decline 0£ the Athenians is in no way evident in either
author.
It is possible, to be sure, to argue £rom the
perspective 0£ the late dialogues 0£ Plato or £rom that 0£
Aristotle, as does Nussbaum in "Practical Wisdom," passim,
that elenchos is a negative tool and there-fore a dangerous
one to use £or moral improvement, in that its results are
unpredictable and inconstant. But moral improvement is
only one 0£ many aspects 0£ elenchos, one 0£ its aims,
according to Plato. This study is concerned with elenchos,
not moral improvement per se; it is concerned with Socrates
as practitioner 0£ elenchos, not with his supposed -failure
at raising the moral consciousness 0£ Athens. Aristophanes
mirrors elenchos accurately, although comically--both the
method i tsel£ and the e££ect it regularly has on
interlocutors. The £act that Aristophanes' portrait has
Yielded so much controversy in interpretation is perhaps a
testimonial to its accuracy in portraying the man and his
method, both 0£ which have long been controversial
subjects.
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words, the portrait o:f the philosopher is one that lacks
tne

common

rancor

to

harsh

criticism.102.

This

is

not

to say that Aristophanes engages only in gentle mocking o:f
socrates. 103

Such

affectionate

teasing

is

unworthy

tne type of comedy that Aristophanes produces.

of

Instead, he

gives us a Socrates who is as big and bold in his
roguishness as he is thoroughly eccentric in his
concentration on the psyche.

That this portrait is an

accura te--though comic--represen ta ti on o:f elenchos' effect
on the interlocutor will now be defended.
It would be di-f-ficult to deny that Aristophanes fully

intended his audience to view Socrates, at least in one
aspect,

as

a

rogue,

a

rather

uncommon criminai.104

When Strepsiades first identi:fies for his suspicious son
the academic society into whose membership he hopes to urge
the boy, he hesitates to name Socrates and his associates,
and

instead

labels

,

them

Te

,

Kaya9ol,

the

standard epithet for men considered "true gentlemen" (101).
Pheidippides, however, not fooled by his father's at tempts
at evasion, names names and does not blanch at giving what
102Whi tman,
103Pace

Comic

Hero,

Arrows mi th,

pp.

Clouds,

142.-143.
pp.

12.-13.

l04The point is that, in acknowledging the roguish
elements of Aristophanes' depiction of Socrates, one need
not be thrown into the position either of de:fending the
historical Socrates, by making Aristophanes' depiction a
mere type, or of at tacking the historical Socrates, by
assuming that Aristophanes is thus criticizing Socrates.
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:n.e considers the unvarnished truth:
t:n.ose

rogues

.

(ltOV'l'JPOl),

a>..a~ovas), 1 05

(1'0\JS

I

know!

"Oh, no!
Those

pale-raced,

You mean
impostors

shoeless,

to

whose number belong that ill-possessed Socrates and
chairephon!"

(102-104 ).

While at -first blush this might be excused as the
over-reaction 0£ a spoiled boy who would rather race horses
in the sun than put his e£fort into academic pursuits,
Pheidippides' assessment 0£ Socrates as a rogue is borne
out by Aristophanes• portrayal 0£ the philosopher as a
clothing thief.

The student who haughtily answers the door

to Strepsiades• urgent pounding proudly describes his
master at work, procuring a meal ticket £or himsel£ and his
cohorts:

"He strewed -fine ash over a

then

taking

stole

a

it

cloak

[to

serve as]

-from

the

a

pair

table, bent a skewer,
0£

wrestling-school."

compasses,106
(177-179).

feat is a source 0£ amazement £or Strepsiades:
do

we

wonder

at

(9auµa~oµt:v)

that

he

This

"Why then

Thales?,"

he

105whi tman, Comic Hero, pp. 139-140, considers
Socrates the alazon, the "quack" whose hold on poneria
rivals that 0£ the usual comic hero. Whitman sees the term
alazon as descriptive 0£ Socrates• aptness at thievery, but
does not attempt to explain the meaning behind
Aristophanes• depiction 0£ Socrates as a thie£.
C£. also
PP. 26-27 and 96 £or Whitman's more general consideration
0£ the alazon and its relation to the eiron, both 0£ which
Strepsiades (449) hopes to become after his tenure with
Socrates.
106Following
Clouds, abridged
87 at line 178.

K.
ed.

J.
Dover, ed., Aristophanes,
(Ox-ford:
Univ. Press, 1970), pp.

86-

l86

intones, and thereupon demands immediate entrance to the
school.

Similarly, a£ter Strepsiades has been expelled,

pheidippides notices that his £ather's education has not
come without a price:
cloaK?"

--"And £or this you lost your

--"I didn't lose it; I

(ic:a1all't:<ppovTtKa)."

--"And

thought it away

your

shoes,

what

done with your shoes, you old £001, you?"
said, I

have

you

--"As Pericles

have lost them to what was need£ul." (856-859).

These blatant charges of thievery against Socrates can
only be taKen as serious by someone who is looking to picK
a £ight with the comic poet, someone willing at the same
time to overlook the fact that Aristophanes shows Socrates
engaging in all manner 0£ unlikely things--like making his
entrance in an ex machina basket--simply to make the
caricature 0£ the philosopher ludicrously accurate.

Dover,

commenting on the student's initial description 0£
Socrates' adeptness at thievery, notes, "Demetrios
(loc.ci t.)

quotes

this

passage

[177-179]

as

an

'unexpected'

joke, 'which has no connexion with what has gone
before/"107

but

this

is

precisely

in making Socrates a sneaky thie£.

Aristophanes'

point

Recall how

interlocutors in Plato's dialogues came to Socrates with
their opinions firmly entrenched, and how soon it was that
they became divested of those opinions.

Recall how often

interlocutors charged Socrates with sorcery, how, £or
107oover,

Clouds,

p.

118

at

line

179.
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e:xarople, Euthyphro was convinced that Socrates could, like
Daedalus, make inanimate objects move.

The Platonic

socra tes, when practicing elenchos, was to his
interlocutors a source of wonder, just as he is in
Aristophanes' play to the dull-witted Strepsiades, whose
exclaroation at line 180 attests to the wonder he feels at
the philosopher's comic practice of elenchos-as-thievery.
How is Socrates in elenchos able to do what he does?
Elenchos is indeed like thievery; it accomplishes the
unexpected by unnoticed means; it achieves re£u ta ti on by
using as arguments analogies which at the time seem
unconnected to the discussion at hand.
Of course Socrates is a
specifically, a

thief.

rogue generally, and, more

Recall how common it is £or

interlocutors as well as £or modern commentators to re-fuse
to believe that Socrates' pro-fession 0£ ignorance is
sincere; that his claim to impassive involvement is honest.
Correspondingly, in the Clouds, Socrates is called an
imposter, an alazon (102), whom Strepsiades assumes will be
able in turn to teach him to be an impostor and a
dissembler,

an

eiron.108

Whitman

is

at

pains

to

108The Ii tera t ure on comic "types" is extensive,
and the subject cannot be considered at length here. For
the classic, though now considered overly rigid,
characterization 0£ the comic alazon and eiron, see
Corn-ford, Attic Comedy, pp. 132-141 and 148-152.
A more
modern consideration of the meanings 0£ alazon and eiron
can be round in R. Stark, "Sokra tisches in der Vogeln," RhH
96 (1953), pp. 77 £.
For the argument that Aristophanes' portrayal 0£
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distinguish Socratic irony £rom the irony 0£ the comic

ne ro •

but he misses the potential £or similarity when

socratic irony is considered £rom the perspective 0£ the
increasingly

suspicious

interlocutor:

rt is a mistake to con-fuse the irony o-f the comic hero
with that 0£ Plato's Socrates, though Socrates,
clearly and o£ten, made use 0£ it to get the better 0£
his opponent, and not seldom with subtle comic e££ect.
For the irony o-f Socrates leads the opponent, at least
theoretically, toward ultimate submission be£ore a
philosophic logos; the irony 0£ a comic hero leads to
his own swaggering triumph over all reason or
opposition, in the name 0£ an impudent sel£ which has
become liberated £rom all small restraints 0£
consistency
or
responsibility .109
Socratic "irony" is, a£ter all, o£ten deemed a

ruse, a

posture, because it seems unlikely that there is no
subter£uge in elenchos, where interlocutor a£ter
interlocutor is robbed 0£ sel£-assurance and the status 0£
one who knows, without once becoming aware that this is
happening until it is already too late, until it is all
over.

And then, the master stroke:

Socrates looks in to

the £ace o-f his con-founded interlocutor, whose claim to
knowledge he has just appropriated, and brazenly alleges
that he has done nothing whatsoever.
admits his guilt?

But then, what thie-f

Aristophanes' depiction 0£ Socrates-as-

rogue in the Clouds, whether in his guise as thie£,
imposture, or dissembler, is elenchos' uncanny ability to
Socrates bears the mark 0£ Socratic irony as analyzed by
Kierkegaard, see K. Kleve, "Anti-Dover or Socrates in the
£..loud~," so 5B (1983), pp. 23-37.
l09Whitman,

Comic

Hero,

p.

27.
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secure un£oreseen reversal, and its so-called "impersonal
aspect," comically depicted £rom the interlocutor's
11 0
perspec t ive.

That Aristophanes shows Socrates in the Clouds
stealing clothing instead 0£ anything else is perhaps not
merely a

serendipitous choice.

Socrates, a £ter all, does

laY everyone bare with his elenchos:

as he impatiently

explains to Strepsiades, who is hesitant to obey the
philosopher's demand that he strip 0££ his clothing, "It is
the

custom

[here]

to

go

about

naked"

(4-98).111

And

indeed, i£ one wants to associate with Socrates, one must
have no scruples whatever about showing to the world
everything that one has.

1£ commitment to the soul's

nurture can be so ludicrously depicted on the physical
plane by making Socrates and his cohorts into pallid,
blood-sucking ghosts, one can likewise imagine that the
soul-baring requisite £or interlocutors in elenchos can
similarly be reduced to a baring 0£ the body, either with
or without consent 0£ the person involved.
llOEdmunds, "Socrates," pp. 221-2.2.2, considers the
Cloud-chorus Aristophanes' representation 0£ Socratic irony
(read: mockery), " . . . as an attitude, as a stance toward
the world." Edmunds makes much o-f the Chorus• mockery and
deception, and yet is amused that " . . . it did not occur
to [Strepsiades] that the Clouds themselves were ironists."
111 see Nussbaum, "Practical Wisdom," p. 74:
"This
Socrates is out to strip away his pupil's preconceptions-it is the custom to enter naked into the phrontisterion
(ll98)--and to expose the inconsistencies in his current
beliefs (c£. esp. 369, 398)."
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Elenchos is, a£ter all, a

process whereby the

interlocutor, by putting his subjective belie£s to the
touchstone 0£ objective logic, only gradually becomes
conscious that his initial bravado was ill-£ounded.

As was

argued above (Chapter One, Part Three), elenchos' personal
aspect--which in Plato's dialogues takes the -form 0£
Socrates' insistence that interlocutors express only their
own views--is integral to the interlocutor's dawning
awareness 0£ his own ignorance.

In the Clouds,

Aristophanes represents this process o-f gradual awakening
primarily

through

the

agency

0£

the

Cloud-chorus.112

The mimetic ability 0£ the Cloud-chorus is elenchos'
personal aspect per se, comically depicted on a
rather than on a mental plane.
personal:
whoever

physical

The Chorus is insistently

its talent £or imitation reveals the nature o:f
comes

within

its

-field

(348-355);113

and

it

112Interpretations o-£ the Cloud-chorus generally
stress their changeability; see the discussion above, this
section, £or up-in-the-air imagery.
Charles Segal,
"Aristophanes' Cloud-Chorus," Arethusa 2 (1969), pp. 143161, does not consider the Chorus' mimetic abilities, but
argues instead, by pointing to the Chorus' persistently
concrete, poetic language and its association with nature's
beauty, that the Chorus are more properly identified
throughout the play with Right.
113As Nussbaum, "Practical Wisdom," p. 76,
comments: "Insofar the Clouds are symbolic o:f Socratic
teaching, they display it as elenctic and negative,
imparting no insight into anything but the interlocutor's
own defects, leaving beyond the structure 0£ the elenchos
only a -formless nebulosity." C£. Martha Nussbaum,
"Commentary on Edmunds[' 'Aristophanes' Socrates']," in
~oceedings 0£ the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient
Philosophy, Vol. 1, 1985 (Lantham, MD:
University Press o:f
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liKewise demands 0£ the contestants in the set contest

..

between Right and Anti-Right:

.v

""'
aauTou

( 1' 'fJ

,
Cf'UCJlV

~

speaK your nature"
,

€lll'€,

960) .

But by also maKing this insistently personal Chorus
the vehicle by which the initial bravado, intermediate
nagging doubt, and £inal a waKening of Strepsiades are
expressed, Aristophanes in his nebulous Chorus gives a
concrete representation of the effect on the interlocutor
of elenchos' personal aspect:

the change £rom ignorance to

Knowledge,

The

i.e.,

recognition.

Cloud-chorus,

having

drawn near Strepsiades, reveals in their waning
approbation of Strepsiades' action the old man's own
evolution £rom self-assurance, to doubt, to recognition 0£

America,

Inc., 1986; herea£ter Nussbaum, "Commentary"), pp.
especially p. 236, where she again stresses, "The
Clouds taKe on the shape or £orm 0£ the person to whom
their attention is directed; they become what they see.
Their £unction is to show or reveal something about the
pupil's own nature." Nussbaum taKes her earlier argument
further, however, by noting that " . . . in at least two
cases [the Clouds] taKe on the shape 0£ the interlocutor's
appetitive desires
" (p. 237).
Edmunds,
"Socrates," argues that the Cloud-chorus represents
Socrates' daimonion as well as his "ironic" (i.e., mocKing)
stance; Nussbaum, "Commentary," p. 234, counters that
Socrates' references to his daimonion could be interpreted
as " . . . an ironic way of alluding to the supreme
authority of dissuasive reason and elenctic argument."
The members of the Cloud-chorus, as Strepsiades is
Perplexed to note, have noses.
For their noses as
indicative 0£ deception, rather liKe the phrase, "lead by
the nose," see A. KohnKen, "Der Wolken-Chor des
Aristophanes," Hermes 108 (1980), pp. 154-169.
231-240,
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A£ter their entrance at 274, which is -followed by a
list 0£ their requirements 0£ devotees and promises to them
at 412 ££., the Cloud-chorus, engaging -first in highhearted encouragement, reflects Strepsiades' willingness to
entrust his £ate to the power of cheating and his gullible
aspirations that this new power will spell £or him an
enviable future:

the Chorus assures Strepsiades that his

new education will procure £or him a "£ame high as heaven"
and
461;

the

"most

~'l'}Aw101a1ov

enviable
f3tov,

.!J6.!J);

,

,

in

addition

oupavoµ.'T)KES,

li£e"
Strepsiades

will become weal thy by selling to others the rhetorical
sK.ills

he

is

about

to

obtain

(468-475).115

At

510-517

the Chorus again encourages the old man, and praises the
courage shown by him during the initiation he has just
undergone.
After Strepsiades' unsuccessful tenure as student,
however, the Chorus becomes advisory, signalling the shift
114Nussba um, "Practical Wisdom," p. 76, sees the
Cloud-chorus as Aristophanes' critic ism 0£ elenchos:
"Insofar as the Clouds are symbolic of Socratic teaching,
they display it as elenctic and negative, imparting no
insight into anything but the interlocutor's own defects."
C£. Harriott, Aristophanes, p. 184:
"
the Clouds
observe human -failings."
11 5 Nussba um, "Practical Wisdom," p. 80 n. 72,
notes that it is not Socrates, but instead "it is the
Clouds who are the goddesses 0£ rogues and who promise
Strepsiades the accomplishment 0£ his dishonest ends (31618, 331-4)," but does not recognize that the Chorus, in
this, is re-fleeting Strepsiades' own desires.
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from Strepsiades• reckless self-assurance to a

sense that,

to save his original trust in the powers 0£ cheating, a new
strategy must now be undertaken.

But his eagerness to

salvage his belief likewise marks Strepsiades as ripe for
refutation:

after advising Strepsiades to send his son to

the

the

school,

Chorus

turns

quickly

to

Socrates116

to

apprise him that Strepsiades--eager, con-fused, and elated
>

(eiOLl.J.OS;

>

I

e:ic lte:lt X'r)yµ.e:vou

I

e:tr'r)pµ.e:vou,

and 809-810)--is now every thief's dream:

806

the easy mark,

but he may not be one for long (see the Chorus•
admonition,

I

-raxe:ws,

810-812).

That the tide has measurably turned against
Strepsiades is appropriately shown right after his moment
of glory, when he has driven his creditors off the stage,
and just before his comeuppance, when his son "beats" him
at his own game.

The Chorus' foreboding pronouncement at

1303 -ff. explicitly connects Strepsiades• cheating with the
result to come, one which he had never imagined:
See what it is, to long passionately for what is
wrong!
For this old man, in passionate longing, wan ts
to de-fault his loans. There is no way today he can
avoid getting back straightaway some bit of that nasty
business he has begun; it will make him "smart." For
I think that soon he will find that very thing he once
upon a time was looking for: his son to be clever for
him, to give voice to views contrary to the just, and
so to prevail--even if he speaks things utterly
depraved--over all those with whom he holds
116 Dover•s discussion of the con-fusion over who
is the Chorus addresses in lines 804--813 argues
Persuasively for Sacra tes; see Dover, Clouds, p. 197 at
lines 804--813.

it
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intercourse. But maybe, maybe he'll sometime wish his
son were dumb. (1303-1320).
strepsiades' final revelation comes from the Cloudcnorus at 1452 ff.

After cursing Socrates and Anti-Right,

strepsiades in vain tries to blame the Clouds for their
part, only to learn that his current plight is one for
which he is personally and solely responsible:
--I have suffered this on account of you, Clouds; to
you I turned over all my affairs. --You yourself are
for yourself the cause of these things; you
turned117 yourself: to roguish a££airs.
(~UTOS
µe~
o~v
oa~T~
,au
TOU\WV
aLTLOS,
OTPE:vas
OE:aUTOV
E:LS
lt'OV'r)pa
vpayµaTa) --But why didn't you counsel me

back
then, instead 0£ leading on an old country bumpkin?
--We do these things whenever we find some lover
(epaaT.fiv)
of roguish a ff airs; we launch him
into wrong, until he knows to fear the gods. (14521461).

To summarize, then, the Cloud-chorus is Aristophanes'
representation of elenchos' personal aspect.

They not only

are reputed to be able to give a physical rendition

o~

someone's nature (a feat which would unlikely be
accomplished on stage), they likewise reveal Strepsiades'
own progression from self-assured bravado, through doubt
and the sense that all is not well, to his final, though
fleeting, recognition that he has only the desires that
Underpin his beliefs to blame.

Recall the similar

Progression from self-assurance to doubt experienced by

117 Edmunds, "Socrates," p. 224, notes this pun on
Strepsiades' name, but interprets this as " . . . making £un
of the old man." This interpretation fits Edmunds' thesis
that the Cloud-chorus represents a mocking Socratic irony.
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guthYPhro and Meno (see above, Chapter One, Part Three),
and

hOW

quick they were to assume that it was Socrates who

led them astray, how eager young Euthyphro was to leave
when, as was argued, the implica lions 0£ his belie£s'
demise became glaringly apparent.

In Aristophanes' play,

the interlocutor's sense o-f how he--or rather, his belie£s
--are -faring in elenchos is given voice by the agency 0£
the Cloud-chorus, who begin by heartily encouraging, and
proceed through cautionary advice to unbridled reproach.
Is it any wonder, then, that Strepsiades burns the
thinkery to the ground?

For it is not only as comic hero--

here reversing his own elenctic reversal--tha t he per-forms
what in real li£e would be an admittedly £oul act, but also
as interlocutor in elenchos.

The early Platonic dialogues

are testimony to the £act that £ew humans are able to
withstand the harsh realization that all that they hold
dear is, at best, suspect and,
fallacious.

more

likely, totally

Recall Euthyphro, in his haste to leave on

unspeci£ied business, or Alcibiades in the Symposium, whose
acknowledged shame at the recognition 0£ own de£iciencies
left him ambivalent about Socrates:

"Many are the times I

would gladly £ind him no longer among men on earth, but i£
this were in £act to happen, I know that I would su££er
greater distress than ever; the result is that I have no
idea what to do with this man at all." (Symposium 216c.13),
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strepsiades in the Clouds has already been shown
squirming as he undergoes the rigors of elenchos; as
Nussbaum and others have pointed out, the bedbugs that
beset the old man at 633 ff. are Aristophanes' comic
depiction 0£ the discom£ort this method can visit upon
socra tes'

in terlocu tors.118

Add

to

this

the

£act

that

strepsiades agrees to submit himself to all sorts of
physical discomfort ( 4-4-0-4-4-2), that he gets rained upon
(267-268), is peppered with £lour and scared out of his
wits (256-260), and is -finally soundly beaten by his own
son (1321 ££.).

In the end, the old man experiences a

much

more obvious but no less unpleasant recognition than
Euthyphro or Alcibiades were seen to experience:
Clouds, your words are hard, but just!

"Alas,

For it was not

right that I refused to pay the money I borrowed." (14-621464).
In summary, then, the mental exasperation regularly
experienced by interlocutors at elenchos' terminus, which
in Plato's dialogues gets displaced onto Socrates, is in

ll8see Nussbaum, "Practical Wisdom," p. 75, who
remarks, "Talking to Socrates undoubtedly was like being
bit ten and drained; talking to the others [i.e., sophists
like Gorgias] was as easy as eating."
See also Sherman,
Koral Education, p. 23, who notes that, at lines 94-1-94-8,
Anti-Right threatens Right with "stinging" arguments
(K€VTou1-1.evo5).
For interpretation 0£ the bugs as
representative of Strepsiades' distress in general (first
caused by his son's "biting" debts, 12 £., and only later
by Socrates), see Whitman, Comic Hero, p. 14-1.
Whitman
makes the additional point that Strepsiades' discomfort is
also alluded to in his name.
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tne Clouds acted out on the physical plane.

This is quite

appropriate, for it is on this very plane that Aristophanes
snows Strepsiades' mental anguish during elenchos.

In

addition, even Socrates' doctrine of the soul was similarly
presented as a

physical reality, while elenchos' amazing

capacity for procuring unforeseen reversal was depicted as
tneft of clothing.

0£ course Strepsiades should physically

destroy even as he has suf£ered--a t least in his own eyes-physical destruction.
destruction
715); it is

>

Poor Strepsiades yowled at his own
,

(a1To).).uµ.al,

>

>

707;

....

GlTO).OUOlV,

justifiable, then, that destroying Socrates and

his cohorts be urged by Strepsiades in turn
>

....

(a1To>.E:LS,

1466),

and

that

out

from

the

school

should come a comically gratifying penultimate cry
>

....

(a1To>.€lS

1499).

The

jolt

when

comic

justice meets history is ours to feel, not for those who
were to sit in Aristophanes' audience and howl their
appreciation at tit for tat.
Only an overly defensive historical perspective can
raise the objection that Strepsiades wrongly lays the blame
at Socrates' feet,

that, after all, Socrates is, by

his

absence from the contest of the two logoi, dissociated from
the positions presented there by Anti-Right, who prevails.
Nussbaum is right, then, to argue that Gelzer and Erbse err
in defending Socrates against the charge of being a
corrupting influence by claiming that blame is rightly
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ascribable to Strepsiades; £or, as Nussbaum points out,
even the Platonic Socrates argues--against the sophist
Gorgias and elsewhere--that the student who acts badly does
so

because

his

teacher

has

failed.119

As

insightful

as

is Nussbaum•s analysis 0£ the contest between the logoi,
ner imputation to Aristophanes 0£ a critical perspective
on socra tes as an ed uca tor--reminiscen t 0£ the implied
views of the later Plato and those expressed by Aristotle-is attributable to her emphasis on the contest 0£ the logoi
as the primary locus in the Clouds 0£ Socratic elenchos.
Instead, the contest should be considered as only one facet
of Aristophanes• presentation of elenchos.

Many of

Nussbaum•s excellent observations can be reconsidered in
this

light.
That Socrates is absent £rom the contest is a great

good joke, and should not be passed of£ as mere theatrical
convention, whereby £i ve actors are seldom £ound on stage
in comedy;120

in

addition,

it

is

at

least

arguable

that

Aristophanes could fairly easily have, £or example,
absented Pheidippides, if he so chose.
from

the

stage,
vap

,

'

all'Ecroµ.al"

marked

his

announcement,

,

,

QUIOlV

(886-887),

11 9Nussbaum,

by

is

a

IOl V

pointed

"Practical

Socrates• departure

~oyolV,

reference

Wisdom,"

p.

,

'

"au-ros.

,

'

€YW

to

what

4-7.

120see Dover, Clouds, p. lxxvii; Nussbaum,
"Practical Wisdom," p. 4-8; Sherman, Moral Education, p.

14.

0,
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nas been termed the "impersonal aspect" of elenchos:
socra tes' insistence that it is not he, but the logos that
does

the

refu ting.121

But

putting

forward

as

antidote

to socra tes' supposed "innocence" the theory that, since
Anti-Right argues elenctically, he is therefore the
"philosophical

persona

clearly culpable:

of

Socra tes," 122

who

is

then

"His attitude is at best morally

121see the discussion above, Chapter One, Part
Three.
Sherman, Moral Education, pp. 14-15, al though she
argues that the limited number of actors is the most
plausible explanation for Socrates' absence, tentatively
suggests that "I£ anything, Socrates' absence during the
contest 0£ the two logoi seems to underscore the ironic,
mocK. claim made in the Euthyphro that while Socrates sets
logoi in motion, once moving they take on an agency 0£
their own independent 0£ his manipulations (91d-e, 15b)."
Erbse, "Sokra tes,"> p.
398, argues that Socrates remains,
,
and that his avecroµaL at 887 indicates merely that
he is withdrawing any influence he might have over the
contest.
This study, by arguing that Socrates' actual absence
is the comedic representation of elenchos' impersonal
aspect, in no way means to deny what Nussbaum, "Practical
Wisdom," p. 66, points out, that Pheidippides associates
Socrates with the position argued by Anti-Right. Socrates'
claim to be separate from the logoi he employed was
regularly disbelieved by interlocutors, who accused him of
using some sort of sorcery to throw the argument. It is
not surprising, then, that Pheidippides would proudly, as
later would the outraged Strepsiades, attribute AntiRight's program to Socrates.
It is surprising, however,
that Nussbaum would follow suit.
122 sherman, Moral Education, p. 16.
Nussbaum's
claim, "Practical Wisdom," p. 51, is slightly more
cautious, "The personi£ication 0£ the two logoi is a handy
dramatic device. But when they appear before the pupil in
Person, ready to tell the Chorus what their natures are
(960), we may also be seeing a telling and particular
representation of Socratic epistemology at work."
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neutral;

at

worst

he

condones

deceit "123--this

is,

again, shadowboxing, now even more so, with a new offensive
taKen against a previously fabricated defensive position.
It is, to be sure, absolutely correct that Anti-Right
argues

elenctically;

Nussbaum

describes

it

succinctly:

The debate is not really an argument bet ween
proponents of rival programs, but something much more
unusual in the rhetorical tradition: an elenchos of
the moral views of one speaker by the arguments of the
other.
Anti-Right yields the first, expository place
to his rival, announcing that he will debate 'from the
things he will say• (942)--starting only -from the
views expressed by his opponent. Using these he will
'shoot him down' (944) using new and inventive
(Kainois, 943) arguments.
These two are not logoi in
the same sense. One expounds, the other argues; one
sets out a view, the other speaks against it (c£.
enantiais gnomaisi, 1037, cf. 1314; antilexai, 1040).
And, as it will turn out, the aim and achievement o-f
this negative procedure will be to show Right that he
himself does not really believe in the education he
defends. This is not to say that there is no positive
content to the position of Anti-Right; it will turn
out both to embody substantial moral assumptions and
to produce tangible results. But in -form and spirit
it is much less like a contest in rhetoric than like
another Kind of debate that also conceals its positive
contribution:
the Socratic elenchos.124
The contest is, however, better understood as the
later stages of elenchos rather than as the whole of
123Nussba um, "Practical Wisdom," p. 48.
It is
mistaken to argue that an elenctically argued position
Which prevails must therefore be sanctioned by Socrates who
staged the contest; indeed, if one were to take such a
Posi lion regarding elenchos in the Platonic dialogues,
Socrates would have to be accused of cleaving to all sorts
of belie£s that are unmistakably contrary to the
convictions he continually professes.
Besides, this is
not, as I argue, the end· of the elenchos.
124 Nussba um, "Practical Wisdom,"
Sherman, Moral Education, pp. 20-21.

pp.

51-52.

C-f.
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~·

i.e., better understood as that part of elenchos

wnen the connection between the emotion and cognition is
made evident, when the emotions that underpin beliefs
surface and win out.

Nussbaum's description of Right's

conduct during the contest is, though she does not remark
on this, peculiarly reminiscent 0£ behavior common to
Socrates' interlocutors when the first flush of selfassurance has worn of£:
Never . .
does he present a reasoned argument £or
his position. He reminisces in sentimental fashion
. . . ; what he does say (at 1002ff.) is so vague and
remote as to be very little help. In the exchange
with Anti-Right, he cannot for a minute hold his own
in argument; he allows himself to be upset by moves so
obviously specious that we wonder at his credulity
(esp. 1050ff.).
He is clearly indifferent to reason
and to the reasoned justification of his opponent's
proposals.
His weapons are abuse, intolerance and
disgust.
One claim is answered by a threat (899);
others by name-calling and unsubstantiated slurs
(909-11, 916-18, 925-9, 1046, 1052-4, 1016-23); a
hackneyed argument, easily answerable, by vomiting
into a
basin (904-6, c£. Ach. 584-7).125
Recall how difficult it was £or Socrates to get
interlocutors to play the game by the rules:

don't tell me

particular instances, he would insist, tell me what x

is.

Recall the pre-literate aspects 0£ interlocutors, how
"indifferent to reason" the pre-literate can seem to
Pla to•s literate readers, how easy it is for Socrates, a
Pre-literate showing the influence of literacy, to win a
game whose rules he alone understands.

Recall, finally,

how, in Seeskin's words, "Protagoras becomes angry, Polus
125 Nussba um,

"Practical

Wisdom,"

p.

57.
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resorts to cheap rhetorical tricks, Callicles begins to
sulK, Cri tias
quit."126

loses his sel-f-control, Meno wants to

This

contest

is,

indeed,

profoundly

similar

to elenchos' later stages, when incontrovertible logic
meets the emotions that underpin beliefs.
Further support -for this contention is to be -found in
what

Nussbaum

calls

Right's arguments:

"an

anomalous

element"127

in

a heavy undercurrent o-f sexuality

which, in the culmination o-f the contest, is brought up to
the surface -for all to see.
own desires--a t

For it is precisely Right's

973 -ff. comically exaggerated as a

prurient, voyeuristic over-emphasis on the steps boys
should take to remain modest--tha t, when exposed, ca use him
finally to admit defeat and run o-f-f like many an
interlocutor.128

It

is

not

without

disrobes as he departs in haste:

point

that

he

he, too, has had his

desires, latent in the mesh of his program o-f education,
exposed by elenchos.

He admits this by giving up his

previous pose and joining the euruprok toi he agrees
l26seeskin,
127Nussba um,

Dialogue,
"Practical

p.

3.

Wisdom,"

p.

55.

1281 am not convinced by Nussbaum's analysis,
"Practical Wisdom," pp. 64 -ff., of the euryproktoi jokes at
108'1- -f-f. as suggestive o-f a doctrine o-f "passive hedonism."
As Dover notes, Clouds, p. 2.27 at line 1084, one could
become euryproktos not merely -from repeated anal
intercourse, but also from being subjected to the notorious
"radish treatment" used to punish adulterers, mentioned
here by Anti-Right.
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coIIlPrise the majority.
Here, then, is the wrenching collocation 0£ pro£essed
beliefs and true desire, so common to elenchos.

And when

strepsiades, who has witnessed the whole contest, chooses
Anti-Right over Right, he bares his own mistaken desire:
to cheat his creditors at all cost.
as

evidence

Nussbaum cites line 4-3
Strepsiades'

0£

"hedonism"; to this may be added his eagerness to hold
"intercourse" with the Cloud-chorus (252-253) and his
preference for masturbation over the labors of cognition
Such a

(733-734).

man will have little trouble accepting

the pleasure-£illed program 0£ Anti-Right; in £act, in
choosing Anti-Right Strepsiades exposes his own desire:
shows

himsel£

,

to

be

'

epaol'f)V

a

"lover
I

vpa yµa1wv,

of

roguish
ill-59).129

deeds"
His

he

(irov'l')pwv

desire

to cheat, £or which he must have access to Anti-Right's
rhetorical skills, blinds him to what comes with them.

But

as Strepsiades chooses Anti-Right, he blindly chooses as
well the revolutionary and blatant disrespect 0£ all
authority that will soon infest his own son.

Strepsiades

unknowingly chooses the very thing which, in the end, will
"beat" him into recognizing how truly misguided his own
desire to default his debts has been.
129 strepsiades'

"desire" to cheat is necessitated
by his inability to control his son, who is spoiled by his
Wife. That Strepsiades' di£ficulties with his wife are in
Part sexual is discussed by RecK£ord, "Father-Beating," p.
113.
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Nussbaum argues that Strepsiades' change of heart is
worth little, and has the undertone of tragedy:
. . whatever he does he has lost his son. He may be
able, in his old age, to return to his own nature; the
son's more malleable personality has been turned £rom
him by Socratic questioning. To imagine him returning
to the old paternal ways would be an optimism nowhere
justified
in
the
play.130
Nussbaum may be right, but the "anguish" she senses in the
ending can perhaps be considered an overstatement of what
in Chapter One was described as the tragic dimensions of
elenchos, the erotic dangling of that which elenchos
portends but is rarely shown to at ta in:

definition of

universals that can lead past ignorance to the birth 0£
truth, and moral improvement 0£ Socrates' interlocutors.
Instead, Platonic dialogues end in avowed ignorance and
with the suggestion that interlocutors lacK the moral fiber
requisite to withstand elenchos.

But the potential remains

poised, and the £inal impression one gains 0£ elenchos is
the erotic gap between pro£ession and achievement.
This eroticism of elenchos may be represented in the
Clouds by the increasing sexual raucousness as the play
comes

to

its

climax:131

130 Nussba um,
131 Whi tman,
"It must be noted
scarcely found in
debts, law suits,

the

"Practical

latent

sexuality

Wisdom,"

p.

of

79.

Comic Hero, p. 123, on the con test:
that the moti£ of sex is elsewhere
the Clouds, whose practical concerns are
barley, and horses."
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Right's

speech132 and

the

blatant

appeal

to

pleasure

by

A.nti-Ihght are only the most obvious examples o-f this.
sussbaum, -following Henderson, remarKs on the possibility
that the physis the Chorus at 959-960 encourages Right to
reveal is a not very veiled reference to £lashing the
penis133
fact

(which

does).1 34

Right,

by

Recl<.£ord

his

disrobing

suggests

that

at

exit,

in

Strepsiades

routs the creditors with an erect phallus to the rear, and
that Pheidippides' "banging" on his -father and proposed
"banging" on his mother carry heavy sexual
con no ta tions.135

Even

Strepsiades'

burning

0£

the

132For which see Dover, Clouds, pp. 215-217, and
Whitman, Comic Hero, p. 123, ".
the Just Discourse,
ostensibly moralizing on the subject o-f boys• behavior
toward male lovers, repeatedly bursts out in images o-f such
pruriency that editorial abatement in school editions is
driven to greater lengths than in the case 0£ his openly
unregenerate adversary."
133Nussbaum, "Practical Wisdom," p. 63 n. 39,
citing Je££rey Henderson, The Maculate Muse (New Haven and
London:
Yale Univ. Press, 1975), p. 5.
Nussbaum sees the
debate as revealing "the impotence 0£ the old morality in a
time 0£ social -ferment."
134For Right •s shedding 0£ his cloal<. as signalling
his initiation in to Socrates' school, see L. M. Stone, "A
Note on Clouds 1104-1105," CP 75 (1980), pp. 321- 322.
135 Reck£ord, "Father-Beating," pp. 96, 113-114 and
n. 20. If in fact physis was understood as a euphemism for
"penis," line 1078, where Anti-Right urges Pheidippides to
~se
his physis (xpw 1!] <f'U<Jel), would support
this
1 nterpretation.
See Nussbaum, "Practical Wisdom," p. 63
n. 39, who cites line 1078 as an example of physis = penis.
Contra physis as penis, see K. McLeish, "<IJu<JlS.
A
Bawdy Jol<.e in Aristophanes?," CQ 27 (1977), pp. 76-79.
Dover, Clouds, notes at line 1300 that Strepsiades
threatens his creditors not with a poke to the buttock, but
a goad in the anus, a cruel practice used on pacl<.-
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tJJ.inKery--i£ it can in -fact be interpreted as a return to
tJJ.e metaphor
wJJ.ere

all

o-£

men

the
are

universe
charcoal

as

a

oven ,136

charcoal

)/

(av9paKES,

97)--may

line

carrY sexual connotations, £or it has been argued that
cJJ.arcoal

is

an

erotic

symbot.137

And

while

such

raucous sexuality is right at home in comedy, a more subtle
counterpart 0£ it can likewise be £ound in elenchos as it
draws to its close, when desire is laid bare to con£ront
all that the interlocutor has agreed is logically
consistent and correct.

Comically exaggerated in the

Clouds, desire exposed by elenchos is brought by
Aristophanes, liKe so much else be£ore it, brashly onto the
physical

plane.

As the Clouds draws to a close, however, the erotic
allure 0£ the unattained gets lost, much as it does in the
early Platonic dialogues, to a growing sense 0£ outrage and
repulsion.

Alcibiades and Euthyphro chose avoidance and

escape; the bawdy comic hero Strepsiades turns to arson.
And, I believe, had we been in the audience -for which this
version 0£ the Clouds was intended, we would have cheered
and hooted as Strepsiades turns the tables and maKes
Socrates "smart," as Strepsiades "enlightens" Socrates with
animals.
136Follow ing

Arrows mi th,

Clouds,

pp.

136-137.

l37 J. Glenn, "Coal as an Erotic Symbol," The
Psychoanalytic Review, 60 (1973), pp. 297-300.
Glenn
Aristophanes• Peace, line 440, as one example.

cites
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:ois new "brilliance," so painstakingly won.

rn

the £inal analysis, the Clouds is a

thoroughly

p:n.ysical, delight£ully comic antidote to the pain£ul mental
laboring towards truth Socrates and his elenchos induced in
interlocutors.

By viewing the man and his method £rom the

perspective 0£ those who £elt con£ounded and accosted
rather than those who felt inspired and enthralled,
Aristophanes gives us a Socrates and an elenchos that are
recognizable from the early dialogues of Plato, but
objecti£ied and disjointed.

From Plato's philosophic and

tragic perspective, Socrates and elenchos are wondrous and
paradoxical; from Aristophanes' chosen perspective, the
perspective of the pre-literate Athenian who found himsel£
con£ronted by Socrates, Socrates and the elenchos he
practiced are quite another thing.
roguish, and laughable:
lunatic.

a

Socrates is weird,

pale ghost, a

thie£, a

babbling

The e££ect he had on his interlocutors begins

with wonder and attraction, but after he has belittled and
bewildered and discomfited them to a point near death,
stripped them of all their beliefs--their normal garb--and
exposed them, and brought down before their very eyes their
whole world, Socrates in the end is a man who begs to be
given just what he has dished out.

The man who spent his

time asking his £ellow citizens to enlighten him, £inally,
and quite literally, in Aristophanes' play, gets what he
asked £or.

His world, his "Thinkery ," is burned to the
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ground.

Socrates is, as the Athenians were by him,

"enlightened,"

and in the con-flagra tion we are shown what

the Athenians came to Know through talKing with this
irritating man:

enlightenment burns liKe £ire.

Part Three:

Comic Elenchos Revisited:

Aristophanes on the Character and Plays o-f Euripides
The Aristophanic evidence on Euripides differs in form
from that on Socrates.

Euripides appears as a character in

three plays produced over some twenty years (Acharnians,
425

B.

C.,

Thesmophoriazusae,

4-11

C,

B.

Frogs,

4-05

B.

C.),

is mentioned by name in four others (at Peace 14-6 ff. and
532

ff.,

Lysistrata

283

and

368

£.,

Ecclesiazusae

825

f-f.,

wasps 61 and 14-14-), and lines from his plays are a regular
subject of parody and comment.

Euripides

1

part in the

frogs is a large one, and yet he does not figure as
prominently as does Socrates in the Clouds, the only
Aristophanic play in which the philosopher is a
character.138

Aristophanes

does

not

give

his

audience

a Euripides who functions as the Socrates of the Clouds
does, i.e., as the examiner in a

complete elenchos; but

this need not entail rejecting the thesis that Aristophanes
depicted Euripides as a

practitioner of elenchos.

In depicting Socrates, Aristophanes used certain comic
images and motifs that, it was argued above in Part Two,
show his familiarity with Socra tes

1

practice of elenchos.

It can likewise be illustrated that Aristophanes uses many

of the same images and motifs in depicting Euripides.
There is, however, a difference:

while Aristophanes made

138socrates is mentioned only twice
Clouds, at Birds 1555 and Frogs 14-91.
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outside

of

the
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~

concrete largely in the character of Socrates, in

the case o-f Euripides, Aristophanes uses comments on the
tragedian's plays as well as characterization of Euripides
to depict his practice of elenchos.

This suggests that, in

Aristophanes• comic view, what Socrates practiced on the
streets was the same thing that Euripides did on stage in
his plays.

Indeed, Aristophanes• Chorus insists at the end

of the Frogs that Euripides lost the contest in Hades to
Aeschylus for just this reason:

that Euripides• poetic art

betrays the influence of conversation with Socrates:
It is smart, then, not to sit beside Socrates
chattering
(:Ewicpale:l
11'apaicae.fiµ.e:vov
AaAetv),
throwing away music and the greatest remnants of the
tragic art. Only a deranged man passes idle time in
, '
solemn words and trif~es of trash ie11'l
creµ.volcrl
Aoyolcrl
icaL
cricaplcp'l')crµ.olcrL
A.fipwv).
(Frogs
1491-1499).
This bold statement is only the most obvious place
where Aristophanes compares Socrates• practice and
Euripides• works.

Repeatedly in depicting Euripides the

comic poet uses the same images and motifs he used in
depicting Socrates in the Clouds.

A general similarity

between the Aristophanic Socrates and Euripides has been
detected by scholars of Aristophanes, who nonetheless do
not taK.e Aristophanes' comment at Frogs 1491 ff. as a
telling revelation about the methodology used by Euripides
in Writing his plays.

Instead, they explain that

Aristophanes perceived the two men as broadly similar
because both played a part in the intellectual
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.
139
revolu t ion.

Kenneth

Reckford

claims,

Far -from sharing the philistine view o-f Euripides and
Socrates as teachers of immorality, [Aristophanes]
sees them both quite fairly as spearheads of the
educational and cultural revolution of his time;
beneath the comic slander (which runs parallel to the
philistine prejudice, but must not be taken seriously)
both exemplify a loss of simplicity in the Greek
world, an ea ting of the apple of knowledge.
Moreover, both Socrates and Euripides extended the
cultural revolution, brought it home to ordinary
people through the media of teaching and theatre (we
would say, college and television), and profoundly, in
their di-fferent ways, disrupted the old mental and
cultural bond between child and parent.140
In a later work, Reckford expounds upon what he means by

the "di-f-ferent ways" of Euripides and Socrates:
. . . Euripides remains a catalyst for change in his
way, as Socrates in his. He exemplifies the power o-f
new ideas in a popular medium. In his tragedies the
older traditions of religion, democracy, and the
family are subjected to conscious and often
destructive scrutiny, just as in Socrates• teaching
139A list of four identical charges Aristophanes
levels against Socrates and Euripides may be found in
Victor Martin, "Euripide et Menandre face a leur public,"
in Entretiens sur l'antiquite classique, Vol. 6, 1958,
Euripide (Geneva:
Vandoeuvres, 1960), pp. 266-269.
For a comparison o-f two equally generalizing and thus
distorting assessments of Euripides and Socrates, as
evidenced in Aristophanes• attitude toward Euripides and
Nietzsche's toward Socrates, see R. Friedrich,
"Euripidaristophanizein and Nietzschesokra tizein.
Aristophanes, Nietzsche, and the Death o-f Tragedy,"
Dionysi us .q. (1980), pp. 5-36.
111 0Reck-ford, "Father-Bea ting," pp. 99-100, -final
italics added.
C-f. E. A. Havelock, "Why Was Socrates
Tried?," in Studies in Honour of Gilbert Norwood, ed. Mary
R. White (Toronto:
Univ. o-f Toronto Press, 1952), pp. 95109, -for the theory that Sacra tes• "school" in the Clouds
was the emblem o-f his very real disruption o-f the old
educational system, in which fathers controlled the
education o-f their sons. Socrates posed a threat to the
social control a-fforded by this educational system, and for
this reason he was tried.
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they are brought, without exception, be£ore the bar 0£
reason. It is no wonder that Aristophanes treats the
two "learned doctors" in similar ways; nor that both
times, in the Clouds and in the Frogs, he goes beyond
satire to deal with deeper issues, 0£ cultural and
educational change, to which Socrates' teaching and
Euripides•
writing
point.141
Reck£ord's comments on Aristophanes' view 0£ Socrates
and Euripides are suggestive 0£ what this study ultimately
will argue:

that there is between Socrates and Euripides a

difference in medium, but no perceptible di££erence in
their method or in its e££ect.

Reck-ford is, 0£ course,

only one 0£ several scholars who have recognized the
similarity between Socrates and Euripides in Aristophanes'
plays.

William Arrowsmith, £or example, who -finds

Aristophanes' depictions 0£ Socrates and Euripides
misrepresenta ti ve, remarks,
The distortions practiced upon Sokrates are typical
and not exceptional.
They are, £or instance,
completely 0£ a piece with Aristophanes' systematic
distortion 0£ Euripides; i£ Euripides' words are
quoted against him, they are invariably taken £rom
their context and parodied by will£ul
misunderstanding. But those who are angered by the
spectacle 0£ Sokrates mocked have never li£ted a
£inger in de£ense 0£ Euripides.142
This study does not propose to take up Arrowsmith's
challenge to de£end Euripides, any more than it has
Previously sought to de£end Socrates.

Instead, it will be

argued that the Aristophanic evidence reveals that
141Reck £ord,

Old-and-New,

14 2Arrowsmi th,

Clouds,

p.

p.

12.

428.
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guripides was perceived to use in his plays a method like
that used by Socrates among his £ellow citizens, the very
thing Aristophanes' lines at Frogs 1491 ££. so boldly
proclaim.

And while it is true that Aristophanes'

guripides is never shown conducting, as did Socrates in the
c1ouds,

an

entire

elenchos,14-3

force£ully suggests a
two.

the

evidence

nonetheless

methodological similarity between the

Additionally, as was true 0£ the Aristophanic

socra tes, it will be seen that the Euripides Aristophanes
depicts is not his own, but instead the Euripides
Aristophanes• audience could laugh at in recognition, a
Euripides whose work was perceived to have much in common
with Socrates' practice 0£ elenchos.
Indeed, in the Frogs, the play in which Euripides•
poetry is examined at greatest length, Aristophanes uses
words with the stem elench- more than in any other
play.144-

At

Frogs

894-

Euripides,

as

he

is

about

to

14-3rf, as this study will argue, Euripides'
practice of elenchos was in his plays rather than in his
daily conduct, we should not be surprised that Aristophanes
would not choose to depict Euripides' practice of elenchos
per se. After all, depiction of an entire Euripidean play
as an elenchos would require, undoubtedly, too sustained
and too cerebral an analysis for comedy's purposes.
Besides, Socrates' practice of elenchos provided
Aristophanes with material lacking in the case 0£
Euripides: a sole interlocutor whose plight made £or easy
comic pickings. See below, Chapter Four, Parts One and
Two, for the Chorus as the audience's agent "interlocutor"
in Euripides' theatrical conduct 0£ elenchos in Medea.
14 4-The fact that such words are not used by
Socrates in the Clouds is perplexing, but does not, I
believe, invalidate the suggestive power 0£ this evidence.
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erobarK on his contest with Aeschylus, prays to his peculiar
that I

"

.....
(op9ws
)

attack"

I

xoywv);

a

may rightly cross-examine these logoi

:few

lines

)

av
"

I

€ >..eyX€l V
later

at

he

908

boasts

Cl

aVTWj.J.Ql

that

he

will

begin his de:fense o:f his own poetry a:fter having put
Aeschylus

to

test

E:J.€yi;w);

922

Euripides

at

because

he

€i;e.A.€yxw);

is

and

re:fu ting
at

VpwT>

(TOUTOV

admits

he

Aeschylus
Euripides

959-961

is

agitated

)
'
(aUTOV

boasts

that

he

not only put everyday, common things to the test o:f
elenchos, but that he submitted his own art to such
testing:
and

"I brought in domestic matters--things we use

with--and

live

)

I

ei;'l'}>..e:yxoµ'l')v);
art

to

those

the

JI

av

who

test

'
T'l')V

j.J.OU

put

them

to

proo:f

>

y>

( €1;

knew--anyone--could

(!;UVEldOTES.

'
yap

put

n

av
my

otiTot

TEX V'l'JV) ...

Aeschylus in this play, by contrast, has to be urged
by

Dionysus to "cross-examine and be cross-examined"

c€>..eyx ••

)

I

e:>..e:yxou,

857),

and

indicates

that

he

considers the only valid "cross-examination" o:f poetry to
be the very concrete weighing o:f lines on scales
The dates o:f the two plays in question (Clouds 420-417,
.~ 405) may provide an explanation: it may be that
Socrates' practice was only regularly termed elenchos some
time a:fter the production o:f the Clouds. Or it may be that
~ristophanes in his characterization 0£ Euripides
intentionally used words he Knew would recall the method 0£
Socrates, with which (not vice versa) he was comparing the
method used by Euripides in composing his plays. Either
a1 tern a ti ve is highly speculative.
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)

'

'

oTaBµov

TOV

(t:ll'l

01TEP

µ.ovov,

1365-1366).

And

although

ayayELV

,

'
T'r)V

Cl

,

, '
auTOV

'
yap

lTOL'r)OlV

Aristophanes

once

in

this play as in other plays uses words with this stem
without identi£iable re£erence to the type 0£ crosse:xamina tion

Socrates

practiced,14-5

the

use

0£

these

words seven times in the Frogs in re£erence to the contest
between Euripides and Aeschylus is (at least) highly
suggestive.

This dictional phenomenon is made still more

compelling as evidence because, 0£ all Aristophanic
characters, Euripides is the one who uses words 0£ this
stem most £requently (£ive times); and, in £act, Anti-Right
in the Clouds is the only other character to use these
words more than once (twice, at Clouds 104-3 and 1062; see
the discussion above in Part Two).

Finally, Euripides•

prayer £or help in put ting logoi to elenchos at 894-, and
his claim at 959 ££. that he not only conducts but submits
to elenchos, mark his practice 0£ elenchos as Socratic.
Further indication that the Aristophanic Euripides was
a practitioner 0£ Socratic elenchos may be £ound in
references to Euripides• penchant £or questioning
everything and everybody and in re£erence to his teaching
others, through his plays, to question in like manner.
~ 958 Euripides credits his plays with teaching men,

145 see Frogs 7 4-1, Knights 1232,
~lesiazusae 485, Lysistrata 4-84-.

Plutus

57 4-,

At

216
"to be suspicious, to consider all things well"
.....
Cl
1T£Pl VO£l V
airav1"a);
at
971
cu1To ,-o 1T£'loea l,

ff.

he

further describes what it is he has taught men through his
dramas:

r

introduced them to thinking (cppov£LV) by
bringing
reasoning and examination (.>.oyLoµ.ov
,
Kal OK£yl v) in to the art, so that now they
reflect on all things and discern other things
(vo£lV
airav1a
Kal
<h£lc5£va1.
ia
,,
Ha) and live their home
lives
better
than
before
>
.....
and
examine
well
(KavaoKolT£lV),
"How's
that?,"
"Where's this?," "Who took ~hat?" (lTWS 10\J,->
€xEL;
lrOU
µ.oL
Tool;
TLS:
10\JT>
€>..af3€;) .
{Frogs 971-979).

.

....._,

Cl

"

'

'

a

The final, persistent questions are especially reminiscent
of Socrates' practice in elenchos, although Euripides'
entire description certainly makes his art sound Socratic
rather

than

what

is

sometimes

termed

sophistic.146

Sophists did not, so :far as we know, pride themselves on
presenting men with questions, but with answers.
Sophists were, of course, great talkers, but the
concern of many of them was persuasion, which cannot be
served if one is perceived to be a babbling lunatic.

But

this is precisely how Aristophanes• Euripides and his
Plays, like Aristophanes' Socrates before him, are
Presented:
sense.

as ever talking about things, but making little

"Prattling" and "chattering" are how Aristophanes

likes to describe Euripides and the effect his plays have
146 For the argument that Aristophanes' hostility
to Euripides is because he considers him a sophist, see D.
A. Deli, "Algunas Incognitas de la Ecuacion Euripides
Aristofanes," Argos 1 (1977), pp. 76-84.
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nad, and whether Aristophanes uses words related to the
or

v-erb

to

it

is

that

clear

guripides' words are incomprehensible because their
signi£icance is puzzling.

This is exactly what the Chorus

indicates when it asserts at Frogs 1491-1497 that Euripides
"sits

chattering

1(apaKa0.fiµe:vov
and

words

.

ic:al

beside

).a).e:tv)
tri£les

OKOplcp'flOµOlOl

Socrates"

and

idles

0£

trash"

)..fipwv) .

other such re£erences.

(2:wKpa TEL

away
)

.

(E:ll'l

time

solemn
).oyOlOl

OE:µVOlOl

Frogs

The

"in

is

0£

-full

For example, Heracles wonders that

there is a dearth 0£ poets "more prattling than Euripides"

,

,

).a).ioTe:pa,

(Eu pl ll'l dou

the

91);

Chorus

comments on Euripides' "sharp-chattering tooth"

,

,

,

(01:;u).a).ov
Euripides

,

odovTa,
"gossip

a

815);

calls

Aeschylus

( o Twµuhoou).).e:K Tad'JI,

gleaner"

841); Euripides describes his reducing regimen £or poetry

as

consisting

in

part

01wµu>.µa1wv,

0£

"chatterbox
according

943);

to

juice"

(xu).ov

Aeschylus,

Euripides taught men "to make a practice 0£ chattering and
prattling"

(Aa).Lav

>

......

E:ll'lT'rJOE:UOQl

.

l(Ql

oTwµuAtav,

1069) and Euripides himsel£ he deems "ever-chattering"

(KOTE:OTwµu>.µeve:,

1160).

In

the

Acharnians,

a

play

Produced nearly twenty years earlier than the Frogs,
Dikaiopolis similarly describes a Euripidean character as
"chattering"

(oTwµu).os.,

429).

To make the charge 0£ "prattling" and "chattering" is
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to perceive that the accused talks nonsense, something that
the ordinary person -finds inconsequential and banal.

A

similar charge o-f incomprehensibility was levelled against
socrates, both by interlocutors in Plato's dialogues and
humorously by Aristophanes in the Clouds, -for precisely
this reason:

Socrates• concern was with what seemed to

other men to trivial and mundane.

Aristophanes' Euripides

and his poetry betray similar concerns.

Euripides' verses

are themselves treated as trivial; re-ference to them is in
diminutives:

Euripides composes
in

its

"versicles"

various

in-flections,

Acharnians 398, Frogs 942, Peace 532) or "phrasicles"
C

I

(P'fJIJ.OTlOV

in

its

various

444 and 447, Peace 534).

in-flections,

Acharnians

In addition, in the verse-

weighing scene at Frogs 1378 ££. Euripides' lines are every
time lighter than Aeschylus', undoubtedly because, as
Euripides himsel£ has boasted, he put poetry on a diet to
take away its heaviness {Frogs 939 ££.).

Euripides' art is

like the practice o:f Socrates in that Euripides, too, tends
to bring things down to their -finest, most pulverized,
:form:

in the Frogs, the Chorus describes the contending

Euripides as one who "will pulverize by talk"
1 47c.
del
Grande,
"'Evu>.>.La
in
Aristo£ane,"
in Kwµ<tJdOTpay.fiµaTa.
Studia Aristophanea W. J. W.
Koster in Honorem, ed. R. E. H. Westendorp Boerma
~A~sterdam:
Hakkert, 1967), pp. 47-50, recognizes in
Etru>.>.La a charge 0£ triviality, and argues that by
its use Aristophanes signi£ies that Euripides is a minor
Poet, one too concerned with sexual subjects.
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(ica-ra>.ell'TO>.oy.fioel,

828),

and

Euripides

himself

boasts

of having introduced in his poetry the squares of the
"finest

ground"

rules

(AE11'Twv,

In

956).

a

similar

"Vein are Euripides" demand for instruments at Frogs 799 ff.
so he can "put the tragedies to the touchstone, word by

,,

£11'05.

word"

'
Tas

paoavle'lv

802). and the Chorus" description of the substance of

Euripides•

speech
,
ica1"€Pf>lV'l')J.1.EVOV,

as

"something 'filed down"

(Tl

901).

But besides being concerned with things that appear
inconsequential, Euripides, like Socrates, attends to what
is mundane, or, generally, to what others consider beneath
serious concern.

Callicles" complaint

at

Gorgias

490-491

that Socrates persists in talking about "meats and drinks
and doctors and other gibberish" is illuminating not only
when one considers Strepsiades" frustration with Socrates
at Clouds 648 ff. (see above, Part Two), but also when one
witnesses the comic business at Acharnians 415 ff.
after Dikaiopolis has requested rags, a cap, a

There,

beggar"s

staff, a little basket with a hole burned through it, a
little tankard with a broken rim, and a little pitcher
Plugged with a

sponge, Euripides laments "Listen, fellow,

You"re robbing me of my tragedy.• (464).

After

Dikaiopolis continues with requests £or withered leaves to
fill the basket, Euripides moans, "You"re destroying me!
Here!

Ky plays are clean gone!" (470).

This scene could
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be chalked up merely as an extended bit satirizing
guripides• alleged penchant £or beggars--which indeed is a
part 0£ its humor--were it not £or similar pronouncements
on Euripides" plays in the Frogs:
brought

"l

in

domestic

1fpayµa-r»--things

we

use

at 959 Euripides claims,
>
,..
(OlK€LQ

matters
and

live

.

....

with

at

1197

ff. Aeschylus belittles Euripides" prologues by showing how

easily one can £it in them everywhere a "little bottle 0£
oil"
a

(A'T)KU9Lov),

"bag"

and

(Kct>dapLov,

diminutives148

and

claims

that

9uAaKov,
all

are

a

1203;

very

"little
note

common

'fleece"

that
items)

or

two

are

would

be

equally easy to insert; at 1331 ££. Aeschylus hilariously
parodies Euripides" monodies by reciting a classic case 0£
"much ado about nothing":

a women bewails at great length

the the-ft 0£ a cock as i£ it were a thing 0£ portentous
moment.

Euripides" plays, then, according to Aristophanes,

are as chock-£ull 0£ the junk 0£ everyday li'fe as are
Socrates" discussions on the streets 0£ A thens.
But Euripides is not, according to Aristophanes"
plays, merely a benign chatterbox.

Euripides and his

characters are shown to be rogues, as was Socrates, and
Euripides and his plays attract and teach roguish behavior.
In the Frogs, Dionysus describes Euripides as a •rogue•
(vavoupyos,

80);

at

lines

104

and

106

148Au three may be diminutives,
codices, 8uAauov, is pre£erred
9uAaKov
0£
the
scholia.
t~e

Heracles

i£ the reading
to the

0£
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denounces Euripides' poetic style as consisting 0£ "knavish
tricks"

and

iraiJ.ll'OV'l'JPa);

as

being

"thoroughly

Aeschylus

credits

depraved"

Euripides

(Kofla.>.a;

with

having

turned the Athenians into, among other things, "knaves"
and

"rogues"

I

ll'avoupyous,

(Kofla.>.ous

and

1015)

with having dragged out onto stage and taught "roguishness"

.

(1'0

I

ll'OV'l'JPOV,

himsel£

a

ll'<XVOUPYOS
fJwµ.o.>.oxos,

1053);

"rogue

Aeschylus

and

>
'
av'l')p

1520-1521;

liar

and

later

deems

o££ering

Kal'

Euripides

swiper"

.

(o

Kal

c£.

1085).

This

last

label,

with

its charge 0£ thievery, indicates why Euripides, his
characters, and his art have a reputation so like that 0£
Aristophanes' Socrates:

it is not merely because he is a

cunning contriver and uses subtle devices (see, e.g.
Acharnians 445, Thesmophoriazusae 198-199, 927, and U311132), but rather because Euripides makes use 0£ the same
sneaky devices Sacra tes was perceived to have used.

This

is made clearest by the speech at Frogs 771 ££., where
Aeacus describes what happened upon Euripides• arrival in
Hades:
When Euripides came down, he made a display 0£ his
powers to the thieves and cutpurses and parricides and
burglars
(TOlS
AWll'OduTalS
Kal
TOlO"l
Pa.>..>.avTLoToµoLs
Kai
TOlO"l
vaTpa.>.olaLO"l
Kal.
Tol xwpuxoLs)--these are the majority in Hades--and
these, listening to his opposing arguments and
twistings
and
turnings
(Twv
avTL.>.oylWV
Kat
.>.uyLoµwv Kai. aTpoq>wv), went mad and named him
cleverest. (Frogs 771-776).
The Aristophanic Euripides, then, is depicted as a
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tnief and therefore attracts to his side a claque of
tnieves because he, like the Aristophanic Socrates, is able
to secure the unforeseen, the peculiarly elenctic reversal.
And yet this ability cannot save Euripides from the
comically appropriate tit for tat.

Euripides is hoist with

:tJ.iS own petard in the Frogs as was only one other character

in Aristophanes:

Socrates in the Clouds, who likewise

suffers

words

his

own

redirected

against

him.149

At

1471 ff. Dionysus retorts to Euripides• objections at being
left in Hades with words identifiable as parodies of lines
from the Euripidean plays Hippolytus, Aeolus, and Polyeidus
or

Phrixus,

respecti vely:150

will choose Aeschylus. . . .
not so to the viewers? . .
die

?"

(Frogs

1471,

"My

tongue

swore,

but

I

What is shameful, if it seems
Who knows if to live is to
1475,

1477).

In Aristophanes• plays, "thieves" like Socrates and
Euripides operate undetected by sowing verbal confusion; in
149nover, Clouds, p. 267 at line 1503, cites
Thesmophoriazusae 51 as a parallel scene, but
inappropriately, because the words of Agathon•s slave (line
43) used by Mnesilochus against him are not put to the
service of quid~~ reversal, but are instead a brief
Piece of comic business that goes nowhere.
150"My tongue swore" (Hippolyt us 612) was so
notorious as to invite no comment in the scholia.
W. S.
Barrett, ed., Euripides, Hippolytos (Oxford:
Clarendon
Press, 1964; hereafter Barrett, Hippolytos), p. 274 at line
612, notes Aristophanes• allusions to the line also at
'!'._hesmophoriazusae 275 and Frogs 101 as evidence of its
notoriety.
For attribution of the other lines, see Scholia in
!_ristophanem, ed. W. J. W. Koster, Frogs 1475 and 1478, and
~holia in Euripidem, ed. E. Schwartz, Hippolytus 191.
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socrates' case, this was accomplished by concentrating on
wnat seemed to be matters entirely unrelated to the subject
assumed to be at hand.

The Aristophanic Euripides is

similarly con£using to those around him.

Dover rightly

notes a similarity in the con£usion 0£ Mnesilochus speaKing
with Euripides at Thesmophoriazusae 13-20 and that 0£
strepsiades speaKing with Socrates at Clouds 227-236; but
the con£usion between Mnesilochus and Euripides starts at
the play's very beginning and is not merely, as Dover
maintains, "[t]he total misunderstanding 0£ a
argument

by

an

ignorant

n151

man

scienti£ic

Instead,

the

con£usion 0£ Hnesilochus comes £rom the £act that he has,
at line 4, asKed a straight£orward question, "Where are you
taking me, Euripides?," in reply to which he has been
treated to a discourse which seems to have no bearing on
the question asKed.

He must listen to Euripides hold -forth

on the diversity 0£ hearing and seeing and to a story 0£
the creation 0£ the eye and ear in living creatures at the
beginning 0£ time, both 0£ which are vast generalizations
on the particular instance at hand:

i.e., that i£

Knesilochus were only to look straight in -front 0£ him, he
wouldn't have to hear from Euripides where they were
going, £or their goal, the house 0£ Agathon, lies dead
ahead.

But these generalizations are such that their

signi£icance to Hnesilochus' question is lost to him;
151 Dover,

Clouds,

p.

128

at

lines

235-236.
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instead, he can only express his perplexity at what in the
world

this

,.t;yels.;,

6;

discussion

has

c£.

and

9,

13,

to

do

with

his

Mnesilochus

22).

(vws.

question
is

con£used because Euripides, as Socrates was seen to do in
the Platonic dialogues and in the Clouds, has made a rapid
shi£t £rom the particular (where are we going?) to a
universal (one need not hear what one may see; hearing and
seeing £rom the beginning 0£ time have been separate).

We

are reminded 0£ Strepsiades, who was £aced with a Socrates
whose practice 0£ drawing analogy Aristophanes rendered
absurd by having Socrates discuss things totally
irrelevant--rhythm and the like--to Strepsiades' very
simple question:

how to get out 0£ his debts.

The confusion that arises £rom drawing analogies is
the result 0£ the perception that x has nothing whatsoever
to do with y, and, as such, is similar to the confusion
that arises when two opposites are equated.

In

Aristophanes' plays, Euripides is the master 0£ such
equations.

Euripides himself, according to Cephisophon at

Acharnians

,,
E:Vdov

>

,

t:OTl V).

Euripidean
'

To

~1lv,

"not

396,

In

line,

1082),

within,

the
"not

which

Frogs,
to

live

Dionysus,

is

>

within"

cites

Aeschylus
is

to

after

£voov,

(OUK

live"

a

>

(OU

having

su££ered

confusion upon hearing Euripides suggest that the
mistrusted should become the trusted and vice versa

.

Ta

.,,
V \JV

alJ'lOTa

c

,

'f]ywµeea,

.

Ta
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,,

,,

J'

1443-1444),

a'lt'Lola,

ov1a

uses

against

guripides in a way that £orce£ully suggests that such
equations 0£ opposites are hyperbolic shorthand £or analogy
that likewise seems to equate two unrelated subjects:

"Who

Knows i£ to live is to die, to breathe is to dine, to sleep
iS

f:a1l

a

sheepskin?"
ica10avE'lv,

.

10

(llS

.

:>

oCoEv

0

'U'VElV

I

µEv

10

El

E l 11' V El V ,

.

10

1477-1478).
Such total con£usion is, in any case, reminiscent 0£
one

aspect

0£

what

precedes

the

aporia152

at the end 0£ the early Platonic dialogues:

that

reigns

the sense 0£

vertigo, resulting £rom the perception that things Keep
moving £rom their once stable locations.

In Euripides'

plays, then, as happens in discussions with Socrates,
things get turned entirely topsy-turvy (see Chapter One,
Part Three).

Opposites converge in Euripides' plays (to

live is to die) no less than they are wont to do in the
course 0£ the early Platonic dialogues, where, £or example,
it slowly dawns on young Euthyphro that his "pious" act 0£

prosecuting his own £ather has the stench 0£ impiety about
it.

Euripidean plays show once sure dissimilars £inding

equation (to breathe is to dine, to sleep is a

sheepskin)

no less than they do in Socratic elenchos, where Socrates'
analogies, initially so apparently irrelevant to what is
152The term aporia is not used in the Frogs in the
technical, Socratic sense, nor is it used in re£erence to
Euripides.
See Frogs 806 and 1465.
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being discussed, have a
5

yuogizing stage.

telling e££ect in the -final

That Aristophanes shows Euripides as

the master con verger 0£ opposites and dissimilars marks the
tragedian as -fomenting con£usion that bears a peculiarly
elenctic

impress.

And still it is not only in his procedure that
Aristophanes• Euripides is shown to resemble Socrates; £or
the tragedian in his plays brings out the truth, the way
things really are instead of' the way they are pro£essed to
be, no less than does the Aristophanic Socrates, whose
prowess at clothes "thievery" bares men's bodies.

The

Aristophanic Euripides is never accused 0£ lying; on the
contrary, the complaint against him is that he persists in
revealing the truth.

The at tempt 0£ women in the

Thesmophoriazusae to charge Euripides with slander is shown
to be motivated by their anger at his exposure 0£ the truth
about their drinking and carousing, which 0£ course makes
it di££icult £or them to continue to engage in these
practices (Thesmophoriazusae,
££.

and

473

££.).

Likewise,

passim,

at

Frogs

especially
1052

££.,

lines

395

Aeschylus•

charge against Euripides in regard to women like Phaedra is
not that he has distorted the truth, but instead that he
has dragged it out in the open and taught it.
With truth-baring comes the disclosure 0£ desires, the
desires that in-form belie£s and actions.

The Aristophanic

Socrates• cross-examining elenchos was shown to e££ect such
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a disclosure, by £orcing Right in the Clouds to admit and
graphically to reveal his latent desires.
guripides is no. less subtle in his plays.

The Aristophanic
Not only does

ne, with only seeming incongruity, put "to desire"
(epav)

at

the

introduced in

center

0£

the

his plays ("to

list

0£

reflect,

things

he

to see, to

deliberate, to turn, to desire, to use cunning, to be
suspicious,

to

consider

all

things

well,"

Frogs

957

££.);

but Aeschylus' boast that he can £ind a place £or
or

9uAatc.OV

in

any

Euripidean prologue may allude to persistent sexual
references

in

Euripides'

works.153

Finally,

Aeschylus

at Frogs 1046, responding to Euripides' jibe that "
there was never anything 0£ Aphrodite in you [i.e., your

153The literature on these three words is
extensive.
See, e.g., c. H. Whitman, "AHKY9ION
AIIOAE~EN,"
HSCP 73 (1969). pp. 109-112 (who sees only
the oil -flask as carrying a sexual connotation, since it
has a suggestive shape and the word has a suggestive first
syllable);
J.
G.
Griffith,
"A'r)tc.U9tov
avwAe:oe:v.
A
Postscript,• HSCP 74 (1970), pp. 43-44 (who confirms the
identi£ication
of
a\rroA.fiKu9os
with
>
'
t9ucpaAAos);
R.
J.
Penella,
"K<tJdaptov
in
Aristophanes Frogs," Mnemosyne 26 (1973), pp. 337-341 (who
argues that all three items refer to male genitalia).
Against sexual connotation, see, e.g., Z. P. Ambrose, "The
Lekythion and the Anagram 0£ Frogs 1203," AJP 89 (1968).
PP. 342-345 (who sees the three items as suggestive 0£ an
anagram, and, as such, criticism that Euripides says the
same thing under di££erent guises); J. Henderson, "The
hekythos and Frogs 1200-1248," HSCP 76 (1972), pp. 133144- {who argues the word symbolizes poverty and sinister
activity);
D.
Bain,
"A'r)KU9tov
avwAe:oe:v.
Some
Reservations,• CQ 35 (1985), pp. 31-37 (who claims sexual
connotations are not borne out by the context 0£ the
Passage).
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plays]," retorts, " . . . well,
[i.e.,

your

plays]

and

but

yours

she sat down on you

much

too

much."154-

That

ts, the chatterbox, ever-questioning tragedian was not only
1<.nown £or his ability to be-fuddle by equating dissimilars
and :for his insistent baring o:f the truth, but :for his
constant exposure o:f the goddess o:f desire, the troubling
Aphrodite.

What an odd, elenctic mixture 0£ attributes!

The practice o:f elenchos won :for Socrates the
reputation o:f an oddball; that Euripides• plays were
perceived by his -fellow Athenians as being as weird as was
the man Socrates is apparent in the £act that Aristophanes
portrays Euripides as writing his tragedies alo:ft, -floating
in the air lik.e Socrates.

As was argued above in Part Two,

the up-in-the-air imagery applied to Socrates is not only
appropriate to his comic stat us as psyche, but is also
expressive o:f the pre-literate interlocutor's sense o:f the
insubstantiality o:f Socrates• subject 0£ choice in
elenchos:

the unseen universals beyond the concrete

particulars with which the interlocutors constantly dealt.
In the pre-literate•s view, unremitting re£erence to the
abstract puts one in the realm 0£ the insubstantial; thus,
in comedy, such a one would o:f course -float, having no

15 ll-Further evidence o:f Euripides• proclivity :for
s~xua1 subjects may be round in the tragedian's own use o:f
Ta 11''1)
as a
pun on Ta 1Te'TJ at line 862 o:f the
~; see G. W. Dick.er son, "Aristophanes• Ranae 862.
A
Note on the Anatomy 0£ Euripidean Tragedy," HSCP 78 (1974-),
Pp.
177-188.
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ballasting substance to hold him down.

And £loat Euripides

does, in the Acharnians of 4-25 B. C., and with no less
grandeur than his soul-mate Socrates.

In place of the awe-

filled Strepsiades is Dikaiopolis, come for some tragic
rags, and instead of the haughty disciple is Cephisophon;
but the scene is much the same as its counterpart in the
Clouds:
{Cephisophon, of Euripides) His mind, without, is
gathering versicles and is not within;
, himself,
,
within,
makes
tragedy
a-loft
(avaf3a<5'T)v).
(Euripides, to the insistent Dikaiopolis) I'll
trundle mysel£ out, but I have no time to come down.
(Dikaiopolis) You make [tragedy] a-loft, is
it possible out of the loft (KaTaf3a<5'T)v)?
(Acharnians 398-4-11).
As we view Euripides writing his tragedies, -floating
"a-lo£t," we know he will share this air with Socrates,
whom Aristophanes was to depict in the same etherial realm
a few years later.

And while it was clearly possible to

write tragedy "out of the loft," Euripides did not choose
to do so.

Instead,

by

remaining

resolutely

"a-loft,"

Euripides incurred many 0£ the same charges levelled
against Socrates, because he used, on stage and to the same
effect, essentially the same methods the philosopher was
using on the streets of A thens.

Aristophanes knew this

method well enough to show Socrates using it in the
Clouds, and well enough to insist that Euripides was using
it in his plays.
Yet Aristophanes le£t £or posterity the task 0£
testing this claim.

For, to him, it was clear.

He never
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felt obliged to do more than proclaim the comparison and
suggest its validity by depicting Socrates and Euripides as
aliKe.

We 0£ course do not wonder that Aristophanes in his

plays did not choose to analyze in depth a play 0£
Euripides, to show that the claims he made about Socrates
and Euripides were true, £or such an analysis would have no
place on the comic stage.

And while centuries have passed

and scholars have persisted in observing similarities
between Socrates and Euripides, no one thus £ar has put the
bold claim 0£ Aristophanes to the test.
testing is long overdue.

The time £or

Accordingly, the £inal chapter 0£

this study (Chapter Four) will make a beginning 0£
vindicating Aristophanes' depiction 0£ Socrates'
conversations and Euripides' plays as methodologically
similar, by arguing that Euripides' Medea is elenchos
trans£erred to a di££erent medium.
But be'fore this de£initive task is undertaken, the
next chapter will show that modern critics 0£ Euripides
have--no less insistently than Aristophanes but not so
consciously as he--spoken 0£ Euripides' method 0£ composing
his plays in terms that make it sound suspiciously like
Socratic

elenchos.

CHAPTER THREE:
SOCRATIC ELE.RCHOS A.RD MAIEUSIS IR EURIPIDES' PLAYS
part One: The History 0£ Euripidean Criticism Reconsidered
This study sought, in its £irst chapter, to de£ine the
procedural elements and characteristics 0£ Socratic method.
The second chapter examined the Aristophanic evidence on
Socrates and Euripides and showed, not only that
Aristophanes explicitly states that Euripides• work bore
the impress o'f Socrates• practice, but also that
Aristophanes can be presented as an in-formed witness.

This

is because his comic depiction 0£ Socrates, which has much
in common with his depiction 0£ Euripides, shows
£amiliarity with Socrates• practice 0£ elenchos.

Since,

then, Aristophanes, a con temporary 0£ Socrates and
Euripides, has depicted the methodological similarity 0£
the two, the next logical step is to look to the work o'f
Euripides 'for evidence 0£ Socrates• method.
It would nonetheless discourage this study's thesis
i£, in the long history 0£ Euripidean interpretation, the
influence 0£ Socrates• method on Euripides• work had never
been discerned.

But such is not the case; £or al though no

one has argued what will now be argued, that Euripides•
work duplicates the method characteristic 0£ Socrates in
the early Platonic dialogues, the critical literature on
231
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guripides points toward, without explicitly £ormulating,
this thesis.

As early as 1923, F. L. Lucas remarked,

"Socrates . . . is persistently linked with Euripides by a
tradition, which cannot be entirely discounted except by
that type 0£ scholar who re£uses to believe any £acts about
antiquity

which

he

has

not

himself invented."1

scholars have nonetheless persisted in discounting this
tradition by their silence on the subject, while critical
estimation of Euripides belies this silence.
A clear example 0£ the intuited link between Euripides
and Socrates is found in the general critical
interpretation the two have shared.
guripidean

interpretation2

there

To begin with, in
is

little agreement on

lF. L. Lucas, Euripides and His In£luence (Boston:
Marshall Jones Company, 1923; herea£ter Lucas, In£luence),
p. 40.

2This study has no intention of tracing the
history of Euripidean interpretation; in any case, this
task has been recently undertaken and superbly executed by
Ann Horris Michelini in the first chapter 0£ Euripides and
the Tragic Tradition (Madison, WI: Univ. 0£ Wisconsin
Press, 1987; hereafter Michelini, Tragic Tradition), pp. 151, "A History of Euripidean Interpretation.• This chapter
is a gold mine of bibliography and scholarship.
Michelini•s history is a critical one; she identifies
various scholarly trends and th us makes the task of sorting
through the critical literature on Euripides a much happier
one. A briefer overview of contradictory trends in
Euripidean scholarship may be -found in Hermann Rohdich, Die
euripideische Tragodie: Untersuchungen zu ihrer Tragik
(Heidelberg:
Carl Winter, 1968; hereafter Rohdich,
Tragodie), pp. 13-18.
A still use:ful survey of Euripidean
scholarship, although already somewhat outdated, is C.
Collard, Euripides, Greece & Rome: Kew Surveys in the
Classics, Ho. 14 (Ox:ford:
Clarendon Press, 1981; hereafter
Collard, Euripides).
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1fhat Euripides was doing in his work..

Albin Lesky

declares, "Kaum eine andere Gestalt der antik.en Literatur
ist in ihrer Vielschichtigk.eit so schwierig zu £assen wie
guripides."3

Lesk.y's

opinion

is

con£irmed

by

the

contradictory results 0£ the many attempts to pin down
guripides and his work. under one label.
reflects in despair:

Peter Burian

"Having been subjected over the years

to Euripides the Rationalist, the Irrationalist, the
Idealist, the Realist, the Patriot, the Escapist, and many
more, we may now well ask. whether there is any Euripides
left

at

au.•4

H.

D.

F.

Kitto

is

no

more

optimistic

as

he contemplates how Euripides has £ared in the critical
literature:
. . . he has been represented as a deplorable atheist,
as the daring and noble critic 0£ an immoral and
e££ete Olympian religion; as a "botcher," as the
contriver 0£ in£initely subtle plays that meant one
thing to the simple and something much more exciting
to the clever; as the preacher 0£ a philanthropic
liberalism and rationalism, as a total irra tionalist;
as a sour misogynist, as the £irst Greek. to recognise
that women too are 0£ the human race.5
Only those who see as the essence 0£ Euripides' work.
its inability to be classi£ied have avoided contradictions.
3Albin Lesky, Geschichte der Griechischen
Literatur, 3 ed. (Bern and Kiinchen: Francke Verlag, 1957
and 1958; herea£ter Lesky, Geschichte), p. 409.
'I-Peter Burian, "Euripides the Contortionist,"
Arion n.s. 31 (1976), p. 96.
Burian concludes his review
{p. 113) by labelling Euripides "enigmatic."
5H. D. F. Kitto, Poiesis:
Structure and Thought
(Berkeley and Los Angeles:
Univ. 0£ Cali£ornia Press,
1966), p. 3.

234
'l'bese

critics

paradoxes, a

recognize

in

Euripides6 a

Protean contortionist.

peddler of

Indeed, Erich Segal

designates Euripides the "poet of paradox" and maintains
tba t "[e]very play of Euripides seems to be asking a
question or else boldly stating some mythical and/or visual
paradox."7

Michelini,

after

tracing

diverging

opinions

of Euripides 1 interpreters, describes Euripides 1 protean
mutability:
The skillful and facile theatrical technician who
proceeds to spoil his plays out of moral principle is
matched by the doctrinaire philosopher who cannot
resist weakly pretty poetic fancies.
The specialist
in female emotional maladies (Leidenschaft) turns cold
rhetorician, just as we become absorbed in his art.
We break our hearts over the most harrowing and
pa the tic of tragedians (tragikota tos), only to find
ourselves in the next scene repressing a terrible urge
to snigger. The most violent and improbable
6As will be noticed from some of the following
comments, there is some tendency to confuse the poet with
his work. See, as a caution against such tendencies,
Harold Cherniss, "The Biographical Fashion in Literary
Criticism," University 0£ California Publications in
Classical Philology 12 (1943), pp. 279-292.
C£.
Michelini, Tragic Tradition, p. 95:
"As a general rule,
preference should be given to traits that seem to
characterize the plays directly, in preference to those
that attach to Euripides himself.•
7Erich Segal, "Euripides:
Poet of Paradox,• in
Greek Tragedy: Modern Essays in Criticism, ed. Erich
Segal (Hew York:
Harper and Row, 1983), p. 249.
A. R.
Thompson, The Dry Kock: A Study of Irony in Drama
(Berkeley:
Univ. of California Press, 1948), p. 156,
lists the "paradoxes" one can find in Euripides plays; for
Michelini, Tragic Tradition, paradox is integral to
Ruripidean drama. See, e.g., her p. 68: "The perversity
of Euripidean theater has a natural tendency to generate
Paradoxes and thus to involve critics in self-defeating
exercises"; and p. 118:
". . . in its use of ambiguity
Rur-ipidean art remains an art of paradox, taking its usual
Position of affirmation in denial."
1
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expedients have long been tried against these
anomalies, without success, and without consensus,
since one such exploit merely provokes another 0£ a
di££erent
stamp.8
Equal inability to characterize and equally pro£ound
~isagreement

in interpretation can be £ound in the critical

literature on Socrates in the early Platonic dialogues.
now Socrates the man and Socrates• practice 0£ elenchos are
to be interpreted continue to be hotly debated.

Socrates

and his practice, too, have proven enigma tic, paradoxical,
and hard to pin down.

That such opinions 0£ the

philosopher and his work are a commonplace can be a££irmed
by even the most casual examination 0£ the literature on
Socratic

elenchos.9

But the interpretation 0£ Euripides• work and 0£
Socrates• method has more in common than a recognition 0£
the perplexity the two consistently inspire.

In Euripidean

criticism are £ound pronouncements on Euripides• work
that, taken together, give a £ull array 0£ the procedural
elements and characteristics 0£ Socrates• practice 0£
elenchos as analyzed in Chapter One.

And while it is true

that at £irst glance Euripides• plays bear little
resemblance to the dialogues, the method 0£ the dialogues
8Michelini, Tragic Tradition, p. 50.
Michelini
(p. 95 n. 1) credits Harald Merklin, Gott und Mensch im
Hippolytos und den Bakchen des Euripides (diss. Heidelberg,
1964), pp. 38-39, with the description 0£ Euripides as a
Proteus.
9For
Three.

some examples,

see

above,

Chapter One,

Part
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and the tragedies, and even the effects of that method, can
be shown to be similar.
And yet there is an apparent dissimilarity between the
dialogues and Euripides
genres.10

Nevertheless,

1

tragedies:
though

they are of different

Euripides

is

certainly

a tragedian, part of the long-standing critic ism of his
work, dating back to antiquity, has been that he is a
philosopher only thinly disguised as a tragedian .
Athenaeus
•LAooo•os,"

(13.561a)
and

the

labels

Euripides

scholiasts

criticize

• c
0

'
OK"IVU.05

what

was

considered superfluous philosophizing in his plays (see,
e.g.,

at

Alcestis 779).

criticism of Euripides

Nietzsche,
1

infamous for

his

prosaic, philosophic approach to

tragedy, sensed that behind Euripides

1

philosophic

•execution• of the genre was the sinister figure of
Socrates.

Nietzsche believed that Euripides in the end

regretted having invaded the poetic terrain of tragedy with
prosaic philosophy, but it was, alas, too late:
Dionysus had already been scared £rom the tragic
stage, by a demonic power speaking through Euripides.
Even Euripides was, in a sense, only a mask: the
deity that spoke through him was neither Dionysus nor
Apollo, but an altogether newborn demon, called
Socrates.11
10 see Nussbaum, Fragility, pp. 122-123, £or the
argument that such genre distinctions are not ancient.
UNietzsche,

The

Birth 0£

Tragedy,

in

The

Basic

~ritings 0£ Nietzsche, transl. Walter Kaufmann (New York:
Modern Library, 1966), p. 82.
See also the discussion 0£

Sneu,

Discovery,

pp.

113-135.
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Nietzsche's hostility, however, did not lend to critics the
pa use for reflection its very excessiveness recommends.
Michelini traces the small success of early attempts to
consider

Euripides

as

a

philosopher.12

The

worst

distortions were practiced by those who presumed to
excavate Euripides" plays for bits of evidence to
reconstruct

his

philosophic

views.13

Even

today,

though without the earlier excesses, critics persist in
treating

Euripides

as

a

philosopher.14

F.

L.

Lucas

exhorts the discretion necessary in making such an
assessment:
After Euripides the dramatist there remains Euripides
the thinker,--the subject to-day of a vast and growing
literature, much of it vitiated by disregard of an
obvious principle, which book. after book. recognizes in
theory in its first chapter, and ignores in all that
follows. You cannot credit a dramatist
indiscriminately with the opinions of his characters;
this mistake is as old as the poet•s own audiences,
who seem to have been in some ways quite peculiarly
12Kichelini,

Tragic

Tradition,

pp.

8-10.

13wilhelm Nestle, Euripides, der Dich ter der
griechischen Aufklarung (Stuttgart: Verlags w. Kohlhammer
GmbH., 1901; reprint ed., Darmstadt:
Scientia Verlag
Aalen, 1969), is the worst offender of those using this
methodology, best described as •cut and paste.•
R. G. A.
Buxton, Persuasion in Greek. Tragedy: A Study of Peitho
{Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1982; hereafter Buxton,
Persuasion), p. 148, calls this type of approach •. . . an
extremely naive form of dramatic criticism, depending as it
does on highly selective quotation.•
14witness, £or example, the confident
Pronouncement of E. R. Dodds, •Euripides the
Irrationalist,• CR 43 (1929; hereafter Dodds,
"Irrationalist•),-p. 97:
•
while Sophocles is a
dramatist, Euripides happens to be, like Bernard Shaw and
Pirandello, a philosophical dramatist.•
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imbecile, so that "immoral utterances" like
Hippolytus• (612) "With my tongue I swore it--never
with my heart," or praise 0£ money in another play,
were greeted with bellows 0£ righteous
indignation.15
Euripides, then, is o-ften considered to be a
philosopher, but the disparity 0£ opinion concerning his
philosophic outlook marks him as no ordinary philosopher,
or at least as no philosopher in the modern sense 0£ the
word.

Instead, Euripides is a disturbing sort 0£

philosopher, one very like the Platonic Socrates 0£ the
early dialogues:

a philosopher who asks questions he does

not answer, and who pro££ers no identi-fiable, consistent
doctrine.16
Euripides• penchant -for questions to which he gives no
answers is o£ten observed.

"Zur Grosse des Euripides

gehort, dass er die Frage stellen, aber nich t

hat losen

mogen," was Karl Reinhardt's conclusion on the
playwright.17

Bernard

Knox

is

less

complimentary:

15Lucas, In£1 uence, pp. 28-29.
See, however,
Michelini, Tragic Tradition, p. 89, who sympathizes with
Aristophanes' and the audience's latching onto what she
considers intentionally provocative epigrams because
Euripides •. . .
le-ft so little room open -for a blow.
At
the end o-f the play, there might be nothing -for [the
audience] to £ix on except a £ew questionable and catchy
witticisms."
16see Michelini, Tragic Tradition, p. 10,
especially nn. 34 and 35, £or bibliography on £ailed
attempts to identi£y consistent doctrine in Euripidean
Plays.
17Karl Reinhardt, "Die Sinneskrise bei Euripides,"
in Euripides, ed. Ernst-Richard Schwinge (Darmstadt:
Wissenscha£tliche Buchgessellscha£t, 1968). p. 541.
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"[Euripides] seems unable or perhaps unwilling to resolve
the discords his plays in£lict on our ears; even his
masterpieces

leave

us

£ull

of

disturbing

questions."18

That "[Euripides] seems more concerned to raise questions
than to answer them, to cast doubts than to show how the
doubts are to be resolved," is the verdict of D. W.
Lucas;19

Gilbert

Horwood

"Euripides settles
agrees, "

similarly

notes

, .. 20

nothing

and

that
Albin

Lesky

. uberall ist die Intensitat der Fragestellung

um ein Vielfaches grosser als die Sicherheit der
Antwort.•21
As a philosopher, then, Euripides is less than
satisfactory to the modern reader, who has come to expect a
philosopher to espouse and defend a definable doctrine.
Instead, Euripides, like Socrates, is lacking in doctrine,
and he is sometimes considered 11 t tle more than a conduit
of the sundry philosophical influences of his time.
"Euripidean plays present no central idea and persuade to
18Bernard Knox, "Euripides:
The Poet as Prophet,"
in Directions in Euripidean Criticism: A Collection of
Critical Essays, ed. Peter Burian (Durham: Duke Univ.
Press, 1985; hereafter Knox, "Prophet"), p.1.
19D. w. Lucas, The Greek Tragic Poets, 2 ed.
(Aberdeen:
University Press, 1959; hereafter Lucas, Tragic
Poets), p. 176.
2.0Gilbert Horwood, Essays on Euripidean Drama
(Berkeley and Los Angeles:
Univ. 0£ Cali£ornia Press,
1954),

p.

49.

Geschich te,

p.

409.
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nothing

.

similarly

•"

Michelini

proclaims;

D.

W.

Lucas

comments:

The 'philosopher of the stage', far from being a
philosopher in the technical sense, was an eclectic
lover of wisdom ready to set himself in imagination
within the framework of many different systems and
unwilling to commit himself to any schooi.22
Leon Parmentier finds Euripides' work to be •en quelque
sorte un miroir oil viennent se refleter

. . toutes les

choses

after

contemporaines."23

Albin

Lesky,

citing

the tradition that Euripides was a student of various
philosophers and sophists and a friend of Socrates, notes
that Euripides' plays show the in£luence 0£ these men's
ideas and yet contradict them:

"Gekannt wird er diese

Manner haben und Beriihrung mit ihren Ideen in Rach£olge und
Widerspruch wird an vielen Stellen seines Werkes
kenntlich.•24

C.

Collard

likewise

cautions

against

identifying Euripides' philosophy with any particular
individual, or even with the spirit 0£ the age:
Ancient sources assert his acquaintance with leading
sophists' or with Socrates--or at least with their
ideas. Similarities and echoes are everywhere,
sometimes apparent controversial engagement, but never
consistently enough to justify the earlier modern view
of Euripides as a publicist, in the guise 0£
dramatist, :for new theories or codes, let alone any
one thinker's theories, a 'poet 0£ the
Enlightenment•.25
22Lucas,

Tragic

Poets,

23Leon Parmentier,
Bouillon, 1893), p. 13.

p.

Euripide

243.
et

Anaxagore

(Paris:

24Albin Lesky, Die tragische Dichtung der Hellenen
{Got ting en:
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1964), p. 150.
25collard,

Euripides,

p.

30.
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All 0£ these observations, however, are £airly broad
generalizations that require little proof.

They merely

identify Euripides as one whose plays raise questions and
offer no answers.

But in so describing Euripides

1

work,

scholars have recently begun to use terms reminiscent of
Plato and of Socrates.

Both William Arrowsmith and

Christian Wolff, for example, have used the term
"dialectic"

to

describe

Euripides 1

drama.26

That

ancient tragic drama in general shares with the Platonic
dialogues "a central structural feature, the elenchos or
cross-examination," has been asserted by Martha
Hussbaum.27

Hore

recently,

Michelini

has

applied

label "elenchus• to the tendency 0£ Euripides
raise questions.

1

the

plays to

She associates this tendency, however,

with the Sophistic enlightenment (in which she considers
Socrates played a part), not with Socrates in particular:
A posture 0£ alienation . . . is precisely what does
characterize the new historical, philosophical, and
rhetorical prose genres of the firth century, all 0£
which have associations with the Sophistic
enlightenment; and it was these genres that Euripidean
drama used as the source 0£ its particular tone and
style. The prose artist, instead 0£ acting as a
source 0£ tradition and its preservation, is a critic
26William Arrows mi th, "A Greek Theater of Ideas,•
Arion 2 (1963; herea£ter Arrowsmith, 11 Ideas 11 ), p. 55,
re£ers to "the complex 'dialectic 0£ Euripidean drama•;
Christian Wolf£, •Euripides,• in Ancient Writers Greece and
Rome, Vol. 1, ed. James Luce (Kew York:
Scribners, 1982;
herea£ter Wol££, "Euripides"), p. 236, describes the story
Of Alcestis as "interwoven with a kind of dialectic of
opposed values."
1

27Nussba um,

Fragility,

p.

128.
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who puts traditional values to the elenchus or who
wishes to make his audience accept as true the
"weaker logos," that is, the inverse of what they
would normally believe and expect.28
The critical literature, then, has of late begun to
acknowledge a

loose association between Euripides 1

methodology and Socrates

1

And yet, such testimony,

•

suggestive though it may be, pales beside the long history

28Kichelini, Tragic Tradition, p. 70.
Michelini
uses the word "elenchus" several times (cf. pp. 127, 213,
297), but she never at tempts to compare the methods of
Socrates and Euripides. She indicates that she considers
the two di££erent in that Socrates "attempt[ed] to
harmonize the contradictory ethics of moral right (dike)
and heroic achievement (arete) by subordinating the latter
to the -former," while Euripides, "by keeping the old and
the new moralities in balance, and by playing the
contradictions of one against the other, . . . betrayed
both of them and laid bare for us the full meaning of the
Greek cultural revolution." (p. 127)
Michelini seems to
suggest that Socratic influence in Euripidean plays is
thematic, that is, as evidenced in "the Euripidean
convention of a sacrificial arete" (p. 91), in plays that
"anatomize the workings 0£ a new morality of altruism" (p.
226), and in the emphasis on cooperative over competitive
virtues (pp. 229-230).
Michelini sees in Phaedra s
musings on virtuous action in Hippolytus and in Kedea s
remarks on akrasia in Medea that "Euripides is giving free
play to some of the problems that made this [Socratic]
argument [that nobody willingly commits a moral error] so
interesting and fertile for fifth-century thinkers," and
she suggests that Phaedra s speech "looks more like a
tribute to Socratic in£luence than a 'polemic against the
Philosopher." (p. 304).
For Michelini, the idealistic
self-sacrifice, passivity, and integrity of the
misunderstood and maligned Hippolyt us mark him as a
"Socratic hero" (pp. 305-310).
Michelini includes Socrates
as a "Sophist" without explanation (p. 140), and adamantly
resists the notion that "Socratic doctrine" can be
extracted from the work of Plato or other authors (p. 304).
For Dionysus in Bacchae as an alter-Socrates, see
Thomas G. Rosenmeyer, "Tragedy and Religion: The
Bacchae," in Greek Tragedy: Modern Essays in Criticism,
ed. Erich Segal (Bew York:
Harper and Row, 1983), pp. 371373.
1

1

1

1
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of Euripidean interpretation, where the striking similarity
between the methodology of the two has been a dominant
though tacit theme, particularly in discussions of those
aspects of Euripidean drama that have been subject to the
most controversy.
For example, a sense of the presence 0£ the
~

sine~

of elenchos, i.e., of two counterpoised

posi tions,29

one

of

which is

refuted, is everywhere in

tbe critical literature on Euripides.

Euripidean drama has

the reputation 0£ developing a plot and at the same time
posing something that is coun terplot, something that
undermines the plot and makes characters on stage, as well
as the audience in the theater, call into question the
inevitability of the plot's progression.

What, then, in

the Platonic dialogues is made discrete by identi£ication
with at least two separate interlocutors, is in Euripides
somehow less discrete.

This lends to Euripidean plays what

Gilbert Murray termed "a certain unintelligible note of
discord."30
29conard, Euripides, p. 32, calls this "the
antithetical mode," and claims that it is "[a]pparently
instinctive to the Greeks." The presence of this mode in
Euripides signals in£luence 0£ the sophists, who "developed
it into an instrument of formal argumentation . . . . • In
addition, Collard notes, "Polar statements and discussions,
polar conceptions of setting and action, pervade Euripides

. . . ."

30Gilbert Murray, Euripides and His Age, 2 ed.
(London, Hew York, and Toronto: Oxford Univ. Press, 1946;
hereafter Murray, Euripides), p. 50.
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The critical literature on Euripides has, however,
resisted leaving this discord unintelligible.

One proposal

is that the poet himself took the part 0£ dissident:
guripides, it is claimed, either was betraying his
disbelief in the Olympian gods who peopled the traditional
stories that were his primary material or was undercutting
the heroic ideals the stories embodied.
A. W. Verrall is the most notorious--but certainly not
the only--champion 0£ the view that in Euripides• plays is
unmistakable evidence that the playwright did not believe
in the gods 0£ his countrymen:
The creed 0£ Euripides was that 0£ nascent philosophy,
science, and rationalism; bet ween which and the
worship 0£ the popular gods there was a war to which
modern religious controversies o££er no parallel. . .
. The duty preached by the philosophers, and by
Euripides as a public teacher known to be in sympathy
with philosophers, was the duty 0£ thinking on system,
0£ not adopting, without evidence or investigation,
contradictory hypotheses on di££erent days 0£ the
month or at di££erent stages 0£ a journey; a duty
which, as was seen with ever increasing clearness,
would i£ pursued make it impossible to use at all such
conceptions as 'Apollo', or 'Artemis', or 'Demeter•,
and reduce even 'Zeus• to the position 0£ an
inconvenient and misleading name.31
31A. W. Verrall, Euripides the Rationalist
(Cambridge:
Univ. Press, 1895; hereafter Verrall,
Rationalist), pp. 79-80.
C£. also the second chapter 0£
Paul Decharme, Euripide et l 1espri t de son theatre (Paris:
Garnier, 1893; reprint ed., Brussels:
Culture and
Civilization, 1966; hereafter Decharme, Euripide et
l 'esprit), pp. 59-103, which begins, "Une des £ormes de
l'espri t philosophique chez Euripide est la critique
appliquee aux idees que ses contemporains se £aisaient des
dieux et aux legendes qu•on racontait a leur sujet."
Dodds, "Irrationalist," p. 101, concedes Verrall 1s position
as £act: "That, in £act, Apollo and the Furies and the
rest of the denizens 0£ Olympus and Tartarus are £or
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Cedric Whitman and others locate the dissonance of
guripides• work in a

broader arena, i.e., in the poet's

deliberate distortion of the heroic world of the
traditional tales that served as his primary material:
Throughout his life, Euripides made use of heroic
fiction, without ever shaping a heroic figure . .
What Euripides did not do was abandon either the
framework or the implications of the myth in which all
these characters move. The -framework continues to
surround them, slaves, minions, and demythologized
heroes alike, and the overtones are still those of the
wide universal world of the grand tradition. The
result is a jarring discrepancy of ethos between the
two £actors, a kind 0£ deliberate polytonality, as i-f
tragedy were now being written in two keys at
once.32
Euripides no more than dramatic -fictions has been
abundantly proved by Verrall and others: there is no need
for me to labour the point." L. H. G. Greenwood, Aspects
of Euripidean Tragedy (Cambridge:
Univ. Press, 1953),
passim, -followed Verrall; see his pp. 4 and 18 for gods as
representing "concealed unbelief" and as "-fantasy."
32cedric Whitman, Euripides and the Full Circle 0£
Myth (Cambridge, HA: Harvard Univ. Press, 1974; hereafter
Whitman, Full Circle), pp. 112-113.
C£. D. J. Conacher,
Euripidean Drama: Myth, Theme, and Structure (Toronto:
Univ. 0£ Toronto Press, 1967; herea£ter Conacher,
Euripidean Drama), who detects a discom-fort with myth in
Euripides• varying "approaches" to it; see Conacher•s -first
chapter, especially pp. 12 ff., where the claim is made
that Euripides "[n]ever -fully accept[ed] the world 0£ myth
as the real basis of his tragedies" (p. 12), and both
"makes use of and yet abuses the 'other world' of myth" in
the Heracles (p. 14).
See also the remark o-f Collard,
Euripides, p. 30:
" . . [Euripides] is so clearly
uncomfortable with the traditional religious and moral
values which tragic myth enshrined . . . ." Similarly, to
Michelini, Tragic Tradition, p. 51, Euripides• art is
". . . an art that opposes tradition."
Cf. Ekbert Faas,
Tragedy and After: Euripides, Shakespeare, Goethe
(Kingston and Montreal:
McGill-Queen's Univ. Press, 1984;
hereafter Fass, Tragedy), pp. 44-45. For character
degeneration as one of Euripides• techniques £or debunking
myth, see Emily HcDermot t, "Euripides and the Decline of
Character:
A Soap Opera Connection," CO 61 (1984), pp.
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Christian Wolff suggests that dissonance in Euripides

1

plays is in some sense the hallmark of the end of the
tragic

genre

itself:

Kore and more in the course 0£ the latter part 0£ the
fifth century B. C., tragedy approaches the exhaustion
of its traditional and conventional resources. For
Euripides, this increasingly creates a tension between
maintaining the established requirements of the genre
--such as the use of a circumscribed body of myth or
the presence 0£ a participating chorus--and a need to
revitalize, perhaps even break with, them by
innovation and change.33
But behind Euripides the dissident, one can sense the
presence of two collocated positions and the refutation
characteristic of elenchos.

For even when scholars do not

assign to Euripides the role of dissident, they recognize
in his work the interplay and opposition of counterpoised
elements.

Wolff, -for example, calls attention to the

general "contradictoriness" o-f Euripidean drama and notes
the "uneasy, unresolved juxtaposition• particularly in the
Medea; Arrowsmith speaks of the •pattern of juxtaposed
incongruities" and "critical counterpointing of . . .
elements"; and Collard wonders if the "correspondences and
balances" 0£ episodes "emphasize the thoroughness of the
contrasts,

o-ften

reversals,

they

embody. 11 34

Michelini

105-108.
33wolff,

"Euripides,•

p.

234.

34wolff, "Euripides," pp. 256 and 241; Arrowsmith,
"Ideas," p. 39; Collard, Euripides, p. 16.
Cf. A. P.
Burnett, Catastrophe Survived. Euripides Plays of Mixed
Reversal (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1971; hereafter
Burnett, Catastrophe), p. 16, on Euripides disturbing
1

1
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proposes that there is in Euripides' work an "aesthetic of
balance and counterpoint:"
The complexity denied to the icy clarity of Euripidean
rhetoric is reconstituted in structure. in the
interplay and counterpoint of the ideas themselves.
and of the speakers who present them. The "drama of
ideas" uses ideas to build aesthetic. not logical,
structures, in which important elements are often
presented only under cancellation by other opposing
elements.35
Nevertheless, in Euripidean plays, two or more
positions do not merely get presented.

Instead, refutation

is a regular feature in this arena of ideas.

H. D. F.

Kitto discerns a character-centered refutation when he
says, "Euripides, to our great surprise, will round upon a
sympathetic

character

in

the

last

.•36

act

More

recently. Michelini describes Euripides' skill at
refutation in a peculiarly Socratic way when she remarks,
Euripidean theater is involved with the same cultural
concerns that are raised by the theater of Sophokles;
but its relation to these concerns is secondary, in
that it represents them almost always by a process of
inversion. . . . To say No is the function of
Euripidean art, and this continual negation always
juxtaposition of "one familiar action with another that was
equally familiar, but contradictory in pattern."
35Michelini,

Tragic

Tradition,

pp.

120

and

119.

36H. D. F. Kitto. Greek Tragedy, 3 ed. (London and
Hew York:
Methuen, 1961; hereafter Kitto, Tragedy}, p.
253.
Whitman, Full Circle, p. 129, sees in Euripides' "war
Plays" refutation on a larger scale, what he calls "·
reversals of moral perspective that come from outside,
rather than from any inherent, organic dynamics of the
action such as would bring them about inevitably; they are
arbitrarily imposed by the hand of the poet in order to
evolve a counterpiece that somehow negates the first half
of the play."
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looks toward something else, ad umbra ting that other by
the play 0£ its re£usal, its irony.37
It is clear, then, that Euripidean plays share with
Socratic elenchos the collocation 0£ two opposing
positions, one 0£ which is re£u ted.

It may be objected,

however, that this counterpoint, or juxtaposition, or
whatever else it may be called, is still not the same as
the give and take 0£ elenchos, where the interlocutor is
subtly urged by Socra tes

1

argumentation from one position

to another, and to yet another, until it becomes clear
that his ultimate position is one that he himsel£ can
neither deny nor maintain, and, realizing that he is
refuted, he experiences the dislocation known as aporia.
The critical literature does, however, give testimony that
there can be -found in Euripides• plays the changing
position 0£ the interlocutor and the aporia of Socratic
elenchos.
The changing position of the interlocutor is
recognizable in what has been sometimes been termed the
"emotional labili ty" of Euripidean characters.
"Instability, conflict, and change seem to mark many of
Euripides

1

characters,• Collard observes, •so that

understanding

them

37Kichelini,

is

problema tic. 11 38

Tragic

Tradition,

p.

Arrowsmith
126.

38collard, Euripides, p. 9.
"Emotional labili ty"
is Hichelini's phrase; see Tragic Tradition, p. 113.
Michelini argues (p. 114) that this emotional !ability gets
in the way of the audience s ability to maintain concern
1
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identifies the mutability of character in Euripides with
the interplay of ideas when he claims that certain
characters change "· . . because their function is not that
of rounded characters or 'heroes" but specifications of the
shaping ideas of the play.•

He continues:

. . . the one kind of character which Euripides"
theater cannot afford is that splendid integrated
self-knowledge represented by the "old fantastical
Duke of dark corners" in Measure for Measure;
Euripides• theater is all Angelos, Lucios, and
Claudios, average, maimed, irresolute, incomplete
human nature . . . . Horal judgment is, as Euripides
tried to show, no less precarious and dif£icult than
the comprehensive description of reality.39
R. G. A. Buxton also senses in Euripides• characters ideas
being developed:
. . [Euripides"] works are composed of a series of
interlocking arguments. Various characters put cases,
trying to persuade each other, and the audience, of
the validity of their position. The effect of the
play consists of nothing less than the complex impact
of all the interlocking persuasions, arguments and
cases.40
A. H. Dale similarly notes that
. . . in a well-constructed Euripidean tragedy what
controls a succession of situations is not a firmly
conceived unity of character but the shape of the
whole action, and what determines the development and
finesse of each situation is not a desire to paint in
the details 0£ a portrait-study but the rhetoric 0£
the situation--what Aristotle calls

for the characters.
39Arrowsmith, "Ideas,• p. 43.
Cf. Kitto, Tragedy,
PP. 274-275, for •schematic treatment" of characters.
4 0Buxton,

Persuasion,

p.

150.
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4

1

Dale's "rhetoric o:f the situation•
£luidity o:f a

~s

nothing less than the

position successfully attacked.

One need

only recall Socrates' interlocutors, who change their tack.
to avoid total de-feat 0£ their position, to recognize that
any attempt to characterize someone in such a situation
would ultimately be :futile.

It is no wonder, then, that

Euripides' characters can seem so inconstant.
One can likewise :find observations in the critical
literature on Euripides on the particular kind o:f
refutation Socrates practiced.

..

Fo~

Euripides does not

merely leave the impression that one o:f the two positions
has been soundly trounced.
a udience42

in

a

Instead, Euripides leaves the

state o:f aporia, lost

and confused

instead o:f convinced 0£ a well-argued surety.

Kurt von

Fritz sees the discrepancy between plot and ending as the
impetus to an intended and enduring confusion.

Von Fritz

41A. K. Dale, ed. 1 Euripides, Alcestis (Ox-ford:
Clarendon Press, 1978), p. xxvii.
See, however, D. J.
Conacher, "Rhetoric and Relevance in Euripidean Drama," AJP
102 (1981) 1 pp. 3-25, whose argument; £or dramatic relevance
o:f certain rhetorical set-pieces an·d consistency o:f
characterization in Euripides' plays does not necessarily
invalidate Dale's perception.
42I will argue below, Chapter Four, Part Two, that
the characters on stage likewise give evidence 0£ aporia 1
but to date I have not found in the critical literature
connection 0£ this phenomenon to Socratic elenchos. For
aporia as the theme of a Euripidean play (without re£erence
to Socratic elenchos) 1 see C. A. E. Luschnig, Tragic
!Poria: A Study 0£ Euripides• Iphigenia at Aulis (Berwick,
Victoria, Australia:
Aurea I Publica tions 1 1988), passim.
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concludes

his discussion of Alcestis:

Alles dies ist die Wirkung der schneidenden Dissonanz,
die Euripides in fast alle seine Stucke gelegt hat,
und die in vielen davon auch in der krassen Diskrepanz
zwischen der Handlung und dem scheinbar gliicklichen
Ende zum Ausdruck kommt. Eben diese Wirkung beweist,
dass die Dissonanz, wie Euripides es wollte, auch von
denen gehort worden ist, die das Ratsel, warum sie so
tie£ aufgestort wurden, nicht losen konnten.43
Bernard Knox, after calling the world Euripides creates on
stage "·

one of disruption,

violence, subversion,

uncertainty, discord," goes on to describe the total ef£ect
of this poet's works in terms reminiscent 0£ aporia:

"In

Euripidean tragedy old certainties are shattered; what
seems solid cracks and melts, £ounda tions are torn up,
direction

lost.•44

Walter

Jens

agrees:

"Hier

gibt

es

nichts Festes, keine Bindungen, auf die man sich verlassen
diirfte

.45

William

Arrowsmith

terms

phenomenon an "impasse," which he sees as "

this

same

the

dramatist's way 0£ con-fronting his audience with the
necessity of choosing between apparently antithetical
43Kurt von Fritz, Antike und moderne Tragodie:
Neun Abhandlungen (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1962; herea£ter von
Fritz, Tragodie), p. 316.
44Knox, "Prophet,"
pp. 5 and 8 (italics added).
Cf. Albin Lesky, A History of Greek Literature, transl.
James Willis and Cornelius de Heer (Hew York: Thomas Y.
Crowell, 1966; hereafter Lesky, History), p. 392, who
quotes the remark of H. D. F. Kitto [Entretiens sur
l'antiquite classique, Vol. 1, 1952 (1954), p. 228] that
with Euripides, "you never know where you are."
45walter Jens, "Euripides," in Euripides, ed.
Ernst-Richard Schwinge (Darmstadt: Wissenscha£tliche
Buchgesselscha£t, 1968), p. 26.
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realities or positions."

Later, Arrowsmith continues to

describe this impasse as one which extends out beyond the
boundaries 0£ the literary piece and into the minds 0£ its
in tended audience:
. . . [Euripidean theater] presents its typical
actions as problems and thereby involves the audience
in a new relation, not as worshippers but jurors who
must resolve the problem by decision. But because the
problem is usually incapable 0£ outright resolution,
is in £act "tragic," the audience is compelled to
£or£ei t the only 1uxury of making a decision--the
luxury of knowing that one has decided wisely.
Something--innocence, comfort, complacency--is always
£orfeited--or meant to be forfeited--by the audience
of jurors. And this suggests that the essential
anagnorisis of Euripidean theater is not between one
actor and another but between the audience and its own
experience, as that experience is figured in the
plays. Anagnorisis here is knowing moral choice,
exercised on a problem which aims at mimicking the
quandary of a culture.46
The critical literature, then, again and again
observes that Euripides

1

plays display the overt procedural

elements 0£ elenchos; but the literature likewise detects
in the plays the presence of elenchos

1

more subtle

procedural elements, the practice of getting the
interlocutor to agree to· a counterpoised set of questions,
which, although they at first seem unrelated to the
business at hand, show themselves in the end, when brought
together, to entail an analogous situation that contradicts
some aspect of the interlocutor s
1

Chapter One, Part Three).

position (see above,

These analogies, then, when

46Arrowsmith, "Ideas," pp. 45 and 53.
See Chapter
One, Part Four, for Seeskin s similar observation on
Platonic dialogues.
1

253

applied to the interlocutor's position, bring it down to
destruction.
o£ a
at

The same subtle, contrapuntal construction

partially hidden, seductive, contradictory position is

the

heart

0£

Euripidean

theater.47 That critics

nave detected the presence 0£ this type 0£ re£utation in
Euripides• plays may be argued £rom their impatience at
what appears to them to be the poet's penchant £or the
irrelevant--a charge that was more than once levelled
against

Socrates.

Chapters One and Two demonstrated that one impression
that the habit 0£ counterpointing analogies gives is that
the counterpointer appears to be a babbling lunatic who
brings up all manner 0£ thing not germane to the subject at
hand.

Such an impression 0£ Euripides can be £ound in the

critical literature.

Compare Callicles• impatience with

Socrates• choice 0£ topics £or discussion (•What •s this
about cloaks? . . . What's this about shoes?
in talking nonsense .

You persist

,• Gorgias 490-491) with the

obvious impatience 0£, £or example, Gilbert Horwood, who
claims Euripides •entered the theatre still groping.•

In

concluding his discussion 0£ the •the sudden
inconsistencies . . . ; the £its 0£ inopportune, i£ not
47This study will argue that Euripides is able to
e££ect such a contrapuntal construction poetically, by
using moti£s and images analogously to re£u te (and even
point the way out of) the seemingly inevitable tragic
progression 0£ the plot. The characters, broadly speaking,
mani£est the particulars of the interlocutor's position in
elenchos. See below, Chapter Four, Parts One and Four.
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unseemly, open-mindedness; the changes o:f mood; the
ramshackle or even sel:f-contradictory plots" to which
Euripidean drama is prone, Norwood bristles with
Calliclean,

self-con:fident

disapproval:

One :fact accounts :for these lapses: with [Euripides]
intellectual control o:f imagination was apt to :fail
abruptly . . . . Euripides--can it be denied?--more
than once began a play with no clear notion of how it
was to develop. . . . When this irresponsible mood
[i.e., of being unable to control his characters] lays
hold on Euripides he chases every hare that shows its
scut. O:ften it is as handsome and nimble a beast as
ever was coursed in March, but it means equivocal
reputation :for the man who promised his guests a
leopard.48
Norwood later grudgingly intones that the "genius• 0£
Euripides perhaps excuses him:

we should be

11

thank£u1• to

receive whatever we get :from him; a:fter all, Euripides is
"notoriously uneven• and had "never read Aristotle:

i:f in

the course 0£ composition a quaint :fancy struck him, down
it

went

into

the

play,

and

a

:fig :for consistency! 11 49

In an earlier work, however, Norwood was more tolerant:
". . . nothing is better known about Euripides than that
his writings are full o:f 'inconsistencies,. that is, o:f
things which we, :for our part, :find ourselves unable to coordinate."

Such inconsistencies leave one, Norwood is

sure, " . . . wondering . . . 'why does [Euripides] mention
48Norwood,

Essays,

pp.

48-49.

49Norwood, Essays, p. 103.
C:f. J. F. Dobson,
"Euripides Unbound," CR 22 (1908), p. 211, :for an imagined
Euripides• impudent rejoinder to Sophocles: "Consistency
was made for slaves.•
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this?' and 'why does he express it in this odd
fashion?'"50

Inability

to

appreciate

the

aptness

of

Euripidean 'inconsistencies• leaves other scholars like C.
Collard with little else to do but sound a

note of regret:

"[Euripides] was rich in moral or philosophical ideas and
illustrative generalizations, clever and striking in their
deployment.
or

These can occur without special dramatic need

contextual

aptness

Beside such impatience and regret, however, there has
been an increasing tolerance and, finally, even a respect
for

Euripidean "inconsistencies" or "anomalies."

Verrall

was

the

pioneer

of

this

tolerance.52

A.

W.

It

is

unfortunate that his approach to Euripides--notoriously
capricious,

uneven, and,

indefensible53 __ has

made

ultimately,
his

name a

totally
byword for

the

50Gilbert Horwood, The Riddle of the Bacchae:
The
Last Stage of Euripides• Religious Views (Manchester: The
University Press, 1908), pp. 3 and 131.
Cf. Kitto,
Tragedy, p. 194, on the Chorus• ode on childlessness in
Kedea: "When such desperate deeds are afoot, why does
Euripides insert this pleasant little essay?"
51couard,

Euripides,

52verrall,

Rationalist,

p.

25.
passim.

53Kichelini, Tragic Tradition, pp. 1-16 and
passim, gives Verrall full critical consideration, noting
that he is the 'first to attempt to defend Euripides against
the earlier critical tradition, which had abused Euripides•
work because it failed to measure up to the canonical work
of Sophocles. Michelini does not mince words, however, on
Verrall's failings:
"His methods amount almost to parodies
of traditional scholarship" (p. 15); and yet she is able to
discern an eerie congruity between Verrall and Euripides:
"It is not by accident that the single most influential
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bizarre

and

idiosyncratic.54

One

nonetheless

gets

the

sense that Verrall, had he not been reacting against a
critical tradition that was openly hostile to Euripides,
might have been capable 0£ sound interpretation.

Witness,

£or example, what Michelini rightly deems •verrall at his
best•:55
Once £or an, let us not £latter ourselves that we can
take the lead 0£ Euripides, and show him how he might
have improved this or that, i£ he had only known what
he was doing. . . . i£ anywhere we suspect him 0£
dulness, we should quietly mark. that place £or
something which probably we do not understand.56
A similar humility in the £ace 0£ Euripidean
•anomalies• has been expressed in the critical literature
0£ recent years, and corresponding at tempts to interpret
Euripides• work. have started with the assumption that such
•anomalies• are intentionally important pointers to the
meaning 0£ the work..

David Kovacs, £or example, makes an

appeal for a holistic interpretation of Euripides, one that
would respectfully confront what, upon first glance,
appears to be anomalous:
scholar to write on Euripides was one whose thesis had a
strong flavor 0£ absurdity and paradox. Such an anomaly
cannot be dismissed; it must be understood.• (p. 3).
54na vid Kovacs, The Andromache of Euripides:
An
Interpretation (Chico, CA:
Scholars Press, 1980), p. 6,
perhaps best describes the most distressing feature 0£
Verran•s contribution in commenting on "the perverse
ingenuity characteristic of his work.."
55Hichelini,
56verrall,

Tragic

Tradition,

Rationalist,

p.

p.
119.

13

n.

48.
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. . . our task as interpreters is never to respond to
small segments of the work in isolation but precisely
to interpret a whole. That whole, though it is
certainly ambiguous as an autonomous text, is
nevertheless not infinitely elastic.
It consists of
disparate elements all contributing to a single plan,
and i£ we have misidenti'fied the plan or misconstrued
the individual elements or both, there will be some
things that do not £it. A view 0£ a Greek tragedy
that can say little or nothing about the contribution
0£ one speech or scene to the whole, that must ignore
or apologize for another speech or scene, is unlikely
to be correct. An interpretation that can •save the
phenomena,• including elements that are puzzling,
alien, or repellent to modern taste . . . has a chance
of reproducing the author 1 s artistic intent. . . .
The critic should there£ore set a high value on a
text s puzzling or repellent 'features. They are his
chief de£ense against subjectivity.57
1

Michelini agrees:
These awkward moments are neither errors nor
meaningless blots, but elements 0£ considerable
aesthetic signi£icance, valid parts of a system of
literary meaning that derives from the Euripidean
play s combative relation to its audience.58
1

Euripidean •anomalies• and •inconsistencies,• then,
have not always been well received, but have nonetheless
been a long recognized feature of his work., a feature that
attests to counterpointed analogies like those used by
Socrates and often received with similar dis-favor by his
interlocutors.

Further evidence for counterpointed

analogies in Euripides

1

plays may be found in a second

impression that this practice leaves, this time not only on
57navid Kovacs, The Heroic Kuse:
Studies in the
Hippolytus and Hecuba 0£ Euripides (Baltimore and London:
The Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1987; hereafter Kovacs,
Heroic Kuse), pp. 8-9.
58Hichelini,

Tragic

Tradition,

p.

71.
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the interlocutor, but also on the reader-auditor:

i.e.

that, although the conclusion is one o-f avowed ignorance,
something has been suggested that lies just beneath the
sur-face--something unstated but nonetheless attainable, if
only

one

is

willing

to

"fiddle

with

the

premises.•59

As fraught as Euripidean interpretation has been with
unsuccess-ful and inconstant at tempts to extract from the
text the poet•s philosophical orientation and thus the
plays" meanings, critics have not refrained from trying to
argue for meanings not readily apparent or easily defended.
Michelini pinpoints the heart of this con-fusing scholarly
phenomenon when she says,
The persistent sense that things on stage in a
Euripidean play cannot be what they seem is familiar
to every reader. This sense of something concealed or
held back, of insincerity, is at the root of the
Verrallian interpretations that seek to decipher the
plays as a code is deciphered, once for all
time.60
Michelini in the above quote obviously touches on irony, a
much debated feature of the Socratic method.

Irony will be

further discussed below under the topic "impersonal
aspect"; the point here is to illustrate that critics,
like the reader-auditor of Plato"s early dialogues, sense
in Euripidean plays the same sort of hidden meaning, a
meaning extractable after some "fiddling.•
59The

phrase,

again,

is

from

The obvious

Seeskin,

11.

60Michelini,

Tragic

Tradition,

p.

71.

Dialogue,

p.
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excesses o:f Verrall gave only a brief respite :from such
:fiddlings; the critical literature soon revealed, side by
side with Euripides the subtle dissident, a new Euripides,
this time the subtle traditionalist.
The 1960"s and 1970"s were :fertile decades :for
excavating such hidden meanings in Euripidean plays.

Thus,

according to Desmond Conacher, one must :first discern
Euripides" treatment 0£ myth before the poet •s sincerity or
lack thereof in regard to his subject matter can be
assessed.

Euripides was on the other hand, according to

Andreas Spira•s interpretation 0£ the deus ex machina and
Anne Burnett •s analysis 0£ the poet •s use 0£ certain plot
types, also regarded as consistent in his outlook, as an
espouser o:f an enduring cosmic order defended by the gods.
And while Hermann Rohdich argued that Euripides introduced
into his plays the sophistic world view only to repudiate
it and thereby reassert the validity of more traditional
views, Philip Vellacott insisted that Euripides" admittedly
subversive and subtly presented ideas carried with them an
undeniable i:f indeterminate "human or moral purpose" that
went beyond the apparent sensationalism o:f their
dramatization.61
61The works alluded to are:
Conacher, Euripidean
Drama; Andreas Spira, Untersuchungen zum Deus ex Machina
bei Sophokles und Euripides (X::allmunz:
Lassleben, 1960);
Burnett, Catastrophe; Rohdich, Tragodie; Philip Vellacott,
Ironic Drama: A Study o:f Euripides• Method and Meaning
(Cambridge:
Univ. Press, 1975; hereafter Vellacott, Ironic
Drama). The quoted words appear on Vella cot t "s p. 94.
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In short, even a£ter Euripidean criticism escaped -from
the long history 0£ censure 0£ the poet, there has been a
recurring sense that Euripides• poetic technique involves
something very much like maieusis, i.e., that it urges
looking beyond the apparently inconclusive endings 0£ the
plays to some unstated but suggested truth.

By an act 0£

critical retrospection, the poet can be suspected 0£
knowing this truth all along, and 0£ leading his audience
to "bring to birth" this truth.
The suspicion that the poet knows what he does not
openly say brings our discussion to the £inal way that
counterpointed analogy is acknowledged in the critical
literature on Euripides' plays:
designated a trickster.

that the poet is

It will be recalled £rom Chapter

Two that Socrates' practice 0£ elenchos earned him just
such a designation in Aristophanes' Clouds, and that the
Aristophanic Euripides -fared no better.

It is amusing and

suggestive, then, to £ind that Euripides has acquired the
same reputation among modern critics.

Michelini re£ers the

reader to "the suspicion 0£ Leeuwen that the audience is
being tricked (verba dari) by the poet," and hersel£
remarks that "(t]he mockery to which Euripidean
protagonists are subjected is 0£ course derisory not only

Michelini, Tragic Tradition, pp. 26-2.7 and 38-46, discusses
all 0£ the above works and £its them into the history 0£
Euripidean criticism. See also her bibliography £or
reviews 0£ these works.
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of them, but of the audience as well."

Michelini calls

Euripidean drama "a drama of mockery" and later declares,
"Euripides chose to present himself as deceiver and
charlatan,

the

poet

as

.. 52

liar

Collard

agrees,

alleging that "Euripides• .. deceptions• extend also to the
audience."63

There

is

a

sense,

then,

that

Euripides,

no less than the Daedalus-like Socrates of the Euthyphro,
manipulates and moves things around to the consternation of
those around him.

This sense of being tricked is, as was

argued in Chapter One, one of the byproducts of
counterpointed analogies, elenchos• most subtle procedural
aspect.
To sum up, the critical literature discerns in
Euripides• plays both Socratic elenchos• overt procedure as
well that procedure's most subtle aspect.

It will now be

shown that the literature likewise acknowledges in
Euripides• plays what was termed in Chapter One elenchos•
"Socratic Character•:

its impersonal and personal aspects,

its confrontation of cognition and emotion, and its
peculiar mix of at traction and repulsion, which results in
an urge both to approach and to escape.
Chapter One•s discussion of elenchos• impersonal
62Johannes van Leeuwen, De Aristophane Euripidis
censore (Amsterdam:
Spin, 1876), p. 27, cited in
Michelini, Tragic Tradition, p. 85 n. 76.
The other two
quotes can be found on her pp. 85, 89, and 124.
63couard,

Euripides,

p.

6.
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aspect argued that what has been termed Socratic "irony"
was no pose at all.

Instead, this "irony" served to

depersonalize the elenctic procedure, th us making possible
an objectivity that otherwise would have been di££icult to
maintain, given the highly personalized involvement
Socrates demands 0£ his interlocutors.

The term "irony" is

one £amiliar in the literature on Euripides; indeed, Philip
Vellacott•s controversial study took £or its title Ironic
Drama:

A Study 0£ Euripides" Method and Heaning.64

Whitman gives testimony to the damage done to Euripidean
studies as well as to the poet "s reputation by Euripidean
"irony" misconstrued:
Throughout his li£e Euripides dramatized myths, but
always with irony, sometimes as delicate as that 0£
the Alcestis, sometimes intensely caustic, as in the
Heracles, so that the mythic and ironic modes, to use
Northrop Frye•s terms, seemed to strive in hopeless
and irreconcilable con£lict, which suggested to many
critics, ancient as well as modern, the view so o£ten
repeated in the handbooks, that the poet was
satirizing the mythology 0£ traditional religion,
demolishing clay-£ooted gods, and teaching reason.
Yet the positive substance 0£ Euripides" rationalism
has never been revealed by anyone, and its very
existence has been devastatingly cross-examined by E.
R. Dodds, so that one is le£t with a sorry picture 0£
the poet destroying with sly malice something that he
could not replace with anything better, and, i£
Verrall could be believed, taking a puerile joy in it.
Nietzsche even saw him as writing to please Socrates,
and Socrates alone, as i£ Socrates were guilty as
charged, and Euripides his gi£ted accomplice in the
dismantling 0£ religion. That 'fantasy has faded, but
the con-fusions linger, and the question 0£ what

64-London:

Cambridge

Univ.

Press,

1975.

2.63

Euripides

was

really

doing

It is clear that Euripides

1

with myth remains.65

reputation has su££ered

the same £ate as that 0£ Socrates, who, because 0£ his use
0£ irony, is accused in the Platonic dialogues as well as
in the critical literature of smugly sniggering up his
sleeve all the while that he delights in the destruction of
other men s illusions.

And even though, as Whitman notes,

1

this assessment 0£ Euripides has £aded, the literature on
Euripides consistently acknowledges his use 0£ irony.
Whitman himself contrasts Euripides

1

use of irony in the

early plays, which he calls "the poet s own irony
1

externally imposed," with irony as used by Aeschylus and
Sophocles:

"internal irony coextensive with the

dramaturgical

forces

0£

action

and

character. 11 66

Michelini, £allowing Whitman, identi£ies "[t]he keynote 0£
Euripidean drama• as •an irony that precludes a direct and
consistent approach, even to the 'low
conspicuous

in

the

plays. 11 67

That

1

elements that are so

Euripidean

irony

affects the audience s perspective is surely a more
1

important critical insight than what little can be derived
from attempts to determine the poet s own attitude toward
1

his subject matter, which is, a£ter all, a

futile exercise.

65Whitman, Full Circle, p. 106.
Whitman s
understanding of Euripides' irony begins on p. 108.
1

66Whi tman,
67Michelini,

Full

Circle,

Tragic

p.

108.

Tradition,

p.

66.
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Euripidean irony, then, like that used by Socrates,
has the e££ect 0£ distancing and thereby allowing the space
necessary £or emotional detachment and a more objective
perspective.
"irony,"68

Whether or not this technique is termed
an

encouragement

to

objectivity

is

well

attested in the critical literature on Euripides.

Kitto,

£or example, calls this encouragement Euripides'
"disconcerting

aloofness"

'from

his

characters.69

Schlesinger asserts that "Euripides composes £or mood
control--that is, to avoid the accumulation 0£ an undesired
emotional

e££ect."70

Michelini

agrees:

"[t]he

Euripidean plot denies the audience a wholehearted
participation in the pathetic circumstances 0£ the dramatic
protagonists.•71
And yet the use to which Euripides puts irony does not
end with detachment.

The detachment is used, as it was by

Socrates, as the necessary precursor £or objective thought
and, finally, for fostering the realization that one does
68A discussion 0£ the problems involved in using
the term "irony• may be found in w. D. Smith, "Ironic
Structure in Alcestis,• Phoenix 14 (1960; hereafter Smith,
"Ironic Structure"), pp. 128-129.
69x:i tto,

Tragedy,

p.

253.

70 Alfred Cary Schlesinger, Boundaries 0£ Dionysus:
Athenian Foundations £or the Theory of Tragedy, {Cambridge,
KA:
Harvard Univ. Press, 1963; hereafter Schlesinger,
Boundaries), p. 19.
For Euripides' detachment, see also
Wol££, "Euripides,• pp. 233 and 237.
71Kichelini,

Tragic

Tradition,

p.

86.
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not know.

Schlesinger brie'fly notes that Euripidean

tragedies can demand 0£ their audience •a considerable
degree

0£

judicial detachment.•72

But

by £ar the

most

insight'ful statement on Euripidean irony is by William
Arrowsmith. who, without acknowledging it, describes
Euripides• irony in terms reminiscent 0£ Socratic elenchos:
In any traditional perspective, Euripidean theater is
complex and uncom'fortably strange, almost exasperating
to a taste 'founded on Aeschylus and Sophocles. Its
premises, as we have seen, are unlike, and almost the
inversion 0£ those 0£ the traditional Greek theater.
Typically it likes to conceal the truth beneath
strata 0£ irony because this is the look 0£ truth:
layered and elusive. For the same reason it presents
its typical actions as problems and thereby involves
the audience in a new relation, not as worshippers but
jurors who must resolve the problem by decision. But
because the problem is usually incapable 0£ outright
resolution, is in £act •tragic,• the audience is
compelled to 'forfeit the only luxury 0£ making a
decision--the luxury 0£ knowing that one has decided
wisely.
Something--innocence, comfort, complacency-is always £or£eited--or meant to be £or£eited--by the
audience 0£ jurors. And this suggests that the
essential anagnorisis 0£ Euripidean theater is not
between one actor and another but between the audience
and its won experience, as that experience is 'figured
in the plays. Anagnorisis here is knowing moral
choice, exercised on a problem which aims at mimicking
the quandary 0£ a culture. As such, it is a pattern
0£ the way in which the psyche is made whole again,
and the hope of a culture.73
Arrowsmith, in describing Euripidean irony, gives an
inadvertent but accurate description 0£ the irony Socrates

72schlesinger,

Boundaries,

p.

73Arrowsmith,

"Ideas,•

53.

p.

66.
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uses

in

elenchos.74

Here

is

the

same

confession that

the truth is difficult if not impossible to attain, the
same need to discard the conceit of knowledge, and the same
hope £or psychic well-being to be gained £rom searching and
coming to recognize that one does not, and indeed perhaps
cannot, know.
Behind Euripidean irony, in short, is what Chapter One
argued was the sincere Socratic conviction 0£ ignorance.
Arrowsmith sees the conviction of ignorance as central to
Euripides• work:

"The immediate, salient -fact 0£

Euripides• theater is the assumption o-f a universe devoid
of rational order, or of an order incomprehensible to
men.•75

Wolf£,

in

discussing

Euripides•

extensive

use

0£ recognitions in his later plays, likewise describes the
poet's obsession with ignorance, this time with reference
to Plato:
The recognitions dramatize one of Euripides• main
preoccupations in his later plays, human ignorance and
human need to know. This is the realm that Plato will
describe as the area of opinion, doxa, which means
"what people think," their consensus on a matter (a
notion associated with the democratic process), and
also "illusion" or what is supposed from the
subjective, individual viewpoint, in contrast to what
74An opposing view is argued by Smith, "Ironic
Structure," p. 128, who contrasts Euripides• irony, the
method "0£ presenting a point 0£ view and at the same time
qualifying or contradicting it by means 0£ a satirical
treatment" with Socratic irony, "understatement which
o£fers an apparently £alse sur£ace meaning but which points
to a pro-founder truth beneath ('I know nothing.')." Smith
concludes that the two are related, but not the same.
75Arrowsmith,

"Ideas,"

p.

36.

2.67
is claimed to be universal truth. Euripides has an
acute sense of the dra.111a and pathos of human
ignorance. It is the decisive mark of human
vulnerability. and al>ove all of the isolated person in
his or her subjective being. It is, so to speak, the
passive determinant 0£ what makes us human, and it
rinds power£ul expression in the emotions.76
Recognizing ignorance, however, as will be recalled
from Chapter One. is not possible in a discussion £rom
which one remains coolly detached.

It is here that what

has been termed elenchos' personal aspect shows its effect,
:for Socrates' insistence tnat interlocutors argue only what
they believe, not hypotheses, assures their emotional
involvement in the subject matter.

It should not surprise

us, then, to find in the critical literature observations
on Euripides' singular adeptness at drawing his audience
into identi£ication with the characters on stage.

Side by

side with Euripidean detachment, Wolf£ declares, there is
Euripidean

conviction.77

The personal aspect of elenchos shows itself in
Euripides• work in what have been termed his "realism• or
•anachronism.•

The realislll of his characters has been

at tested as far back as Aristotle. who, at Poetics 60b.3334

oe'l

reports

>

that

....

1l'Ol€lV

1

•

.

Cl

au1'05

µ.ev

olol

t:lOlV."

,

.

Collard remarks upon this Euripidean realism and its
potential

effect:

76wol:ff
77wolff

'
'

"Euripides,"

pp.

"Euripides,"

p.

2.59-2.60.
33.
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Euripides theatre . . . shares with our own the
representation 0£ credible human beings, however
extreme their predicaments: they :feel, think., talk.,
hold themselves and move, doing the actions and
gestures o:f their time, some unique to it, some
universally human and so out 0£ time, because that is
how Euripides, how any dramatist, conveys reality .
. . . it may be the everyday-realism, and the :familial
or -friendly intimacy o:f so many settings, which
paradoxically keep the persons within the range o:f
experience and easy identi£ication.78
1

Michelini, in contrasting the characterization 0£
Clytaemestra at the hands 0£ Aeschylus and 0£ Euripides,
gives vivid testimony to how convincingly :familiar the
Euripidean portrayal would have been to his audience:
Aischylos• Klytaimestra is a monster 0£ heroic
stature, resembling no woman 0£ her time. The
audience who watched the drama 0£ male against -female
played out in the Oresteia were not likely to be
moved, as Aristophanes claimed Euripides audiences
were, to check under the bed :for an Aigisthos when
they returned home £rom the per£ormance. Because
Euripidean women have not been placed in a remote,
heroic past world, where clashes with everyday life
are muted, they generate a discom£ort that is a part
0£ the continuing Euripidean assault on the tragic
norm.79
1

A more audience-speci£ic £orm 0£ realism is
anachronism.

That Euripides transported into the archaic,

heroic past o:f the stories that served as his subject
matter mannerisms and concerns characteristic 0£ £i:fth
century B. C. Athens is a charge against him as old as the
scholiasts.

The scholiast on Hecuba (ed. Schwartz, line

254), £or example, complains, "This is

just like Euripides,

78couard, Euripides, pp. 16 and
bibliography, see also his p. 13 n. 26.
79Kichelini,

Tragic

Tradition,

u.
p.

For
81.

more
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imposing things from his own time on heroes and confounding
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similarly

I

.

KQl

remarks,

[Euripides] brought his polis into the mythic world

more obviously and consistently than Sophocles and even
Aeschylus.•80

Kenneth

Reck-ford

makes

the

point

that

Euripidean anachronisms in Medea close the distance between
the audience and the characters in the play:
The anachronistic, fifth-century ideas with which
Euripides enlivens his myth point to no program £or
better Athenian living; but they do bring the tragedy
nearer home for the audience, and by extension for
ourselves, by focusing the general failure 0£ human
aspirations in specifically Athenian terms.81
By the technique of anachronism, then, Euripides disallows
the complacency of distance and forces his audience to be
involved in an immediate way.

P. E. Easterling comments on

the jarring effect of Euripides• use of anachronisms:
All these subversive devices complicate the effects of
the heroic stories by reminding the audience of the
clash between the time of the story and their own
present time, suggesting, often enough, that they
should look closely at the disturbing implications of
the heroic tales and not allow themselves to be
anaesthetised by their glamour or by their familiarity
on
the
Attic
stage.82
In summary, Euripides uses techniques that have the
80couard,
99

Euripides,

p.

32.

81x:enneth J. Reck£ord, "Medea's First Exit," TAPA
(1968; hereafter Reckford, "First Exit"), p. 340.

82p, E. Easterling, "Anachronism
Tragedy," JHS 105 (1985), p. 9.
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same e:f:fects as the impersonal and personal aspects o:f
Socratic elenchos.

Euripides, like Socrates, encourages

both objectivity that allows room :for cognition and
identi:fication that ensures emotional involvement.
Michelini sums it up nea Uy:
Euripidean theater plays a dangerous game with its
audience, luring them in with pathos and charm, but
chilling their sympathy always, just at the crucial
moment when the watchers would have become incapable
o:f detaching themselves :from the dramatic illusion. A
biased and sentimental pity is deliberately evoked,
only to be expunged by a wave o:f astringent
irony.83
It is not surprising, then, that the literature
recognizes in Euripides• plays a con:frontation between
emotion and cognition--the very con:frontation that builds
to a crescendo in elenchos as practiced by Socrates.

Albin

Lesky, £or example, vividly describes this con£rontation:
•na steht das Pathos £lammender Leidenscha£t neben
handl ungs£remden

w84

Ra tionalismen

Michelini

similarly remarks 0£ Euripides, "The specialist in :female
emotional maladies (Leidenscha:ft) turns cold rhetorician,
just

as

we

become

absorbed

in

his

art.•85

And

finally,

R. P. Winnington-Ingram summarizes the outcome 0£ this
con:frontation 0£ emotion and cognition in Euripides in such
a way as to evoke memories o:f that moment in Socratic
83Hichelini,

Tragic

Geschich te,
85ffichelini,

Tragic

Tradition,
p.

pp.

93-94.

409.

Tradition,

p.

50.
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elenchos when the interlocutor realizes the emotional
unacceptability o:f inescapably

logical conclusions:

The devastating power o:f emotion in human li:fe--that
is indeed something by which Euripides was obsessed,
not least during the period in which he wrote the
Hippolytus; and he was hardly sanguine about the
ability o:f men, individually or collectively, to
control this power by intelligence.86
But such a confrontation o:f emotion and cognition is,
as will be recalled :from Chapter One's discussion o:f the
interlocutor's experience o:f elenchos, :fraught with
contradictory impulses.

There is the erotic allure o:f the

as yet unrevealed truth, and then the painful prospect o:f
admitting one's ignorance and reforming one's actions
according to strange new standards.

There are both

attraction and repulsion at elenchos' terminus, and
likewise, it seems, :for the audience o:f Euripides' plays.
P. T. Stevens, after considering the evidence :for
Euripides' legendary unpopularity among the Athenians,
concludes that while Euripides was probably "unorthodox
sometimes and disconcerting," he was nonetheless "a
dramatist

whose

plays

everyone

wanted

to

see.•87

86R. P. Winnington-Ingram, "Hippolytus:
A Study
in Causation," in Entretiens sur l' antiquite cla~sique,
Vol. 6, 1958, Euripide (Geneva:
Vandoeuvres, 1960;
hereafter Winnington-Ingram, "Hippolytus"), p. 173.
87stevens, "E. and Athenians," p. 94.
C:f. the
similar conclusion o:f Michelini, Tragic Tradition, p. 73,
"Euripidean plays were and are notoriously good theater;
and an archon who gave a chorus to Euripides could be
certain that the audience would not be bored or
disappointed."
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Michelini similarly not.es "[t.]he apparent.ly cont.radict.ory
aims 0£ Euripidean t.heat.er, t.o enthrall and delight., as
well as to a££ront. and irritate . . . ," and concludes her
chapt.er "Euripides and His Audience:

The Tactics 0£ Shock"

by describing the ambivalent. impulses Euripidean theat.er
was meant to evoke:
An out.break 0£ rage and reject.ion -from t.he audience,
t.he dreaded uproar in t.he t.hea t.er (t.horybos), is
court.ed--and then allayed by a reversal that. disarms
resent.ment and seems £or a time to right the moral
universe. Besides the vibrat.ion between t.wo ext.remes,
t.here are also -fainter overt.ones 0£ dissonance built.
int.o scenes that. seem to compel sympathy or
repugnance, overtones t.hat become dominant once t.he
next variation begins to un£old. By approaching the
audience in this way, Euripides guaranteed that they
would never be able entirely t.o deny him their
attention, t.hough he would never gain their entire
approvai.88
Euripides with his plays, it. seems, roused in his
audience no less intense £eelings 0£ attraction and
repulsion than those experienced by the A t.henians who both
eagerly engaged in conversation with Socrates and hastened
t.o escape t.he dist.urbing conclusions his practice 0£
elenchos suggested.

The reason £or the similar reaction 0£

Euripides• audience and Socrat.es• int.erlocut.ors is t.hat.
both men practiced the same method--Socra t.es in seemingly
casual conversation and Euripides in constructing his
plays.
This chapter has thus £ar shown that. the crit.ical
literature on Euripides gives ample t.est.imony in support 0£
88Kichelini,

Tragic

Tradition,

pp.

74

and

94.
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the above thesis.

Euripides, like Socrates, was considered

to be a philosopher, but a peculiar one, one who could only
be consistently classi'fied as unclassi'fiable, whose medium
was paradox, asking questions but giving no answers, and
advancing no identi'fiable doctrine.

In Euripides

plays

1

one can detect the overt procedural aspects o'f Socratic
elenchos:

two counterpoised positions, one o'f which is

re'futed, the changing position 0£ the interlocutor, and the
aporia at the procedure s end.
1

One can even 'find evidence

'for the subtle procedural a,spect o'f counterpointed
analogies.

Finally, Euripides

character 0£ elenchos:

1

plays exhibit the Socratic

its impersonal and personal

aspects, its con'frontation o'f emotion and cognition, and
its ability to elicit both attraction and repulsion.
It is clear, then, that correspondences between the
methodologies o'f Socratic elenchos and Euripides
have been strongly sensed.

1

plays

It remains the 'final task o'f

this study to illustrate those correspondences by a
thoroughgoing analysis 0£ a Euripidean play.

Part Two:

The Periods 0£ Euripides' Work
and the Choice 0£ Medea

Choosing to establish the operation 0£ Socratic
elenchos in Medea, one 0£ the earliest Euripidean plays,
raises the question 0£ when Socrates himsel£ began using
the method.

It would seem imperative to argue that the

production 0£ Medea in 431 B. C. did not precede Socrates'
practice 0£ elenchos on the streets 0£ Athens.

And yet,

the tantalizing but inde£inite evidence on Socrates'
intellectual

development89

does

not

indicate

when

he

took to practicing the method he is shown using in the
early

Platonic

dialogues.90

But

it

is

not

necessary

that Medea come a£ter Socrates' practice 0£ the method, £or
illustrating the similarity between Euripides' and the
early Platonic Socrates' methods does not require what this
study does not pretend to do:

to argue that the historical

Socrates actually used the method, or used it £irst.
Since, then, the question 0£ priority is moot, any
play 0£ Euripides may be chosen.

As it turns out, there

89For at tempts to assign a chronology to Socrates'
early li£e and to date the "autobiography" at Phaedo 96a
££. and Chaerephon's visit to the Delphic oracle (Apology
21a ££., c£. Xenophon's Apology 14), see, e.g., Guthrie,
Socrates, pp. 58-88, and Taylor, Socrates, pp. 37-88.
901£, however, Chapter Two's analysis 0£ the
Clouds is correct, we could hazard the guess that Socrates'
practice 0£ elenchos was in 423 (the date 0£ the £irst
Clouds) £amiliar enough to the Athenian citizenry to raise
a la ugh 0£ recognition.
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2.75
are compelling reasons for choosing an early play rather
than a late one.

For although critics di££er on the

evolution 0£ Euripides' work through his middle and late
periods, distinguishing features 0£ the early plays are
more

widely

agreed

upon.91

It

happens

that

these

features mark the early plays as more promisingly
illustrative of elenchos than those from the middle and
late

periods.
First, early plays are recognized as being more purely

tragic

than

commentators

the
see

ones

that

tragedy

as

£ollow.92
an

Some

elenctic

though they may not label it as such.

modern
genre,93 even

Recall Hussbaum's

observation that tragic drama shares with Plato's
philosophic drama the central structural feature of
91Either 42.7 B. C. or 417-415 B. C. are cited as
the dividing point between early and other plays. For an
overview of critical opinion on the periods of Euripides'
work, see Michelini, Tragic Tradition, pp. 23, 39-40, 75
and 89-91; and Collard, Euripides, p. 5.
92.The exceptions, 0£ course, are the early
Alcestis, usually designated tragicomic, and the late,
tragic Bacchae. For the early period 0£ Euripides• work
as high tragedy, see, e.g., Kitto, Tragedy, pp. 188-90.
Kit to (p. 311) deems Alcestis one 0£ Euripides'
tragicomedies, and Bacchae •almost in a class 0£ its own•
(p. 370).
See also Andre Rivier, Essai sur le tragique
d'Euripide, 2. ed. (Paris:
Di£fusion de Boccard, 1975),
passim, but especially pp. 139-148, who includes Bacchae in
with Alcestis, Medea, Hippolytos, Iphigenia at Aulis, and
Heracles under the designation •1e tragique,• while other
plays are designated either "le romanesque" or "le pathetique."
93rn the original Chapter Two of this
dissertation, since set aside, it was argued that the genre
of tragedy as conceived by Aristotle in the Poetics shared
much of elenchos' procedure and character.
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elenchos,94

and

add

to

it

the

following

observation o'f

Froma Zeitlin, which unwittingly attests to tragedy's
elenctic

nature:

. . . tragedy is the epistemological form par
excellence. What it does best through the resources
of the theater is to chart a pa th from ignorance to
knowledge, deception to revelation, misunderstanding
to recognition. The characters act out and live
through the consequences of having clung to a partial
single view of the world and themselves . . . . If
tragedy, as I have suggested, is the epistemological
genre par excellence, which continually calls into
question what we know and how we think we know it, it
does so often by confronting the assumptions of
rational thought with those psychological necessities
that may not be denied.95
It therefore seems reasonable to seek the operation of
elenchos in a play recognized as tragic, rather than in one
that has been considered a hybrid of tragedy and another
genre.

The later plays of Euripides, then, are not likely

candidates for analysis, since these plays are often
defined as not purely tragic, but are instead variously
designated as tragicomedies, melodramas, or romantic
94Hussbaum, Fragility, pp. 128-129; on p. 133
Nussbaum argues that tragic elenchos works primarily
through the emotions, while Platonic elenchos teaches by
appeal to the intellect alone.
95Froma I. Zeitlin, •Playing the Other:
Theater,
Theatricality, and the Feminine in Greek Drama,"
Representations 11 (1985; hereafter Zeitlin, "Playing the
Other"), pp. 72-74. Zeitlin refers the reader to JeanPierre Vernant, •Tensions and Ambiguities in Greek
Tragedy," in Myth and Tragedy in Ancient Greece, ed. JeanPierre Vernant and Pierre Vidal-Haquet (Hew York: Zone
Books, 1988), pp. 29-48.
See especially Vernant•s p. 38:
"In a tragic perspective man and human action are seen, not
as things that can be defined or described, but as
problems. They are presented as riddles whose double
meanings can never be pinned down or exhausted."
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tragedies.96

Even

more

generally,

however,

the

tragic

dimension 0£ elenchos (see Chapter One, Part Four), i.e.,
elenchos' apparent lack 0£ success at attaining its stated
aims, suggests that a play with a happy or even a neutral
ending would not reproduce elenchos' interlocutor's descent
to acknowledged ignorance and the ultimate de£eat o-f his
position.97
A second characteristic o-f early plays indicating
their a££inity with elenchos is that these plays display,
more consistently than later ones, Euripides' above
discussed (Part One) propensity £or posing questions, and
that they £ocus more consistently upon broad moral
issues.98

Michelini,

£or

example,

agreeing

with

Schadewald t •s delineation 0£ Euripides• stylistic
development in the decades a£ter the mid-420's, notes that
"vigorous polemic against conventional views is replaced by

96Tragicomedies:
Kitto, Tragedy, 309-329, and
Whitman, Full Circle, pp. 138-139.
Melodramas:
Horwood,
Essays, pp. 21-22, and Kitto, Tragedy, pp. 330-369.
Romantic tragedies: Conacher, Euripidean Drama, pp. 265
and 341.
97 See Michelini, Tragic Tradition, p. 85:
"In a
£ew 0£ the late plays, the cynicism becomes more benign,
and the scramblings 0£ the protagonists are sometimes
rewarded with a success that, £or all their plot ting and
contriving, they have not completely earned."
98According to Eric Havelock, "The Evidence £or
the Teaching o-f Socrates,• TAPA 65 (1934), p. 283, "Acted
drama, or dramatized conversations, was the traditional
Greek method 0£ discussing and analysing moral ideas."
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a

more

'resigned'

stance.•99

And

Whitman

detects,

in

three late Euripidean plays, what can only be described as
the hardening 0£ Euripidean speculation into dogma.

There

is, he maintains, in these plays truth "built 'from within
the plays themselves" or rather "woven into the 'fabric" o-f
the plays, which contain "revelations 0£ inherent truth,
like

axioms

rightly

stated."100

Similarly,

Friedrich

Solmsen traces in the later plays a growing indi££erence to
broad, philosophic issues and to the moral issues that
received ironic treatment in the early plays, and a
correspondingly increasing emphasis on the individual's
concern over his own problems, his own quest £or
happiness.101

Early

Euripidean

plays,

then,

more

closely approximate both the general 'focus and the broad
program 0£ elenchos in the early Platonic dialogues.
Third and last, early Euripidean plays are similar to
elenchos in 'featuring the throes 0£ heightened emotion that
accompany the questioning 0£ personal values.

Many

99Michelini, Tragic Tradition, p. 79, in reference
to Wol£gang Schadewald t, Monolog und Selbstgesprach;
Untersuchungen zur Formsgeschichte der griechischen
Tragodie, Neue Philol. Unters. 2 (Berlin:
Weidmann, 1926),
pp. 131 ££.
See also Michelini, p. 90, where she notes in
plays 0£ the 420's and a£ter themes 0£ "patriotism and
doctrinaire moralism."
100Whi tman,

Full

Circle,

pp.

139-140.

101Friedrich Solmsen, "Euripides• Ion im Vergleich
mit anderen Tragodien," in Euripides, ed. Ernst-Richard
Schwinge (Darmstadt:
Wissenscha£tliche Buchgesellscha£t,
1968), p. 453; reprinted 'from Hermes 69 (1934), p. 408.
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scholars, beginning with the Schlegels, have denounced the
emotionalism

0£

Euripidean

plays,102

but

the

early

plays are widely recognized as the most highly emotional,
ridden as they are with themes 0£ sexual deviance and an
emphasis

on

women.103

Webster,

£or

example,

characterizes the pattern 0£ Euripides' early plays as
£ollows:

"Each year he produced one play about a bad

woman, one play about an unhappy woman, and one play 0£ a
di££erent

K.ind."104

The

extent

to

which

scholars

identi£y with early plays the predominance 0£ high emotion
or, more speci£ically, the erotic, can be seen in LesK.y's
inclination to group together £or discussion with early
plays

those

that

display

emotionalism.105

Two plays, however, £rom the early group are
conspicuous in showing the con£lict between cognition and
emotion that is integral to elenchos:
Hippolytus.

Medea and

For this reason both Kitto and Lesky assign

102For discussion 0£ this point and bibliography,
see Michelini, Tragic Tradition, pp. 5-6 and especially n.
16.
103Michelini, Tragic Tradition, pp. 75-79,
discusses Euripides' move away £rom themes 0£ sexual
deviance and the emphasis on women, and assigns the mid420's as the time when this move began.
10 4T. B. L. Webster, ""'T....;;;h'--e_..;;;;T;.,;;r;_a~g._e_d...;,..;:;;i..;;;;e..:;s'---o-'£"--'E;..;;.__u_r_1;;;_·&p_i_d_e_s
(London: Methuen & Co., 1967), p. 116; c£. p. 31.
105LesK.y,

Geschich te,

p.

422.
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these

plays

to

a

category

0£

their

own.106 That

these

two plays depict this con'flict is not, however, the only
reason for considering them leading candidates for this
study's analysis.

There is, in fact, a related but a much

more seductive reason for illustrating elenchos' operation
in one of these two plays.
This is because both Medea and Hippolytus have long
been studied for possible signs of Euripides' attitude
toward "Socratic doctrine."

I speak, 0£ course, 0£ the

controversy over Medea 1078-1080 and Hippolytus 380 ff.

In

the former, Medea proclaims, in seeming de'fiance 0£ the
Socratic paradox that one does the good if one knows it,
that she knows the harm she is about to do, but will do it
anyway.

In the latter, Phaedra addresses herself to the

puzzle of human akrasia (inconstancy) in the 'face of a
perceived good, and meditates on the ca uses for not doing
what one knows one ought to do.

Speculation on these

lines' relation to Socratic doctrine began in 1948--when
Bruno Snell suggested that the lines spoken by Medea (Medea
1078-1080) and Phaedra (Hippolytus 380-4-30) respectively
gave impetus to and conveyed sentiment against Socratic

106Kitto, Tragedy, p. 250 ("The tragedies fall
into two groups, the Medea and Hippolytus, and the warplays or social tragedies."), more so than Lesky,
Geschichte, p. 4-22 ("Im die um Kedeia und Hippolytos
geschlossene Gruppe
. . ").
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doctrine--and

continues

to

the

present

day.107

And

while it is not the intention 0£ this study to try to
determine the philosophic orientation 0£ Euripides £rom the
words spoken by his characters--surely an exercise in
£utility

and

presumptuous

£ony108 __ i t

nonetheless

would seem cowardly to avoid choosing one 0£ the two plays
in which the critical literature has discerned something
distinctly

Socratic.

Joseph Campbell, in the videotaped series, "The Power
0£ Myth," cites an old Irish query, "Is this a
'fight,

or

can

anybody

join

in?"109

In

private

analyzing

one

0£ these two plays, I plan to enter the £ray, but to move
its 'focus away £rom the purely speculative realm 0£ the
poet s own philosophy to a subject more suitable £or a play
1

whose author is long dead:
play s e££ect.
1

the method used to create his

For here we have all the evidence we need:

l07Bruno Snell, "Das £riihste Zeugnis uber
Sokra tes," Philologus 97 (1948; herea £ter Snell,
"Zeugnis"), pp. 125-34; c£. Snell 1s slight revision in
Scenes £rom Greek Drama (Berkeley and Los Angeles: Univ.
0£ Cali£ornia Press, 1964; herea£ter Snell, Scenes), pp.
59-69.
For Snell supporters and detractors, see below,
Chapter Four, Part Two.
108on this point, see Kovacs, Heroic Muse, p. 3,
who quotes Northrop Frye, A Hat ural Perspective: The
Development 0£ Shakespearean Comedy and Romance (Hew York,
1965), p. 43, on the indecency 0£ reducing a poet "· . . to
an ego with something to 'say.
1

"

109Transcripts 0£ the tapes, edited and reordered,
were subsequently published. See Joseph Campbell, The
Power 0£ Myth, with Bill Moyers, ed. Betty Sue Flowers (Hew
York:
Doubleday, 1988; herea£ter Campbell, Power).
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we have the play itself.
But why Medea rather than Hippolytus?
preferable for one, critical reason:

Medea is

the domination of the

play by its protagonist duplicates what was seen in the
model dialogue, Eu thyphro, analyzed in Chapter One--the
focus on and refutation of the views of one person.

For it

will be argued below that it is primarily Medea s world1

view,110 a

view with

which many Athenians in the

audience would feel special affinity, that is ultimately
found to be emotionally unacceptable when taken to the
impeccably logical conclusions to which its premises
point.

UOffedea s world-view is shared by
to by Creon, and approved by the Chorus.
1

Jason,

aspired
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CHAPTER FOUR
SOCRATIC ELEllCHOS ARD MAIEUSIS Ill EURIPIDES' MEDEA
Introduction
A tragic play is not a

philosophic dialogue.

Similarity 0£ method, not essence, is what must be shown
here, and to do so requires dismembering the text.

To

trace in Medea what were described in Chapter One as the
constituent elements 0£ Socrates" method in the early
Platonic dialogues requires that its parts be considered in
turn be-fore they be restored to the sum that is their
whole.

Such an analysis and reconstitution will show that

Euripides• Medea operates in every aspect like an early
Platonic

dialogue.

Similarity of intent will be demonstrated -first.

It

will be seen that in Medea, definition 0£ three related
universals is what is sought and proposed.

These can be

identified by the occurrence of key abstract nouns; their
definition is proposed through etymologically related
adjectives describing particular individuals per-forming
particular

actions.

The £ate 0£ these particulars, however, is the same in
Medea as was the £ate 0£ the interlocutor's proposed
definitions in elenchos.
refuted.

In short, they are ultimately

Through the preferred "indirect establishment" 0£
283
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the thesis, particulars in Medea are 'forced to undeniably
logical conclusions that are nonetheless emotionally
repugnant.
It will be argued that in this play one can discern
the same evidence £or reversal and recognition as in the
early

Platonic

dialogues.

The

Chorus,

who

serve1

as

the primary interlocutor, experience the interlocutor's
trans-formation 'from boast£ul con'fidence in their certitude
to a halting awareness 0£ the limitations 0£ their
knowledge.

Sel£-assurance gives way to 'feeling lost:

the

Chorus describe their recognition as aporia, mark the
defeat of the definitions they supported by trying to
project onto others blame £or the de'feat, and yet, i'f only
momentarily, display a form of wonder and uncertainty that
is the mark of the budding philosopher.

Medea, and

secondarily Jason and Creon, all of whom manifest the
definitions, illustrate failure of these by their own
reversals.
reversal,

Medea alone betrays recognition of her
but

chooses escape.

The choice of escape at the end of Medea is made for
the same reasons that interlocutors chose to leave at the
end of elenchos.

For, unless one wants to begin to define

the universals anew, there is nothing but to abandon the

1r have chosen, £or the sake 0£ consistency, to
treat "Chorus" as a plural noun, since I o'ften refer to the
Chorus as "the Corinthian women" and must thereafter use
the pronoun "they."
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now repugnant particulars.

As in elenchos so in this play:

the particulars are abandoned, le£t, literally, in suspense
at the end as escape is made.

There remains only the vague

suggestion 0£ de£inition £or the universals, and the queasy
suspicion that their satis£actory de£inition would entail
turning the known world on its ear.
The play proper, then, ends in aporia.

It will next

be proposed that aporia is not, however, the true terminus
0£ Euripides

1

play.

To support this proposition, we shall

examine two 0£ the poet s tactics to bring the truth to
1

birth outside the play s con£ines, in the audience 0£
1

theater-goers, as Plato in his dialogues le£t this task to
the reader-auditors.
The £irst 0£ these tactics is two£old:

the so-called

"personal" and "impersonal" aspects 0£ elenchos £amiliar
£rom the dialogues.

It will be shown how Euripides renders

the re£utation e££ected in the play "personal," i.e.,
power£ully relevant, not only to the Chorus 0£ Corinthian
women, but to the Athenian audience as well.

He likewise

renders it "impersonal," by allowing the Chorus and his
audience the requisite objective distance £or attempting to
come to de£inition 0£ the universals.

In short, Euripides

both engages his audience and pushes them away so that they
can re£lect upon what they see and £eel.

Like Socrates 0£

the early Platonic dialogues, Euripides collocates the
actual with the possible, the known with the unknown, the
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particular with the universal.

His Medea is, in the end,

tantalizingly suggestive at the same time it is repulsive.
Euripides• -final tactic to bring the truth to birth is
the Platonic Socrates' counterpoint 0£ analogy.

In Medea

this counterpoint is provided by subtle poetic devices:
metaphors, images, and motifs, which show affinity for one
or more of the definiends.

These poetic devices are put to

two uses, to overturn the particulars proposed as
definition and to suggest, but not defend, a preferred
definition for the uni versa ls.
In conclusion, then, it will be argued that Euripides•
elenchos is like that of the Platonic Socrates:
provocative,

but

not--ul tima tely--nega ti ve.

highly

Part One:

Proposed De£ini tions in Medea:
Arete, Sophia, and Eros

Introductory Remarks
The universals whose de£inition the Medea considers
are £amiliar to any reader 0£ the play.
consideration

is

given

to

arete

Primary

("heroic"

excellence),

while arete's relationship to two other abstractions,
sophia

(wisdom/cunning)2.

is secondary.

and

eros

(generative

desire)

And although these three abstract nouns are

not o£ten used (arete twice, 62.9 and 845; sophia twice, 82.8
and

1086;

eros

eight

714, 842.), scarcely a

times,

8,

152., 330, 530,

62.7,

698,

line goes by in which de£inition 0£

at least one 0£ these universals is not implied, openly
discussed, or boldly asserted; thus, their ring 0£
£amiliarity.
aspects

0£

In the critical literature the "heroic"
Medea,3

the

sophistry

passing

£or

wisdom

0£

2.As will become apparent, my discussion 0£ sophia
owes its inspiration primarily to Arrowsmith, "Ideas," pp.
47-48, who asserts that Medea "is based upon a central keyterm, sophia." This term, Arrowsmith rightly argues, "is
an extremely complex term," comprising "Jason's cool sel£interest, the magical and erotic skills 0£ the sorceress
Medea" as well as "that ideal Athenian £usion 0£ moral and
artistic skills which, £ostered by eros, creates the
distinctive arete 0£ the civilized pOlis."
This last is
"the standard by which the actions 0£ Jason and Medea are
to be judged."
3 one 0£ the best-known treatments 0£ Medea as hero
is that 0£ Bernard Knox, "The Medea 0£ Euripides," YCS 2.5
(1977), pp. 193-2.2.6; reprinted in Word and Action.
Essays
on the Ancient Theatre, pp. 2.95-32.2. (Baltimore:
John
Hopkins Univ. Press, 1979; herea£ter Knox, "Medea").
Knox
(pp. 2.97-2.98) gives an impressive array 0£ attributes Medea
287
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one or more
nature

0£

0£ the characters,'! and the disturbing

Medea's

desire 5

are

frequent

subjects.

And

yet, so compelling are the positions presented in this play
that critics tend to side strongly with or against
characters, praising or blaming them as i£ they were real
people

6

Such tendencies confirm how emotionally engaging this
elenchos is; critics can barely keep £rom choosing sides.
But £or the moment, at least, emotional engagement with the
shares with the Sophoclean-type hero. C£. Wol££,
"Euripides," p. 238; George Gellie, "The Character 0£
Medea," BICS 35 (1988), p. 16 (herea£ter Gellie,
"Character"); P. E. Easterling, "The Infanticide in
Euripides' Medea," YCS 25 (1977; herea£ter Easterling,
"Infanticide"). p. 183.
Suzanne Hills, Euripides Medea:
A
Study in Dramatic Hythopoeia (diss. Stan£ord Univ., 1976;
hereafter Hills, Hythopoeia). pp. 101-103, elaborates on
Knox, adding, e.g., that Medea's heroic stature is enhanced
by "occasional epicisms in her speech."
4-Jason is regularly charged with sophistry; see,
e.g., Rohdich, Tragodie, pp. 55-59; Conacher, Euripidean
Drama, p. 189; Carrie E. Cowherd, "The Ending 0£ the
Medea," CW 76 (1983; herea£ter Cowherd, "Ending"), p. 134;
Easterling, "In£anticide,• p. 184; Stephen Ohlander,
Dramatic Suspense in Euripides' and Seneca's Medea (Hew
York:
Peter Lang Publishing, Inc., 1989; herea£ter
Ohlander, Suspense), p. 95.
5Host recently, Rick H. Newton, "Medea's
Passionate Poison," Syllecta Classica 1 (1989; hereafter
Newton, "Passionate Poison"), pp. 13-20.
6The dangers 0£ "The Documentary Fallacy" are
discussed by A. J. A. Waldock, Sophocles the Dramatist
(Cambridge:
University Press, 1951; paperback. ed., 1966),
pp. 11-24.
I owe this reference to James G. Keenan.
C£.
Hicole Loraux, "Herakles: The Super-Hale and the
Feminine,• in Be£ore Sexuality: The Construction 0£ Erotic
Experience in the Ancient World, ed. David K. Halperin, et
al. (Princeton, HJ:
Princeton Univ. Press, 1990), pp. 2223.
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text must be postponed until the attempt to de-fine in this
elenchos is considered.

We must 'first look to the inter-

related de£inition 0£ the just mentioned universals, and
then to how they £are in elenchos, and 'finally to the
artistry 0£ Euripides, who, like the wily Socrates, has
picked this 'fight and subtly shapes its inexorable
progress.
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Arete, Sophia, and Eros:
Al though
twice

in

the

the
play

The Quest £or Sel£-Advancement.
>

,

but

abstract

noun

apel""I

is

used

and

845),7

Medea

is

largely

(629

concerned with appropriate human behavior.

Excellence in

behavior is assumed to be the natural province 0£ the
power£ul--in short, 0£ "heroes"; it is de£ined by a quest
to be known £or promoting one's own interests, and a code
o£ conduct that supports this quest.
quest and code is unchallenged.

The validity 0£ this

As remnants 0£ a heroic

past, they are adhered to, and their adherents are
respected i£ sometimes £eared.

But when translated into

the play•s present, where the status quo has dislodged the
very underpinnings 0£ excellence, the code is de£ormed and
the quest becomes deadly.

The nonetheless enduring appeal

0£ the quest and code is obvious in that neither is
completely abandoned, at least not by the Chorus.
The two other abstractions the text is concerned to
de£ine, sophia and eros, are integral to the de:fini tion 0£
arete and cannot, there:fore, be arti:ficially separated :from
its de:finition.

Both sophia and eros are valued only

inso£ar as they are able to advance arete as the play

7 The text used :for Medea is Page, Medea.
I have
chosen this over the more recent text o:f Diggle because I
object to many o:f his excisions, especially the excision 0£
lines 1056-1080.
For word study o:f the text, I have relied on Marianne
McDonald, A Semilemma tized Concordance to Euripides' Medea
{Irvine, Cali£.:
Univ. o:f Cali:fornia Press, 1978;
herea:fter McDonald, Concordance).

291

defines it; their definitions are distorted by the
exigencies of the code and quest whose purposes they serve.
As in Socratic elenchos, de£inition 0£ universals in
Medea is approached through the description 0£ particulars.
such definition is, however, problematic in that no
definition should be confined to instances in which the
abstraction itself is uttered.

Such an approach would be

limited and nonsensical; concepts as broad as excellence,
desire, and wisdom are discussed not only when absolute
reference is made to abstract nouns.

We are, admittedly,

on firmest ground when such references occur.

As far as

the three universals in Medea are concerned, arete, sophia,
and eros, definition of arete is most difficult to trace,
for besides occurring only twice in abstraction, it finds
its primary expression in generalized approval or censure
of individuals and their actions.

Eros is somewhat easier,

for it is both more frequently discussed in abstraction
than are arete and sophia, and its expression can likewise
be found in nouns and verbs which obviously denote erotic
engagement.

In Medea, this includes eros

anthropomorphized as the gods Aphrodite (Cypris) and the
Erotes, and the physical manifestation 0£ the force in
nouns

meaning

"bed"

(e.g.,

>

I

£\JV'l"I,

AEK "l'pov,

,
KOl 1''1')).

Sophia"s

definition

is

easiest

of

all;

although it occurs infrequently as the abstract noun
sophia, Medea is heavy with descriptions of individuals by
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recourse to the adjective sop hos.
I

6£LV05

gives

£urther

The related adjective

guidance.

And yet, since a play is unlike a dialogue in that no
one person is posing the question, "What is X?" to which
other persons are proposing answers, tracing de£inition in
Medea is not as easy as tracing de£inition in a dialogue,
and must proceed by certain assumptions.

First, it will be

assumed that the very use 0£ abstract nouns contains an
implied i£ not clearly stated de£inition.

Second, it will

be assumed that description 0£ an individual or an action
by using words similar in meaning or cognate to one 0£ the
abstract nouns likewise contains a de£inition.

Third, a

de£inition--whether by re£erence to an abstract noun or to
a particular individual or action--may be assumed to have
been proposed and supported by an expression 0£ approval,
while its rejection takes the £orm 0£ censure.

In short,

the establishment and rejection 0£ de£inition gleaned £rom
the admittedly rare discussions 0£ the abstract nouns will
be supplemented by tracing the approval and disapproval
with which the characters and their actions are described.
Finally, it will be assumed that approval (or disapproval)
can be assessed:
"good•

and

1) by the occurrence 0£ words denoting

•£ine•

("bad,"

"ugly•)

and

the

like;8

2)

by

8 r 'follow Adkins, Merit, p. 30, who lists among
"the most power£ul words 0£ commendation used 0£ a man both
in Homer and in later Greek• the £allowing: arete,
agathos, esthlos, chrestos, kalon; comparatives ameinon,
beltion and kallion; superlatives aristos, beltistos, and

2.93
patent expressions of approval or agreement (disapproval or
disagreement); 3) by espousal or emulation of like and
thereby validating (opposing and thereby dissenting)
positions or actions.

In Medea, it is the Chorus

primarily, and the minor characters (although the Hurse is
a special case) secondarily, who serve as the interlocutors
in this would-be dialogue, and it is therefore the Chorus
primarily, and the Tutor, Hurse, Creon, Aegeus, and the
Messenger to whom one must turn £or expressions 0£
approbation and censure.
In tracking these expressions of approbation and
censure, it soon becomes apparent that generalized
approbation 0£ behavior, which signals definition of arete,
is above all given to what A. W. H. Adkins has termed the
"competitive virtues,• and to what Bernard Knox and others
have described, in part incorrectly, as the "heroic"
aspects

or

Medea.9

Unreserved

approval

is--a t

least

at

kalliston.
9I first realized that to describe Euripides•
Medea as heroic was missing the mark. when I felt qualms
about comparing her to Achilles or Odysseus. In the
conclusion to a paper read to the Illinois Classical
Conference in 1985, I described Medea as an "individual
with no society, an Achilles who will never ransom Hector•s
body, an Odysseus who can never go home."
The critical literature is full or descriptions of
Kedea•s heroic aspects, but there is often hesitation to
describe her without qualification as a hero. See
Elizabeth Bryson Bongie, "Heroic Elements in the Medea 0£
Euripides,• TAPA 107 (1977; herea"fter Bongie, "Heroic
Elements"), pp. 32. and 30, who deems Medea "probably the
most genuinely 'heroic• figure on the Greek. stage• in
vocabulary and characterization and analyzes Medea as •an
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heroic play 0£ the Sophoclean type." Yet Bongie tends to
narrow heroes when comparing Medea with them. Medea is
compared, e.g., to Achilles reacting to his insulted honor,
or to Ajax "who cares not a whit £or the hideous crime he
has almost perpetrated but only £or his tarnished prestige,
his loss 0£ time." (pp. 29-30).
Bongie seems to sense some
discordant notes in this picture, £or example when she
contrasts Antigone's "positive aim in li£e" with Medea's
"negative aim inspired by the same values" (p. 31).
C£.
also p. 32 n. 17: "Quite conceivably, by the very
exaggeration 0£ Medea's heroic qualities, Euripides is in
£act criticising the system 0£ values that produced such
results."
This system 0£ values, as Bongie describes it
(p. 30), is taken £rom Adkins, who deems it "competitive"
rather than "heroic." Bongie's use 0£ the term "heroic"
£orces her to interpret Medea's exit on the sun-chariot as
a "puri£ication," symbolic 0£ the "glory she has won in the
eyes of the gods." (p. 54).
Furthermore, Medea becomes, "
. . . in the code 0£ the ancient heroic system, a veritable
'saint.'"
I £ind this statement, quali£ied though it is,
impossible to accept.
Helene Foley, "Medea's Divided Sel£,• CA 8 (1989;
herea£ter Foley, "Divided Sel£•), pp. 79-81, 'follows Bongie
and Knox, Medea, in seeing Medea •s heroic aspects, but
avoids engaging in hero worship. Perhaps the reason is to
be £ound on p. 76, where Foley compares Medea to Ajax,
Odysseus, and Achilles, yet suggests that Medea "models her
sel£-image . . . on a masculine heroic and even military
model . . . ." (emphasis added).
According to Foley, by
con£lating Achilles and Odysseus, •two brands 0£ heroism
that epic views as partially contradictory, Medea shows
hersel£ a pathetically con£used imitator 0£ heroic
masculinity."
(p. 81).
Foley's discussion 0£ Medea's
destruction 0£ "the heroic integrity 0£ her ethic" is
excellent; see her conclusion that Euripides "comes close
to labeling the '£riends-enemies• ethic as destructive 0£
humanity and human values and thus suitable only £or gods."
(p. 82).
C£. Wol££, "Euripides," p. 238, £or Euripides'
uncovering 0£ contradictions in the heroic code. See also
Margaret Williamson, "A Woman's Place in Euripides' Medea,•
in Euripides, Women, and Sexuality, ed. Anton Powell
(London and Hew York.: Routledge, 1990; herea£ter
Williamson, "Woman's Place"), p. 26:
"Her [Medea's] heroic
stance is paradoxical and contradictory not only in its
central £ormulation but also in its consequences: the
distinction on which it rests has already been subverted by
Medea hersel£, and it leads yet again to the destruction 0£
the most intimate bond 0£ philia, that between parents and
children."
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£irst--gi ven to the competitive and autonomous character
who has a reputation :for advancing his own interests,
while secondary, and much more wistful and provisional
approval is given to the cooperative and connected
character whose success is measured in his protection o:f
and consideration £or others.
This hierarchy 0£ values is :first delineated by the
Hurse

in

her

Argonauts
apl<JTWV,

5),

prologue.10 She

obliquely
the

only

as

re£ers

the

sincere

use

to

Jason and

men•

(av6pwv

O:f

the

>

the

,..

super la ti Ve

See also the unelaborated but quali£ied remarks 0£
Conacher, Euripidean Drama, pp. 189 and 196, who, although
he terms Medea "heroic," likens her, in the earlier scenes,
" . . . to a hate-ridden Philoctetes as yet undisturbed by
the 'friendship 0£ Heoptolemus, or to a stubbornly resent£ul
Achilles, untried by the loss 0£ Patroclus.•
Similarly, Emily McDermott, Euripides• Medea: The
Incarnation 0£ Disorder (University Park and London:
Pennsylvania State Univ. Press, 1989; herea:fter McDermott,
Incarnation), pp. 55-56, agrees that Medea is in some
aspects set "squarely in the heroic tradition," and yet
notes that " . . . standard [heroic] sentiments are
misapplied by Medea."
Furthermore, Medea's " . . .
ascription to the heroic code must necessarily involve the
demolition 0£ the £emale and speci£ically maternal aspects
0£ her . . . "
Finally, according to Arrowsmith, •Ideas,• p. 38,
Euripides, by using recognizable aspects 0£ •traditional
heroism" to construct Medea's character, exposes " . . .
the Widening gul£ between reality and tradition, between
the operative and the pro£essed values 0£ his culture .
"
Such exposure was, o:f course, Socrates• practice in
elenchos.
10 Lines 1-17 0£ the prologue have excited attack,
Primarily on the basis 0£ the illogical quali:fication
describing happy circumstances in lines 11-15. A summary
of the arguments and suggested emendations may be £ound in
David Kovacs, "Euripides, Medea 1-17," CQ 41 (1991), pp.
30-35.
Kovacs proposes a lacuna be:fore line 11.

296
of

the

adjective

agathos

in

the

whole

play.11

Coming

as it does in the first few lines, it lends power£ul
approval

to

Jason

and

his

expedi tion.12

however, approval without qualification.

It

is

not,

The reason £or

the Nurse's unattainable wish--that this heroic quest 0£
the past had been nipped at its inception--is that she sees
a

chain 0£ cause and e££ect13 reaching from

the actions

of these "best men," through Medea's being stricken with
love, through her destruction 0£ Pelias and general
assistance to Jason, to the stat us quo:
are

enmity,
>
'
€X9pa

and
,

the

vav-ra,

dearest
'

Kal

things

VOO€l

"Now all things

are diseased"

(vuv

'
Ta

16).

The result, then, 0£ the quest £or heroic excellence has
been the creation of a world 0£ enemies, the spread 0£
disease in all that is most dear.
The Nurse's prologue does not, however, merely ponder
UThe text 0£ Medea, while heavy with negative
words like kakos, is sparse in words 0£ positive
connotation, like aga thos and kalos.
These words alone,
according to McDonald, Concordance, appear as follows:
kakos, 56 times; aga thos, once; kalos, once.
Both aga thos
and k.alos are, besides, in some way negated.
A possible
explanation £or this may be the heavily negative
orientation 0£ zero-sum competition (see below, this
section) toward harming enemies over helping friends.
12see Mills, Mythopoeia, p. 63, £or the use 0£
epic language by the nurse. C£. Deborah Boedeker,
"Euripides• Medea and the Vanity 0£ AOrOI," CP 86
{1991; herea-fter Boedeker, "Medea"), p. 104.
13 For
example 0£
Intellectual
(Princeton,

a discussion 0£ the Nurse s prologue as an
a utopian wish, see Friedrich Solmsen,
Experiments 0£ the Greek Enlightenment
NJ:
Princeton Univ. Press, 1975), pp. 66-67.
1
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the achievements of' the "best men"; it likewise. in its use
of' the noun eros (8). indicates the place that generative
desire plays in such achievements.
Medea's
suit.

~

The Hurse clearly sees

as the impetus to her advancement of' Jason's

In addition, the interplay between eros and what

may be deemed "the heroic code of' competition" is clear in
the description the Hurse gives to Medea's f'alling in
love:

she was "struck in her thumos with desire £or Jason"

')I

(E:pWTL

auµ.ov

>Jaoovos.

8).

Although the Nurse's situating passions within the thumos
is not at all surprising. the use of thumos in this play,
as will be argued below (Part Two), is peculiarly limited;
in this play, thumos is regularly the source of' motives £or
competitive advancement, whether this takes the f'orm--as it
does here--0£ helping £riends or--as it more regularly
does--of' harming enemies.
And yet. although the Hurse does not explicitly state
it as such, it is clear f'rom her view of' events thus f'ar
that the erotically impelled aid to this heroic quest has
had

some

disturbing

issue.14

Medea's

eros-stricken

14Mills, Mythopoeia, pp. 63-64, notes how the epic
voyage is rendered destructive in the prologue, and that,
just as Medea is "smitten" by love (8) in the play's
beginning, Jason is likewise "struck" at the play"s end--by
a Piece of' the Argo. Cr. Bennett Simon, Tragic Drama and
the Family: Psychoanalytic Studies f'rom Aeschylus to
Beckett (New Haven and London:
Yale Univ. Press, 1988;
herea£ter Simon, Tragic Drama). pp. 72.-73, who points out
that epic is bemoaned at the beginning, ridiculed at the
end.
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tbumos has e-f-fected horrors in the past and the Hurse -fears
that it will do so in the -future:
children o-f

Pelias

to

kill

Medea, who persuaded the

their

-father (9-11),

will

doubtlessly engage in violent retaliation -for Jason's
betrayal (37-43).
deck

of

human

Eros is obviously a
a-f-fairs;15

destruction that has

this

r~sul ted

is

loose cannon on the

clear

-from

the

-from its arousal in Medea.

The second use o-f the abstract noun eros, 152 (this time in
its poetic :form, eros), is even more explicit in
associating eros with destruction.

There the Chorus ask

Medea, whom they have just heard wishing :for death,
What in the world is this desire o-f yours :for the
unapproachable bedding-down, poor :fool? The end that
is death rushes :forward; do not pray :for it. (1'lS
OOl
11'01'E
1'a5
a11'Acl1'0U
KOlTaS
EPOS,
Q
µ.a1'aLa;
Oll'EUOEL
9ava1'ou
1'EAEU1'clV•
IJ."16E:v
T06E
AlOOOU,
151-154).
These words show a powerful association, not only in
Medea but in the Chorus as well, between eros and death.
The Chorus, it is true, censure Medea's desire -for death by
labelling her •poor :fool" and urging her to desist; but the
poet has them nonetheless, in their description of death,
,
use the erotically suggestive KOL 1'as ("beddingdown"),

albeit

modified

("unapproachable,•
associations, these:

i.e.,

by

the

"dire").

oxymoronic

>

I

a11'Aa1'ou

Disturbing

desire -for death; death as a

bed,

15 The phrase is Ethel Person's, in her Dreams o-f
Love and Fate-ful Encounters. The Power o-f Romantic Passion
(Hew York, HY:
Viking Penguin, 1989). p. 14.
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approach to which is discouraged; proximity as danger.
~·

is as i£

It

normally associated with the generation 0£

life, is here instead the guarantor of violence i£ not
death.

This will not be the last time such associations

are made (see below, Part Five).

And yet, since in the

prologue the Hurse sees everything as stemming £rom the
sailing of the Argo (or rather, £rom the £elling of the
tree that went to build its oars), it is hard to tell
whether the legacy 0£ violence results from Kedea s
1

erotically smitten thumos or rather £rom the glorious past
deeds 0£ the "best men."
The ambiguity is not accidental:

eros is £irmly

entrenched in the arena 0£ competition where dangerous
issue such as the Hurse describes is not only possible, but
predictable.

This may seem, at least to modern readers,

surprising.

Yet it is precisely to this use which Jason,

both in the past and in the present (though, as will be
argued, he is not alone in this), puts eros.

The Hurse

implies what Jason will later (526-531) be proud to admit:
that in the past, he relied on eros in his quest £or the
fleece, by which he won his status as one 0£ the "best
men."
Likewise, in speaking 0£ the present, the Hurse
informs us that Jason has now made another strategic erotic
attachment:
Child

of

"Jason beds a kingly marriage, having wed the

Creon,

who

rules

over

this

land"

(yaµ.OlS
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, ,
£uvat£1"aL,

,...,
fJaaL.>..llCOLS.

>Jaawv
Cl

os.

,

xaovos.,

QLO"UJ.I. V{J

,

y•ru.1. a S.

18-19).

K:peOV1"05.

lines,

These

which describe in explicitly sexual terms the acquisition
of social advancement, in themselves go a long way toward
illustrating how £ar removed £rom modern ideas 0£ eroticism
is this play's definition 0£ eros.

For not only is eros a

loose cannon {so much even we could recognize as common
wisdom in our day), it is also a
advancement.16

This

is

-further

means to social
illustrated

by

the

£act

that the "child o-f Creon"--Jason's new bride--remains
unnamed:

she is, just as Jason will later maintain (593-

597), not the object of his eros; instead, her erotic
interest is used, as Medea's was before her, to gain
Jason's goal of competitive advancement.
Medea's response to Jason's new attachment shows the
16John J. Winkler, Constraints of Desire:
The
Anthropology o-f Sex and Gender in Ancient Greece (Hew York
and London:
Routledge, 1990; herea-fter Winkler,
Constraints), pp. 77-79, notes that in the ancient Greek
magical texts, requests £or erotic allure are a regular
part o-f prayers £or social success. After giving by way of
illustration a prayer to Helios in which the petitioner
asks, among other things, £or wealth, good reputation,
charm (charis), looks, beauty, and persuasiveness, Winkler
explains the logic 0£ this admixture as follows:
"The
petitioner would like to shine in his community not only
with external marks 0£ physical success but most
particularly in personal quali ti tes, because the truly
significant interactions in which his value is continuously
judged and rated by others are those where he shows his
individual excellence.
To get the edge on competitors
o£ten means charming or outfoxing them rather than -fighting
or insulting them, so generalized prayers £or success
frequently include what may seem to us a rather peacocklike pride in looking good and being seen as sexually
appealing.• (p. 77).
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validity bot.h of t.he Hurse"s pronouncement that. now hat.red
is epidemic and of our description of eros as a loose
cannon on the deck of human a£fairs:
friends

unresponsive

is

Medea

>

,

QKOUEI.

8aAaO<H05

to the advice of
,
c
(WS
ll'E'l'POS

vouee-rouµ.ev"'

28-29), •she bewails [as if he were dead] her dear 'father"
>
,
q>L.Aov,
31),
Q1J'Ol.IJ.Wf;!I
"she
hates
her
(11'a -rep>
,..
,..
., I.
(o-ruye1.
6E
36;
1l'a1.6a5,
c£.
117.
children"

.

~x8e1.5;

-rouo<S>
at

and

112-114:
,,...

.

Medea"s curse
,
ica-rapa-ro1.

.

auv

µ.a-rpos

o-ruyepas

.

11'a-rpi.) .

against

t.he

children

o.>.01.oee
In

addition,

the

Hurse expects that Medea "will not endure being treated

39)

and

>

>
(ou<S>

badly"

will

,

QVEl;E'l'OI.

retaliate

KQKWS

viciously

11'aoxouoca1,

(40-43).

Finally,

38the

Hurse predicts that •no one joining in enmity with her will
easily

come

c
,
p~61.w5
>I

01.ae-ra1.,

YE

out

beautifully

ouµ.pa.>.wv

>I

>I

(OU'l'OI.

victorious"

ex8pav

>

QU'l'!I

44-45).17

In short, as 'far as Medea is concerned, the world has

17Michael Shaw, "The Female Int.ruder:
Women in
Fi£th-Century Drama," CP 70 (1975; herea£ter Shaw, "Female
Intruder•), 'following Page, Medea, at line 45, notes that
"'Beautiful victors" . . . is an athletic term, a male
term."
Hills, Mythopoeia, pp. 98-99, cites this as one 0£
many athletic metaphors used in the play (see its
repetition at 765; c£. agon at 235, 366-367, 403, and 1245;
terms £rom wrestling and other competitions occur at 27 4276, 546, 557, and 585).
Buxton, Persuasion, p. 165,
points out that ica.A.ALVl.KOS is "an epithet 0£ Herak.les
and a term redolent 0£ Pindar"s world 0£ athletic
immortality."
See also Foley, "Divided Sel£," p. 75.
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vered in hal£, there are £riends and there are
been Se
enemies.

But more than that:

in the process 0£ Jason's

quest, and the use to which eros has been put, the world 0£
•£riends"

has

been

violated. 18

The

quest

has

taken

precedence; £ormer £riends are lightly turned into enemies
in the wake 0£ the unrelenting pursuit 0£ sel£-advancement.
So much the Tutor says when he comments on Jason's
willingness to let his children su££er exile:

"The old

give way to new alliances; that one is not a £riend to
this

house.•

,

,

£K£lVOS.

KOUK

77).

(11'a>..ala

KQlVWV

TOLCJch:

A.£l 11'£TQl
<Swµ.aalv

76-

Such £luidity 0£ attachment is common, as the

discussion below will show, to the type 0£ arete pursued by
competitors

like

Jason.

But the stalwart Hurse has trouble de£ending or
18J. Roger Dunk.le, "The Aegeus Episode and the
Theme 0£ Euripides' Medea," TAPA 100 (1969; herea£ter
Dunk.le, "Aegeus Episode"), p. 101, sees sel£-interest as
motivating mistreatment 0£ £riends. According to Seth L.
Schein, "Philia in Euripides' Medea," in Cabinet 0£ the
Muses, ed. Mark. Gri££ith and Donald J. Mastronarde
(Atlanta, GA:
Scholars Press, 1990; herea£ter Schein,
"Philia"), pp. 57-73, the concept 0£ philia was ambiguous:
it signi£ies "solidarity or a££ection• and is at the same
time -fundamentally instrumental. By the last part 0£ the
£i£th century philia was primarily a political alliance and
"came to be seen more and more as merely a use£ul
connection which individuals manipulated and exploited £or
their own advantage." (p. 59).
Jason and Medea, then, are
not aberrant.
The play, according to Schein, "explores the
ambiguities" inherent in the concept 0£ philia. C£.
Williamson, "Woman's Place," pp. 24-25, on Jason and
Medea's violation 0£ the very code they espouse, 0£ helping
Philoi; Newton, "Passionate Poison," p. 13, by omission
seems to exonerate Jason: "it is the mark. 0£ Medea to
con£ound the distinction between £riend and £oe."
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censuring Jason.
(~AOL TO

.

With her wish, "Kay he perish not"

,

µ.ev

IJ."1,

83),

manages

she

to

both

curse

Jason and yet, by a technicality, not to curse her master;
she does, however, openly express her disapproval by
describing him as kakos:
£riends"

hiS

aALOK€Tal,

84).

>

•

(a-rap
In

less

"But he is caught being vile to
,

KQKOS

y>

than

one

>

>I

ES

WV

hundred

lines,

then, Jason has gone £rom aristos to kakos, and all in the
mouth 0£ one Nurse.

He will descend even £urther, to

pankakistos, when Medea gets hold 0£ him.
The Tutor, however, who enters at line 49, is blithely
incredulous that the Nurse £inds Jason's conduct unusual:
Who isn't this way? Were you born yesterday? Don't
you k.now that everybody loves himself more than his
,,._,
C
'
"°"
neighbor
(1l'as
TLS
au-rov
Tou
11'£Aas
µaAAov
cplAEl)?
Some do it justly, some £or the sake 0£
<
'
C
'
g~in
(Ol
IJ.€V
dlKQlWS
Ol
0€
K€pdous
xaplv).
And just so the father, for the sake of a
>
"
Cl
bed
(€UV"JS
ouveKCaJ),
doesn •t
love
these
boys.
(85-88).
~

I

I

I

The Tutor here, as Medea will later, interprets Jason's
actions as motivated by erotic pursuit ("£or the sake 0£ a
bed"), but the Tu tor lacks Medea •s jealousy and is able to
go further and equate erotic pursuit with the pursuit of
gain.19

We

have

just

been informed 0£

so

much by

the

Hurse•s description 0£ Jason's choice 0£ bed partners (a
kingly marriage, 18); we will later be in-formed by Jason
19Kusurillo,

"Euripides•
Medea:
A
~econsi~eration,• AJP 87 (1966; herea£ter Kusurillo,
Reconsideration•), pp. 53 and 57, misses this point, and
there-fore believes that Jason is in £act motivated by lust.
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himself (593-597), and even later by Medea (700) that this
"bed" Jason pursues is £or the sake 0£ cozying up to
royalty, not a new and younger bride.

In short, Jason puts

everything at the service 0£ self-advancement, even his
generative desire.
£urther:

But the Tu tor claims that it goes

the love one £eels, the love that defines

£riends and, more generally, those dear, is more selfre£erential than not.

Jason, like all others, loves

himsel£ first; those near him, whether they be his sons or
his friends, will inevitably come second.
This ethic makes just about any action possible, and
closeness--whether erotic

~r

£ilial--there£ore dangerous

because it puts one in striking distance 0£ someone who,
£or self-interest, is likely to lay aside emotional
investment in order to use or harm one.

And so it should

be no surprise that the Nurse, who has already expressed
her concern at Medea's glowering at her children (36), now
warns them not to go near their mother in her ill-humor

.

102,

>

and the discussion above
>

I

upon

her

I

~L€VTOL

1

101-

,

eyyu5,

Jl.'ll

avAaTou

cf.

91;

I

KOL TQS.

enemies

.

1-L"I

at

151-152),

instead

Tas.

0£ the Chorus' phrase,

0£

and
her

ill-wishes
friends
Tl,

>

Medea
I

(ex0pous.

ye

95).

The Nurse's last wish is the half articulation of a
code whose full expression later in the play is Medea's
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exP 1a na

tion of her decision to kill her own children:

Let no one consider me despicable and weak nor gentle,
bU t of another sort, :t;a.ea vy to my, enemies, and ~indly to
mY
triends
(1-L'11c5~1.s
1-L,£
cpau~·riv.
tc.ao0£!''11
VOl-Lltt:TW
IJ.'l')d:.
'l')OU,Xala~,
a>.},?
9?T£pOU
Tp01tOU,
papt:laV
£X9po1.s
Kai.
cplAOl.OlV
t:uµt:v:fl,
807-809).
This code--of helping friends and harming enemies--a t first
glance may seem contradictory with the espousal 0£ sel£advancement.

Yet by making the defining characteristic 0£

friend and foe the action one delivers to others, and
there£ore logically receives at the hands 0£ others. this
code, read one way, puts the individual and his interests
at

the

center.20

And,

in

£act,

when

viewed

in

light

0£

self-interest, the code loses its force 0£ helping as soon
as self-interest dictates that gain lies in the disposal or
mistreatment 0£ former friends.
Espousal has so far been made, then, £or two not
necessarily antithetical standards 0£

excellence:

1)

making oneself known through the successful completion 0£ a
venture that advances one .. s own interests, and 2) helping
friends

and

harming

enemies.21

Approval

0£

the

first

20see Gouldner, Enter Plato, pp. 70-71, £or the
individual-centered world.
Simon, Tragic Drama, p. 82,
sees in Medea the perversion of the golden rule, so that
you "do unto others as others have done unto you." This,
Simon suggests, is a result 0£ Medea s "identification with
the aggressor."
1

21 For evidence on ancient Greek espousal 0£
helping friends and harming enemies, see Mary Whitlock
Blundell, Helping Friends and Harming Enemies: A Study in
Sophocles and Greek Ethics (Cambridge: University Press,
1989), pp.
26-59.
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iS evident in the Nurse's (albeit qualified) description of
nd his men as aristoi, in her unconscious use of the
Jaso n a
· e
adjec t iv

icau.I. VLKOS.

(

45),

which

in

itself

expresses

the beauty o-f conquest, and--although to a lesser degree-in the Tutor's unshaken recognition of personal gain as an
an-too-common motive (87).

Approval of the second can be

found in the Tu tor's automatic assigning Jason to the
class of not-friend because of the wrongs against Medea and
the children he will tolerate (76-77).

It is also evident

in the Nurse's half-hearted malediction against Jason (83):
he is, as her master, both philos and, as one who harms her
mistress, ou philos, in her obvious contemptuous
description of him as k.akos by his actions against philoi
(84), and--finally and most especially--in her wholehearted and unreserved wish that Medea's wrath may be
visited upon her enemies and not her friends (95).
In addition, the play has proposed a concomitant
definition of eros as an assistant--albeit unpredictable-to acquiring arete.

Although to this point Jason is the

only one who has been shown to manipulate desire so as to
attain the end of being considered "excellent" in this
Play•s terms, we shall see that such a tactic is used even
by Medea, who is currently the victim of such manipulation.
Ironically, the Chorus, who reacted negatively to Jason's
use of eros for such ends, will accept without comment
Medea •s admittedly more subtle but similar use o-f eros.
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As will become even more evident later, the Chorus•
blind loyalty is in large part a £unction 0£ their status
as £riends to Medea.

The Hurse•s loyalty is similar, but

not quite so blind since not £ired (as we will see the
Chorus• is) by prejudice against Medea's (and their
vicarious) enemy Jason.

A reader with modern Western

Christian sensibilities may incorrectly assume that the
Hurse, who knows all that Medea does, should censure
Medea's vicious past and £uture vicious potential.
does not.

Instead, she merely thrice intones that she

knows what Medea is like:

.....

I

4PP"IV,

((:lapElQ

43),

But she

and

her "character is heavy/severe"
she

38),

"clever/terrible"

is

(6ELVTt,

retaliatory
44).

(39-

Furthermore,

the Nurse's description 0£ Medea as deine, with its
connotations 0£ both cleverness and the horri£ic, gives
warning 0£ what, exactly, will be meant by the designation
0£

Medea

as

sophe,

adjective deinos,

"clever/wise,"

i.e., "smart."

The

joining as it does intellectual prowess

with destructiveness, is an apt term £or describing Medea's
brand 0£ "smartness"; it is no coincidence that this same
adjective will be used to describe the product 0£ Medea's
cunning:
(1121,

the horri£ying deaths 0£ the princess and Creon

1167,

1184,

1202,

1214;

c£.

Creon's

dread

0£

Medea•s

doing something deinon at 356) as well as Medea's murder 0£
her own children (403, 859, 1243, 1294).

In short, the

Hurse•s description 0£ Medea as deine is the £irst
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. ation that intellectual prowess will be used as a
inti.m
destruction, not Of crea tion.22
force of
But we must note again that while the Hurse fears
Medea •s actions (36, 39), she never openly disapproves of
ner.

The Hurse•s tone, if anything, is one of pity,

distress, and foreboding.

It is true that the Hurse

nerself would not choose t.o live as Medea and her kind;
tnis is evidence of indirectly expressed censure.

But in

ber reflection on such lives at 119 ff., the Hurse stops
short of denouncing Medea as she had Jason, and in this we
can discern bot.h her loyalty t.o her mistress and a
grudging respect., alt.hough perhaps one born of fear.

Kore

importantly, though, the Hurse•s generalization on Medea
gives definition to the t.ype of individual most. likely t.o
be emulated or described in terms of high approbation
elsewhere in the play:
The moods of tyrants (Tupavvwv) are scary
(c5e:lva), because even when little ruled and much
>
>
in
command
(o.>.ly>
apxoµ.evol,
11'0.>..>.a
icpaTouvTes.) they find it difficult to change their
temper. Truly it is better to accustom oneself to
live on equal terms cE:v> :roololv); may I at.
least grow old in not-greatness (Ev µ..f)
µ.e:ya.>.OlS.), securely.
For invoking moderate
things
first
succeeds
(Twv
yap
µ.eTplwv
11'PWTa
µ.ev
d11'e:L'v
Touvoµ.a
vu~),
and
to
make
use
of [moderate things) is by far best £or man.
Ex.celling
(Ta
t11'eppa.>..>.ovTCal)
effects
no pro£it £or mortals; but greater ruin, when god is
angered, he brings to houses. (119-130).
I

d

~ 2 ":ills,

I

'

Kythopoeia, pp. 119-120, sees in the
~script.ion 0£ Medea as deinos an expression of her

divinity.
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The Nurse's bid £or humble obscurity and moderation is
rema rk

able as a counterpoint to the opinions 0£ the Chorus,

Medea, Creon, and Jason, all 0£ whom espouse and emulate
(but, in Creon's case, only hal£-heartedly) the opposite:
to be in command and not be ruled, to have power over many
things, under no circumstances to live on equal terms, but
instead to aspire to greatness which is mastery.
has nothing

to do with the

moderate.23

Winning

but instead is

excelling over against others, pure and simple.
The most highly approved conduct in this play is not
what we at least would deem "heroic," but is instead,
suggestively

put,

getting

on

top

and

staying

there.24

This is what Gouldner calls "the Greek contest system,"
23Alan Elliott, ed., Euripides. Medea (London:
Oxford Univ. Press. 1969; herea£ter Elliott. Medea). p. 75.
comments that the sentiment expressed in lines 119-130 is
akin to µ.'l')dev llyav.
That this sentiment was an
integral part of and yet antithetical to the Greek contest
system is noted by Gouldner, Enter Plato. p. 44, and Philip
R. Slater, The Glory 0£ Hera (Boston:
Beacon Press, 1968;
hereafter Slater, Glory). p. 40.
Slater agrees with the
infamous pronouncement 0£ Bertrand Russell, which he
quotes: "[The Greeks] had a maxim, 'nothing too much 1 ' but
they were in fact excessive in everything.• The Nurse's
advocating moderation as success is a striking contrast to
the "win at all costs• ethic of the zero-sum game. The
Hurse•s creed, which James G. Keenan summed up to me as
"winning is tying for second," is one step away £rom
proposing that "winning is losing" (or 1 to put it in the
terms of Joseph Campbell, "sacrifice is bliss").
Michelini, Tragic Tradition, p. 92, sees the motif of selfsacrifice in Euripides• works as evidence of a connection
between Euripides and Socrates.
24 Th.
is turn of phrase was suggested to me by the
s;atement of Winkler, Constraints, p. 37: "The very £act
0
considering social and sexual relations together
Provokes the question, 'Who's on top?'"
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. b.
yb.l.C

win

be describes as "a zero-sum game in that someone can

On ly

i£

someone

else

loses."25

According

to

Gouldner, a complex 0£ behaviors and belie£s is
characteristic 0£ the Greek contest system, whose
orientation--to achievement won through competitive
struggle--permeates nearly every aspect 0£ sel£-identity as
well

as

relations

between

sel£

and

others.26

Tbe objective of participants in this contest system
is simple:

to achieve, through one's own individual

efforts, as much recognition as possible.

The achievement

is not complete unless one has the reputation of
predominating over all others on the 'field 0£ contest.
Gaining such a reputation necessitates that one "be in all
circumstances 'free and independent of the constraint 0£
another
Actions to achieve recognition o-f one's predominance
may take the 'form of actual attack upon another, threatened
attack, or competition.

This last, which Gouldner suggests

25 Gouldner, Enter Plato, pp. 41-77; the quotation
is taken 'from p. 49.
See also Winkler, Constraints, pp. 198, passim.
26 Arrowsmith, "Ideas," pp. 33-36, gives a succinct
overview 0£ the "breakdown of the old community, the
overwhelming destruction of [the] mythical and coherent
world-order" and "transvaluation of morals" that occurred
in the last hal£ of the 'fifth century B. C. Arrowsmith
quotes Thucydides, History 3.82 ££., a passage that can be
read as a thumbnail sketch of the realities 0£ zero-sum
competition as described by Gouldner.
27 Gouldner, Enter
PP. 42-43 and 48.

Plato,

p.

12

(quote);

c£.

also
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iS a sublimation 0£ actual attack, may occur in any number
competition can be physical, intellectual, or

o£ arenas:
economic.

There are basically only two ways 0£ winning:

either one raises onesel£ or cuts the other down.

"Playing

£air" is not important; winning is, and to win one may
break rules, use people as objects or interchangeable
parts, and violate traditional codes 0£ conduct.
only one commitment--to onesel£ as the victor.

There is
To achieve

victory one must be smart (thus Medea's renowned sophia),
be able to control one's emotional impulses (it is here
that we can discern Jason•s judicious choice 0£ where to
expend his erotic impulses), and be willing to be ruthless
enough to do whatever is necessary to win (as will be the
case

with

Medea).28

The zero-sum system inspires £our concomitant
attitudes, which make sense only in context 0£ the contest.
The £irst 0£ these, that the risk taken must be very high,
has a double impetus:

£or one who aims at £ame, risking

what is dearest makes one legendary as a competitor, while
gaining the high stakes risked by one's opponent increases
one's own £ame.

The second attitude, that envy is as

savored as the de£eat 0£ a £oe, makes sense in an arena
Where there is only one victor.

In such a circumstance,

envy is the natural companion to victory, which itsel£ is

28 Gouldner,

and 107.

Enter

Plato,

pp.

48,

50,

56,

71-72,
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ushed only by someone else s de£ eat.

The third

1

accom P

1

attitude is related to the competitor s autonomy.
as he

1.. s,

Pitted

alone against all others, the competitor must

resist dependence and thwart all attempts to put him under
constraint.

He there-fore values reciprocity and

retribution, :for he must repay what has been given to him,
whether it be good or ill.

"Helping :friends and harming

foes" becomes his creed, the individual-centered creed so
highly touted in Medea, that covertly measures others by
their services £or or actions against one.

The -fourth and

final attitude re-fleets the teleology o-£ such competitors:
means are chosen £or their ability to achieve ends, and
since there must be total commitment to achieving ends,
any means will do.

This is what Gouldner calls "total

commitment rationality":

the willingness to carry out,

regardless

rationally

the

cost,

a

conceived

plan.29

It

will be such willingness on Medea s part that brings this
1

play to its disturbing climax.
As should already be clear, the zero-sum system has
its human costs.

For the competitor himsel£, there is the

lunacy 0£ what must have been a 'frantic and never-ending
engagement in potentially sel£-destructive competition.
There is no rest in a zero-sum game, £or the minute one
attains what appears to be the summit, either a higher

2 9Gouldner,
and 65-66.

Enter

Plato,

-------

pp.

13,

43,

46,

49,

56,
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·t offers itsel'f as the new goal 'for one's opponents,
summJ.
or one becomes the target o'f all other competitors, who are
to a man eager to pull one down.

One must continually, as

Gouldner puts it, "hurl [one]sel'f back into the 'fray."

The

competitor becomes prone to violence which appears and is
deemed necessary.

Such an escalation o'f "necessary"

violence will be one o'f the most horri'fying visions
Euripides' play presents.

Continual engagement in crisis

leads, however, not only to escalation o'f violence, but to
the recreation of crisis itself, for it is only the edge of
crisis in competition that holds competitors together,
ironically

enough,

in

league.30

At all other times, competitors are alone and
alienated 'from others, and this is the second price that
competition exacts:

it creates a

world o'f autonomous,

highly sel'f-conscious beings 'for whom social discord is the
norm, and feelings of separation, isolation, and insecurity
are

de

rigeur.31

We

will

shortly

see

evidence

isolation and self-consciousness in Medea.

of

such

Insecurity

encourages what Gouldner terms "low object attachment,"
30G ouldner, Enter Plato, pp. 54, 74, and 109.
For
the Greeks as excessive, see also p. 59, and Slater, Glory,
p. 40.
31see George B. Walsh, "Public and Private in
Three Plays of Euripides," CP 74 (1979; herea'fter Walsh,
"Public and Private"), pp. 294-295, for the tension bet ween
PUblic life and private life in the Iliad:
"
ties of
'family seem to inhibit distinction, and the private life
seems to be incompatible with heroic action."
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i.e.,

the ability to slough off connection to things and

persons so

as to avoid the pain experienced when the

competitor must put these in jeopardy or when they are
Friendships and intimacies are therefore fluid--

lost.

precisely the status quo described by the Tutor in Medea at
85 ff.; people and things are used and discarded, or
treated like interchangeable parts--as was Medea before the
play's beginning, and as will be the children at the play's
climax.

Fluidity of attachment further contributes to

desire for immediate gratification rather than pursuing
long term goals, for these, after all, may be overturned at
any

juncture.32

At

the

play's

close,

Medea

espouses

precisely such pursuit of immediate gratification at the
expense of long term goals.
But what undermines security and destroys faith in
human relations nonetheless promotes, according to
Gouldner, the development of rationalism,
an orientation in which the relation between
means and ends is subject to deliberate calculation;
in which ends or goals are constituted as perceptually
organized foci set off from the contextual ground in
which they are embedded; and in which other aspects of
the surround are also taken from their context and
evaluated primarily in terms of their anticipated
capacity to realize the goai.33
In a zero-sum system, then, the mind--like the emotions--

becomes a tool for achieving the goal of victory.

and

32 Gouldner,

Enter

Plato,

pp.

15,

106-108.

33 Gouldner,

Enter

Plato,

p.

70.

54,

60-61,

66-74,
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DiScerning
efficiency

means to ends is the mind's primary task;
is valued, morality discarded:

thus, Medea's

.
al choice to kill her children to effect her goal of
i.mmor
punishing her enemy.
disdained

(Medea

Treachery and duplicity are not
both

uses

and

is

never

cri ticized),34

and their use in turn deepens distrust between individuals.
The mind is prized over emotions, which cannot calculate
and besides are distrusted, for they must always be in
control lest they betray one and bring defeat (so at line
1049 Medea chides herself -for lack 0£ control).

Detachment

from one's own emotions becomes as important as detachment
from

objects

and

others.35

In

short,

one

should

expect

in such a system the same subservience of desire to the
acquisition of the goal of self-advancement already seen in
Jason in Medea.
As one would guess, the moral costs 0£ this system are
high.

Individuals see themselves in competition with the

group instead 0£ members of it; the value of cooperative
virtues is diminished.

Gouldner traces participation in

the contest system to the breakdown 0£ tribalism and the
rise of urban centers, when kinship was no longer an "allembracing ma tr ix" and the once unquestioned rules of
tradition were cast aside.

The Greek taboo against excess

34Cf.

Winkler, Constraints, p. 75, who describes
duplicity as "· . . a permanent state of defensiveness
against intrusive enemies . . . "
35 Gouldner,

Enter

Plato,

pp.

65-71.
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and Co

mmendation 0£ temperance were, in Gouldner•s view,

counter
moder a t

to the contest system and vain attempts to
e the behavior 0£ contestants whose behavior could

no tonger be moderated.

The concentration on obtaining

:fame blinded contestants, ironically, to any opinion
opposing their progress.

Shame became an ine££ecti ve tool

o:f social control because the need -for a high opinion 0£
oneself outstripped all other opinion; i-f all else were
lost, the contestant could choose to ignore current opinion
as irrelevant to the ultimate prize:

posthumous -fame won

by ranking high in the eyes 0£ those yet to be born.36
With its -focus on the individual, then, competition in
a zero-sum game is ultimately anti-social.

Even its

seemingly most social aspect, the code 0£ "helping -friends
and harming enemies," spells danger in its individualcentered logical extreme:

-friends are those who help one,

and enemies are those who hurt one.

The world is readily

divided into two camps, -friends and enemies, with the
greater -focus on enemies, since it is only to enemies that
one can lose and, in addition, one way 0£ winning is by
harming enemies.

Divisiveness is endemic--as the Hurse in

Medea says "all things are hatred" (16)--and harm becomes
the action 0£ choice.

Violence is not just predictable, it

is endorsed.

36

and 97.

Gouldner,

Enter

Plato,

pp.

15,

44,

58-59,

72-74,
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Tbe espoused excellence in Medea, the profile of the
autono Dl

ous competitor, is a concentration on harming one's

enemies ove r
promotion

helping one's friends, and, as such, is a

of divisiveness.

There are two opposing camps,

tbe Ebiloi and the echthroi or ou philoi.

Every one of the

minor characters introduced thus far operates under such a
division.
Medea:

Tbe Hurse, Tutor, and Chorus are all philoi to

all but the Chorus are household retainers and by

definition philoi.
to

the

house

The Chorus de:fine themselves as philon

(138). 37

Creon,

as

will

be

seen,

is

willing to be an enemy to Medea (2.90), while Aegeus will
define himsel:f as :friend (664).

Jason is no longer a

philos to the house (77), and is there:fore by de:fini tion an
echthros to all but Creon, and perhaps the cautiously loyal
Hurse.

Although Jason attempts to define himself as a

philos to Medea and the children (459), and Medea refers to
herself and the children as :friends whom he has harmed
(470), she makes it clear that he is in :fact no :friend,
except in hypothesis

( 499).

It is important to understand, then, that the Chorus•

disapproval o:f Jason is because, as enemy to Medea, he is
enemy to them; Medea, on the contrary, is a :friend and
therefore deserves their help and support.

Right and wrong

37
t
Ohlander, Suspense, p. 52. n. 10, suggests that
. he Chorus• total support of Medea is a Euripidean
~~v~nti~n, and one that goes against the tradition o:f the
ri.nthi.ans as slayers of the children.
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·n the £irst hal£ 0£ the play at least--not measured
are--i
esceP t

bY the relativistic standards 0£ the code:

the

roclaim that Medea rightly punishes Jason
Chor Us P
(eVdlKW5

268

>

yap'

,

,

£KT£l0"!}

267-

VOO"lV,

), the husband who has wronged her; they in£orm Jason

·
their opinion, his action has been wrong
that,. in
,..
( dOK £1.5
,..

11'podous.

Their

578).

dpav,

.

O"'f'IV

>

ch.oxov

concept

0£

OU

justice,

is

one o£ an individual-centered reciprocity, not one sprung
£rom social consciousness or broader concepts 0£ right and
wrong.

In short, in their support 0£ a £riend over an

enemy, one can see the Chorus' espousal and practice 0£ the
code 0£ "helping £riends and harming enemies"; their
loyalty can hardly be de-fended on ethical grounds.

The

actions o-f Medea and Jason are at least equally
despicable, even only those actions known to have taken
place at the time 0£ the play's beginning.
But the Chorus do not support Medea over Jason merely
because she is -friend and he is enemy; they censure Jason
and are willing to stand silently by so that he may be
harmed (267) because Jason is, in addition to being their
enemy vicariously through Medea, their enemy vicariously
because

•

38

0£

his

sex:38

in

this

he

is

a

representative

Arrowsmith, "Ideas,• p. 49, cites the Chorus"
Pro£ound resentment . . . against male domination" to
~XPlain the ease with which Medea convinces them to help
er.

319
o£ the class that has prevented their advancement to

sUP er
and

nun.

ior status.

•i· ves • nave

Jason is a man, a husband; they, as women
long been kept in£erior to the likes 0£

TheY do not like this.

They, like Medea and Jason,

be on top, and are willing to witness the use 0£
crave to
narm to get there.
In short, the Chorus advocate the aggressively
competitive creed 0£ the zero-sum game practiced, as we
nave glimpsed already, by both the two main characters.
This is £irst obvious -from Medea's use o-f it to gain their
support.

Her opening monologue (214-266) assumes on their

part a competitive hostility which must be overcome and
redirected.

As has long been recognized, her speech is a

masterpiece

0£

manipulation. 39

But

what

has

been

largely overlooked is that such a masterpiece can only
succeed with a highly competitive and willingly hostile
group.'10 Such a

group is the Chorus o-f Corinthian

3 9For the speech"s rhetorical -flair, see P. Mazon,
•ne quelques vers d'Euripide (Medee, 214-229)," RPh 27
(1953), pp. 119-121.
C-f. Reck£ord, "First Exit," pp. 336337, and Pietro Pucci, The Violence 0£ Pity in Euripides•
Medea (Ithaca and London:
Cornell Univ. Press, 1980;
herea£ter Pucci, Violence), pp. 61-77.
40 0hlander,

Suspense, pp. 60-64, argues that
Euripides, by not letting on that he was not going to
follow versions of the myth wherein the Corinthians killed
Kedea•s children, left the audience in suspense; i-f
Ohlander is correct, Medea's treatment of these women as
Potentially hostile is even more plausible.
R. G. Ussher,
~~~ripides Medea 214 ff.," CP 55 (1960), pp. 249-251,
Poses that Medea uses oeµ. vous at 216 not in
reference to herself, but to the Corinthian women. Her
opening words are, therefore, according to Ussher, "de£iant
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women.
Medea's £irst sentence signals her recognition 0£
their

competitiveness. 41

hostile

She

tells

the

women

that she has come outside "lest you in some way £ind -fault
with

me"

'

Tl

j..LOl

(µ.fi

µeµcp'l')o9Ct:J,

215).

Medea

here

diSPiays not only the sel£-consciousness typical 0£ the
zero-sum competitor, she likewise by this statement shows
her awareness 0£ the dynamics 0£ the competition.

Fault-

finding in a zero-sum society is more serious than what we
may cavalierly dismiss as gossip-mongering; in such a
society one's chances £or advancement can be thwarted by
malevolent

rumor.42

Medea

accurately

describes

the

kind of unjust and ready-to-hand censure typical 0£
participants in zero-sum games, who are quick to destroy
the other

to

advance

themselves:43

Medea

knows

that

one can incur at best indi£ference, at worst a bad
and attacking."
I agree in part; Medea, however, is too
smart to encourage, by attacking, a counter-attack, when
What she wants is to make these women allies, not enemies.
Reck-ford, "First Exit,• pp. 334-339, takes a di££erent
tack in analyzing Medea•s speech.
In it, he detects an
ambiguity that indicates the tragedy 0£ Medea, once
intelligent and passionate, now su££ering so much that she
becomes cold and inhuman.
41 Medea later describes to Creon (292-305) her
past experience with the hostility and envy 0£ others.
Even if she has -fabricated this experience, her statement
shows that she is well aware 0£ the potential for such a
reaction on the part of competitors.
42 Winkler
43

See

•

Constraints,

Gouldner,

Enter

pp .
Plato,

58-59.

pp.

55-58.
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22 1).44
theS e P

ion

•

by merely minding one's business (217-218), and

me people will simply hate one on sight (220Medea

is

therefore

eager

to

impress

upon

otentially hostile women that she is neither haughty

(216 ) nor does she mean to give offense (224); she has kept
herself from them because she has been unexpectedly
destroyed

(225-228).

This last is a reassuring display of vulnerability.45

By

spilling

out

her

tale

of

woe

Medea

communi-

cates to the Chorus not only that she is a deserving object
of pity, but that she, once perhaps viewed by them as a
suspiciously withdrawn foreigner, is not worth considering
as competition.46

She

is

already

therefore visit upon them no harm.

destroyed,

and

may

She cannot thereby be

considered an enemy; they are--friends (227).

44-This last is deemed unjust (2.19) not because
hating per se is not just, but because hating on sight is a
violation of the reciprocity code of conduct followed by
zero-sum competitors; by contrast "unjust" people hate
though "having su££ered no injustice" (221).
45 Medea"s

exploitation of her alleged
vulnerability (see Gellie, "Character," p. 17) is a
constant in her repertoire 0£ manipulation. It is easy to
discern when Medea is engaging in, as Foley, "Divided
Self," p. 74, terms it, "-feminine role-playing" with men,
but she is not above using it, as here, on her own sex.
Pucci, Violence, p. 72., speaks of Medea's rhetoric as
"mov[ing] back. and forth between the contradictory -figures
of master and slave."
to

46
.
0dysseus similarly uses the disguise 0£ a beggar
discourage the suitors from considering him a contender.
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And
the

so,

Medea

may

.£irst person P lural ·

join

them,

albeit

-falsely,47

in

"We women," she intones at 230-

:a.

he most wretched creatures 0£ all things that
231, •are t
are

alive

and

have

intelligence.•48

Her

description

0£

. common wretchedness is no less an appeal to their
their
·udice against the opposite sex--a trait we will see
preJ
they share with Jason--than it is designed to make the
blood o£ a competitor boil:
themselves
awJJ.aTOS.

privilege!

to

Aaflav,

the

mastery

233),

even

women must willingly submit
o-f

another

pay

dearly

(o£a11'oT'l')V

£or

T£

the

The whole sordid predicament 0£ trying to get a

good deal £or one's money Medea describes competitively
,
>
•
(aywv
greatest
contest"
tJ.£YlOTOS.,
"the
as
47 So,
e.g.,
Easterling,
"ln£an ticide,"
p.
182:
are le£t in no doubt that this is a -formidable woman;
and, despite all that she has said in this scene about the
limitations 0£ the -feminine role, it is clear that she
herself is capable 0£ overcoming them." See also Stewart
Flory, •ffedea•s Right Hand: Promises and Revenge," TAPA
108 (1978; herea£ter Flory, "Right Hand•), pp. 70-71, who
notes that Medea's extraordinary marriage contract with
Jason made on her own behal£ makes her "a larger-than-li-fe
female."
C-f. Williamson, "Woman's Place," pp. 18-19.
Foley, "Divided Sel£," pp. 74-75, similarly points out that
Kedea is no typical house-wi£e, and that she o£ten -feigns
femininity to manipulate others. McDermott, Incarnation,
pp. 43-64, examines the tensions between the realistic and
the demonic in Euripides• characterization 0£ Medea. Medea
as woman is an anomaly: sympathetic and revoltingly
unnatural.

•we

48

Medea •s descriptions o-f the plight o-f women are
realistic.
See Helene P. Foley, "The Conception 0£ Women
1: Athenian Drama," in Re-flections 0£ Women in Antiquity,
; · Helene P. Foley (New York: Gordon and Breach Science
:blishers, 1981), pp. 129-130, £or prose text con£irmation
0
several 0£ Medea's points.
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235), 49

for

the

task

of

protecting

one's

repu ta tion--an

suming one in a zero-sum competi tion--deems escape
au-co n
a bad marriage impossible for women (236-237). The
from
hope for is a husband who does not strain
best one can
against the yoke; this makes one's life enviable (241-243).
The competitor, recall, covets envy, perhaps even this
sorrY

excuse

it.50

for

It is clear throughout this description that women are

constrained
247,
the

and

QVclYK"'l) 1

hands

of

have

While
men

no

power
(see

power
and

242,

(see

232

Choice

pi~.

and

and

are

239,

6e'l;

Solely

244-245).

in

The

description is thoroughly degrading to anyone with an ounce
of self-respect and a need for self-mastery; for the highly
competitive it is incitement to riot.

Medea ends with a

rousing call to arms:
"They say that we live life without danger at home,
while they do battle with the spear. They don't know
what
they"re
talking
about
(KaKWS
cppovouvTES);
I'd rather stand three times beside a shield than give
birth
once.•
(248-251).51
49Foley,

•Divided

Sel£,•

50Gouldner, Enter Plato,
Slater, Glory, pp. 39-40.
51 Hedea's

p.
pp.

75.
43

and

55-58;

cf.

comparison between the front line
warrior and the child-bearing woman is, according to Simon
Gol~hill, Reading Greek Tragedy (Cambridge: Cambridge
Univ. Press, 1986; herea£ter Goldhill, Reading), pp. 116
~nd 121-122, a comparison between the transitional moments
~n the lives of young men and young women. Cf. Simon
D~ldhill, "The Great Dionysia,• in Nothing to Do with
(/ 0 ~Ysos?, ed. John J. Winkler and Froma I. Zeitlin
u:i.nceton, HJ:
Princeton Univ. Press, 1990), pp. 107-
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In o n

e sentence Medea reasserts the supremacy 0£ women by

degrading me

n

who are, a£ter all, misin£ormed -fools (recall

that competition need not be only in the physical realm,
that

it

also

invaded

the

realm

0£

the

intellect),52 and

who bave one-third the courage 0£ women; she takes back the
power of choice by ber own pre£erence £or bearing arms over
birthing;53

she

advances

the

already

implied

keenly

competitive role 0£ wi£e by saying that one 0£ her
functions, giving birth, is the equivalent 0£ three times

Jean-Pierre Vernant, Myth and Society in Ancient
Greece, trans. Janet Lloyd (Hew York:
Zone Books, 1988),
p. 34, remarks that "Harriage is £or the girl what war is
for the boy . . . ."
Vernant continues--tellingly, in
light 0£ Medea's trans-formation in the play--that a girl
who rejects marriage (or, one could argue, a woman who is
ejected £rom marriage) " . . . £inds herself to some extent
forced toward war£are, and paradoxically becomes the
equivalent 0£ a warrior." See the even more telling
comment 0£ Joseph Campbell, Power, p. 12.5, who, a£ter
noting that the Aztecs placed warriors killed in battle in
the same heaven with mothers who died in childbirth,
asserts, "Giving birth is definitely a heroic deed, in that
it is the giving over 0£ onesel£ to the li£e 0£ another."
I t is here that one may begin to discern the
difference between the "hero" and the zero-sum competitor,
the latter 0£ whom never "gives over• him or hersel£ •to
the life 0£ another• and, there-fore, has no claim to being
a "hero."
52 Hedea"s

weapon in the zero-sum game is her
cleverness.
See H. I. Finley, The World 0£ Odysseus, 2
r~v. ed. (Hew York:
Penguin Books, 1978; herea£ter
Fi.nl~y, World 0£ Odysseus), p. 12.0:
":Nothing de-fines the
quall.ty of Greek culture more neatly than the way in which
the idea 0£ competition was extended -from physical prowess
to the realm 0£ the intellect . . . •
53 Pucci
Point.
'

Violence,

pp.

66-69,

is

excellent

on

this
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on

the

well

front

fight

onlY t

to

lines. 54
win. 55

Harriage
This

is

is

a

war,

so

sentiment

one

may

as

appealing

o those who have been on the bottom way too long, are

d tired 0£ their subservience, and sense that in
sick an
thiS

•us vs. them• game only one side can win.
Medea has there-fore skill-fully reminded the Chorus 0£

what to them is quite pain£ul:
helpless, constrained, degraded.

they are subservient,
They must pay £or their

degradation and endure being considered lucky £or it.
Medea easily wins the Chorus over because she appeals to
them not merely as women, but rather as competitors who are
sick of

losing.

Medea at the same time de-fines hersel£ as an
aggressively competitive person, and one who is skilled at
playing the zero-sum game.
sum competitor

is

her

What defines Medea as a zero-

manipula tion56

0£

assets

critical

54Simon, Tragic Drama, p. 89, sees Medea's
equation of childbirth and battle as a re-formulation 0£
women's duty to bear sons who will bear the shield £or the
polis.
55 The phrase "Harriage is war" is taken 'from Susan
Starr Richards, "How to Win at Marriage," Ms. Magazine,
Karch 1983, pp. 44-49, who claims that she came to
recognize her own mistaken desire to "win" as "what comes
of seeing yoursel£ as the last 0£ a long line 0£ losers--by
Which I mean women." (p. 49).
C£. the Janis Joplin song,
"Women is Losers," whose lyrics include the regret£ul "men
always seem to end up on top"; the sentiment is similar in
John Lennon and Yoko Ono's "Woman is the Rigger 0£ the
World."
th

56

HcDermott, Incarnation, pp. 45-48, may be right
at Medea knowingly -falsely assumes the role 0£ the
average Haus£rau; if so, this is more evidence that Medea
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her reputation in general and her particular
status with
it

.

these (to her) alien women.

As a competitor,

politic :for her to dispel any negative accruals to

J.S

ner reputation and to ensure that these women will remain
The :first she has accomplished--in a

a111es.

wily display

of vulnerabili ty--by redirecting their suspicions about her
reserved nature; the second she accomplishes by delineating
for them the degrading lot they share with her.
But Medea's identi:fication as a player in a cutthroat
competitive game does not stop with her concern :for
impression management and securing allies.

In the last

part o:f her opening monologue, Medea claims she is
different :from the Corinthian women 0£ the Chorus because
of

her

isolation

and

alienation.57

Such

isolation

and

alienation, however, are hallmarks 0£ one whose major
concern

is

sel£-advancement.58

Parallels

can

easily

be

drawn to Achilles, whose isolation was similarly sel£is using the intellectual tools 0£ the zero-sum competitor.
See Gouldner, Enter Plato, p. 68, £or treachery and
duplicity as one aspect 0£ the contest system.
57 Margaret

Visser, "Medea:
Daughter, Sister, Wi£e
and Mother," in Greek Tragedy and Its Legacy, ed. Hartin
Cropp, et al. (Calgary, Alberta, Canada:
Univ. 0£ Calgary,
l986; herea£ter Visser, "Medea"}, p. 151, explains,
however, that "[i]n marriage, a woman is a :foreigner." C£.
Re~kford, "First Exit," p. 354, who notes the appearance 0£
this idea in Alcestis, where Admetus claims it is a
·
•stranger woman" (yuv.fi 9upal'os, 805) who has died.
58

See

Gouldner,

Enter

Plato,

p.

106,

£or

-feelings

~f separateness and isolation as one of the tensions of
individuality.
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it was put to the service of achieving his sole
.
of receiving the honor he felt he deserved.
desire,
11edea

•s current plight, as commentators indignantly point

out, 5 9

course

of

is

of

her

own

making:

all

that

she

suffers now, as she will be eager to remind Jason (475
) is because of her desire to help Jason, who was her
ff .•
sole interest
selfish.

(228-229).

Medea

is

not

selfless,

Jason

They are both dominated by self-interest, both

jocKeying for the mastery to gain the objects of their
d e s i r e . 60
Medea's isolation and alienation, then, which she uses
to emphasize her distinction, must in one sense have had
the ring of familiarity to the competitive members 0£ the

59see

•

e.g.,

Easterling,

"Infanticide,"

p.

182.

6 0E. M. Blaik.lock., "The Nautical Imagery 0£
Euripides• Medea," CP 50 (1955; herea-fter Blaik.lock.,
"Rautical Imagery"), p. 236:
"The Medea of Corinth is to
be understood in the light of the Medea of Colchis. The
situation is a consummation. If the moralities are to be
sought, it was a betrayal which led to this story of mutual
treachery. 1£ motives and catastrophe are to reveal their
source and origin, it is in the past of both Jason and
Medea."
C£. Dunk.le, "Aegeus Episode," p. 99:
". . . it
would be a mistake to see Medea's passion for Jason as a
self-sacrificing love . . . ."
Pace Cowherd, "Ending," p.
l3t: "[T)he -fact remains that Medea took. her oaths because
of love. On the other hand, . . . Jason was simply looking
0
his own advantage." Cowherd's thesis 0£ Medea as
feeling" and Jason as "unfeeling" forces her to ignore
J~son•s expressions of grief at the end of the play so that
: e m~y maintain that Jason "· . . expresses no feeling
or his children." (p. 134).

!
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chorus.
are

61

not

iost h

And

al though

imagined--she

the
is

di££erences

literally

she

alone62

describes

(she

has

er city, her father's home, and cannot enjoy the

colDpanY

o£ £riends, 253-254) and an alien (256)--Medea

nonetheless stresses her helplessness, so recently put
forth as their common plight.

In this, she maintains the

thread 0£ their similarity, £or her description 0£ her
alleged contrast to them £inds her as one whose world is
full o£ things she does not have, whose every action is
blocKed by negators (255-258; the use 0£ negatives is
remarKable here), and who is acted upon instead 0£ acting
255,

256).

In

short,

she

remains nonetheless one 0£ them, helplessly constrained by
others,

liKe

all

women

0£

her

earlier

description.63

By the time she comes around to listing the things she
lacKs, there£ore, these women will be hard pressed to
recall (i£ indeed they knew it) that Medea hersel£ has been
61see Easterling, "In£anticide," p. 180, £or the
stress on Medea's foreignness as a way to emphasize her
vulnerability and isolation.
62 Arrowsmith,

"Ideas," pp. 41-42, sees the
depiction 0£ loneliness as a £ate common to all humans as a
striking £eature 0£ Euripides' tragedies.
63 Bongie,

"Heroic Elements," p. 35, cites the
murder 0£ Medea's brother and the Nurse's warnings about
Kedea•s temperament (172) as evidence that Medea, "no
shrinking violet," does not con£orm to the Chorus' image 0£
t~e "helpless £emale creature."
Indeed, "[Medea's]
situation never was the same as that 0£ an average woman."
( p. 36).
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cnorus

some

least

at

£or

0£

desola tion.64-

her

The

are ripe to grant her request £or silence, which she

clever ly

couches both in tentative indefiniteness and

. itY ("i£ £or me some way, some device may be £ound
passi.v

...

.

• 260) as well as in another rousing appeal for

woJDen to rise above their reputation as £ear£ul cowards:
woJDen, Sh e asserts, can be bloodier than anyone when it
reallY matters

to them (264--266).

And when does it really matter to a woman?
she happens
>

to

have

>
I
"!OllC"l~E:V'r}

•

£VV"IV

lost

K UP!l1

honor
265).

in

bed."

Does

"Whenever

Cl

(oTav

this

cP

>

E:S

mean

that sex, or--to put on it what Winkler calls "vanilla
connotations"--love,65
Hardly.

is

all

that

matters

to

women?

For i£ we return once more to the -first part 0£

Kedea•s speech to the Corinthian women, we £ind that £or a
woman, good reputation and enviable li£e--both things to
which the zero-sum contender aspires--are secured through
good relations with her husband, her "bed-mate":
no such thing as a

.

respectable divorce £or a

>

yap

•

avaAAayal

I

Y\JVOlf,;lV,

there is
woman (ou>

236-237),

and if she makes a miscalculation in dealing with her bedmate

(.;uve:uvET!J,

24-0,

as

synonymous

64 0hlander,

with

"husband"

at

Suspense, p. 54-, notes that, in any
case, Medea's 0££ stage sel£-accusations, in which she
~eems to be addressing her own soul in regret £or her past
t~eds, would elicit sympathy £rom anyone who overhears
em.
Constraints,

p.

72.
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) her life will not be the enviable one she
2.37 and 24 2 '
possible had this not happened (t'llAWTos
describes as
If
social

S

a

woman

tatus is at risk..

is

"dishonored"

This is a

in

bed,

her

far cry from the "hell

nath no fury" spins commonly put on interpretations of this
passage. 66
a

Medea

privately

is

talking

suffered sense

about
of

repu ta ti on

having

been

here,

not

scorned.67

For ,., 0 men in general as well as for the men in this play,
there is a connection between eros and one's social status.
For men, eros is used to achieve a

higher social standing;

for women, the connection is something more integral and
beyond their control:

their degree of success with their

•bed-mate" is in direct proportion to their social success.
It is no wonder, then, that Kedea•s description of women
66pace Page, Medea, pp. xiv-xv11.
Cf. Musurillo,
•Reconsideration," passim, to whom Medea is "a woman
wronged," or "a woman scorned," and £or whom line 330 ("Ah,
what a great evil love is £or men!") is "the £inal theme 0£
the play.• (p. 74).
C£. also his p. 73, where Medea is "a
pure woman . . . wounded in the weak.est and most sensitive
part 0£ her nature."
67 Bongie, "Heroic Elements," pp. 28-29, is
especially good on this point:
"No reference is made, it
should be noticed, to a broken heart. . . . [T)he k.ey to
[Medea's character) is not rejected love and jealousy, but
a sense 0£ slighted honour and a £ear 0£ loss of respect
and status."
Cf. Bernd Seidensticker, "Euripides, Medea
1056-80, An Interpolation?," in Cabinet of the Muses, ed.
Mark. Griffith and Donald J. Kastronarde (Atlanta, GA:
Scholars Press, 1990; hereafter Seidensticker, "Medea 105680•),

p,

~

98.

Easterling, "Infanticide," p. 183:
"There is a
c 1ash here between Medea's self-image as a hero of the old
~tyle braving a great ordeal and her awareness of the
estructiveness of thwarted female passion."
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. g bloody-minded when dishonored in bed does not
becomi.n
.
the Chorus as odd. Here is a battle worth fighting.
str.lke
such a description 0£ women as able to be "bloody. d d" can only win the day with a group to whom it

aai.n e

appea l

s to be bloody when it matters.

The women 0£ the

Chorus define themselves as eagerly vicious by granting
Medea's request £or silence.
them.

It will be all she needs 'from

As they pledge silence, they 'further show their own

agreement with the code 0£ harming enemies:

"I will do

this; £or justly you punish your husband, Medea"
J

J

'
yap

I

(t:VdlKW5

I

I

ETElO!)

26 6).

ll'OOlV,

one can hardly posit in this group willing passivity and
horror 0£ bloodshed.

They are, in essence, sicking Medea

on Jason, and are eager to stand by and watch as the £ur
flies.

It will be a

vicarious victory £or them.

But this victory is hardly secured.

What threatens it

is the predicted order for Medea's exile with her two
children,68
brusque

now

and

issued

bristling

upon

his

Creon.69

entry
Creon's

(271)

by

exiling

a
Medea

68 Exile was no tri£ling sentence, physically or
psychologically.
Jean-Pierre Vernant, "A .. Beautiful Death'
and the Disfigured Corpse in Homeric Epic," in Mortals and
Im~ortals:
Collected Essays, ed. Froma I. Zeitlin
(Princeton, HJ:
Princeton Univ. Press, 1991; hereafter
Vernant, "Beauti£ul Death•), p. 54, recalls that Achilles
~ompared his dishonor with the plight 0£ the exile, whose
ate was to be "a less than nothing (outidanos), a homeless
and worthless dri£ter, a k.ind 0£ nonperson (Il. 9.648)."
69
ent
Alth?ugh Creon is blatantly threatening upon his
b t ranee, :11-i.s_ command 0£ theatrical space nonetheless
e rays his inferiority. Bernard Gredley, "The Place and
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es the £act that Medea's actions--based on the
underscor
that she is a participant in a zero-sum game--have
attitude
misguided. Creon and his daughter have won,
not been
tnere f o

re someone must have lost.
These

cost.
278

are

there£ore

They win only at Medea's
her

enemies

>

,

(Ex9poL,

), £or they willingly harm her to advance their own

Creon likewise considers Medea an enemy:

interests.

upon

his entrance he calls attention to her scowling countenance
and the £act that her th umos has been roused against her
husband

(vooEL

9uµouµf:v

'I')

v,

The

271).

participle

can hardly be adequately translated by the English phrase
•angry at your husband"; Creon makes it clear that he
expects that Medea's roused thumos will inspire retaliatory
action.

He £ears she may do his child some deadly harm

(282).70

He

recognizes

that

Medea

has

been

deprived

0£

a husband in this his gain (286); he has heard 0£ her
threats.

Furthermore, Medea is sophe; this, combined with

her skill £or doing much harm, makes her a woman to be
feared

(285).

Creon's fears of the sophe Medea suggest that sophia
Time of Victory:
Euripides• Medea," BICS 34 (1987;
hereafter Gredley, "Place and Time"), P:--30, notes, "He
comes to Medea; his palace, though the centre of communal
authority, occupies a marginal position in theatrical
space, displaced and decen tred at the end of an eisodos."
70

creon•s fears are not misguided, for Medea is
uncannily proficient at discerning weaknesses she can use
aga·
o£ inst her enemies.
See J. o. de G. Hanson, "The Secret
Medea's Success," G&R 12 (1965), pp. 54-61.

r·I' \)~
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17:

,. ._. being defined as something use£ul in de£ea ting an enemy;
.jJldeed

that this is the de£inition 0£ sophia posited here

i• apparent from Medea's response to Creon's £ear.

To

11J1derstand her response, however, we must first understand
who it is Medea believes she is addressing, and to discern
tbJlt, we must look at Creon's announcement that he will
take precautions against Medea.

In this announcement, he

laJ'• claim to the code 0£ behavior preferred by nearly

e.-eryone in this play:
better
than

now
to

1roan

be

to

be

made

greatly."

"As -far as rm concerned, it is

hated
so£t

>

,

(a 11'EX8E<J9a t.)

by

(µa.>.8auo8ev8Cat.1)

you,
and

woman,
later

(2.90-2.91).

In this statement, Creon identifies himsel£ as one who
considers it better to have enemies than the regrets that
come with being so£t, yielding, approachable.

In short,

Creon espouses, but cannot, to his mis-fortune, live up to
Hedea•s disposition:

she, too, has a

distaste £or softness

and being gentle; she is heavy /severe, according to the
Burse (38) and the Chorus (12.65), which is just what she
wants to be, at least to her enemies (809); she makes but a
Pretense 0£ softness, according to Creon (316; Medea
herself at 776 admits to such a pretense regarding her
intended words to Jason); later she chides herself £or
softness (1052) and finally sends £rom her sight the
Children with their so-ft skin and sweet breath (1075-
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10'1 6

>·

7 1

To designate this so£tness as e££eminacy, and
tia.ere£ore to argue that Creon•s and Kedea"s disdain 0£
softness is a rejection 0£ the £eminine, is one step in the
right

.
72.
direc t ion.

Th e

G ree k. s,

h owever,

use d

th e

designations "so£t" and "£eminine" in their rhetoric 0£
competition.

To be "so£t" or a "woman" means to be weak.;

tb.at is,

be passive

to

and

the

loser.73

Creon's

own

bluf£ing disdain 0£ so£tness is an attempt to reject
in£eriori ty in competition.

Such a rejection is not,

there£ore 1 £or Creon obviously or even £or Medea, a
rejection 0£ the £eminine.

Medea chooses, as Creon wishes

he could by his words choose, to be the superior
competitor, to be "hard."

In a world £ull 0£ actual and

potential enemies, such a tack. is not untoward, as the
fatal consequences 0£ Creon"s ultimate so£tening will
71simon, Tragic Drama, p. 78, indicates how little
touching there is in the play, and how touch is again and
again described as abrasive or even torturous.
72 see, e.g., Bongie, "Heroic Elements," pp. 39,
•ho typi£ies Medea "s reactions as "masculine" in arguing
against "scorned woman" interpretations. Foley, "Divided
SeH,• pp. 73-83, gives a gripping analysis 0£ Medea •s
struggle as one between her "masculine" and "£eminine"
•elves, and £urther delineates how Medea exploits
ezpectations others have 0£ her as a £emale. Shaw, "Female
I~truder," pp. 2.58-2.64, argues that Medea begins the play
!'b th many 0£ the traits 0£ a typical Greek. woman, but
Cl ec_omes a man" {p. 2.61) in her vengeance and desire to
a.omi.nate.
C£. Schein, "Philia," p. 67, £or Medea"s use 0£
asculine vocabulary at 12.40-12.41.
•pi

~ 3 Wink.ler,

ayi.ng

Constraints, p.
the Other," pp. 69-71.

50.

C£.

Zeitlin,
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4e111onstra te.
But in this scene, Creon still has the power to thwart
lledea's plans; Medea must there-fore succeed in manipulating
b.illl

40

out 0£

his

competitive

superiority.74 She

tries to

this £irst by addressing his £ear that she is sophe,

that is, that he sees her as having in this a competitive
edle over him.

Medea tries, unsuccess£ully, to counteract

Creon's £ear 0£ her sophia as a competitive edge by
despising her reputation for cleverness.
ireat bane to a competitor:
to her

detriment
>

it has more than once worked

instead 0£

•

>I

11 eya>.a

her

>

,..

-favor {ou vuv µ.t:

KpE:ov,

au.a

'W'PWTOV,

She labels it a

t:LpyaaTaL

#

KaKa,

292-293).

In

short,

though it may appear a competitive advantage, it is not.
It is there-fore in Creon's apprehension and Medea's
attempts to soothe it that we get the play"s first
pro££ered de£inition of sophia:

it is a means to bring

about the end of advancing one"s own interests; here, by
harming one"s enemy.
£eared.

Sophia in others, then, is to be

Nothing Medea can do will convince Creon

Otherwise.

This is all to his credit, for in this scene we

74 Hills,

Mythopoeia, pp. 105-106, sees Hedea"s
SOPhia in argumentation in her ability to present herself
~s other than what she is. Here, she tries to soften
W~~o.n"s perception of the dangers of her competitive savvy.
a h.amson, "Woman"s Place," p. 21, detects three distinct
PProaches Medea tak.es in her assault on Creon. She is
1
.~-:..t _successful in the first, which is made in "abstract
JUdicial language."
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the sophe Medea manipulate her enemy into harm's
•i'tness
For it is Medea sophe who continues, by way 0£

••r·

,enera

uzation on sophia, to try to persuade Creon not to

· d she does this both by resuming her at tempt to
be afrai i
·
Creon's perception 0£ sophia as a competitive
undermine
eclte and by appealing to Creon's own pro-fessed
competitiveness.

Arter -first baldly stating that her

reputation has, in £act, o£ten harmed her (292-293), Medea
claims that sophia is such a liability that anyone with his
head on straight will re£rain -from teaching his children to
be

too

•smart"

(294-295).75

This

is

because

a

"smart"

person does not, among the stupid, have the reputation
sought by a competitor, because he seems useless (296; c£.
298-299), or because such a person incurs envy as a
recognized superior (297; c£.

300-301

and 303, 305).

Medea

is walking a fine line here, however, for at the same time
that she is tacitly admitting to the superiority 0£ one who
is sophos (only stupid people think such a person is
useless and not "smart," while others who are considered-but are not really--smart are hostile in their envy), she
•Cain tries to convince Creon that this admitted
superiority is a liability, £or one either has no
reputation or incurs enmity.

Bur. ~ Rohdich, Tragodie, pp. 48-49, argues that
l.Pl.des suggests in this scene that Kedea•s own
1 nteu ·
. all-too-human, i.e., obtained by nurture,
and igence i.s
is not thereby supernatural.
5

337

sut this time Medea adds a new wrinkle to her
she backs Creon into a corner by implying that
if creon distrusts her because 0£ her sophia, he must be

·ous or stupid--maybe both.

e11v1

In either case, i£ Creon

admits that he considers Medea "smart," he places her on
top:

being •smarter" means she has the competitive edge;

))eillg envied means she is already recognized as better

( 3 03).

Ir, then, Creon is a

real competitor, he must

airee with Medea and stop considering her "smart," £or
otherwise he shows himsel£ to be at a disadvantage.

But

Creon does not so agree, because, as he will soon admit, he
is blurring at being a hardened competitor.
Medea, however, has taken him at his word, and
continues to appeal to him in competitive terms.

She tries

to dispel his £ears that she is by her "smartness" superior
to him, -first by encouraging him to believe that she "is
not so smart" (305).

She then baldly states that he, in

'fact, has the advantage as tyrant (309).

Besides, he has

not harmed her (309) and cannot there-fore be considered her
enemy; her rage is against her husband, not Creon (310311).

She bears no grudge against him--he, competitor that

he is, should let his th umos guide him in choosing a
husband £or his daughter (310); his choice has been
Prudent

311;

e6pas.

Cr.

•imilar claim at 549 that his betrayal 0£ Medea was
On

the

contrary,

Medea

wishes

him

well

338
She--not the type to try to fight a tyrant,
(312-313).
( 07-308)--admits, in a false display of selfreca 11 3

efface!D

ent that she is vanquished by her betters

•

(acpet.aaovwv

VLICWJJ.EVOl),

defers

to

apparent

his

powe r and begs to be allowed to stay (314-315).
This tactic, however, does not work with Creon because
b.e has JDore at heart than his own interests.

Indeed, he

proclaiJDed as much in his first speech--his fear was for
biS daughter, not himself (283)--but somehow Medea and we

were :fooled by

his

blu:f:f. 76

And

bluf:fing

he

was, :for

b.e is JDUCh more easily won over by an appeal to the
champion o:f quiet virtues he is than to the competitor he
b.as pretended to be.

It takes a bluffer to know one, and

Creon at :first makes a show of firm resolve by calling
attention to the discrepancy between Medea s ability to
1

speak things "soft to hear" while planning--he shudders to
iaaeine--some evil thing (316-317).

She is, he knows, not

saying what she really feels; he knows her thumos has been
roused (as he indicated at 271) and that she is feigning
congeniality and compliance:
76 Bongie,

"Heroic

she is the type that is not

Elements,"

p.

38,

proposes that
"By putting to
b eon first a request she knows he cannot grant, and then
Pretending to be very upset when he refuses, Medea
P Pares the ground for a much smaller request that he
::Uld hardly be so ungracious as to refuse, especially
ton~~-she appe_als to his feelings as a parent." According
Cr
l.~ analysis, Medea must realize straight 0££ that
*ee~~~ is blu££ing, £or being seen as gracious and having
com gs 0 £ connection are not the concern of the hardened
Pet1 tor he professes to be and has so far been.

~dea i~ instead using a clever strategy:

!e

339

f'.

80 easY

t

o guard against, a "smart" person who keeps silent

.

aocpos.,

320).

Creon seems to know this woman well.

We will later be

Medea herself that he was completely accurate in
told. by
tbiS characterization of her:

she was only fawning on him

to get what she needed (368-369).

That Creon would connect

Iler •smartness" with an ability to keep silent as to (read:
lie about) her true £eelings gives us another wrinkle on
the de-finition of sophia in the competitive arena.

The

aoehos individual in a zero-sum game is the one who--to use
a close paraphrase 0£ Winkler's description 0£ astute
conduct in a scarcity economy--appears -friendly, tries to
aa:simize his pro£it, lies through his teeth, and plays his
cards close

to

his

vest.77

110meone •smart," a winner.

This

is

the

0£

But Medea cannot win this way

with Creon, £or Creon knows her too well.
.repeats his order £or her to depart.
not, lost.

portrait

At 321 he

All seems, but is

For it is now that Medea starts playing to the

real Creon and gains her success.
By admit ting his connectedness to others and even
•rmbolically extending it to an aknowledged enemy, by
_responding to an appeal £or aidos, and by allowing himself
to be touched, Creon reveals his true, non-competitive,
cooperative nature.

In these three ways Creon's previously

stated Pre£erence for acquiring an enemy over making
77 Winkl

er,

Constrain ts,

p.

108.

340

concessions to one and su££ering £or it (290-291) is
exposed as the blu££ that it is.

Creon even admits as much

as he reluctantly grants Medea's request £or one day's
reprieve:

"It is not at all my natural temperament to be

tyrannical, and I have, in the act o-f showing aidos, many
destroyed."

been
,
-rupaVVLKOV,
times

>

u

('llKlCJTa

>

•

TOUIJ.OV

,

at60UIJ.€VOS
348-349).

Creon's statement recalls the Nurse's re£lections on
the

moods

of

tyrants

(TupavvtaJv

>--.ftµ.aTa,

119),

and

forces the realization that the real tyrant here, the
autonomous competitor, is Medea, not Creon.

For what Creon

allows, both Medea and, in £act, Jason repeatedly resist.
Creon is not like them.

As noted above, he marks his

de£iciencies as an autonomous competitor in three ways.
First, Creon does not k.eep the attachment he has to others
as a priority lower than his responsibility to himsel£.
By contrast, Jason shows his ability to do this in his
remarrying £or political advancement, Medea in killing her
children to get the better 0£ her enemy.

Second, Creon

heeds aidos, whereas an autonomous competitor like Jason
does

not,78
7 8 The

especially
reason

when

that

the

aidos

con£licts

competitor is

with

his

shameless

~Pelled out by Jerome A. Hiller, The Way 0£ Su££ering:

is
A

p eography 0£ Crisis (Washington, DC: Georgetown Univ.
~ess, 1988), p. 109:
"When we operate on the basis 0£ the
;~11 t~ control, we are aware 0£ only one kind 0£ 'evil':
it e -failure ~-f existence to con£orm to the plan we have -for
· From this point 0£ view, a being has worth only
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tion of himself as superior. For this reason, Jason
perceP
le to shake off Medea •s branding him as "diseased"
iS a b
anaidei[a) (472).79 Third, Creon fails to keep
with
f inaccessible to the touch of one he considers an
him Se l
unlike Medea at 1320-1322.
ene my •
creon is almost the opposite of Jason and Medea.

He

readilY admits that, for him, his child is his first
priority, his country second (329); he thereby defines
himself as concerned for others above himself.

He is not a

keen and autonomous competitor and is consequently open to
the in£luence

0£

aidos, 80

to

which

Medea

appeals

insofar as it performs some instrumental function for me.
I experience a being as evil whenever it stands over

against me, insisting on its Otherness. Seen from this
point of view, evil occurs in its most radical form when a
crisis upsets my whole way of living at the most
fundamental level. It is important to notice that when we
define good and evil in these terms, we cannot possibly
conceive of ourselves as evil. For from such a vantage
Point, evil is, by definition, that which runs counter to
our wills. By taking the view that the goodness of a being
depends on its measuring up to my criteria of what it ought
to be, I put myself in the position 0£ being the one who
sets up criteria, not the one who has to measure up to
them. That is why, when operating on the basis 0£ the will
to control, we are incapable 0£ shame."
Pace A. P.
Burnett, "Medea and the Tragedy of Revenge," CP 68 (1973;
hereafter Burnett, "Tragedy of Revenge"), pp. 9-10, who
attributes Hedea•s freedom from shame to her status as nonGreek.
79

According to Gouldner, Enter Plato, p. 95, shame
•ails as a sanction in the contest system where there is
t~~ 1n~ense _concern with victory." It may also fail when
re is a di.screpancy between what others think 0£ one and
one•s own sel£-image.
'f .

80Th·
1.s, as Buxton
Persuasion, pp. 159-160, points
out
is
"[t]
.
•
ev •
o his
[Creon's]
moral credit, but to his
entua1 downfall."
For an excellent definition of aidos,

342
326)
11as

more

and

than

to
once

Which

£inally

Creon

>

succumbed

admits

I

{aLoouµt:vos.,

he

349).

It

1S signi£ican t that these two uses 0£ the verb aideomai are

u1e on ly

ones in the play:

aidos, as the Chorus will soon

proclaim, is gone £rom Hellas (439-440).
reside only in this one man, Creon.
he suspects, serve him well.
sof~

It seems to

It will not, just as

It in £act signals him as

a weak and easily overcome contender in this

dangerous game he hal£-heartedly plays.
so too does his allowing himsel£ to be touched (339).
BJ' this Creon

needlessly81

puts

himsel£

in

the

position

of the supplicated; he must now choose either to ensure
that Medea is removed by an act 0£ violence, or else he
must willingly extend to her--this woman he considers his
enemy, a threat to what he holds dearest--the consideration
normally given only to a philos.

He chooses the latter and

shows himsel£, in competitive terms, in£erior to the woman
who now grovels at his knees, but who later will rise in
see Vernant, "Beauti£ul Death," p. 52.
81 John

Gould, "Hiketeia," JHS 93 (1973; herea£ter
Gould, "Hiketeia"). pp. 84-85, notes that the supplicated
~an, like Odysseus at Euripides• Hecuba 342-345, take
counter-measures• to see to it that the supplicant is
:nable to gain hold 0£ him. Creon here, like Odysseus
here, has ample warning that a "£igurative" supplication
1
. ; about_ to be made actual:
Gould sees evidence £or
1
IUrati.ve• supplication as early as 324 {c£. Creon's
:ords at 325); it becomes actual only at 338.
Creon,
h:•ever, £ails to take the necessary precautions to avoid
to submit or--wha t is a rare case, according to
80
him
{p. 80)--having to use physical £orce to extract
self £rom Medea •s supplication.

.::::g

343
t at this act so far beneath her.
disgus
The act of supplication, Gould argues, is not entirely
·t
debasing--i
abasement

1· s

ambivalent, teetering between self-

and

aggression.82

symbolic

In

displaying

yulnerabilitY, it ostensibly acknowledges the superiority
o£ the supplicated, since the supplicant by his act "has

teaiporarilY opted out of the 'contest system• of social
relationships that characterises normal behaviour between
And

suppliancy

yet,

does

so

by

the

brash act of taking physical hold of a person and refusing

to let go.

Winkler describes the inviolability of the

Athenian citizen, for whom touch was taken as a profound
insult because it was what one did to social
inferiors.84

And

while

it

may

be argued

that

Medea •s

gesture of supplication is something else entirely, it is
clear from Creon s
1

immediate, albeit reluctant, compliance

to do something that he has good reason to believe will
destroy him (349) that he has been dominated more than
entreated.

Indeed, Bennett Simon has shown that in this

Play touch is violation, and that Medea is one who not only
Will not allow herself to be touched, but who equates touch

•

82
Gould, "Hiketeia,"
Place and Time," p. 30.
83

Gould,

84

Winkler,

"Hiketeia,"

pp.

p.

Constraints,

94-97.

Cf.

94.
pp.

48-49.

Gredley,
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,,ttll Vlounding. 85

And,

as

the

Nurse's

:forebodings

have

suggested, even proximity spells danger.
creon, then, who has espoused the play•s pro£:fered
definition o:f competitive arete, shows himsel£ to be not up
to carrying it 0££, at least against a

contender like

For just as she used a display 0£ vulnerability to

Kedea.

gain the support o:f the Chorus, Medea uses with Creon a
pretense o:f sel:f-abasement to get :from him what she wants:
one day.
In short, Medea •s exhibition of' vulnerability is as
false as Creon's proclaimed espousal o:f the competitive
code.

A:fter Creon departs, Medea lightly shrugs o:f:f the

Chorus• concern over her isolation and the obstacles she,
without resources, must overcome (357-363).

Instead, she

rises :from her abased posture to assume a competitor's
stance:
have

she promises the Chorus that Jason and his bride

contests

,

>I

E:la>

aywve:s

yet

to

come,

and

no

small
>
OU

ICQl'

troubles

,,

(e:-r>

'
O"IJ.llCPOl

I

VOVOl,

366-367).

Finally,

there

is

Medea's

contender's disgust at having comported herself as an
inferior:

"For do you think that I would ever have :fawned

so Upon that man, i:f I weren't to gain something or weren't
85 Simon,

Tragic Drama, pp. 77-78.
Flory, "Right
pp. 69-74, traces in Medea the transf'ormation -from
~OVing_ to hostile touch. Flory notes (p. 69) that denying
p h~ right to touch is cruel.
C£. Newton, "Passionate
d ~I.son," p. 13:
"The touch o:f Medea •s hand, it seems,
wi.s_tort~, perverts, and poisons all relationships with
hJ.ch l. t comes in to con tact."
Hand,"
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devising
biDl nor

something £or mysel£?
W ould

I would not have spoken to

I have touched his hand." (368-370).

While it may not be surprising that Medea openly
ackno "

ledges that her pleading touch veiled a sense 0£

superiority, it perhaps shocks modern Western sensibilities
uiat she so brazenly displays her deceit-fulness, hatred,
and villainy to these women, and they never once demur.
Kedea, however, knows these women as the competitors that
they are, and there-fore -feels no compunction about
displaying to them the competitive use to which she puts
her •smartness," her vigor £or competition, and her
proneness to violence.

She contemptuously points out to

them Creon's in-feriority in intellectual competition (he is
a

fool

£or

having

believed

her,

371),86

and

unselfconsciously savors the imagined de£ea t 0£ her three
enemies:

Creon, his daughter, and Jason (374-375).

There is no question, then, £or the Chorus or Medea
that she is right to kill these enemies; though they may
have their own reasons £or wanting to see Jason punished,
the Chorus do not protest that this gentle soul--their own
king!--and

his

daughter

be

k.illed;87

Medea's

only

86
K
Husurillo, "Reconsideration," p. 55, shares
edea•s view 0£ Creon's "stupid sel-f con-fidence."
87
G. M. A. Grube, The Drama 0£ Euripides (London:
Methuen & c o., L td., 1961), p. 105.
•T
See also Burnett,
ragedy 0£ Revenge," p. 18, who notes that the Corinthian
W
.
. .
Cfomen , "prov e t o be women £irst
and citizens
only later."
he. Ra anana Meridor, "Euripides, Medea 639," CQ 36 (1986;
reafter Meridor, "Medea 639"), p. 95, and Ohlander,
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concern
not t

· n the act is how to accomplish it in such a way as
i

o threaten her superior stat us.
Lines 376-385 show Medea pondering her course 0£

action.

They end with her choosing one road, the way in

which she
IJ.GAL<11'a,

she

acKnowledges

385),

the

use

0£

is

"especially

drugs.

What

the

smart"

{ooqial:

use

such

0£

drugs has over other courses 0£ action, Medea notes, is
that she cannot be detected in the act 0£ using them.
Detection would lead to her death, which would in turn give
her enemies a good laugh (381-383), which would cinch her
inferiority.· That being inferior to her enemies is
unbearable is obvious from Medea's repetition 0£ this point
within a £ew lines, the second time bolstered by the need
to maintain her status as genealogically superior to
Jason's tribe (404-406).

So, instead 0£ choosing a

course

which would involve direct action, Medea chooses one which
affords her the sa£ety 0£ distance £rom the action.
competitor,

she

must

choose

this

road.88

All

As a

others

allow proximity of the enemy and room for de£eat, and
thereby the chance £or her enemies to gloat.

Given her

aims, the plan is well conceived and highly rational.

It

is, furthermore, liKe the use 0£ drugs themselves, an
indication 0£ the essence 0£ Medea's sophia.
§.uspense,

•

is

88

p.

59.

Easterling, "In£anticide," p. 183, claims that
· · in [Medea's] own view 0£ hersel£ her magical sKill
Part of her heroic arete."
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.A.fter all, using drugs to poison requires certain
ersonal skills." For one cannot merely mix up
•1nter P
.
and be done with it; drugs work. only in proximity
p0t1ons
to the intended victim:
touch the skin.

they must either be swallowed or

The skill 0£ concoction is, then, only the

beginning; the success£ul poisoner is one who can render
the victim heedless 0£ the drug's presence, and can somehow
so lull the victim's fear and distract him from his natural
wariness of o£ferings from the poisoner that he willingly
and thoughtlessly administers the deadly dose to himsel£ .
.A.nd while Medea's plan in general indicates her abilities
at rational calculation, her sk.ill'ful execution 0£ the use
of poison--where she boasts of being especially sophe-shows what is meant in this play by "smart":

Medea's real

•smartness" will be her ability to lie to her intended
Yictims and wheedle out of them what she needs to destroy
them, and her willingness to use innocent agents--her own
children!--to gain the necessary proximity.
Medea's •smartness• as a
power of her words.

poisoner, then, is in the

She cannot be successful without the

persuasion she wields over others.

In short, Medea's

sophia in regard to poisons is her sophia as a chary player
o'f the zero-sum game, translated to a specialized use.

We

have already seen the sophe Medea use these skills--of
appearing friendly, trying to maximize her profit, lying
through her teeth, and playing her cards close to her vest

348

reon especially, but to a certain extent even with
--•ith C
From each she gets what she wants: one day
tile chorus.
and silence.

we will later see her using many 0£ these

sJtillS •i th Aegeus (with whom, however, she seems genuinely
friendly) to get a

place 0£ re£uge; even later she will use

these skills with Jason, when in her second interview with

hilD she is more interested in manipulation than, as in her
first interview with him, con£rontation.

It will be in

this second interview that Medea•s sophia as poisoner is
put to the test and shown exceptional, £or she easily
arranges to gain the proximity needed £or the poison to
•ork.
Medea•s sophia has, then, been on display all along.
It is only in the scene with Creon where its de£inition is

discussed and made explicit.

Whether as poisoner or

wielder 0£ words, Medea is shown to be the "smartest"
person in this play because 0£ her skill at conceiving and
bringing into e££ect whatever plans advance her own
interests.89

She is

precisely

the

"smart"

woman

Creon

89 Ann
Margaret
Abbott,
The
av.fie OO!OS in
Buripides (diss. Bryn Mawr, 1971), is an exhaustive study
of the £ull range 0£ meaning 0£ words with the stem sophin the Euripidean corpus. Abbott acknowledges that concern
:or one's own interests is one 0£ the meanings 0£ sophos in
edea (pp. 102-104; 141), but does not discuss sel£1Hnterest
in the competitive arena, and there£ore classi£ies
A:~ea ·~ knowledge 0£ drugs only as a sinister skill.
w ott s study, passim, traces the evolution 0£ soph- stem
fords, and argues that their connotations, once both
b~v:ra~le_ and un£avorable, become predominantly un£avorable
2-hil uri.pides• time. The exceptions to this are sophia and
OSOPhia.
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feare d '

for she is interested in harming those who have

her and she is most capable at this because her
'
• is wheedling from others what she needs to
•saaartness

J18r1De

d

accoJDPliSh her goals.
Medea's sophia, in short, 'finds its de£inition in the
coaapeti ti ve arena as a force of destruction.

It is a

sKill--whether in using words or administering potions-wherein one

finds

the

way

to self-advancement.90 And

in this particular competitive arena, that advancement
comes chiefly through the destruction 0£ one's enemies.

As

the episode comes to a close, Medea contemplates what is to
come, and in her contemplation shows the competitive domain
within which her sophia operates, and its consequently
destructive bent.

Medea's current situation is described

by her in purely competitive terms:

"Creep forward to the

clever/awful thing," she prompts hersel£, "How is the
contest

of

>
es

courage
403).

Medea

.

TO

6et. vov•

concludes

V\JV

with

another appeal to the solidarity of women, this time as the
•smartest

craftsmen

.

aocpwTaTat.,

of
409).

all

harms•

This

last

(KaKwv

may

6E

.

11'aVTWV

appear

•

Abbott's approach to this evolution is moralistic.
onetheless, her list 0£ characteristics 0£ •the bad 'wise
•an•• (pp. 125-126), is an illuminating list of zero-sum
• ame strategies.
90Th·
sophia t is may be why Pucci, Violence, p. 94, finds
com
. ~ be "an improbable heroic virtue." Zero-sum
Petition, not heroism, is the issue in this play.
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· to the casual observer; it is in :fact the
•isogynistic
acknowledgement o:f the destructiveness o:f sophia
firSt open
· the zero-sum game o:f this play. One may expect
defined in
e women o:f the Chorus will balk at being so
tlJ,at th
But these women are not predictable to
described.
sensibilities outside the zero-sum game, :for they not only
do not protest, rather they crow their approval and
a•reement.
These

women

are,

as

they

say,

no

ladies.91

first half' o:f their :first stasimon (410-445) is a

The

song o:f

celebration o:f the zero-sum game in which they, at long
last, are

on

top.92

The

image

o:f

the

streams

o:f

sacred

rivers £lowing backward is not just an expression o:f
violent reversal; it is as well an expression of the zerosum game.

There is only one river; either it :flows in your

91pace Arrowsmith, "Ideas,• p. 48, who tends to
take at their word the Corinthian women 0£ the Chorus,
•with their Greek praise o:f sophrosune and their :fear o:f
ezcess . . . .•
The women's control o:f their passions is,
nonetheless, i:f better than that o:f the barbarian Medea,
•still inadequate and precarious.•
92 conacher, Euripidean Drama, p. 191, terms this
•tasimon "almost 'a song :for 'feminists.'"
Hills,
ll1thopoeia, p. 99, sees in the meter 0£ the :first £our
choral songs an extension o:f an athletic theme: "The :first
'four stasima are all built on dactylic cla usulae, a meter
Which Euripides was employing in this period generally :for
:n epic or heroic e:f:fect. The Hedeia is unusual in that
t;ur stasima are in this meter, occurring specifically in
Ode -form 0£ the dactylo-epitrite, the meter o-f epinikian
Indeed, the :first stasimon does constitute a
orr-ode :for women as represented by Hedeia.•
this Boedeke~, "Medea,• p. 102, argues that the Chorus in
1a con°td_e begin their critic ism 0£ received opinion, which
inued throughout the play.

Yi::·
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r in theirs. Women can now be superior only
41rection o
men have shown themselves in£erior, at least in the
])eCause
realm of trust. There is no question 0£ men and women both
baV'inS good repute; change in the order 0£ things will
eff eC t

a change in the stories about woman's reputation
411

(o'tP£fe"t'aL

and

418).

Since

•en are now designated deceit£ul, women will no longer be
90

impugned.
The tone 0£ the stasimon•s 'first half is sel£-

con£ident and brazen.

The Chorus are confident in their

report that the 'future holds changes in their favor (411,
418, 420, 421), and attribute their troubles in the past to
their impotence at manipulating song.

Phoebus had given

song to men, it seems; the women boldly submit that
otherwise they would have sung a song in their own de£ense
>

.

I

av"t'ax'r)a>

yevv{I, 426-429).

But

"'
av
they

>

CJ

are

they intend to sing a new song.

now

I

apae:vwv

UIJ.VOV

the singers, and

They are up, men are down.

A long-standing wrong has been righted.
The antagonism the Chorus espouse in the 'first part 0£
their song has taken its toll in the li£e 0£ Medea.

In the

second strophe they relive her fa te£ul departure 'from her
PClterna1 home, her taking up residence in a foreign land,
her husband's betraying their marriage, her current status
as 'fugitive.

In this concentrated recapitulation of the

Pivotal events of Medea's li£e, the Chorus concentrate on
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,,

•edea

5

alienation:

she has le-ft home, lives among

ers has lost her husband, and is now an exile. The
•
ce now £or the second time in the play, has been
audien •
to a cause and e££ect view 0£ Medea"s past and
trea t e 4
For although the Chorus either pass over or are
presen t ·

•tran g

unaware o£ the circumstances in which Medea le£t her
paternal home, the audience cannot help but be aware 0£
A nd while the Chorus cannot discern a

them.

turning 0£ the

tide as they recount Medea"s swi£t descent 'from active
antagonist

,

.

clauv'!I.

to

passive

431-438).

victim

Euripides,

,,

(£11').£uoas

by

making

them

in

seven

lines give her whole history, compels his audience to
consider that this woman"s will'ful choice to leave home and
abandon philoi £or strangers is a choice 0£
alienation;93

it

is

only

logical

hersel£ abandoned and driven out.

that

she

now

£ind

In addition, the

unspoken subtext 0£ the strophe, that Medea betrayed and is
now hersel£ betrayed, is at least suggested by the Chorus"
tale 0£ Hedea"s trans-formation -from the master 0£ her £ate
to its victim.
The Chorus, however, speak none 0£ this; instead, they

fin
f

93v
. isser. •ffedea.• pp. 150-155. delineates the
e ~i.ne that women must walk between natal and conjugal

n!~ili.es. _upon marriage. women give up the security 0£ the
fa ~l £ami.ly only to become "-foreigners• in the conjugal
la::ly. Medea di£fers from the ideal wife in that she
l"el 8 the reluctance to leave the natal family, a
lin:c~ance that signals a wife will prove to be a strong
et ween males of two lines.
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5y111pat

nize with Medea's fate because she is on their side,
current alienation is one with which t.hey, as

and ner

itors are doubtlessly familiar.
The zero-sum game,
co111Pe t
•
l sets one at odds with all defined as contenders for
rec al •
rize.94 The Chorus unwittingly describe the
the same P
etb.iCS

O

f this game in which they so willingly compete:

trust

is

not

fixed

>

I

I

(OUK£Tl

>I

ll'lO" TlS

apape,

415)--

it is as fluid as the streams that flow backward; the grace
of oaths is gone, and aidos does not remain--it has flown
away. 95
This is the creed of competition.

Trust and oaths and

regard for the sensibilities of others are only applicable
in a consciously cooperative society, one in which common
security

and

stability

are

the

goals.96

In

the

field

o-f autonomous competitors, such values are only weights

around the neck.

In such an arena, where what is on the

94Gouldner, Enter Plato, p. 106, indicates that
contentiousness increases individuality, along with which
comes a feeling of separateness and isolation.
95 The allusions to Hesiod's Works and Days 190-201
are discussed by Richard Garner, From Homer to Tragedy:
The Art of Allusion in Greek Poetry (London and Bew York:
Routledge, 1990), pp. 95-96.
See also Burnett, •Tragedy 0£
Revenge,• p. 20 .
96g
ee Burnett, "Tragedy of Revenge," pp. 13 and
20 • for the importance of oaths to society and their
:_nction by the gods. GailAnn Rickert, "Akrasia and
.A:ipi~e:' Medea,• HSCP 91 (1987; herea£ter Rickert,
Punr:asi.a ), pp. 107-113, makes the point that Jason's
Of /shment~ childlessness, reflects one part of the penalty
or orsweari.ng designated from Homer onward: "destruction
one~ermanent obscurity of one's house or the destruction of
s Children." (p. UO).
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:t>OttOID

strives only to be on the top, security and

..... itY are a part 0£ the rhetoric 0£ power and control,
stawl. 1
of cooperation. Instability becomes desirable when one
no t
bottom; change, £luidity, and £light are then
1• on t h e
•oveJDen t s toward what is better.

Stability is only to be

•aintained when one is in control.
stifling and

Otherwise, it is

intolerable.

The Chorus, however, ignorant as yet 0£ the
consequences of the de£inition of excellence they support
and espouse, ironically despair over the disappearance 0£
the very values their chosen code 0£ conduct destroys.

In

their ignorance, they can luxuriate in the pity they feel
for Hedea s loss 0£ her father s home (441), and encourage
1

1

her to fluidity in what is an unacceptable status quo:
another queen is set up in her house in control 0£ her bed

,.£

(Twv

,

"EK ,.pwv
>

,

£11'£0,.a,

6011.0LOLV

KP£LOCJCa>V

443-445).

particular

This

stability--that 0£ another "set up" in one s £ormer place-1

ia of course intolerable to a competitor.

And although

1

Hedea s troubles began when she chose to set sail from her
>I

(£11'"£uoas,
that

this

anchorage

cSoa,LoL,

Ta pa,

431),

is . lost

c5uoTave;,

the
to

Chorus

her

(ooL

despair

now
cJ>

>I

OU,.£

llOX9pwv

441-444).

The Chorus thus seem peculiarly short-sighted.
hard to imagine that they could indulge in such

It is

355

contradictory thinking, but it is precisely their sel£contradiction which effects the refutation of all they
:t>elieV'e.

It would be possible at this point in the play to

de£end the Chorus as simply ignorant of Medea s past
1

criIDes,97

for

they

have

gotten no

explicit

information

thus far from anyone on stage, and th,ere is no reason for
us to imagine that they of necessity know the nature of her
services to Jason.

During the next episode, however, they

near enough details of Medea s treachery against her father
1

and Pelias (see 483-487) that, if they were inclined to
censure her, they would surely have grounds for it.
they do not.

But

It is here, then, that one can see in

operation the dangers inherent in even the seemingly
innocuous part of the "help friends, harm enemies" code:
in their support of Medea and hatred of Jason, the Chorus
will find themselves paradoxically condoning violence they
will come to abhor.
Ronetheless, the Chorus• support of Medea over Jason
is not hard to understand.

For it is in the thoroughly

self-serving opportunism of Jason, who is currently, but
only briefly, on top, that Euripides shows to his audience,
and even to his Chorus, the underside of competitive

97 They are not, however, ignorant of what Medea
has just said, and, as Williamson, "Woman s Place," p. 28,
Points out, "the ode is in fact in a deeply paradoxical
relationship with what went before it." The Chorus have,
that is, just seen Medea display the deceitfulness they
attribute to men.
1
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autonomY·
individual,

11er

except when one recalls that Medea, £or all 0£

services in behal£ 0£ Jason was, in doing service to
which was everything to her (228), actually serving

tba t

11er

It is hard to imagine a more sel£-centered

O

wn interests.

It is Jason•s job to illustrate how

despicable is sel£-service and how thoroughly revolting is
tbe individual who con-fuses his own interests with the good
of

others.9 8
Jason is, in short, a contender like Medea and the

Cborus, but he has, unlike Medea, the victor•s easy
ienerosity

and

nonchalance.99

With

his

entrance at

une 446, he begins by trying to convince Medea that she
sbould not have squirmed so at having been displaced; she
should have been content to be one down.

His arguments

recall those very things about the stat us of women that
1alvanized the Chorus into taking Medea•s side.

Jason

first counsels that Medea could have stayed if only she had
consented to being inferior, i.e., would have "born lightly
the

decisions

lPelooovwv

0£

those

pouAeuJJ,aTa,

in

449).

control"
In

Yiolate the creed of the competitor:

sum,

she

should

she should let others

rule and forget about being in control.
98

(Kou•ws

These words are,

According to Easterling, •In£anticide,• p.
!! {heextent
character of Jason ". . . we are allowed to see the
of the provocation [Medea] has been suffering."
183,

1

Jaso ~ Bo:r1gie, "Heroic Elements," pp. 42-43, sees in
ah ~ s disregard 0£ Medea•s threats his contemptuousness;
e is not considered a worthy opponent.

9
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se

of cour

11118,,are

cheap when one is on top, as Jason is. He seems
'
that suggesting that Medea accept in:feriority would

hiS competitive wi:fe, and yet, maddeningly, he does

offen d

oot stop at that.
Jason continues by supporting the play's de:fini tion o:f
•sma rtn
ene my

ess• as a :force used in competition to throw o:f:f the

and thereby gain the edge.

Medea, he notes,

displayed her intellectual in:feriority by re:fusing to be
duplicitous.

He is con:fident in terming Medea a :fool :for

speaking her mind:
because

o:f

0 ;sveda1,

450),

not

go

let

"You will be driven out o:f the land

:foolish

o:f

he

(Aoywv

words"

scolds;

your

and

:folly

again:

(µ.wpias.),

aouthing the rulers• (457-458).

'
µ.aTalWV

•But
:forever

you

will

bad-

According to Jason, then,

lleclea has made some ill-considered moves in this game, and
•hould consider hersel:f lucky to be getting o:f:f with exile

c•av

Kepoos.

c

'l'IYO'U

C'lllJ.lO'UIJ.EV'll

cpuy-o,

454).

Perhaps it is only because Jason is now on top that he
can be magnanimous.

His condescension, however, can be

read in the :fact that it means nothing to him that Medea
(Underdog :fool that she is) calls him kakistos (452).

And

~et. he still cleaves to the competitor's code o:f helping

'friends.

He there:fore will not desert Medea and the

Children, Who are still, by his lights, philoi to him (459,
465

).

He has, as :far as he is concerned anyway, done

llOth·

ing to harm her; everything she su:f:fers is her own
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faU I

t

can

(450, 453, 457-458).

In

these

care£ul

de£enses,

one

discern his competitor 1 s attention to reciprocity.
Medea does not

s11e "

mince words with him,100 and

later

ill have to repair some 0£ the damage her honesty here
Jason is pankakistos, a coward, and her enemy (465-

ct.oes.

What he is doing to those he considers £riends is

46'1).

She £urther

shamelessness pure and simple (469-471).

reckons that--locked as they are in a zero-sum con test-- her
will

d.eli1ht
,

1 ov•La8'flCJOIJ.a L

•
11vwv,

>

,

pain

(£yw

1'£

•UX'l'IV

KQKWS

0'£

KQL

She

recalls

be

473-474) .

his

.

in

.

detail

.

yap

.

O'U

the

,
Aet;aoa

,
AU11''110''tl

services

she per£ormed £or him and intimates that he has £allen
short 0£ the expected reciprocity (476-487); instead he has
betrayed her £or no reason (488-490).

Competitor that she

is, Kedea would have understood being treated as an

interchangeable part had she not given Jason the expected
children, but such was not the case in their £ruit£ul
aarriage (490-491).

She, like the Chorus, ironically

bemoans the fluidity 0£ attachment typical 0£ the zero-sum
tame; like them, Medea the loser now despairs at the loss
Of cooperative virtues like aidos (472) and oath-keeping

(492-495).
The irony 0£ Medea s lament is driven home as she
1

l'"ecaus how Jason used to supplicate her--£alsely, she now
lOOGredl ey, "Place and Time," p. 31, shows that
ea likewise controls the theatrical space in this

lled

•Piaode.
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reauzes:

"Ah!

This right hand. which you so many times

toolt hold o£. and these knees.

How £alsely were we touched

. harming man; how far off target has landed the
thJ.S
These lines, of course,
our hopes." (496-498).
arrow 0£
scene just witnessed, where Medea so skill-fully
recall the

br

did unto Creon as she now reveals had been done by Jason
unto her.101

Her

regret

of

false

suppliancy is

of princip 1e. J.·t is one of expediency.

not

one

Suffering such an

act is regrettable £or the competitor, but doing it to
others brings success, and therefore no regret.
Medea concludes her speech with a review 0£ what
Gouldner re£ers to as the low object attachment, sense of
isolation, and distrust of others common to the zero-sum
competitor.

Fluidity of association, an indication of low

object attachment, can be witnessed in the present acts of
Jason as well as the past acts of Medea.

Jason, once a

friend, can now only hypothetically be considered one--and
this consideration Medea, now his enemy, undertakes only to
•how up his baseness (499-501).

Medea openly admits that

•he herself, in the service of her sole concern, Jason,
has--like Jason without due cause--become hateful to her

101

Boedeker, "Medea," pp. 95-100, shows how first
ason, and then Medea violate trust by misusing oaths,
•up 1
.
•
h P ication, and persuasion. Such are the potential
f:~rors of ::eciprocity. Boedeker argues that Medea uses
th:e supplJ.cation with Creon, Aegeus, and, indirectly
Pri ough the children, the princess. In all three cases her
hermary goal is not the falsely proffered salvation £or
Self or the children, but successful retaliation.
J
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J.1.0V'I'),

512-

Finally, her prayer to Zeus at 516-519 is £or some

way to see through the deceptiveness which, as has been
argued, is a large part 0£ the sophia 0£ zero-sum
co1Dpeti tors.
we soon see, though, that Medea has misrepresented
Jason in this generalization, £or Jason is anything but
deceptive.

He lacks intelligence and tact; he can be

nothing but blunt.

By constructing Jason's character in

this way, Euripides does more than 'further alienate Medea
and the Chorus against this man; in this characterization
Buripides highlights the brutality 0£ the zero-sum game's
precepts.
For example, Jason's most in£uriatingly crude
argument--when he admits to using his erotic appeal to
purchase Medea's aid--is an incredibly unsel£conscious
acceptance 0£ manipulation 0£ desire in the zero-sum game.
Jason can, by this £rank admission, cancel the debt 0£
reciprocity Medea claims he owes her; he's beholden only to
APhrod.i te and Eros:
As £or me--since in £act you overstress your 'favors to
me--1 consider Cypris, alone 0£ gods and men, to be
the savior 0£ my naval enterprise. As £or you, you do
have an ingenious mind, but it would be begrudging to
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ribe ho'fl Eros compelled you with his unavoidable
desc -s to save my lif'e. (526-531).
arro ..
. merely making explicit the standard opera ting
Jason is
the protagonists in this play: using
procedure f'or
eYerything at one's disposal, including one's erotic
1 to accomplish one's goal of' self'-advancement.
appea,

He

indulges in a bit of' archaic anthropomorphism, but his
tactic with Medea dif'f'ers not at all f'rom his tactic with
Creon's daughter, and only but a
from Medea's tactic with Aegeus.

little, as will be seen,
Medea in Jason's

description is depicted as the constrained and theref'ore
the loser; she was compelled by Eros, whose arrows were
unavoidable

>
I
'l')VayKaOE

P'Epws

He

will

soon

go

I

"tO~OlS

so

£ar

4e£end reusing this old tactic as "smart" (548).

as

to

Jason is

one who knows how to use eros to his advantage; he is not,
however, one who will be himself' stricken by desire
556).

Medea,

who

according

to Jason believes this to be true of' him, he will call
•1staken.
But even more generally, Jason in his reply identif'ies
himsel-f as

a

competi tor.102

He

readily

admits

that

'fame, the competitor's highest prize, is more important to
him than anything:

•As f'ar as I'm concerned, rather than

102·
to Wh
Cf'. Walsh, "Public and Private," pp. 295-296,
om
Jason is a man who attends only to the public
41 mension
of' lif'e.
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'old

·n tbe nouse or a song more beautiful to sing than
.1

s• I'd have the fate that made me famous." (542orpbe U •
Jason can imagine that the score is settled between

544).

bimse lf
sbe

C

and Medea, since he has brought her to a land where

an

540 ).103

enjoy
Jason

the
in

terms o£ contest.

fruits

addition

of

her

sees

fame

things

€oxes,

(doi;av

broadly

in

His argument with Medea is a •contest•

of words; he refers to producing many children as a
•contest•

in

which

he

takes

no

part

u

(a1.u>.>.av,

546

and

55'1).

Furthermore, from the rest of what Jason says, he is
clearly a ware of the realities of the zero-sum game.
accepts that relationships are fleeting:

He

he takes it for

1ranted that friends flee the impoverished man (560-561).
Indeed, he defines a friend as one who can advance social
status; he is able therefore to defend himself as a •great
friend" to Medea and the children because he has arranged
for their prosperity and social standing (548-560).
But perhaps the most telling indication that Jason
fits the definition of the zero-sum competitor is what is
to Medea most infuriating about him:
himself as •smart• as a

that he defends

competitor would:

As for your reproaching me for my royal marriage, I
103Bo

.

ack
ngie, "Heroic Elem en ts,• pp. 43-44,
no nowledges Jason's appeal to "heroic" values, and further
ac:~s his sly omission, i.e., "that he has by his recent
appions brought [Medea] ill-fame since he has made her
ear weak and vulnerable, and hence open to ridicule.•
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snall £i~st show ,that I w~s smart. in doing. this
,
-rctt6E
c§eu~w
11'pw-ra
µ.ev
oocpos
(EV.~.~) then that I was prudent. and finally that
y£Y-3 •
•
•
was a great 'friend (µ.eyas cpl~os) to you and
1
IDY cb.ildren--but do be quiet. (547-550).

lD snort. Jason can claim •smartness• precisely because he
operates

bY total-commitment rationality and displays the

concomitant low object attachment.
thiS is •smart.•

In the zero-sum game,

Consequently, what Jason considers

•smart• and •prudent• is his ability to have conceived 0£
and carried out a plan to win security and social standing
for b.imsel£ and his children.
he. e xile that
aarry a

he

was,104

What luck!, he argues, that

stumbled

king's child (551-554).

upon

the

chance

to

His goal is not to produce

more children, but to live well and not be in need (557 560).

He dreams 0£ bringing the children up worthily, 0£

creating a clan that thrives and lives the good life (562565).

Perhaps this dream is, one begins to sense, not all

that reprehensible.
But in the wake of this glorious dream of eudaimonia,
Jason's former wife has been summarily dismissed so that he
and his children (past and future) and new bride can live
happily ever after.

Wives are, obviously, interchangeable

Parts, as, Jason makes it clear, are children.

Both are

Objects to be used to one's advantage; Medea, £or example,
according to Jason, does not need children (565), while it

104

Sha w
•Female Intruder,•
Pliiht Of th~ cityless man.

p.

261,

describes

the
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lY to his advantage and bene£it to have them (566i• ciear
But, he at last concludes, wives--especially this
56'1)·

lY disgruntled one be£ore him--are too messy a thing
ol>•ious
•smart" man like himsel£ to have around. Jason, in
for a
Co ncluding remarks, is not being so misogynistic as
JiiS

coldlY rational:

wives should be avoided because they,

Ulte Medea, simply cannot accept being treated as
interchangeable parts, even when it is clearly £or the
J>etter; why, they cannot even recognize a great plan when
the:r

see

one

567).

(µ.wv

can they not see this?

Why

It is something to do with sex--

"'
it is the •bed• that rubs them the wrong way (ou6> av

.

>I

av

El.

).exos,

0£

569-570).

In

567-568;

c£.

£rustra tion,

Jason argues that the whole matter 0£ beget ting children to
set onesel£ up socially is bet t.er le£t done without sex
(5'13-575).
imagines,

Things would run so much more smoothly, he
in

a

sexless

world.105

This last remark. well accords with what £or the

105 Jason•s disdain 0£ women and sex is predictable
for a zero-sum competitor. His blatant misogyny is as much
an expression 0£ eagerness £or success in competition as
•as Creon and Medea •s prior disdain 0£ so£tness. For
IDiaogyny as the ma1e•s projection 0£ and contempt £or his
sensed weakness as a physical being, see Susan Gri££in,
cirnography and Silence: Cult ure•s Revenge Against Hat ure
York.:
Harper and Row, 1981; Colophon Books, 1982),
aa~e 13 -_14. For the sexual act as a threat to sel£'lh rtion, see Ernest Beck.er, Denial 0£ Death (Hew York.:
162~ :,ree Press, 1973; paperback. ed., 1975), pp. 42-45 and

;•n

p;•

1
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present

·s the one real difference between Jason and Medea

1

--altbOU g

h

even this di££erence will not last.

Jason s
1

competitor is his control of his emotions--the
forte as a
e •cold £ish" leaps to mind--while Medea, at least for
p11ras
resent, has abandoned control of hers and instead
tile P
e)losen to speak openly.
will

soon

This is a tactical mistake, as she

recognize.106

For the present, however, Medea attacks Jason•s claim
to being sophos.

At £irst it appears that she is over-

turning the play s previously o££ered de£ini tions 0£
1

90phia, because she seems to be denying that one who is
sophos is duplicitous:
I admit that I am in many ways di££erent £rom many
mortals. For as £ar as rm concerned, the one who is
unjust and "smart• at speaking (ooTlS. ac5u:os.
b1v ao•os.
AEYEl v
v£.uu:)
should
get
the
greatest punishment. Glorying in his power of speech,
he dresses injustices in finery; he
dares to>I do
>.,...,
anything
(yl.woo't)
yap
auxwv
Tac5LK>
Eu
'D'EPlOT£A£LV.
TOAJ.Lp
Va voupy£LV• ).
But
he
is
not
really
•smart"
(eOTl
6>
OUK
ayav
ao•os.).
This
applies
to
you
now:
you
don t
•
>
,
impress me as being elegant (£1!0X'l')J.LWV) and
•clever/ terrible" at speaking (A£YEl v
6ElVOS.).
For one remark will stretch you out
£lat. 1£ you were not Kakos, you would have persuaded
me about making this marriage, and not done it in
secret
from
your
friends
(JJ.°'1
al y~
•LAwv).
I

~

t.

1

(579-587).

106 Foley, 11 Divided Sel£,• p. 64, argues that
11e:ea, i~ her second interview with Jason, mimics Jason's
: : d ratio~alit! and, in formulating her revenge, employs
p ainst him his own "bloodless decision making . . .
rectsely to make Jason feel the emotions he once rejected
~ • • ·"
also p. 80, where Foley argues that Medea
0me~ to See
despise eros along with •au that is feminine.•
111
opps ort, she assimilates Jason's misogyny; once the
ressed victim, Medea becomes the oppressor (p. 81).
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j.

car e

11edea

ful reading 0£ this passage, however, proves that
iS in no way saying that only those who do not hide

the truth are sophoi.

In the 'first place, Medea does not

atake the claim to being sophos depend on the use or not-use
of duplicity, but instead on the propriety of matching
1>ehavior to type 0£ individual--friend or foe.

In fact, in

her first speech to Jason Medea admitted that she herself
had likewise abandoned sophia when she betrayed philoi--her
father and home--and came to lolcus with Jason.

She

describes hersel£ in this action as "more zealous than
smart"

I

oo•wTepa,

(vpoeu11os

485).

In the current episode, then, Medea criticizes Jason•s
duplici ty--not per se, but for its basis in betrayal:

with

his duplicity Jason conceals that he is "unjust," that is,
that he is not returning to others what he has received.
When Medea upbraids Jason for pretending to be "just" when
he is in fact being "unjust," she picks up on the choral
interjection that immediately precedes, which likewise is
concerned with the intersection of what is "just" and the
comely arrangement of words:
these words nicely (e~
IJ.£V
TOUOcP
EKOOIJ."l')OQS
l.oyous);
nevertheless, as far as I am concerned, even if I
speak. against popular opinion, in betraying your wife,
you seem to have done things that were not just
Jason,
"

<ou

you

have

I

dLKala

arranged

>

I

I

dpav).

(576-578).

In short, both Medea and the Chorus are put off by
Jason•s "sophistry" because it has been used in violation
of the code of reciprocity.

He has dressed up betrayal as

367
)l.elp--J:>U t
bJIS don

·n this he is not at -fault.

l.

The -fault is that he

e this with someone with whom he himsel£ claims to

)I.ave a £hilos-relationship.

Jason's real transgression is

of the code 0£ "helping -friends and harming enemies,"
beCause he has used on a -friend the sophia-tactics
(pre t

ending -friendliness, maximizing one's own pro£i t,

iring, and playing cards close to one's vest) right-fully
used against a not-£riend.
unes 586-587:

Medea makes this clear in

i£ Jason were really a

philos, he would not

11ave sneaked behind her back, but persuaded her 0£ their
mutual bene£it in this new marriage.

He did not:

there-fore

kakos.107

mani£estly

•unjust•

There is, however, a

and

he is

second -facet 0£ Medea's criticism

of Jason's claim to be sophos, obvious even in both the
Chorus' and Medea's being able to call him on his
duplicity:

he is not credible.

As Medea points out,

Jason's argument is preposterously easy to

107 Jason

is kakos to Medea (586, 618) be ca use he
has harmed her and is there-fore her enemy. He is not kakos
because he is unjust. The equation 0£ justice and virtue
is later than the date 0£ this play; see Adkins, Merit, pp.
T8-79, £or the equation 0£ arete and justice as a late
!if~h century or -fourth century B. C. phenomenon. The
t~ti.ons 0£ th~ autonomous competitor do not concern
emselves wi.th what we would consider •justice,• which is
:::. 0 ~ the "quiet,• i.e., cooperative virtues.
In an
J l.~l.dUal-centered system like the zero-sum contest, any
c!:t~ce (as distinct from reciprocity or revenge) which
ca Sl.ders the interests 0£ others as equal to one's own
0
t take precedence. For Socrates' wranglings with
_
:.ce
and personal benefit, see Irwin, Horal Theory, pp.
57 6

Ju!:_1.

368
e 108 She can do it, she claims, with one
disman tl .
cannot point to such a £limsy construction as
remark; one
eYidence o£ one s sophia.
1

the s e

1£ one is going to dupe another,

cond party should never detect a sneer beneath the

acco mm

odating smile; the intended victim 0£ poison should

,iadlY qua££ the potion.

Jason is too transparently sel£-

serving to convince her that he is acting in anyone s
1

interest but his own.

Medea assumes he is simply

incompetent at using sophia against an enemy.

In reality,

he is probably just too self-centered to see that this is
what this circumstance requires, and too slow-witted to
pull it o£f even if he were able to discern the di££erence

between his own interest and that of others.
The rest 0£ the scene deteriorates into verbal
sniping,109 shorthand
arete, eros, and sophia:
attaining arete.

redefinitions

of the

1) eros is merely a

nexus

0£

means to

Medea accuses Jason of interest in sex

and the security of his beloved good reputation (591-592,
823-624); Jason assures her that sex was not the issue,

social advancement was, and social security (593108 0hlander,

Suspense,

pp.

87-88,

agrees.
He
C£.
;Dermott, Incarnation, p. 79, for whom "· . . her
[ i:dea .. s] outright duplicity seems a part of her strength,
: ile_ Jason s lesser dishonesty argues an innate weakness
0
his character.•

~erms Jason•s first two arguments •ludicrous."
1

109 see Bongie,
"Heroic Elements," pp. 44-46, who
s careful to dispel the validity of the charges that Jason
and He d ea exchange.
1
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59

aside e

means

biting

one's

tongue,

setting

motional reactions, and instead looking to the gain

.

one 1s
(

sophia

able to accrue, especially in terms 0£ 'faring well

_ 2,
598 60

614-615,

one down

(607).

621-622).

Speaking

openly

only

brings

In these their last bitter words, both Medea and Jason
ain their adherence--a t
sbOW ag
of reciprocity:

least in words--to the code

Medea again tries to shame Jason into

realizing that he has not given her her due (603-604, 606);
Jason again denies that he is to blame £or Medea •s plight
(605, 607).

Jason, as magnanimous as he was at the

1>e1inning 0£ the scene, repeats that he is, as ever,
willing to help Medea and the children since they are, to
bim, still philoi (610-613).

Medea

rejects

the

help 0£ one

who harms her (598-599), one who is kakos (616-618).

She

accordingly sends him 0££ with a threat 0£ harm (625-626).
That the Chorus now in the second stasimon (627 -662)
sing 'first about eros and aretc, and then philoi, is not
surprising when one re-fleets upon how charged with such
discussion was the previous episode.

For not only were we

treated to Jason's memorable disquisition on Cypris and
Bros as his aides-de-camp in the expedition which won him

St

110

Robert

B.

Palmer,

"An

Apology

£or

Jason:

A

•A Udy 0£ Euripides• Medea,• CJ 53 (1957; herea£ter Palmer,
Ch~~logy"), pp. 49-55, sees Jason's need £or legitimate

PrJ. dren as the impetus £or his actions against Medea, and
SJ':Poses t~at_ the Athenian audience would have 'found Jason
Pa the tic in this need.
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reputation (526-531), we were also made to witness,
broadly, the nexus 0£ eros and arete.

Similarly, a

IDajor point 0£ contention between Jason and Medea was who
nad helped or harmed whom, i.e., who was 'friend or enemy,
and consequently who owed what, help or harm, to whom.

The

stasimon, then, picks up on themes £rom the previous
episode.

It also, however, as will be shown, leads

thematically into the next episode with Aegeus.
In the 'first strophe-antistrophe pair, the Chorus turn
to the use 0£ personi£ied universals to explicate the
relationship between eros and arete illustrated previously
only by the particular actions 0£ Jason and Medea.

In

turn, they rein-force the previously intimated competitive
arena and potential destructiveness 0£ eros:
Love coming in grave excess grants>I men neither
c
•
good
repu ta ti on
nor
excellence
(epwTes
uvep
'
>I
>
>
>
>
J.1,ev
ayav
e.>.eovTes >
ouK
eudo1;Lav
oud>
>
'\
,
,
apeTav
vapedwKav
avdpaoLv•).
But
i£
Cypris comes just su££iciently, no other goddess is so
•
>
Cl
>I
'
>
gracious
(EL >I d>
a AuLS
e.>.90L
ICU11'PLS,
OUK
>I
'\
a.>..>.a
eeos
euxapL5
ouTw5).
Hay
you
never,
mistress, against me launch £rom golden bow your
unavoidable
arrow,
wounding me with desire
c
,
,
(LJ.1.E:Pct>
XPLOaoCaJ).
Hay prudence (ow•poouva), the gods' most
beautiful gi£t, 'favor me; may clever/terrible Cypris
never smite me with disputatious wrath and unceasing
strife, driving my thumos away to other beds (JJ.'rldE
ll'oT>
aJJ.•LAoyous
opyas
aKopeoTa
Te
>
Cl
>'
V~LK'T)
9UJJ.OV
EK11'A'T)~ao>
ETEPOLS
EV!.
At:K TPOLS
ll'poopa.>.oL
deL
ICu11'pL5);
may
she
be
sharp-witted
(Ol;U4PPWV)
in
judging
beds
0£
w>omen, and honor beds not battle-scarred
(all'TOAEJ.1.0U5).
(627-64-1).
I

I

1

'

1

va

The Chorus claim that eros, through conferring grace, can
larner £or one the personal advantage 0£ a good reputation
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So much is not new.

and !Fe~·

But their further claim

-cessive eros can ruin one is a sentiment not before
tnat e °"
in so many words. The question is, how can excessive
11eard
1

eros ruin one s reputation?

=--

The Chorus answer at first seems to be that eros in
1

excess leads to marital infidelity.
in only this way is a

mistake.

But reading their song

Granted, one must allow

that these women do not wish to be driven to other beds
(S38), and one must

recall that, as Medea has flatly

stated, women have no respectable way of leaving a marriage
>

(OV

237).

.

yap

>
"'
E\JKAEELS.

>

•

all'aAAayaL

I

yuvaL~Lv,

236-

Their prayer against excessive eros is, then, partly

a prayer for marital fidelity.

But it is more than

that.111
The antistrophe clarifies what the strophe only
sketches.

It continues the women s prayer that they not be
1

•wounded" by the "unavoidable" arrow of Cypris.

The image

of love as a wound is so familiar, both from the Greek
lyric poets and our own derivative depictions of rotund
cherubs coyly sporting their weaponry, that the menacing
essence of the image gets lost.

If one is wounded,

1UM eri_
.d or, "Medea 639," pp. 95-100, argues that
t e Chorus in line 639 are praying that they not be unable
-C~ accept _spousal infidelity. Meridor further remarks that
h )he desire of married women for men other than their
Instead, wifely
1 u;ban~s i~ alien to this context."
wn ideh.ty is alien, not to this context, but to these
.:~~n, Who are eager to protect their reputations. The
Ject of reputation is germane to this ode.
th
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one is vulnerable and likely to lose. These
ll0 ,..eve r •
·ntbian women, competitors that they are, pray that they

cor1

ne"Ver be P

ut at a disadvantage in the competitive arena by

tile likes 0£

~·

It is more than anything else this--

tllat is, advantage in competition--that they pray £or, as
tile antistrophe shows.
Tbe prayer, which began in the strophe at line 632, is
ostensibly against ex:cessi ve eros, but it £1 uct ua tes
c:hiasticallY between positive and negative -formulation.

In

the -first and last lines 0£ the antistrophe, the
formulation
favorable.

is

positive,11 2

and

the

results

are

In the -first lines (635-636), the women pray

for sophrosuna, prudence, which they imagine as "£a voring"
them, as "the gods• most beauti£ul gi£t• 0£ which they
will be the recipients.

"Prudent• (sophron), recall, was

how Jason billed his use 0£ eros to acquire his royal
aarriage (548).

In the last lines (640-641), the women

pray that "clever/terrible" Cypris be "sharp-witted" in
Judging and "honoring• the beds 0£ women, beds which are
•not battle scarred."

It is obvious £rom this set 0£

lines, at the antistrophe•s beginning and end, that the
•omen are praying £or the control 0£ eros by the mind; that
control, they imagine, leads to £avor, gi£ts, and honor,
the competi tor•s prizes.

Prudent women succeed, £or they

control e_ros to win.
.
112

Heridor,

"Medea

639,•

p.

96.
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irne central lines 0£ the antistrophe (637-640).
are negatively £ormulated and show at best a
b01'eve r •
t o£ undecided outcome. There is no winning--no
contes
i£ts or honor--when eros is out 0£ the mind's
favor. g
•
-control.

Instead, one's thumos becomes the object 0£

yiolence; one is •driven out• and •struck. at• by the
•clever/terrible• Cypris, the battle one £inds onesel£ in
18

wi tnou t positive outcome:

wrath is •disputatious/

wavering/uncertain," stri£e is "unceasing."

There is no

wa:r to win, £or the two aces in the success£ul competitor's
bole.

~

and sophia, are not being played to advantage.

It is as i£, to continue the card-playing metaphor, the ace

of sophia is never played, while the ace 0£ eros is
carelessly laid out on the table £or all to see.
The women abruptly change theme in the second stropheantistrophe pair, and end this song as they ended their
last, with verses on country, home, and city.

But whereas

there (431-445) the Chorus spoke directly to Medea in the
second person, and turned in the antistrophe at least
l>rie£1y to discussion 0£ lost civic virtues 0£ oaths and
aidos, here (643-662) they are more personal.

Hot only

have they changed to the £irst person, they now turn in the
antistrophe to the value 0£ honoring £riends.

As we shall

see (below, Part Five), it will be this very thing, the
Proper treatment 0£ philoi, which not only endures the
def1n·t·
l. ions'

(i.e., 0£ arete, eros, and

sophia)

wending
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y to a logical but emotionally repulsive
t11eir ..,a
·on it also, ironically, is the very £uel 0£ the
conc1usi •
e•otional

repulsion.

'!'he honor due a 'friend is the subject 0£ Aegeus'
·ng remarks in the next episode (663-823), and thus his
opeDl.
entrance,
of

criticized

Aristotle

thematic

as

(Poetics

connection

to

unmotivated113
1461b.19-21),l14
what

precedes

since
has

the

time

obvious

it.115

Aegeus

U3ohlander, Suspense, p. 107, argues that Aegeus'
•aagic appearance• colors the help he is able to give Medea
with the sense •that it was meant to be, was ordained by a
higher will.•
114'1'. v. Buttrey, •Accident and Design in
Buripides' Medea,• AJP 79 (1958; herea£ter Buttrey,
•Accident•), pp. 1-17, answers Aristotle's objection by
showing that the Aegeus episode is the •pivot on which both
action and emotion turn• (p. 10).
Buttrey dismisses
earlier attempts to justi£y Aegeus' appearance as
functional, i.e., as either o££ering Medea an escape (the
ezod.os proves Medea needs no such help) or as
unintentionally serving to suggest killing the children
(this post quod ergo propter quod argument is invalidated
1>1' analysis 0£ the scene).
115Easterling, •Infanticide,• p. 184, points out
that the Aegeus episode is the third 0£ • . . . three
contrasting visits to Medea, 0£ which the third o£fers a
close parallel to the :first.•
Bongie, •Heroic Elements,•
pp, 40-41, a £ter Hans von Arnim, ed., A usgewahl te
'frasodien des Euripides, vol. 3, •Medea,• (Berlin:
Weidmannsche, 1886; herea£ter von Arnim, Medea), p. 19, and
~ Darnley Kaylor, •The Aegeus Episode, Medea 663-773,• CR
3 . (1909), pp. 189-190, sees the Aegeus episode as that
:hl.ch suggests to Medea killing the children. Bongie
urther notes (p. 47) that "Euripides uses this scene to
~ein~o~ce the audience's sense 0£ the strong obligations
.:~hcit in the relationships 0£ philoi." Dunl<.le, "Aegeus
th Sode,• pp. 104-107. terms the episode •a microcosm 0£
the •hole ~lay,• and argues that Aegeus' childlessness, and
e operation 0£ chance and sel£-interest in the episode,
are thematically relevant to the rest 0£ the play.
Burnett, •Tragedy 0£ Revenge," p. 13, argues that the
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,reets ff e
J)et•een

dea witb a salutation be deems most appropriate
:friends;116

unamended (664-665).
are :f r

iends

,

sbe

returns

tbe

greeting

to

bim

Tbe two tb us acknowledge tba t tbey

and tbe scene will sbow tba t

tbey are willing

to uve up to tbe de:finition 0£ :friend by lending belp to
each other.

This is all, it seems, so mutually congenial:

lledea o££ers belp to Aegeus in alleviating his sterility
('16 -718);

Aegeus o££ers Medea help with a

place 0£ re£uge

('123-724).
Both, indeed, show their adherence to the code 0£
reciprocity not only in these acts, but throughout the
•cene.

A£ter Medea relates that Jason is kakistos to her,

having returned harm £or no harm (690, 692), Aegeus is
clearly appalled, terming Jason"s action 0£ supplanting
Bedea

•most

reproach£u1•

,,
(alOXlO"l"OV,

695),

the

functions 0£ the Aegeus episode are to show oath-making in
action (c:f. Boedeker, "Medea," p. 98) and to suggest the
ensuing rescue theme. Thomas Chase, "On the Introduction
Of Aegeus in the Medea 0£ Euripides," AJP 5 (1884), p. 87,
suggests that Euripides introduces Aegeus to emphasize the
contrast bet ween the blessing 0£ children he is about to
receive and Jason"s dire future childlessness.
Conacher,
Buripidean Drama, p. 190, points out that Aegeus• patent
high regard £or Medea as pro£essional wise woman increases
audience respect £or her. At the same time, the episode is
a •turning point in Medea"s career 0£ vengeance and in the
S7mpathy which the Chorus has hitherto a£forded her."
U6R

.

Stu .
: A. Browne, •Medea-Interpretations,• in
ii di.es in Honour 0£ Gilbert Horwood, ed. Mary E. White
• 1 :~onto: Univ. 0£ Toronto Press, 1952; herea£ter Browne,
see
erpretations•), p. 77, proposes that Aegeus• entrance
conm: ur:imotivated only because the Athenian king,
anc~ rained by "the polite conventions o£ten observed in
Yhi:~t conversation," would not blurt out his motive £or
i.ng Medea upon his entrance.
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• 11per l a

ti ve degree 0£ the adjective Adkins deems "the most

erful

word

used

to

denigrate

a

man•s

actions.•117

pow
•eel.ea refers
iS no YI

to hersel£ as a "'former 'friend" 0£ Jason•s who

dishonored (696).

A£ter hearing the exact nature 0£

Jason•s erotic desire (see below), Aegeus is quick. to agree
that Jason is indeed k.ak.os (699).
Aegeus, however, has no desire to o££end anyone:

not

the gods (719-720, presumably those who protect the
suppliant),118

nor

his

obligated to help.

'friend

Medea,

whom

he

is

It is because 0£ his keen desire to

return like £or like that Aegeus re£ers to his readiness to
help

Medea

as

evidence

that

he

is

"just"

(6i.KaL05 1

724).

In addition, Aegeus, eager to use an oath as a

pretext to Medea•s enemies (743-745), is unwilling to incur
new enemies

even

on

an

old

£riend s
1

behal£.ll9

Aegeus is, in short, a man who seems deserving 0£ the
Chorus•

description

0£

"noble"

(yEvva'los,

762).

He

is clearly one to whom reciprocity is 0£ the utmost

importance, and one who looks out £or himsel£, but not-unlike Medea--£irst and only.

This characteristic is

signalled, as it was earlier in the case 0£ Creon, by
117 Adkins,
118see
Protection

Merit,

p.

30.

Gould, "Hik.eteia," p.
by
0£
suppliants

78, £or
the
C
lKEOL05.
Zeus
I

ll9Bo ngie,
.
Ae
"Heroic Elements," p. 48, remarks on
hel~us• •scrupulousness• as indication 0£ "how very serious
eems the 'formal relationships 0£ philoi."
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single-minded

concern

£or

children.120

Aegeus

•••eus•
rneyed, not, like Jason on the Argo, seeking his own
Jl8S jOU

t but, as he tells Medea upon his entrance, to
adYancemen •

tile o r
,eeds

acle o£ Apollo, "seeking how there may be £or me the
of

children"

(669).

'l'be interaction between Medea and Aegeus is strange,
cllarged with talk. 0£ eros and allusions to sophia.

The two

terms are so inextricably entwined that it is di££icult to
treat them separately.

What should however preliminarily

:be noted is that both eros and sophia £unction in this

scene on two levels.

The -first level is that 0£ explicit

definition, the second that 0£ enactment.

Previously, we

baYe been treated only to the enactment 0£ the play•s
definitions 0£ arete and sophia; now at last we get a truly
erotic scene.

But the scene is erotic in the sense that

the play has de-fined eroticism, something subtly
aanipulated by sophia and there-fore di££icult to espy.
On the level 0£ explicit de-fini tion, this scene
provides a turning point in the meaning 0£ eros.

For while

we once again are given the by now -familiar de-finition 0£
eras put to the service 0£ sel£-advancement (697-700),
beside this is put another de-finition (714-715) which will
Ultimately suggest the re-futation 0£ the more -familiar one

120M
.
Ae
cDermott, Incarnation, pp. 101-104, considers
Ja:eu.s amia~le and noble-souled, a paragon when compared to
•eron, and h.k.e Creon in that his virtues put him at the
cy 0£ Medea.
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t>eloW,

(see

Part

Five).

gros and etymologically related words are used more

==---

often

in this scene than in any other.

The verb erao and

n eros are used thrice in £our lines (697-700);
tile nou de£ini tion is the one 'familiar £rom previous
tile ir
formulation. The scene is of Aegeus asking Medea about the
nature o£ her rift with Jason:
>

I

--Was
it
that
Jason
fell
in
love
(epao9EL!i),
or did he loathe your bed?· --Oh, it was a great love
(µeyav
y> ~pw1'a) [he had],
this man not
faithful to his friends.
--Let him go then, if, as
you say, he is bad. --He loved to get a marriage
>
""
connection
with
rulers
(avdpwv
-rupavvwv
"""
>
,
,.,.
K'f)dO!i
"IP0<19'Jl
AafJELV).
(697-700).
I

'!'his catty characterization 0£ the nature 0£ Jason s erotic
1

desire is nonetheless one at which Jason would not flinch.
In his view, one need not squirm against using eros to
advance one s own suit.
1

For Aegeus, however, eros has aims other than social
advancement.
has as

its

His eros, at least by Medea s description,
1

end

point

the

production

0£

With no mention 0£ his own gains thereby.

children,121
Medea pleads

With him,
· · · receive me in your land and in your house at the
hearth (ecpeo1'LOV).
In this way with the gods
favor your desire may, be £ru,it£ul 0£ children
(OUTW!i
~PW!i
OOL
VPO!i
9EWV
TEAEocpopos
1

121
A
A £ew critics suggest that Euripides intends
• e:eus: impotence to be amusing. For example, Arrowsmith,
1
iro~a_s. p. 4~, sees Aegeus as "Euripides pathetic and
de l.~ embodiment 0£ Athens," especially the Athens
fo~~ribed as visited by Cypris in the choral song that
ows Aegeus
exit.
1

1
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and

ll'OlOWV),

you

yourself

may

be

(713-715).

It iS precisely this Aegeus, whose strong desire is -for
en 122 whom Medea supplicates, using both the
cllil d r
'
. suggestion that she could serve as his bedmate, as
erotic
that she could avail him of her renowned sophia.
well as
While it is not certain that Medea •s supplication o:f
.Aegeus is, like that 0£ Creon, actual instead 0£
figura ti ve,123
quite subtle.

its

erotic

element

is

unmistakeable

i:f

One could argue that Medea here supplicates

.Aegeus -figuratively by placing herseH--in his mind only
and in the -future--at his hearth.
•Receive

me
And

at
yet

the
the

Recall her plea at 713:

hearth"
-figurative

(0€.;at.

placement

0£

herself at Aegeus• hearth suggests that Medea could be to
him more than a mere suppliant.

The hearth, while

certainly a stock site for the suppliant, also has general
associations with group solidarity and :family stability
and, more speci:fically, with marriage:

"The association 0£

122 Dunk.le,

"Aegeus Episode," pp. 106-107, ties
Aegeus• childlessness to his sel-f-interest, and suggests
that "[h]is childlessness seems to in-feet the air 0£
Corinth lik.e a pestilence, bringing about the death 0£
three children."
123
t
See Gould, "Hik.eteia," p. 85, -for use o:f a past
hense to indicate an achieved supplication. With Aegeus,
t:wever, Medea never deviates -from the present tense; on
sue c~ntr_ary, Medea uses what Gould calls "the language o:f
th:ih.cation," and there is no indication in this passage
Point the act is being per-formed in word only, as Gould
s out must be the case at 321 and 325.
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and
'l'bat

£rom the phrasing he gives to Aegeus' report of the
"1 am not to loose the projecting £oot 0£ the

oracle:

•ineskin.

" Aegeus relays. "until I

.

(ll'PlV

b.earth"

place

traditional. "124

is

the poet was aware of such an association seems

obvious

"olw).

hearth

(679;
~

681).

"'
av

reach my paternal

,

11'a1'pctiav

Medea's

suggestion

<

,

e:o"l'lav
that

Aegeus

at his hearth is, to be blunt, one that

encourages him to imagine himsel£ "loosing the projecting
foot of the wineskin" in her presence; in short, he is to
1magine

her

as

sexual

partner.125

124Gould, "Hiketeia," pp. 97-98.
Cf. Visser,
•Medea," p. 150: "A woman's position in the home was
represented by the stationary and interior hearth." Visser
does not note Medea's proposition to Aegeus, but does
remark (p. 151) upon the chilling £act that Euripides has
lledea kill her brother •at the hearth• (U'apeo"l'lov,
1334). C£. McDermott, Incarnation, p. 96, who in addition
notes that the death 0£ the princess and Creon is
4~scribed as Medea's outrage against Creon's hearth (1130).
•either 0£ these, 0£ course, bodes well £or Aegeus'
impending experience with Medea at his hearth.
How Hestia, the virginal goddess 0£ the stationary
hearth, came to be associated with wives, who are expected
lo be neither virginal nor stationary (since they must
leave their natal hearth to marry). is explained by JeanPierre Vernant, Myth and Thought Among the Greeks (London:
Routledge and K:egan Paul, 1983), pp. 131-142.
.
McDonald, Terms for H appiness
.
.
R . l25Ma
.
rianne
in
i!ri.pi.des (Got tigen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1978;
[:reafter McDonald, Happiness), p. 52, notes that "[s]he
edea) cans
hersel£
his
[Aegeus'J
e:up'r)µ.a
(716),
:ing t!1e very word Jason did in describing his lucky £ind,
!l~hPri.n~ess (553)." The same point is made by Mills,
Who opoei.a, p. 71.
C£. Williamson, "Woman's Place,• p. 19,
•a v ar~ues that Medea o£fers Aegeus and receives from him
•ar e~si.on of what a woman would give and receive in
•afe~i.age," Le .• she would promise fertility and receive
Y. here "not 0£ an oikos, but that 0£ the Athenian
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rrnere are. obviously. two objections to this interpretation:
for

1) the hint is too subtle £or Aegeus (or anyone,

that matter) to pick up on; 2) Aegeus in particular

cou ld

not possibly pick up on the hint, because he does not

ttno• what the oracle's pronouncement means; this is why he
iS seeking Medea's advice in the £irst place.

An answer to

the -first objection is Winkler•s description 0£ what he
calls •the normal caution and restraint 0£ Mediterranean
social intercourse.• and the series of parries and thrusts
of half-hidden meaning and intention whose use (by Daphnis,
his parents. and Chloe's £ather in their negotiations
concerning the potential courtship 0£ Chloe by Daphnis)
Winkler uses as illustration £rom Longus• Daphnis and
Chloe.126

A

similar

scene

0£

discreet

understatement

and subtle manipulation. with the suggestion 0£ sexual
availability, is the one between Hausicaa and Odysseus in
Odyssey

6,

at

least

by

Dimock's

interpretation.127

With the second objection. that Aegeus does not know
the oracle's meaning and there-fore cannot be manipulated by
reference to its sexual connotations. one must agree, and
l!!Olis.•
Williamson likewise points out that Medea later
claims she is going to "live with• (auvoLK.fiaouaa,
~3 85) Aegeus.
On this last point. c£. McDermott,
fcarnation, p. 92, who proposes that Medea's announcement
hs a sly reference to the variant tradition in which Medea
as a child, Med us, by Aegeus.

126 Winkler,
127

Constraints.

pp.

107-112.

George E Dimock. The Unity of the Odyssey
(Amherst:
Univ.· of Massachusetts Press, 1989), pp. 77-81.
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instead that Euripides intends not Aegeus, but the

pasit
be cognizant 0£ the erotic undertow 0£ this
audience to
For it is likewise the audience, but not Aegeus,
uld be aware that Aegeus will, in fact, become
WJ:l.0 t(O

l(edea
tben
00

•s spouse/lover and have a child by him, and it is

the audience who can be expected to be able to pick up

Medea•s manipulation of the erotic in this scene.
Aegeus• ignorance is, in £act, something upon which

lledea •smartly" relies in her bid for a place 0£ refuge.
one of the puzzles of this scene is whether or not Medea
knows what the oracle means, and, if so, why she does not
reveal its meaning to Aegeus.

Since Medea has been more

than once termed sophe, and since Aegeus explicitly remarks
that the oracle pronounced "words wiser than can be
interpreted

by

ov111Ja >.t:'lv

a

mere

man"

and

that

675),

av6pa

he

certainly

can

tell

them to Medea, since "there is need of a smart mind"
(OOf~S

I

6€lTQl

cppevos,

677),

Euripides

encourages

the audience to expect that Medea will be able to interpret
the

oracle's
128

advice,128

which

is--at

least

to

the

0ther versions of Medea's story, if the
audience can be assumed to know them, also suggest that
:edea has the ability to interpret the oracle's answer.
:e Jacob Wolf Petroff, Medea: A Study in the Development
d a Myth {diss. Columbia Univ., 1966; hereafter Petroff,
e~). p. 64, who cites Pindar Pythian 4-.15 as evidence
'fut t Medea could interpret omens and prophesy about the
lled!re,_ and a £ragment from Neophron•s Medea {W34-), where
•e ~ interprets £or Aegeus the oracle's reply. Whether
a ~P ~on•s play preceded Euripides• is still debated.
For
eview of the controversy, see Ann Norris Michelini,

juia
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that would know Aegeus• story as it un£olds in
audience
with Aethra--£airly transparent.
-rroezen
sut i:f Medea Knows the oracle's meaning. why does she
eveal its meaning to Aegeus?

11ot r

11ed ea

The answer is simple:

•s •smartness" in this scene is used competitively,

ot to give £ree advice to Aegeus. but to serve her
i.e., n
interests. 129 I:f she "unwisely" here, as
previously in threatening the royal :family. speaks openly.
she will lose her chance 0£ gaining the :final thing she
needs:

a place 0£ re£uge.

For i£ Medea were to solve the

riddle :for Aegeus, his insecurity about having children
would ostensibly be allayed. and he would have no need £or
her drugs or her.

By withholding the answer, Medea ensures

Aegeus will £eel need 0£ her to cure his sterility.
In short, it is more by appealing to Aegeus• sel£1nterest130

than

his

pity

£or

her

desolation

(712)

that

•Beophron and Euripides• Medea 1056-80," TAPA 139 (1989;
hereafter Michelini, "Reophron"), pp. 115-116.
129so. too. according to the tradition. did
Pittheus. who is termed sophos in this episode {by Medea,
at 685). serve his own interests in not interpreting the
oracle for Aegeus, so that his daughter would be
impregnated. For ancient sources on the proverbial wisdom
0
£ ~i~theus, see Mills, Mythopoeia, p. 81 n. 15.
Did
Bur1pi.des borrow Pittheus• tactics £or his equally "smart"
!ied.ea to use against the same man? Tradition dictated
(Ki~t Medea must. not interpret the oracle £or Aegeus
his ls, Myt~opoei.a, pp. 82-83); Euripides may be :fitting
a k Medea into this tradition more than has been previously
c nowledged.
0

. ~ Harmut Erbse. "Ober die Aigeusszene de
Uri.pi.deischen Medea." WS 79 (1966), pp. 127-129,
l'ecognizes that Medea uses the promise 0£ £ertility drugs

e

1
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.
£rom Aegeus the re£uge she needs. And by
11e4ea wi.n 5
to protect Medea, Aegeus shows his sel£-interest,
a•reeing
turn blinds him in to unquestioning support 0£ his
w:tiJ.ch in
In this, he and the Chorus share blame.
friend.
Aegeus, however, is not as competitive as are the

wolDe n

o£ the Chorus.

achieving his goal.

He is willing to go only so 'far in

Nor does he display the low object

attachment and total commitment rationality seen in Jason
and (very shortly) in Medea.
his

~:

Aegeus'

desire

is

Aegeus di££ers -from Jason in
£or

children

(714-715),

Jason's is £or a marriage to advance his social position
(TOO).

Aegeus, then, is similar to Creon, and not only in

his solicitous concern £or children.
king Medea manipulates £or

her

Aegeus is the second

own ends,131

and

he

will very nearly su££er in the -future the £ate that Creon

as a bargaining chip with Aegeus. Dunk.le, "Aegeus
Episode,• pp. 98-99, notes that mutual sel£-interest
operates in Medea's relationships with Aegeus and with
Jason.
131Gredley, "Place and Time," p. 32, notes how
Kedea dominates Aegeus by setting the terms 0£ their
agreement.
Musurillo, "Reconsideration," p. 59, sees
Aegeus• dif£erence £rom Creon (who has "stupid sel£confidence") in Aegeus' ability to "match wits with Medea."
He gets What he wants, and only gives as much as is
necessary.
Rickert, "Akrasia," p. 109 n. 43 and p. 113,
n~tes that Aegeus, in swearing his oath, is delicately
: 10.•ed to a void "actually stating the usual imprecation
ra.lai.nst one's children . . . ."
Rickert imagines that the
;re threat 0£ the usual penalty £or perjury (destruction
0
I>!' on~·s Children) would nonetheless discourage Aegeus -from
eaki.ng his oath.
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su f fers

near

the

end

of

the

play.132

The audience senses, then, that Aegeus, like Creon, is
a mark.
i>eing se t Up as
.

Medea, however, does not treat him

as she did Creon) because it is not as yet in her
like one (
interest to harm Aegeus or his family.
friendship is what suits her plans.

For now, his

The safe anchorage he

has offered will allow what she most desires:

to be proven

•beautifully victorious" over her enemies; to make
retribution by repaying the harm they have given.

Medea

savors her imagined triumph:
Oh Zeus, and Vengeance of Zeus and light of Sun, now,
friends, we will prove ourselves beautifully
victorious (KaAAlVlKOl) over my enemies, and we
have set foot on the road. How there is hope that
these enemies o-f mine will pay the penalty. (764-777).
Aegeus• kindliness and -friendship have been used by Medea
no less than were Creon's display 0£ quiet virtues; Medea
in the case 0£ Aegeus has promised a service (and hinted
perhaps at something more) in return £or a service
promised.

This is the manifestation o-f her and Aegeus•

friendship:

mutual support in attaining desired ends.

132 Reck£ord, "First Exit," pp. 330-331, discusses
•hat introduction to Euripides• treatment 0£ Medea the
audience of 431 would have had, after viewing Euripides•
Peliades of 455 and his Aegeus, whose production date is
~kely to. have been bet ween 450 and 430. Kills,
!!lthopoe1a, p. 83, points out that Euripides combined two
separate motifs in -formulating the interactions 0£ Aegeus
~~d Medea: ". . . a magical cure £or sterility and a
l.sastrous favor promised to a supernatural being in
~Xchange for help out of a dilemma; this favor ordinarily
e!Volves the loss of a child."
According to Mills (p. 84),
li-fen as Aegeus secures his fertility, he jeopardizes the
e of his unborn son.
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Medea now has the time to complete her revenge and a
place

to which she may escape.

.,1tb her plan.

She therefore may proceed

This involves, she reveals, using her

· idren as tools of revenge, to carry deadly gifts to

cb1

creon's daughter (780-789).

But that is not all:

she will

proceed then to kill her own children, a deed "most unholy"
and

whose

contemplation

makes

her

weep

(790-796).133

But Medea the zero-sum competitor is willing to weep,
and she gives a

competitor's array 0£ reasons:

1) it is

unendurable £or her to be laughed at by her enemies (ou
'
yap

y£>.aoaat

T>.T)Tov

>

.....

£X9pwv,

797);

2)

Jason

will "bhereby be repaid the harm he has done her (os
c

....

"IJ'lV

'
ouv

,
TElOEl

802);

and

3)

she

is concerned to pursue the code 0£ harming enemies
(primarily) and helping friends (secondarily), £or it is
this type o-f conduct which wins the most -fame (807-810).
All three motives contribute to the type 0£ excellence
133Medea •s announcement at 790, "Thereupon,
however, I
will change the story," (evTauaa µ.evTot
Tove§>
alfa).).aaow
.>.oyov),
has
generated
intriguing
scholarly debate.
Boedeker, "Medea," pp. 106-112, argues
that Medea becomes the author 0£ a new tale, which negates
Jason's story 0£ epic grandeur and her own labors in
regard to her children. The old tale is replaced by a new
one: a tragedy, for both Jason and Medea. See also Emily
HcDermot t, "Medea Line 37:
A Note,• AJP 108 (1987), pp.
158-161, who argues that the Nurse's dread at line 37, "I
fear that she [Medea] will come upon some stange new
Plan," anticipates Medea's change from the old plot (where
~e does not kill the children) to a new one (where she
. oes).
McDermott, Incarnation, pp. 17-20, offers this
~t~r~retation as possible evidence £or the priority 0£
H ripides over Neophron in creating this version 0£ the
edea story.
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,odbt

l>Y the zero-sum competitor, but emphasis is on

. £riends are included almost as an a£terthought.
eoelDieS,
~e iast lines cited are especially telling in this regard,
bere£ore must be looked at closely:
and t
Let no one consider me pal try and weak, nor gentle,
l>Ut o£ another sort: heavy to my enemies and kindly
to £riends, £or t~e li£e 0£ su,ch pers~ns is "most
reno"!ned
(J.L"l6£LS. <
J.LE , cpauA"l":
.Kao9£V'11,
VOJHt£ TCIJ
Tp01t0)!o
£~J.LEV"l·

IJ.'116 ~

TCIJV

a)..)..~
9a 1'£PO\J
KQL
> cptA~>LOLV
TOLO\JTWV
£\JKAeeOTQTOS.

'110\J>X a La'!..•

fl~p£LQV,

yap

£X9pOL~

807-810).

flLOS.,

surely it is not -friends by whom one would imagine it a
danger to be considered paltry, weak, or gentle; only in
reiard to enemies would such a reputation be imagined
dangerous.

Renown in the zero-sum game is here, as

Gouldner has described, won primarily by the conduct 0£ one
toward one's enemies; one must guard at all times against
l>eing viewed as gentle or weak, £or it is at those moments
that one is likely to be overtaken by overzealous enemies
who are ever vigilant £or their best chance at success over
one.

And so Medea, like the typical zero-sum

competitor,134 must focus

much of her attention on her

enemies, who are the chief obstacles to achieving the goal
Of .reestablishing her lost predominance over them and all

Others. 135 Her

.... -...
d

134

C£.

three-fold

Bongie,

plan

is

to

keep them

•Heroic Elements,"
here.

8 e ea•s •heroic outlook•

p.

49,

£rom
on

135
in
Easterl1ng, •infanticide,•
p. 185, recognizes
th Hedea~s. arguments • . . . all the words that belong to
e traditional code, in which the laughter 0£ enemies is

388

. g predominance over her (signalled by their being

_. 1ntainin

al>le
faDle

to iaugh at her), to harm them, and to establish her
as an ef£ective competitor.
With such a program 0£ action in mind, merely harming

the princess and Creon, and, for that matter, Jason, is not
enough.

She must kill her own children; it not only makes

per£ect sense, it is the only way.
o£

zero-sum

competition,

the

It is, within the arena

rationa1136

eDlotionally repugnant, necessary conclusion.

albeit
In her

recourse to the zero-sum competitor•s total commitment
rationality, Medea £inally establishes hersel£ as a

£ull

participant in this cutthroat competition 0£ self-

the ultimate disgrace and harming enemies and helping
friends is the duty 0£ a hero.• Easterling is right to
continue that • . . . Medea•s appropriation 0£ the code
seems hideously out 0£ place•; this is because her acts
aeainst husband and children, cited by Easterling, in
themselves deny her the status 0£ hero. Eilhard
Schlesinger, •zu Euripides• Hed·ea, • Hermes 94 (1966;
herea£ter Schlesinger, •zu Medea"), pp. 30-32, opposes the
favored psychological interpretation 0£ Medea•s monologue
(i.e., passion vs. maternal 'feeling), and sees the killing
Of the children predetermined by Medea •s decision to take
revenge. In the monologue, Medea simply comes to terms
With this necessity.
136see Wol££, "Euripides,• p. 239, £or the
relentless logic• 0£ killing the children.
C£. Foley,
•Divided Sel£,• p. 65: "This argument has its own
~:tionality as wen, although some recent critics assume
the contrary.•
Foley, like Wolf£, sees the rationality 0£
e. argument within •the Greek heroic code.• (p. 66).
81
trmi.larly, Buxton, Persuasion, p. 157, remarks, "Medea is a
1mae.'!dY 0£ . ananke:
not a metaphysical 'necessity•, but one
fi Pll.ca ted in the social circumstances in which Medea
nds hersel£."
•
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ncement.
ad'Va
:Medea's total commitment rationality, able as it is to
assur

e achieving her goal, is not employed, however,

With OU t

a,ppe r

CO St •

most

For by viewing self-advancement as

and all others--including her beloved children-I

..,,pendable, Medea ultimately achieves what Gouldner
as e ...
yie•s as the inevitable byproduct of zero-sum competition:
total isolation and alienation.

For Medea now suffers the

alienation of the Chorus, who previously supported her.
They, in disbelief and horror, will at the end of this
episode have no recourse but to begin to distance
themselves from her by imagining an idealized Athens (824865; see

discussion

below,

Part

Two).

The Chorus are incredulous, for they had never
envisioned what it meant to play this game to its logical
conclusion.

They -first direct her away £rom this abnormal

deed (811-813), and then express their disbelie£ that she
Will be able to commit a

anguish (816; 818).

crime which will cause her so much

Medea's only explanations are that

they would understand had they su£fered as she has (814815), that her goal is to sting her husband as much as

Possible (817), and that her own wretchedness counts £or
nothing

,,
(lTW,

819)--all

spoken

like

a

true

competitor.
137

See Bongie
"Heroic Elements," p. 46, for the
t ensi
'
on between rational
and emotional motivations in Jason
and. Medea.

390
In the last sentiment especially we can detect the
,,1111ngness

o£ the zero-sum competitor to set the stakes

111gh, an d e Ven

to destroy that to which one is most

attacned--a nd by which one is there£ore made most
yulnerable--be£ore the enemy can get to it and thereby
prevail.138

The

death

0£

Medea's

children

will,

the

cnorus predict and she readily admits, render her "most
wretched"

(OU

cP

l'\

av

'

'

Y£VOlO

y>

yvv"1, 818); it is precisely why Medea

>

'

a9AlWIQi'r)

must

kill

them.

Kedea is aware that her enemies would, if they could, take
.-engeance £or her deeds upon her innocent children (781'182);139

she

will

return

later

to

this

consideration

138Thus Bongie, "Heroic Elements," p. 50 n. 47, on
Medea's killing the children: "By this particular act she
not only achieves the most ruinous vengeance conceivable,
she also strips Jason 0£ any means whereby he can exact
retribution £rom her, £or in destroying her children she
has also destroyed her one vulnerable point. It is a
perfect scheme £or one who has the strength 0£ will to go
through with it."
Gouldner, Enter Plato, pp. 66-70, cites Thucydides
History 1.143-144 as an example of total-commitment
rationality. There, Pericles urged the Athenians to
abandon their lands, and suggested that total commitment to
Victory would entail laying waste to their own lands
themselves, so that the Peloponnesians would realize that
such destruction could not make the Athenians submit.
13 9There

were several versions of how Medea's
Children died.
A full discussion of the sources can be
found in P. Roussel, "Medee et la meurtre de ses enfants,"
REA 22 (1920), pp. 158-161.
C
The audience could only have been as surprised as the
ho:us over Medea's proposal to kill the children i£
~l'l.Pides• version of Medea predated Neophron•s, which fact
~s not firmly established, pace E. A. Thompson, "Neophron
Hnd Euripides' Medea," CQ 30 (1944), pp. 10-14, and Page,
Ted~, PP. x.xx-x.xxvi. See the discussion of von Fritz,
Jagodie, pp. 333-336.
Michelini, "Heophron," pp. 115-136,
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(1059-1061).

It 0£ course makes no sense to argue that

fledea Kills her children so that they will be spared the
outrage

her

enemies

may

visit

them;140

upon

she

Kills

tbelD so that she will be spared the humiliation 0£ total
defeat her enemies' outrage 0£ them would cause her.

The

focus here, £irst and only, is on Medea and her victory;
tbe children will be sacri£iced--not without a

struggle--to

attain a victory made all the more glorious by the
sacrifice it demands.
we, like the Chorus, £ind it di££icult to envisage
such total commitment to victory; we would deem such
behavior--by understatement--excessive.
is the

mark

0£

such a

system, as

Yet excessiveness

Slater

has

noted;141

calls £or moder a ti on in the zero-sum game were, according
to Gouldner, £eeble attempts to control those who, by all
usual standards

and

norms,

were

out

0£

controi.142

Medea's -final words to the Chorus who, incidentally, cite
argues £rom Euripides' play f'or Heophron's anteriority;
McDermott, Incarnation, pp. 9-24, argues the opposite; c-f.
Ohlander, Suspense, p. 28 n. 9, £or other supporters 0£
Euripides' anteriority.
Mills, Mythopoeia, p. 79,
concurs, and (pp. 38-42) reviews fragmentary works on Medea
Predating 431 B. c £or possible preconceptions 0£ the
audience.
140 Except, as Easterling, "In-fan ticide,• pp. 186187, has argued, to the desperately rationalizing parent.
141 s1a ter

•

142 Gouldner,

Glory,
Enter

p .

40.

Plato,

p.

44.
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•JJ,U m

an

norms"

indicate how, to
appea

).144

In

a

feeble

at tempt

to

stop

her

(812),143

a person at the extreme, middle ground

rs immoderate:

excessive"
819

in

"All arguments in the middle are

'
(11'£PlOOOl

short,

the zero-sum game.

there

'
11'aVT€S.

is

no

<

ouv

room

£or

compromise

in

Compromise is £or losers like Creon.

It is at this point, then, that the Chorus, formerly
50

loyal to Medea and the values she embodied, draw back

from her in an attempt to reassess that to which they had
formerly lent their wholehearted support.

The next ode

they sing, the Ode to Athens (824-865), marks the beginning
of the re£u ta tion 0£ their pro££ered de£ini tion 0£ arete
and is only understandable in the context 0£ the other two
terms the play seeks to de-fine, eros and sophia.
Discussion 0£ this ode, and indeed 0£ much 0£ the rest 0£
the play, will be postponed to later sections.

For now, we

143see the comment 0£ Walsh, "Public and Private,"
p. 300: "Medea's heroic bid for public honor isolates her
completely, £or in abandoning natural feeling she offends
conventional sensibility."
C£. McDermott, Incarnation, p.
61: ". . . the Chorus passes £rom a gender-oriented
complicity with Medea to revulsion against her, born 0£
common humanity." Their complicity, I have argued, is not
only gender-based.
144 Buxton,

Persuasion, p. 166.
Cf. Boedeker,
p. 107, who translates the line, "all >.oyol
n the middle are superfluous," but adds (n. 49) that the
~hrase is indeed ambiguous--perhaps intentially so--and
t~OUld be interpreted as 'words spoken between now and the
m~me I kill the children' or 'words 0£ compromise, in the
:dd~e between ex,tremes.'"
Gredley, "Place and Time," p.
3•o'
interprets µ.ea<t> spatially, i.e., as referring to
in rdts coming--hereafter unheeded by Medea--£rom the Chorus
he orchestra.

~!tedea,"
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peed on
}>eCODle

lY note that the Medea 0£ the last hal£ 0£ the play

s more and more the zero-sum competitor.

The first evidence 0£ this is during Medea's second
tnter V

coIP Pe

iew with Jason (866-975). where, with the

titor's savvy, she discards her -former honesty with
In fact, Medea's success£ul manipulation 0£ Jason

]>ears a strong resemblance to her manipulation of the
Chorus in that she again £aces someone who views her as a
potential contender or enemy (recall that she minced no
words with Jason in their £irst interview), whose services
she nonetheless needs, and whose suspicions must there£ore
be de-fused.

With the Chorus Medea combined sel£-abasement

with an appeal to their status as viable contenders, and
fueled their support by rousing their prejudice against
men; with Jason she uses exactly the same tactics.

She

abases hersel£ by owning her stupidity, she appeals to
Jason's desire to play the role 0£ the magnanimous victor,
and plays 0££ his sense that he, as a male, is naturally
superior to her.
In using on Jason the bait that even Creon would not
take, Medea reveals her sense 0£ Jason's stupidity. And, in

fact, in this contest 0£ wits, he is gravely disadvantaged,

for he mindlessly snaps up Medea's bait:

au, intelligent.

In

reality,

she

is

she is not, a£ter

stupid.

Unlike

Creon • th e witless Jason o££ers. no challenge to Medea's
verbal Withdrawal of herself as a contender against him;
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.,1tnou

t a word to the contrary he accepts her assessment

of nerse lf

as impaired by being out of her mind
imprudent

as

873),

(11C1LVOµ.al,

,

IJ.OT'11V,

(cipouALOV

882

and

)

.

{E:YW

after

all,

,,

acppwv,

cP

better

no

885);
than

as

a

tninking

had

been

a

woman

,

)

V'l11f'LWV 1

-faulty

Medea

883).

babbling

a VTL'

av"tl1'€LV€lV

senseless

she must have lost her

continues, as he silently agrees:
mind

and

{ic.aic.ws

she

is,

couo'

infant
891 );

her

cppOVE:l V

TOT[€),

892-893).
Medea ends her speech by summoning -forth all o-£ her
contender's sophia:

she lies through her teeth and uses

the best weapon she has--her children!--to gain at least
symbolic physical proximity to her enemy Jason.

Through

the agency o-f the children, she is able to touch Jason and
falsely reassure him with a -forsworn pledge 0£ -forgiveness
and

revived

philia:145

Children, children, come here! Come out of the house!
Greet your -father; say -farewell to him along with me,
and, together with your mother, change -from the
enemies we were to -friends (6ta>..>..ax9'119' a1J,a
T:'JS
1f'poo9E:v
ex9pas
e:s.
cpL>..ous.
1.J.'l"ITPOS.
IJ.ETa); -for we now have made a truce and my anger
has changed (896-897).
,....

,

,,

,

#

'

Although it may seem unlikely that Jason could believe
this Pack o-f lies, it will do well to remember that this
man, like the Tutor, is not unsettled by the fluidity of
:relationships; he has stated outright (560-561) that he
145

Flory,

"Right

Hand,"

pp.

71-72..
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others to abandon (or, as here, cleave to) him
espec t s
ding to their best interests.
His willingness to

accor

acceP

t Medea's "change of heart," then, is a byproduct of

.... pectations he has accrued as a player in the zero-sum
the e ....
BY his lights, she has (at last!) come to her

8a1De·
senses.

She--now that she finally realizes there is no way

r to succeed against his and Creon's plan--is playing
for he
the game smart, by putting her true (and only natural)
feelings under the control of her rational mind:
I do praise these things [you say), woman, though I
can hardly blame those things [you said before]. It
is only natural that a member of the female race get
angry at her husband, when he engages in secret
commerce for marriage with another (yaµ.ous
1fapeµ.1foAwv1'oS
aAAol.ous).
But
you've
changed
your heart--though it took. you some time!--to the
better course, now that you've recognized the
>I
'
"'
prevailing
plan
(eyvws
de'
T'l1V
vucwaav
fJouA"1v). " These
,, are the,,..., acts of, a prudent woman
(yuvaLKOS
epya
Tau Ta
awcppovos).
(908-913).
In concluding this speech, Jason indulges in
fantasizing about the future of his children, and in the
process reconfirms himself as a competitor in the game (see
below, Part Five).

He imagines his children at the top of

the heap in Corinth:
•111

be

first

(Ta

"I expect that you with your brothers

1fpwTCaJ)

of

the

Corinthian

land"

<916 -917)--a position his new social standing will, he
assures them, buy them.

Furthermore, at lines 920-921, he

hopes that they will serve as his protectors against the
enem.ies he never questions he, the future aged competitor,
•111 have:

"Hay I see you thriving as you come to the end
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of your

youth,

,

,..

stronger
<

€1.J.WV

my

than

enemies"

>

,..

(€x9pwv

•

uv€p1"€pous).

Medea now asks a clearly receptive Jason that the
allowed to stay, feigning that she realizes the
cb.ildren be
4ecree

la1't

of

A~a1"a,

exile

is

for

and

935),

her

equating

of the royal house and Jason:
in the way (934-937).

own

good

her

>

'

(Kaj..l.Ol

good

with

that

after all, she would just be

She further reminds Jason, who at

first is incredulous of his success in achieving the
children's release from exile, that he will easily be able

to have his way with his new wife, to which he agrees (942His manipulation of his own erotic appeal will

945).

again win the day, he is sure, and in his breezy selfassurance one can perhaps discern the source of his
prejudice against women.

For, unlike the Corinthian women

of the Chorus, whose prejudice is the competitor's

prejudice against a

long-victorious competitor, Jason's

disdain for women is the victor's contempt for the
Yanquished--women to him are interchangeable parts, easily
manipulated to his advantage.

For this reason he feels

that Medea, in o-ffering the costly gown and diadem to the
Princess, is disposing of valuable resources £or no good
reason:
Medea,

he will certainly prevail without these girts;
to

him,

is

therefore

-foolish

(~

.

µ.a 1"ata,

959).

But Medea, £ar -from being a £001, is showing her
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colDPeti tor
the P

's savvy.

For if she cannot gain proximity to

rincess through these gifts, Medea will not be able to
Medea therefore at this crucial juncture once

pa1son her.

again plays the supplicant, imaging herself as such to
Jason:

she is in a thoroughly vulnerable position before

this young girl, whose star is rising, on whose side are
the gods, and in whose young hands is the absolute power to
,,
,
c
KElVQ
V\JV
aut;e:l
0
oaLJJ.WV,
(KEl V'r)S
rule
,
,
lays
notionally
966-967).
She
1upa VVEl,
ve:a
8E05,
her life on the line in approaching the princess ("I would
exchange £or my children •s exile not only gold, but my
Medea culminates her imaged supplication

life," 966-967).

of the princess by bidding the children to "beseech your
father's

young

yvvau:a,
971).146

wife,

OEO"ll'Oll

The

woman

my

>

v

,

so

(11'a1pos
c

€1.J.'l')V,

sounds

,

mistress"

ve:av

,

lKEIEUEl[O],

pathetic,

so

970-

helpless,

and seems, by sending her innocent young children into the
den of her enemy, to be putting so much on the line.

That

would be true 0£ anyone but a zero-sum competitor.
For Medea the competitor this is another master
stroke.

Who could guess that so pathetically tendered an

146K l.· 11 s,

Kythopoeia, pp. 120-121, argues that
[t]he entire episode comprising the death of Glauke is
full of ambiguities which give it the aspect 0£ a perverted
:~crifi_cial ritual."
Point by point, Kills illustrates how
Of e chi.~d~e_n can be viewed as o££erants -following the steps
th sacrifi.ci.al procedure, which culminate in the holocaust
th at consumes the princess. The children later, of course,
emsetves become the sacri£icial victims 0£ Medea's kni£e.
•
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offer o

given ostensibly to attain something only for
'
not hing for their mother--could be hiding treachery

1nnoce
tbeDl--

f such obviously costly gifts in the hands of two

nts

and death?
w11en
•

tbl.S

S

Medea shows to the knowing a sleight of hand

he is ever so careful to instruct the little boys--

i.· 5

important!, she tells them--to put the gifts in the

1iands of the princess (972-973).

In the zero-sum game,

proxiDlitY spells danger, touch kills, as these boys will
tbeDlselves soon discover.
To such a state Gouldner indicated zero-sum
coDlpeti tion ultimately comes:

it brings in its wake a

crisis of intimacy that results from manipulating desire to
the dictates of the game.

At lines 974-975, Medea signals

her now full involvement in this crisis by the instructions
she gives her children:

"Go, quick as you can; do well,

and bring for your mother the good news of the things she

desires

to

obtain"

(~v

1"UXE:lV).

statement Medea has come full circle:

With

this

she is no longer a

woman stricken with desire for any man (8), but one who,
like the husband who taught her, knows how to control and
channel her desire to the achievement of her own success
over her enemies.
her desire.

This has now become the sole object of

Medea has become Jason:

no longer does she

•Pend her desire on living beings, she saves it en ti rely
for h er own success.
The fourth

stasimon (976-1001), which follows,

is
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entirely with the Chorus' expression 0£
ta1ten up
sness, and, as such, belongs properly in discussion
110pe1es
next section, as does much of what £ollows. The
of tbe
Chorus, and indeed even Medea, from this point £orward show
tbe e

ffects of the reversal in which they are involved.

ow, we must ignore these fluctuations, and instead
var n
concentrate on what is left of adherence to the definiuons.

For this reason, discussion of the remaining

eboral songs will be postponed to the next section.
nespi te the reverberations from the impending horrid
deed of killing the children, Medea nonetheless argues
successfully for cleaving to the definitions which have
:been established thus far in the play.

A£ter the Tutor

announces that the children have successfully delivered the
fateful gifts, Medea, al though she wavers, remembers what a
competitor can ill afford to forget, that her enemies await
her failure so that they can laugh.

At 1049-1051 she

steels herself against so£tness, and determines to act:

•Do I want my enemies to get off scot-free and to be a
laughing-stock.?

I

must

do

these

things."

(ToAµ.'f}TEOV

Tac§[E])

Medea, who mani£ests the de£initions tested in this
!!enchos, with this verbal adjective begins to show the
inescapable , unendurable logic of the game into which these
d.ef1n1 lions fit.

this .

As happens in elenchos to interlocutors,

1.s the point past which one cannot answer anything

4-00
For i£ one is to support the de£ini tions, the
con S

equences logl.. cally £ollow .

11•ing
4eed s
other

This is why we see Medea

expression to her sense 0£ the "necessity" 0£ the
he is about to commit, although, obviously, there are
alternatives to killing the children, alternatives

his intelligent woman hersel£ has been able to see:
whiCh t
she could, a£ter all, take the children with her (104-51046).

But this alternative means abandoning the 'full
It cannot be chosen

punishment 0£ her enemy, Jason.

unless the de£inition 0£ arete Medea represents is itsel£
abandoned.147

And

that

that 'follow, will not

choice,

through

the

horrors

be taken.

Instead, Medea, upon seeing the Messenger arrive with
news £rom the royal palace, reverts back into her old,
competitive sel£.

She has been eagerly awaiting his

arrival (1116-1117), terms the news that Creon and his
daughter

are

· . . µu9ov,

dead

1127),

147 Easterling,

"a

and

most

beauti£ul

claims

that

story"

the

(KaHloTov

Messenger

can

"In £an ticide," p. 188, po in ts to
Kedea•s "obsessive need to triumph over her enemies• and
her "heroic sel£-image" as pieces in the inescapable logic
killing the children.
Similarly, £or Schlesinger, "Zu
_edea,• p. 32, killing the children "aus Rache und . . .
aus Rotwendigkeit" cannot be separated. C£. Walsh, "Public
and
·
bef p ri.vate,"
pp. 298-299, who sees Medea, like Jason
e ore her, now opera ting in the public sphere at the
Xpense of the private.
as
Husurillo, "Reconsideration,• p. 65, by contrast,
Kc~erts that "[t)here is no logic in the deed . . . ."
kill~r-m.ot t, Inc~rna tion, p. 92, sees the logic 0£ Medea •s
as l.~g her children in that it is the climax 0£ her career
viola tor of the parent-child bond.

:f

401
..,
110

and

forevermore be counted among those who work to her

ad~antage,

and

ea!lt

and

.

1"0

elJ£pyf:'f<ll5

"

therefore

1127-1128).

one

Of

her

~olltov

What

we

are

friends

.

o>

cE:v

>

KQl
about

to

€J..LOl5
hear

is

ghastly;

uedea consummate competitor that she remains, shameri

•

loats over the prospect of savoring grisly
1ess ly g
details:

"How don't hurry through it, friend, but do tell.

So• did they die?

You will give me twice as much pleasure

if they died really horribly."

This statement, and the Messenger's description that
follows, will be considered in the last section of this
chapter (Part Five, below); here we need only acknowledge
that, typical as this gloating is of the zero-sum competitor,148

the

suggested

eroticization of

death

that

her

anticipation of "pleasure" implies, gives pause to all but
the fully committed competitor, Medea.

The disgusting and

pathetic details of the deaths do nothing to her resolve
but stiffen it:
Friends, the matter is resolved (oE:ooK l"al) that
I must kill my children as quickly as possible and set
out from this land, and not by dallying give opportunity for another, ill-disposed hand to kill the
ch~ldren.
It is in every way necessary that they die
(1l'avTw5
ocp>
avayK"l
KQT9aV€lV).
And
since
it
is
necessary
(E:1t€L
of:
xp.f}),
we
ourselves shall kill them, we who bore them.
So come
on,
now,
heart,
arm
yourself
(oll'~ttou).
Why

llo

148

Ohlander Suspense, p. 167, compares Medea to a
hero, wh~ likewise "relishes the pain he has
cour~cted oz:i his foes."
An exception to this is, of
he he, Achilles, who does anything but gloat over the pain
as brought Priam (Iliad 24.538-548).

tn:1i~ric

r
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'"

d0

'W e

narDl

hesitate
to do
the
terrible/clever
and necessary
'\
'
,
,..,
•
(Ta

dt:lVa

KavayKala

•

•

•

KaKa)?

come, poor hand 0£ mine, take the sword, take it,
creep to the pain£~1 starting-post 0£ li£e, and don"t
turn weak (Ka1C.L08't)5), don"t remember the
hildren, how very dear they are, how you bore them.
~ut £or this short day £orget your children, and then
lament.
(1236-1249).
Three things are 0£ concern here.

First, Medea again

espresses, indeed this time stresses (£our times in eight
>

1236;

unes:
clvayKal'a,

1243)

the

I

1240;

avayic.'I'),

necessity

0£

her

I

1240;

xp'I'),

deed.

And

necessary it is, unless she is to abandon her pursuit 0£ a
reputation as one who comes out on top.

There are no

answers but •yes,• £or this logic, terrible though it is,
is

cohesively

clever

(dt:l

va,

Second,

1243).

Medea" s

decision here is basically to enter once again the £ield
of competition.

Mother that she nonetheless is, she must

now be soldier who arms hersel£ and takes up the sword
1242;
who

sets

1245).149

out

1244),

£rom

Gouldner"s

the

starting-post

description

0£

the

athlete
(PaAPtda,

competitor

Who can •never withdraw £rom the contest; he must always
hurl himsel£

back

into

the

£ray"150 seems especially

149simon, Tragic Drama, p. 81.
Medea here
•tdentifies with the aggressor,• i.e., becomes like the
•ale oppressor.
Simon, p. 80, sees such identi£ication,
:nd •separation or segregation of the sexes,• as the only
lines 0£ resolution: "What makes the play a tragedy is
U t none 0£ the solutions really allows men and women to
Chvie together in harmony and to beget and cherish
ldren.•

t::

150

Gouldner,

Enter

Plato,

p.

54.
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to these lines.

apropos
another

combat, prodding hersel£ to begin yet another

Third, in urging herself to forget the children and

race.
)ler

Here is Medea, arming herself £or

connection to them, that they are "very dear," that she

he one who bore them (1246-1248), Medea is merely
was t
urging herself to take on the competitor's mandatory
practice 0£ fluidity in relationships.

Individuals, no

matter how dear, cannot stand in the way 0£ one's success.
And it is indeed this cold-blooded competitor that the
children £ace, as Medea 0££ stage traps and stabs them to
death (1271-1281).

The de£initions have been brought to

their logical conclusion, and here it is:

dead children at

the hands 0£ their own mother.
The tragic magnitude 0£ a mother's killing her children should be enough to destroy the system 0£ de£ini tions
that made such an act necessary.

But this does not happen.

For as Jason enters, blustering and threatening, we are
liven to know that the competitive ethos which has wreaked
all this savagery thrives.

Jason is sure that the royal

household will soon be looking £or vengeance, and will
extract it from Medea, who he is sure "will pay the
Penalty

(dWOE:l

•without
treat

her

dlK'flV,

penalty"

>

,..

(a9ct1os.,

harmfully

that is not all.

1298)

and

will

1300),

£or

,,

(E:pfi,OUOlV

IC.OKWS,

not

escape

they

will

1302).

But

His concern is not her, but his chil-

dren, Whose lives he expects are also threatened by

404
relatives

0£

the

(1303-1305).151

princess

wnen he hears that Medea has beaten them to the task.,
declaration is that he will get even
JaSO n 's £irst

1£

1316).

1't:LOWIJ.al

But

he

touch
•o1'£).

Helios,

to us,

a

I

with

me

£a ther

I

xepo5).

111-wish

her

call her

0£

against

defense

•oAEIJ.LaS

your

hand

our

hostile

(1320-1322).
(oAolCol,

names,152

yet

he cannot "sting" her:

he

All

1329;

"You will not
>

(XElPl

£a ther,

O\J

gave

hand"

this

chariot

,,

(epuµa

Jason

can

,,

eppCel,

acknowledges

cannot,

really

e is impotently unable to touch her:
for b

(T.fiv

that

do

is

1346)

and

with

these

"But I would not be able to sting

rou with a thousand reproaches." (1344-1345).

Furthermore,

he will not be allowed to bury his own children (1377-1378;
cf. 1412), only

his

new

wi£e

(1394).

In £act,

he

cannot

even touch the children, though he longs to do so, begs
Bed.ea to let him, and calls the gods to witness that he
cannot (1399-1400;

1402-1403;

1410-1412).

His

vanquishment

151 Easterling,

"In £an ticide,"
p.
189;
cf.
Oblander, Suspense, p. 180.
Oblander, passim, argues that
the .audience throughout anticipates and fears that the
Corinthians will kill the children, as they in £act did in
earlier versions.
152g·

~mon, Tragic
Drama, p. 93, notes how the £orm
Un the dialogue £rom 1393-1398, with its intertwined hal£wr:s• shows Jason and Medea "entwined in some murderous
Stling match, not entwined as husband and wi£e in
Procreative sex or in complementary efforts on behalf of
Children."

Of

r
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1

coIDPlete.

153

J.•
Medea could not be happier £or it.
control
out of

She is -fully in

as victor, hersel£ and the bodies 0£ her children
reach.154

As

victor,

she

does

the

touching
Medea

stinging, but is not hersel£ touched and stung.
in her

ability

to

have

touched

his

1360);

Kap<Stas

heart

she

•sung• !!!!!!--by -flaunting his children as dead:
longer
1310).

exist;

and

that

will

sting

you"

and

(oe

c-r:fls

can
"They no
<S.fie;e-ral,

She lets him (and us) know that this is merely the

payback for what was done to her:

Jason did not practice

reciprocity with her, but instead dishonored her (13531354); Creon provided her husband with a ready-to-hand

marriage and tossed Medea hersel£ out 0£ his land (1356135'1).

Both needed to be punished; she could not be the

object of la ugh ter

£or

her

enemies (1355; 1362).

Furthermore, Medea leaves Jason and us with a pathetic
picture of his -future:

he will die in disgrace, struck. by

a timber -from the rotting Argo (1386-1389), a£ter having

153 Flory, "Right Hand," p. 73.
Furthermore,
Burnett, •Tragedy 0£ Revenge," p. 22, suggests that in
lledea•s not allowing Jason to touch the children she is
•treating them as if they were consecrated objects that
::u~d be soiled by Jason's touch . . . ." Furthermore, by
frll~ng the children Medea has "robbed [Jason] 0£ the last
n ~J.t of that £lawed quest £or the -fleece. He will have
e 0 so much as a pair 0£ corpses to show £or that entire
See also Simon, Tragic Drama, p. 92, £or
11:::df-tion."
illllll as revenge as robbing Jason 0£ the chance £or
ortau ty through children.
154-

.
Schlesinger,

"Zu

Medea,"

pp.

34

and

36.
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nis old age in lamentation more bitter even than he
•pent
(1396).

now

feels

A.S the Chorus so long ago predicted, the tables have

The rivers £low back.wards.

turned.
confiden t
defeat.

.n
l.

Jason, once so

his rising star, is now su££ering utter

And Medea, what 0£ Medea?

\tli th her display 0£

seemingly total potency and control, she has all the
trappings o-f the victor.
J>e touched or stung.

She touches and stings but cannot

From her invulnerable position on

high and with her departure announced and imminent (1384t385), she and the definitions she manifests are

maintained even to the end.
But have the definitions withstood the elenchos?

Or

have they, like Medea, merely escaped further scrutiny?

As

she £lies 0££ in Helios• chariot, the sun's new course
signals cataclysmic upheaval

(see

below, Part Five).

Despite triumph and Medea's claims to the contrary, all is
not well.

A reversal 0£ the -first order has taken place.

Ro wonder the Chorus 0£ Corinthian women. and we. are
dismayed

and

con£used.155

155
att .
Burnett, "Tragedy 0£ Revenge." p. 10, would
kU~lbute the audience's confusion to the £act that, in the
of ing of the children. they have witnessed •an inversion
an expected tragic pattern."

The Socratic Character 0£ Elenchos in Medea:
tart T1'0:
Re£u ta tion, Recognition, .Aporia, and Escape
In statements made by Medea•s Chorus o-f Corinthian
troJDen.

one can see the same progression toward and through

· n witnessed in interlocutors 0£ the early Platonic
refutatio
41a1ogues:

the Chorus go -from boast-ful con-f idence in the

proposed de£inition to uncertainty and doubt.

Although

tber:e is some evidence that these women experience
recognition and begin to grope -for a new truth, they end in
aporia.

-primary

The women o-f the Chorus are, a£ter all, the
interlocutors in this would-be dialogue.

They

are, however, not the only ones in whom the progression
through re-futation can be traced:

Euripides shows traces

of elenctic progression also in Medea, and, to a
extent,

in

Jason

and

lesser

Creon.156

Medea, in short, serves a

double role.

In her -first

role, she, along with the other main characters, mani-fests
the proposed de-fini tions o-f arete, sophia, and eros.

In

her second role, however, Medea mani-fests some o-f the same
aspects 0£ re-futation evident in the Chorus:
and doubt, and evidence 0£ some recognition.

uncertainty
Medea,

there-fore, by being both the de-finition and its
refutation,

illustrates

the

de-finition•s

£allacy.

.
The messenger who witnesses the deaths in
d~Yal house is likewise stricken to aporia; see the
scussion below, this section.
r

156

internal

4-07

the

408

can be said 0£ Jason and Creon, in whose £ates

tfbe sa111e

is evident.

re•ersal
es:J1il>i ted

oot seen

In Medea alone, however, is

the one hallmark 0£ early Platonic interlocutors

in Medea's primary interlocutors, the Chorus:

the

.iapdash solution 0£ escape.
The Chorus, not being a££orded escape, exceed Medea as
j,Dterlocutors because they must stay and labor toward
truth, the terminus 0£ elenchos never witnessed in Plato's

earlY dialogues.

And al though Medea does not transcend the

early dialogues• terminus in gaining the truth, the Chorus•
willingness to grope £or it marks them as budding
philosophers.

They at one point realize, like Socrates,

that they know only one thing:

that they know nothing.

Tb1S is quite a distance -from where they started.
They started in general agreement with Medea.

This

auch was apparent -from their entrance at line 131, where
their concern and sympathy are mani£est, and where they
define themselves as -friends 0£ the house (137; c£. 178179, applied more speci£ically to Medea).

Although they

cannot at this point (152-154) understand or approve 0£
Kedea•s ~ (£or death), and consider her -foolish

(tiaTala,

152)

£or

entertaining

it,

this

is

be ca use

they have not yet been encouraged to acknowledge their own
outrage at their endemic helplessness as women in the £ace
o'f spousal in-fidelity and abandonment.

For now they see

•uch treatment as not remarkable (155-158).

The Chorus are

409
at first

more concerned to commiserate with Medea's woes

support her in action (173-182): they do not even
tJ:&aD to
to consider taking action profitable or availing; to

-·

tile ir
j.D

invariable victims• minds the best course is to trust
g ods

the

(157-158).

sut a£ter hearing Hedea•s assessment of her own and
other women's position, the Chorus• general agreement
J)ecomes £ull-fledged support of Medea, and they become
bC)ast£ullY confident of their position as allies of Medea
10 her intended action.

They without hesitation agree to

lteeP silent, and approve of Hedea•s plan to harm her enemy

Jason

(267-268).

The £irst stasimon (410-445), recall, showed them
upousing broadly but unmistakably the zero-sum ideology,
the •us vs. them• division of the world into winners and
losers.

The tone of the stasimon is evident from the first

strophe:

the women intersperse strongly declarative

present tense verbs (410-411; 419) with bold, predictive
futures (418; 420).

They obviously feel they know not only

•hat is, but what will be.

In the £irst antistrophe (421-

430) they confidently explain their previous status as the

•ron11y oppressed:

they hadn't the control of song

afforded men.
The second strophe (431-438) finds them briefly
reviewing
(C'f.

Medea•s

duoTav£

at

history.

442)

marks

The
their

use

of

-ra.>.alva

sympathy

with

at

437

410

11edea
tile P

•s degeneration 'from active determiner 0£ her £ate to
assive and helplessly dishonored; their transition in

8 £rom previously active verbs to a passive one
une 43
signals their perception that Medea is 0£ course not
responsible £or the status quo they subsequently describe
iD the second antistrophe (439-445):
so is aidos.

oaths are gone, and

Poor Medea is not to blame; how can she be?

Sile is without home (441), has no place 0£ anchorage in a
sea of woes (442-443), and is under the control 0£ another
woman whose position is 'fixed as ruler of a bed once hers
(•and another queen is set up in control 0£ the bed in your
,..

11ouse,"

TWV

60JJ.OLOLV

£1f£OTa,

,

.

T£

.

>.eicTpwv

443-445).

KP£LOOWV

Jason,

the

oath

breaker

and shameless betrayer of his wife, and the unnamed
princess whose exercise of control takes the manifestation
of possessing the bed once belonging to Medea, are
responsible.

Medea is the victim with whom these women can

identify, for before the vicarious moral victory afforded
them by Medea's helplessness in the £ace 0£ obvious male
treachery, they once were--but, thank god! no longer are-one down.
But later, after the women have witnessed the verbal
contest between Jason and Medea, they admit for the £irst
time a certain distaste £or one predictable aspect of the
zero-sum game:

strife arising between friends.

"Terrible

1a the anger and one hard to cure when friends engage in

with

,trife

friends."

,

(6El v.fi

.

OPY"I

411

.

KQl

Cl

OTQV

1u0La 1'05

They,

unlike

Medea

(and

strangely

lpLVt

520-521).

the c a

utious Hurse, who hesitates openly to curse her

foraier

like

master and therefore philos, Jason, even though she

adDli ts be bas wronged his friends), seem unable to forget
tnat in the relentless pursuit £or one•s own advancement
friends are often discarded or betrayed and therefore
))eCODle enemies.

They take seriously the part of the creed

that dictates that one help 'friends; this will soon
contribute to the demise of the zero-sum definitions of

-

arete, sophia, and eros they propound and defend.
The beginnings of this demise can be -found in the

second stasimon (627-662), though not until the end of the
first strophe.

Here the high con£idence of the first

atasimon is continued as the women assert that eros can, in
fact, as has been illustrated by Jason, bestow eudoxia and
~.

and that, as Medea's plight has shown, it is a

dangerously unpredictable ally in this acquisition.

Again

the tone is, at least initially, one 0£ great sel£confidence and fully supportive 0£ the propounded
definition, and yet, there is, by the first antistropbe, a
note of uncertainty.
The women•s uncertainty is marked first by a change
fl'olll the indicative to the wist£ul optative.

A£ter their

b1-ash

(1fape6wKa v,

gnomic

aorist

0£

the

first

lines

412.

indicative mood appears again only in the last

ez9), the

which sports the boldly declarative

antistrophe,

652.,

une

of

J601J.£V

its

in

indicative

the

vurthermore,

and

the

final

~.>..9oL

definitive
>I

(£0Tal,

word

of

line

662.).

part

630,

tense

future

0£

a
It

condition, is the only optative not expressing a wish.
1S clear that the Chorus accept certain things (like the

usefulness yet danger of eros in the zero-sum game) as
status quo, and yet, despite their acceptance, nonetheless
wiSh for certain things to be otherwise.
For example, beyond the Chorus• general mood 0£
uncertainty, they again give at least lip service against
the strife endemic to the zero-sum game.

In the -first

antistrophe, they want nothing to do with the "disputatious

2

I

unceasing

and

wrath
I

a1topeaTa

I

V£lK'f),

T£

>

strife"

637-638),

I

(aµ.•L.>..oyous
with

which

>

•

opyas
they

suspect Cypris of being able to beset one s thumos.
1

They

further wish that she may with keen discrimination honor
"beds
)

I

euvas.

Of

not

battle-scarred"

639).

Furthermore,

moderation

>

I

(a 'll'To.>..£µ.ous
their

(aTepyoL

desire

for
I

aw•poauva,

µ.£

the
635)

favor
in

the first line 0£ the antistrophe, marks them as chary 0£
the excessiveness characteristic 0£ -fully committed
competi tors.157

157 Gouldner

filor-z,

p.

4o.

In

•

£act,

Enter

all

of

Plato,

the

p.

above

59,

and

appear

Slater,

to

413

und e r

cut their commitment to competition, and the second

he/antistrophe pair adds more evidence £or the Chorus'
stro P
ing doubts about the dictates 0£ the zero-sum game.

grow

The theme 0£ the last hal£ 0£ this ode, like the last
the £irst ode, is the value 0£ connection to
balf Of
otbers, this time applied more personally to the Chorus
themselves.

As they sing the praises 0£ country and

friends, the women take another notional step away £rom the
complex de£inition of arete within the con£ines 0£ the
zero-sum game.

For al though competitors in the game claim

to value helping £riends as much as harming enemies, as
indeed does Medea later in the play (807-810), the game
ttse1£, as Gouldner has argued, puts emphasis primarily on
harming enemies, £rom whom victory in competition must be
wrested.

The Chorus here, in their song 0£ longing £or

fatherland, home, and city, and their musings on the
meaning 0£ having £riends, stress instead the worth 0£
connection, that £luid commodity in the zero-sum game.
we

Can

then continue to posit the Chorus' initial avowal and

defence 0£ the zero-sum competitor's de£ini tion 0£ arete,
•hen they have so quickly begun to repudiate necessary
aspects 0£ the game?
We, in £act, can, £or in addition to the argument
above (Part One), that the Chorus here £ight £or their only
access to social respectability, the status as wi£e, they
continue to cast their descriptions, both 0£ their imagined

414

futur

e encounters with Cypris and their wistful musings on

home, and friends, in competitive terms.
fa JD ily •
. allY they still are concerned to remain in control,

sas1c

'

e willing at least to ill-wish their enemies.
and ar
The first indication of their persistently adversarial
standpoint is the terms by which they describe their
iJDagined future

encounters

with

Cypris.158

Hot only is

she uncharacteristically described as sporting bow and
arrow,159

but,

as

argued

above

(Part

One),

the

encounter shows the Chorus imagining themselves in a
position of helplessness, and this is a
contender can abide.

position no

Cypris here is in control:

with her

weaponry she is envisioned as "having stricken the thumos•
of her victim, and, by means of the disputatious wraths
and insatiate strifes, •striking out against• her
(8uµov

>
•
t:Kll'l'fl~aoCaJ,

639;

11poopa.>.ot.,

640).

In

addition, Cypris is depicted in the zero-sum contender's
Y1ctorious role of having rational control over this
emotional landscape:
(deLva,

640),

and

the

she is "clever /terrible"
women

describe

her

as

Potentially

"sharp-witted•

discernment.

This first antistrophe, in short, is not for

641)

in

her

the women of the Chorus merely a wish to avoid stri£e; it
158
the .
Oblander, Suspense, p. 99, presumes Medea is
intended referent in the Chorus" remarks about Cypris•
Y1ct·l.miza tion of lovers.
159Page,

Medea,

p.

118,

at

lines

633-634.

415
J$ illS t

ea

d a wish to avoid strife with which they visualize

lves helplessly assailed, at the hands of a superitJ:LelDse
armed, highly rational contestant.

orlY

ThiS interpretation is but tressed by the terminology

of helplessness which invades the second strophe.

As they

i•agine themselves in Hedea•s current state of disconnection. the Corinthian women -foresee not only a pain£ul
>

situation

,

(axt:wv,

but

647),

severely disadvantaged:

one

in

which

they

are

the disconnected life is one

without resources and is hard to get through (Tov
dUO''lfEpa Tov

>""
QLCaJV(aJ,

645-646)i

death is now preferable to them, too, rather than such a
state of helplessness

(648-649)i

loss of

one•s fatherland

is described as the worst hardship, and as that most

helpless
'II

a Hos

of

states,

bereavement

Cl

U1f£p9t:V

>
OUK

(µ.ox9wv

OTEp£o9aL,

yas

650-

The women clearly despair of attaining for

651).

themselves the zero-sum contender•s isolation, but they
despair of its practical disadvantages as much as its
emotional deprivations.
Furthermore, the Chorus are not yet willing to allow
that they are at a loss, but instead insist on their
enduring knowledge.

They begin the second antistrophe back

in the indicative, with a declaration of first-hand
knowledge,
rem ·

•we
.

have

seen•

>I

(£Ldoµ.£V 1

653).

They

ain soll.dly on Hedea•s side, Medea, whom they describe

416

••

S

uffering and unpi tied by city or £riend (655-656).

!'bef ill-wish

those who do not honor £riends, and end the

ode bf proclaiming. with a strongly predictive £uture. that
••UC h

a person will never be a

£riend 0£ mine• (661-662).

'!'he ill-wishing marks their enduring status as competitors
iD two ways.

First. ill-wishing a

non-£riend is

tantamount to the hope £or harm to be£all an enemy, which
puts them squarely back into the £ray 0£ dealing out harm,
at least notionally.

So much £or their wish to avoid

conflict.

Finally. this

without

charm•

which (balanced

>

particular ill-wish, •may he die
,

(a xapla-ros

as

it

is

by

>I

o>.ol9CEJ.

the

659)

earlier

is

>I

t:uxapl5

one
0£

line 631 of the £irst strophe), wishes upon the non-£riend
the worst 0£ all £ates £or a contender:

to die without the

l!"&Ce which can lead to good repute and arete.

For the

competitor, recall, does not prevail only by his strong
ri1ht arm.

Grace

and

good looks can bring victory.160

The women end. then. wishing upon enemies what they
themselves despair at su££ering, inability to attain one•s
own advancement.
It cannot be denied, however, that these same women

have begun to display reservations about the competitive

160se
w·inkler. Constraints. pp. 77-79. and the
discus . e
doe
sion above, Part One.
Keridor, •Medea 639." p. 97.
and.s not sense the connection bet ween grace and reputation.
1011 there£ore argues that line 631 "does not £ollow quite
•tatcally upon the £irst part 0£ the bipartite introductory
ement.•
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The neat is rising, and they begin to move away
frOlll

11rst
t11ese

its source.

Like interlocutors made to sense £or the

time the logical repercussions 0£ their belie£s,
•omen show discom£ort at one 0£ the prices paid by

tile zero-sum competitor:

the total alienation that is one

of the game's most devastating and inevitable by-products.
It is £or this reason .that the Chorus are able to take

Solace in the ensuing interaction between Aegeus and Medea.
J)espi te its undertow 0£ erotic manipulation (see above,
Part one), the current 0£ the interaction between the two
friends is one 0£ cooperation and help, not divisiveness
and harm.

The Chorus can thereby well-wish Aegeus along on

bis journey (759-763), and they, like us, can experience
aomentary re£uge £rom the competitive £ray.

This is,

however, merely the calm be£ore the storm, the moment in
elenchos when the interlocutor, still clinging to his
initial de£initions, has been lulled into believing that
the analogies with which he has expressed agreement have no
real bearing on the maintenance 0£ his thesis.

Elucidating

the analogies must wait £or the £inal sections 0£ this
chapter.

How, however, we must look to the Chorus'

reaction as Medea, a£ter Aegeus exits (764-823), brings the
definition 0£ arete supported by them to its emotionally
repugnant yet inescapably logical conclusion:

that she

•ust k"l
1. l her own children--there is no other way (see
above, Part One).
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The Chorus• first reaction (811-813) is horror.
iia4 n

They

o waY of foreseeing the inevitability of this

solutiOD·

Claiming a desire to help Medea, they try to

cliSsuade her from this act, so far from human norms as it
18·
f OU

Their second reaction (816) is incredulity:
dare to Kill your own o:f:fspring, woman?"

"But will

Their

reactions allow them a certain distance :from her; it is
from this perspective that they again, in the third
stasimon, define arete, eros, and sophia.
we shall see,

~

And al though, as

and sophia are once again subordinate to

-----

arete, the Chorus in their descriptions of the
interconnection among these three terms show a subtle
shift in their thinKing.

It will do well for us to recall

that their third ode is sung in the spirit 0£ trying to
help Medea.
That ode, the Ode to Athens (824-865), is pivotal in
the development 0£ the moti£s and images which serve as the
play•s elenctic analogies, and there:fore discussion 0£ its
full impact must be postponed :for the last two sections of

this chapter.

At this point, however, we may note that the

Chorus• musings on the play•s three crucial terms puts them
into a

new

and

decidedly

different

context.161

161
This may explain why the ode is sometimes
con Sl.dered
·
a sort of escape for the Chorus.
See, e.g.,
Boneie "H
·
th
•
eroi.c Elements," p. 50.
Ruth Padel, "'Imagery of
e
IUsewhere•·
Two
Choral
Odes
0£
Euripides,• CQ n.s. 24
(19'14)
•
(Bi • Pp. 227-241, :finds in two other •escape odes•
iii. :PP01 Ytus 732-775 and Helen 1451-1511) "a reassertion 0£
e themes and problems 0£ the play in a di££erent and
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wnereas before arete, eros, and sophia were always

4ef ine

d in the arena of conflict, here they are

. ipants in a cooperative milieu.

partlC
appea

Sophia makes its

ranee first as that by which the prehistoric Athenians
K~£LVOTaTav

nourished

were
_ 29).
826 8

This description, which renders sophia as

sustenance for a whole society of undifferentiated humans,
iS a far cry from its previous depiction--as a commodity to

J>e 1Danipulated for individual advancement.

transformed and with even more subtlety.

Eros is also

It 'first appears

as the sensuously depicted Cypris, who busies herself not
with advancing the position 0£ one individual over another,
:but with drawing water and being pelted with flowers (835843).

Then eros is the personified Erotes, who are

likewise not involved in competition, but who do the
flower-pelting and are described as •the assistants
to

Sophia,

helpers

toward

all

sorts

0£

arete•

(Tp

distant context• (p. 227).
Furthermore, "This type 0£ ode
· · · creates mythological and pictorial associations that
lead to a lyric vision of the appropriate action, and
reassembles motifs 0£ the play in a new mode, as a dream
regroups the thoughts and events of the waking day.• (p.
241). These comments have obvious relevance for the first
strophe-antistrophe pair of the ode under discussion here.
~f. the similar analysis of another Euripidean ode by
,;orge B. Walsh, "The First Stasimon 0£ Euripides•
lectra•,• YCS 25 (1977), pp. 277-289, especially pp. 28128
st 2 ~nd 288-289, where Walsh stresses the importance of the
asimon•s world as a contrast to that 0£ the play.
di
. By contrast, Husurillo, "Reconsideration,• p. 60,
_ smi.sses the significance 0£ this stasimon by remarking,
QiUri Pl.·des had long since abandoned the tautly relevant
Ch
ora1 ode save for special · occasions.•
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I

•
,,,vf;pyous,

~·

844-845).

At

£irst

>

11'av-ro\a5

ape-ras

the

0£

nexus

arete,

and sophia seems to remain the same here:

arete is

he ultimate goal, while eros and sophia are the
still t
aides-de-camp.
There is, however, a di££erence.
an

is

assistant

not

That eros would be

surprising,

£or

we

:tiave heard Jason describe Cypris, i£ not with this word, in
broadly the same terms (526-528).

Furthermore, as Winkler

:tias noted in his study 0£ magical papyri, the word
is

used

to

describe

the

all-purpose

serviceableness 0£ eros throughout the competitive
structure.162

Here,

though,

eros

is

imagined

as

the

assistant to sophia, not to the person seeking an
edge.163 Elsewhere

in

the

play

we

have

seen eros set

off against sophia, as i£ eros were something which had to
be kept in control, and the controller were sophia.

It is di££erent here.
overwhelmingly sensual.

First, the description is

The Chorus engage our sense 0£

•iCht with •most brilliant air• (829-830) and •golden
Harmony• (834), 0£ touch with •moderate breezes• (839-840),
of smell with •sweet-breathing breezes" (840) and the
162 Winkl

er,

Constrain ts,

p.

79.

163
ac
Foley, •Divided Sel£,• p. 83.
Foley, however,
dec~ra_tely cautions against taking this idealistic
ab:iction too optimistically:
"· . . yet Athens itsel£ is
Ut to be visited by Medea . . . .•
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•stte e
4esc r

t-smelling" rosebud wreath (843).
1. ption

trben Ke d e

Such sensual

will only occur one other time in the play:

a caresses her children £or the last time.

There is, in addition, an the overriding spirit 0£ aid
and cooperation that pervades the ode, and casts arete,

· •s and sophia
~·

in

a

totally

di££erent

light.164

And

although the Chorus are unable to bring new definitions to
es:plici t -formulation, the sense one gets 'from their use 0£
tbe three terms suggests the beginning 0£ a complete
realignment, away 'from autonomy and competition, and toward
connection and cooperation.

Later analysis (below, Parts

Four and Five) will bolster what here is presented as a
mere suggestion 0£ this realignment.
The second strophe/antistrophe pair continues the
suggestion 0£ realignment 0£ values in two ways:

'first,

the Chorus betray a new uncertainty; second, their
alienation -from Medea is unmistakable.

Their uncertainty

is obvious -from the series 0£ questions they ask (846-850;
856-862); again, this is a

-far cry 'from the sel£-con£ident

brashness 0£ the first ode:
holy rivers receive Medea?

How then will this city 0£
How will the land, safe escort

of friends, contain her, the child-murderer?

How will she

let the boldness 0£ mind either £or hand or heart to

164
el
So Wol££, "Euripides," p. 241:
"All the
h enaents that in the play produce destructive conflicts are
~r: integrated and beneficent: wisdom, 'fame, traditional
e ry, passion, heroic achievement, and excellence."
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clever /terrible daring for the childHow

cbild r

will

she

be

able

to

look

at

her

en and tearlessly proceed with their murder?

what, in fact, all their questions amount to, is:

can thiS be true?

How

The Chorus' uncertainty and incredulity

regular feature of the interlocutor's reactions in
are a
!!enc hos.

The women's only recourse is to predict,

)lopefully, that Medea will not be able to go through with
tile murder when the time actually comes (862-865).

It is

tlleir only way of salvaging de£initions which are sel£destructing before their very eyes.
Clearly, if Medea can kill her own children, the
Cllorus' definition of arete, and along with it the
definition of its helpmates, eros and sophia, must undergo
severe revision, simply because these women can no longer
approve 0£ Medea's actions.

And that they can no longer

approve is evident from their imprecations that she
consider what she is about to do, and their figurative
supplication 0£ her not to proceed as planned (851-855).
It is the 'first time they have disagreed with Medea's

actions, and thereby with the definitions those actions
represent.166

It

is

ironic

that

they,

who

165
1 adopt Page s solution for the
this line; see Page, Medea, pp. 135-136 at
1

have

so

difficulties in
lines 856 f£.

166
Cb.
Buttrey, "Accident,• p. 9, argues that the
f orus' attitude a£ter this point is reversed to sympathy
or Jason.
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tlY insisted upon standing by £riends, must now
_.,eadfas
stand against her, but they supplicate her with
talte a
even as they imagine in the last antistrophe the
•ords,
cnildren's (vain, although the Chorus are unaware 0£ this)
fiDa l

actual supplication 0£ their mother (863).

For the

cnildren will con£ront, despite the Chorus' prediction
otiierwise, a mother who remains true to the de£ini tion 0£

te her actions represent, whose thumos is un£altering

re
!--(&65),

even when murdering her own o££spring.
The Chorus come to this realiza tion--tha t the

4e£inition 0£ arete they have openly approved does, in
fact, include emotionally repugnant corollaries--during the
ensuing episode between Jason and Medea.

Their only

interjection (906-907) shows the beginning 0£ this
realization, £or they admit that they, too, are beginning
to weep and express the--what must appear even to them-Tain wish that things may not get worse than they now are.
But as the episode draws to a close and Medea has
succeeded (though with great di££iculty; see lines 899905), as the zero-sum competitor must, in keeping her

emotions in line with the accomplishment 0£ her goal, and
has sent the children out with the poisoned garments, the
Chorus sing the £ourth and last

regular167

stasimon

l67E11 iott,
·
Medea, p. 92 at lines 976 ££.
The
fi~nt may be important when we consider that the Chorus'
in 1 observations are £rom the perspective 0£ the reversed
er1ocutor.
Po.

t
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l) remarkably different in tone :from the high
(9'16-10 O •
evident in the :first.
•P1r1ts
The double anaphora in this :fourth stasimon"s :first
uoes.

olJ1t£'1'L,

no

longer
976-977),

and

"She

longer"
will

>

I

( o u u: ·n

receive

she
978-979),

receive"

1>etrays the numbness the Chorus :feel as they own the
consequences o:f the definitions they have espoused.

Such

numbness is common to interlocutors at the moment o:f
reversal.

But it is primarily in the Chorus" resignation

and their despair that one can detect the dawning o:f their

reversal.
They now admit that the hope they had--that Medea
would not be able to go :forward with her plan--is gone.

By

sending the children o:f:f with the gifts, Medea has set o:f:f
a chain o:f reactions that will lead to the children "s
death, one way or the other.

For either the Corinthians

•ill kill them in revenge (so much even Jason expects; see
lines 1301-1305), or Medea

herself will--this

much is

certain, given the rules o:f the game the principals in this
Play are so

proficient

at

playing.168

The

Corinthian

168 Kichelini, "Reophron," pp. 121-124, discusses
the ef'fect on Euripides" play 0£ an earlier mythical
~radition, in which the Corinthians kill Medea"s children
revenge_ :for the royal murders. Michelini sees lines
1~58-1063--in
which Medea :first decides to take the
C~ldren to Athens with her, then reverses her decision and
~:ims that since in any case the children must die, she
a 0 bore them will kill them--as concluding in an illogical
nd Perverse cooperation o:f Medea"s conflicting personae:
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begin their song with the simple and pathetic
•0111en
nouncement: "How there are no longer any hopes le£t me

pro

children to live, no longer; £or they proceed

for the

to the slaughter.•

a1rea d Y
reve r

sal

•

This is a statement 0£

0£ acknowledging the inevitability 0£ something

-omen £ind intolerable.
the ...

As they sing, it is obvious

that the success Medea will gain is a bitter one, not the
long anticipated moment 0£ glory the women initially sang
of in the £irst ode.

The mood, somber and regret£ul

throughout, is the exact opposite 0£ that -first ode, with
its crowing sel£-assurance and high hopes £or the -future.
As the reversal 0£ de-finitions begins to take shape,
the old hard and -fast lines between 'friend and enemy, the
•us vs. them• ethic that drives the whole contest system,
break down.
involved:

6uaTavos.,
6uaTavt:,

Suddenly these women empathize with everyone

the princess (whom they twice describe as
979

and

988),

995),

and

Medea

Jason

(Ta>.av,

(Ta>.alva,

996).

991;

Ho

one here is named; instead, all three (£our, including the
Children, who are unnamed here as throughout the play) are
described tellingly by their marital and familial
connections to each other.

The princess is "bride" (she,

:other and hero. This is a compelling insight, but I
an not agree with Michelini 1s interpretation (p. 122) that
lle 4 ea1s
,
ch.
c l aim
that "in any case (1tavTw5)•
the
O-f l~dren _must die •strongly suggests . . . that the death
Will he Children is determined by £actors other than the
Of Kedeia.•
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11J<.e tbe

children, is admittedly otherwise also unnamed;
978;

,rul'•a'

avvt:uvetJ,

1001);

>.exE:wv,

c:f.
Jason

is

the

"unhappy

,001);

Medea,

groom•

991,

•busband"
pathetically,

is

and

999,

and
,

and

VOOLS,

•mother•

998).

BY expressing only the relatedness o:f the princess,
Jason, and Medea to each other, and by joining them each,
stropbe by antistrophe, in the same web o:f horror the
Chorus themselves are vicariously experiencing, the
Corinthian women not only signal the beginning 0£ the
reversal o:f the old creed separating :friends and enemies,
they signal the beginning 0£ a new kind 0£ knowledge:

that

the apparent rugged autonomy 0£ the zero-sum competitor is
counter-factual.

Here, in this ode, as in real life, all

humans are bound by their misery and mortality.

There is

no •us• and "them" o:f the :first ode.
By having the women express their sympathy :for the
princess and Jason as well as :for Medea, Euripides sets a
tone which continues into the next episode.

The horror at

•hat is inevitably resulting :from the established
definitions, and the regret that it must be so, extend the
reversal beyond this ode and these women to the next
episode, where it reaches its culmination in Medea s
1

struggle to bring her plan to :fruition.
In this episode, Medea takes up the tone 0£ horror and
re1ret as she reacts to the news the Messenger :first

427

that the gi£ts have been delivered and the
.
en reprieved £rom exile. This should, like
cJJ.1ldr
etion of earlier steps toward the success of her plan,
colDP l
We have seen her react
l>t! a time of boastful exultation.
fter her success with Creon (366-385) and Aegeus (764so a
we shall see this Medea again shortly, as she gloats
'189)·

over the deaths 0£ the princess and Creon (1127-1128;

u 34_U35).

But here, as Medea £alters when she

contemplates her permanent severance from the children,
suripides shows us the emotional unacceptability of the
logical consequences of the definition of arete
actions represent.
groans

twice

(1008

Medea~s

For instead 0£ gloating, Medea now
despair:

her
and

> .....
QlQl.

>

.....

QlQl

1009).

The Messenger, who is confused at her reaction, asks
what is the matter, only to hear in her repetitive "You
have

reported

,,

'IYYEL>.as,

1011),

what
her

you

have

numbness

at

of>

reported"
the

news.

Recall

that

the Chorus betrayed a similar numbness in their repetitions
at 976-977 and 978-979.

Euripides has, in fact, fashioned

an entwined reversal and recognition of the Chorus and
Medea:

the Chorus lead in certain reactions, Medea in

others.
Medea shows the same despair and resignation as the
Chorus.

Again, these are not the reactions of one

42.8

as t

goal.

long-awaited

a

She

hersel£169

pities

be Chorus pitied her and the princess and Jason:
refers

to

as

hersel£

(1032.),

and

duo-ra~aL va

Ta~av

(1057).

(102.8),
She

despairs, as did the Chorus, 0£ her own lost hopes:

she

will never see ber children grow up or have them tend to
)1er in ber old age (1032.-1037).

And yet, as were the

corintbian women, Medea is resigned that this must be
50

:170

tbeY

will,

indeed,

die

(1038-1039);

the

princess has already dressed in the poisoned gi£ts and set
off tbe chain 0£ reactions that will lead to the children s
1

deaths

(1064-1066).

Medea likewise shows a recognition 0£ the value 0£
connection as did the Chorus, but hers is a much more
physical and much more personal recognition than their
notional and more philosophical one.

Medea, experiencing

the physical proximity 0£ the children, twice exults in the
Joys of connection to them.

At 1040-1048, she nearly

16 9nunkle, "Aegeus Episode,• p. 102., argues for
Medea's sel£-pity as evidence 0£ her "sel£-obsession• and
considers her to be lacking in love £or her children. One
can protest, however, that sel£-pity is a regular -feature
Of loss.
170 Reck£ord, "First Exit," pp. 355-356, argues
t
t:at H_edea's resignation to the inevitability 0£ killing
~ Ch1ldren is a result 0£ her entrapment in su££ering,
Which is a result 0£ her extraordinary alienation £rom her
c~njuga1 -family. Hotional alienation is inherent in the
s a~us 0£ wi£e as •stranger" (9upa'los.).
It is this
n~tiona1 alienation that -forces Medea literally "outside"
: k2 l4; her extraordinary alienation in turn -forces her to
a e revenge as the only •way out."
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renounce

s her plans when they look. into her eyes and laugh

in childish joy.

She momentarily chooses connection over

competitive autonomy and even plans to take the children
awa Y

with her so as to preserve her connection to

thelD,171

acknowledging

iose them.

the

pain

it

would cost

her

to

Again, at 1069-1075, she calls them back. to

ner, takes their hands and kisses them, speaks of their
liPS and again of their eyes, experiences their sweet

embrace, soft skin, and their childish--sweetest of all!-1>reath.
These two moments between Medea and her children,
laden as they are with experience of the physical, are
sensuously if not erotically cast.

Medea's reactions to

171The illogic of Medea's not taking the children
to Athens, and her implication that not killing them means
leaving them for her enemies to kill (1060-1061), have
encouraged scholars to argue for excising some or all of
lines 1056-1080.
J. Diggle, Euripidis Fabulae, Vol. 1
{Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1984; reprint ed. with
corrections, Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1987), pp. 138-139,
encloses all the lines in square brackets. A recent review
of the history of the debate on these troubled lines, and a
persuasive argument for retaining them, may be found in
Seidensticker, "Medea 1056-80," pp. 89-96.
Cf. also Gustav
A. Seeck., "Euripides Medea 1059-68:
A Problem of
Interpretation,• GRBS 9 (1968), pp. 291-307, who proposes
excising 1060-1063~solve the problem of the illogical
Progression of Medea's decision; David Kovacs, •on Medea's
Great Monologue (E. Med. 1021-80)," CQ 36 (1986; hereafter
l:ovacs, "Great Monologue"), pp. 343-352, argues on
stylistic grounds for retaining with minor correction all
but 1056-1064.
For Medea•s decision as illogical synthesis of her
~:nflicting personae, see Michelini, "Reophron, 11 pp. 1224· McDermott, Incarnation, pp. 57-59, argues that Medea
~lnPloys a self-serving delusion here, because her decision
~s only valid "in an offbeat sense, given the mythic
raditions.•
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11er c
of t h

the i r
taS t e

nildren engage all 0£ the senses:

she hears the sound

eir laughter, sees the brightness 0£ their eyes, £eels
ups

embrace, and so£t skin, and smells the sweet

•

o£ their breath.

180 1Dents.

We linger with her in these

17 2

But, in the end, the sensuous joys 0£ physicality-iaughter, bright eyes, sweet breath, and so£t skin--must
not win out.

Sweet thoughts are dead (1036), words must

not be so£t (1052); the joys 0£ the presence 0£ children
(1058) lose out to the thumos, that organ which "includes
all those emotions which have to do with sel£esteem."173

In

short,

the

erotic

comes

under

control

of the mind, ever calculating to assure the predominance
of the autonomous competitor.

Despite her attempts to stop

her thumos (1056)--the urge to sel£-assertion--Medea
nonetheless chooses domination over her enemies, which has
driven her by turns in this scene (see above, Part One),
and once again puts her deliberation £irmly under the
control 0£ her thumos.
alas,

but

"total

This is not the reign 0£ emotion,

commitment

rationality"

writ

large.174

1721 cannot agree with Gellie, "Character,• p. 20,
Who considers that Medea's momentary rejections 0£ the plan
to murder her children are •
meant only to tease us.•
173 IUliot,

Medea,

p.

94

at

lines

1078-1080.

174Pace Bongie, "Heroic Elements,• p. 52, to whom
edea•s thumos is her heroic passion that overcomes her
~:ason. "The heroes 0£ Greek tragedy are not reasonable;
v· ey are undeniably and magni£icently unreasonable .
•
_lde contra Seidensticker, "Medea 1056-80," pp. 96-97, £or
H
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• •0

tton

would

have

let

the

children

live.175

Instead,

•edea abruptly dismisses them (1053)--no more physical
·initY for her!--and becomes the epitome of the zero-sum

proS1

antithesis of passion and reason as artificial.
tile Kedea•s dangerous •passion• has, however, been so
rstressed in the critical literature that it is
o•;ftcult not to exaggerate her rationality to make the
di int. For an antidote to viewing passion as a danger, see
iabert c. Solomon, The Pa~sions: The Myth and Rature 0£
euman Emotions (Garden City, RY: Anc~or Press/Doubleday,
1976; reprint ed., Rotre Dame, IR: Univ. of Rotre Dame
press, 1983), p. 120:
"Without the guidance of the
passions, reasoning has neither principles nor power. Cut
off from our 'sentiments,• we can justify or show that one
cannot justify anything. Hume made this point powerfully
but brutally when he insisted that it was not 'irrational
(that is, against the dictates of reason) for him to prefer
tile slaughter 0£ a hundred thousand Orientals to the
pricking of his little finger. Reason makes contact with
human values only through the passions. It is only a
particular form of reason--objecti ve reasoning--tha t is
free of personal values and passions."
One cannot, of course, separate emotion from reason
es:cept theoretically; a very balanced discussion of the
folly of doing so can be found in Solomon s introduction,
pp. 1-25. Solomon•s view of the interrelation of emotions
and self-identity is thought-provoking: "It is the goal of
Self-esteem that motivates our actions, our inquiries, and
--most importantly--our passions. Self-esteem is the
ultimate goal of every passion. . . . Our emotions, to put
the matter bluntly, are nothing other than our attempts to
establish and defend our self-esteem.• (pp. 96 and 99).
The success of a zero-sum competi tor s self-promotion,
however, is largely if not entirely dependent upon the
opinions of others, upon which Solomon claims •self-esteem•
is not dependent. (p. 99).
The inability of pre-literate
individuals to formulate self-analysis (see Ong, Orality,
P· ~4-55, following Luria, Cognitive Development, pp. 14460) is perhaps at issue here.
1

1

1

r

.175 Reckford, •First Exit,• pp. 334-335 and 34034
3
i , is excellent on the alienation of emotion and
nteUect as Kedea s tragedy; he sees Kedea•s "inhuman
•elf-mastery• as •a kind of suicide.• Oblander, Suspense,
::· 1_43-1~1, is convincing on the psychological
de~~i.nations of the loving mother that underlie the cold
sions of the competitor.
1
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ti tor, willing at any cost to ensure her reputation as
colDPe
..,ictorious contender.
tJle
For despite Medea•s apparent victory over her enemies,
ssured, there remains her unmistakable recognition of
no• a
reversal and defeat.
discussed

lines

This takes place in the much-

1078-1081:

In fact I understand what sort of harm I intend to do,
but the urge to self-assertion176 has control over
my considered deliberation, which urge, is the. cause of
the greatest harm for mortals (Kal µ.av9avw
µ£v

ofa

KP£taawv
µ£Yl0"'1'WV

dpav

IJ,EAAW

KaKa,

9\JIJ,05.

d£

-rwv
~µ.wv
Pou>..euµ.a -rwv,
ga 11'£P
aLTlOS.
KQKWV
ppo-ro'i:"s.).

Does this translation correctly interpret these lines?
The controversy over lines 1078-1080 is one that will
perhaps never be resolved; especially when it is possible
that ambiguity

was

Euripides•

intent.177

One

more

discussion will not end the controversy; yet judicious
choices must be made to try to understand these lines.

It

is my belief that the above choices about key words, all of
them supported by previous scholars, are justified by the
use of these words elsewhere in the play and by the
interpretation of the play advanced in this study.
176see Michelini, "Reophron, 11 p. 132, who
describes the thumos Medea addresses as "the product of an
a11ressive self-assertion that can lead to much
Unhappiness."
177 See

Michelini,
"Reophron, 11
pp. 115-136,
;specially pp. 128-136; cf. Foley, "Divided Self," p. 72.
a ee also Ohlander, Suspense, pp. 156-160, for the ambiguity
t~ a way of maintaining the audience•s hopes (and, given
Ch9: threat of Corinthian vengeance, £ears) on the
l. 1dren•s behalf.
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disputed
0£

fJou>-e:tJIJ.Ct -rwv
•
l'aveo vw

o£

words

are

1079,

line

and,

1078,

line

euµ.os.
to

a

'

KPElOOWV,

lesser

Ka Ka'

and

and

extent,
,...

and

KOK WV

·nes 1078 and 1080. Here I intend to consider each 0£
of l 1
words in turn, to review the most relevant scholarthes e
shiP on each, to look to their use elsewhere in the play,
and to reconsider their meaning in light 0£ the rules 0£
the zero-sum game and the thesis that an elenchos is in
process here.
0£ the £our disputed words, thumos undoubtedly gives
the most trouble, because 0£ its apparent re£eren t:
mental or psychological phenomenon.

a

What exactly the

thumos is, i.e., what it does and how it was imagined to
function, is a question which in scholarship is not always
separate £rom its relevance to the debate over these
lines.178

Bruno

Snell,

in

1948,

was

the

£irst

to

try

to clari£y the meaning 0£ thumos by contrasting thumos with
psyche and noos.

Snell begins pro£i tably enough by

claiming that •[t]hymos in Homer is the genera tor 0£ motion
or agi ta ti on .

•

He subsequently reduces the

translation 0£ the term to an •organ o'f (e)motion• and

178see

e.g.,

£or

a

transition

between

Snell's

~reatment of. Homeric use and later considerations 0£

.:ripides• use 0£ the term, William G. Thalmann,
eschylus• Physiology 0£ the Emotions,• AJP 107 (1986),
P p. 494-511.
--
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cl• i

lllS tbiS

does n

renders

the

matter

"simple

enough."179

He

ot nowever, stop there; the parentheses around the

•e• are

'

all too easy to dispatch, and dispatch them he

If, as we have suggested, thymos is the mental organ
1'hicb causes (e)motion, while noos is the recipient of
illlages, then noos may be said generally to be in
charge of intellectual matters, and thymos 0£ things
emotionai. 180

A].tbough Snell admits some overlap between noos and thumos,
and acknowledges that "thymos may also serve as the name 0£
a function, in which case we render it as 'will' or
,•

'character•
with him;

in

a

the

later

idea of

thumos as emotion stuck

discussion181

he discards

his

initially cautious translation of thumos as "agitation,
passion" £or "passion" over against bouleumata, which he
renders

as

"reason."182

Snell's

understanding

of

these

two terms may be fuller than the black-and-white,

179snell, Discovery, p. 9.
The original 1948
publication was titled Die Entdeckung des Geistes; in the
same year Snell published his provocative "Zeugnis."
180 snel1, Discovery, p. 12.
Cowherd, "Ending,•
PP. 131-132, seems to follow Snell in seeing th umos as
emotion, despite her re£inemen t that th umos undergoes
trans-formations •from love [8] to lamentation (108) to hate
<310) to murder (865)
"
t

181Snell,

Scenes.
On p. 50 n. 3, Snell indicates
hat this discussion supersedes that -found more briefly
sketched in his 1948 "Zeugnis."
182 snen,

Scenes,

pp.

52

and

55.
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cucnotomous

terminology

suggests,183

but

this

dicho-

:nas nonetheless been influential in the critical

tolllY
11ter a

ture on Medea.

For although not all hold that

t1edea's con£lict is between •passion• and •reason• per se,
5 0111e

e lement 0£ the irrational is usually considered to win

the

day

in

her

decision.184

It was not until 1987 that G. R. Stanton's convincing
objection was raised against interpreting t.humos as
•passion,• which wrenched Medea's decision £rom the
stranglehold irrationality had had on it for so
iong.185

Stanton

looked

to

the

context

of

the

passage

183e.g., Snell later states (p. 56) that "The
inner impulse which drives Medea forward is the rebellion
of the heart against a deep injury which Jason has done
her. Her passion, which springs from just indignation, is
element.al in its dimensions . . . .•
184see, for example, Albin Lesky 1 Greek Tragic
Poetry, trans. M. Dillon (Hew Haven:
Yale Univ. Press,
1983), p. 2.2.7, •rt is clear that. 8us.ios represents
irrational emotion,
.•; H. Diller, •euµ.os
dE
1tpt:taawv
Twv
E:µ.wv
pou.>.t:uµ.aTwv,•
Hermes
94
(1966;
hereafter
Diller,
•euµ.05,"),
p.
2.7 4,
who
translates the line, •[Heine) Leidenscha £t Herr iiber
[metne] Plane ist.•; Schlesinger, •zu Medea,• p. 2.9:
"Das
wort 9uµ.os hat. hier sicher sch on die Bedeu tung:
Leidenscha£t, leidenschaft.liches Temperament . . . . •; D.
J. Conacher, Euripidean Drama, p. 196, is slightly more
moderate in calling 1079-1080 •a victory . . . of allconsuming passion for vengeance over her better counsels.•
Christopher Gill, "Did Chrysippus Understand Medea?"
Phronesis 2.8 (1983), pp. 136-149, especially 142. ff., is
convinced that passion and reason operate on both sides 0£
Medea's dilemma.
Gill's -footnotes, passim, are use£ul in
identifying positions taken in the passion-reason
controversy by various scholars.
185 G. R. Stant.on, "The End 0£ Medea's Monologue:
Euripides, Medea 1078-1080,• RhK 130 (1987; herea£ter
Stanton, "Medea's Monologue"), pp. 97-106.
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as we 11
tran S

as the validity 0£ other scholars

1

solutions to

lating kreisson and bouleumata, and concluded,
iS

not

seat

the

0£

so£t

emotions

such

as

IDotberlY love, but the strong £orce in Medea which drives

ner to assert hersel£."186 In the same year, Gail Ann
Rickert discussed the tendency to simpli£y thumos and, in
tbe process, got to the heart 0£ modern misgivings about
Medea's thumos:
Since thumos is at the center 0£ the passage under
discussion, it is important to be aware 0£ the
tendency to reduce it to less complex concepts, or,
more precisely, to concepts which in £act are no less
complex, but with which we are more com£ortable:
£eelings or emotion. . . .
The overgeneraliza tion and reduction 0£ th umos to
•passion" (Leidenscha£t) obscures its complexity,
especially the principles with which thumos, including
Medea's thumos, are inextricably bound up, namely, the
heroic principles 0£ harming enemies, helping £riends,
not submitting to dishonor, injustice, insults, or the
mockery 0£ one s enemies.
All 0£ these principles
have been acknowledged to play a central role in
Medea's action and tragedy. This reductionism,
combined with a moralizing tendency to see passion as
evil and in con£1ict with reason, which is good, is at
the center 0£ many unsatis£actory interpretations 0£
this
drama.187
1

Then in 1989, Helene Foley agreed with Stanton and Rickert:
. . . it is better to categorize thumos in the
monologue not as "irrational passion" or •rage" but as
a capacity located in Medea that directs her to act, a
"heart• that can (or at least pretends to itsel£ that
it can) choose to side either with the arguments 0£
the revenger or the arguments 0£ the mother (although
it is predisposed to the £ormer).188
186 stanton,

"Medea s

187 Rick.ert,

"Ak.rasia,•

188 Foley,

1

"Divided

Monologue,"
pp.

Sel£,•

p.

99-100.
p.

71.

106.
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It seems possible, then, to translate thumos broadly

as

•motivator,• which,

ironically, comes close

earlier, more cautious renderings.

to Snell•s

But is it valid to

particularize this to •urge to sel£-assertion• suggested
a1>ove?
play.189

Yes, i£ we look to the use 0£ thumos in this
Besides

the

line

in

question,

there

are

eight

other uses 0£ thumos, and three uses 0£ the verb
Two

0£

these

attribute

ability to execute the murder:

to

thumos

Medea•s

at 865 the Chorus assert

that Medea will not be able to murder her children •with
unfaltering thumos•; at 1056 Medea pleads with her thumos
not to kill the children.

Since Medea•s stated purpose,

both to the Chorus and to hersel£, £or killing the children
was to put herse1£ above her enemies, it is sa£e to assume
that self-assertion is operational here.
Five 0£ the remaining uses re£er to actions 0£ Medea
other than killing the children:

at lines 6 ££. the Hurse

notes Medea•s being •struck with eros in her thumos• as the
precursor of her leaving home, persuading Pelias• daughters
to kill him, and becoming Jason•s wi£e; at 106 f£. the
Rurse anticipates a "cloud 0£ lamentation• which "will rise
up anew with a greater thumos• in Medea, which makes the
Rurse, Who describes Medea as •high-spirited, hard-toCheck•

(IJ.Eya>.oov>.ayxvos

~ 89 Foley,

duoKaTa'll'auoTos),

dread

what

"Divided Sel£,• pp. 69-70, gives an
erv1ew of thumos in all Euripidean plays and £ragments to
arr·
ive at her slightly less speci£ic rendering of the term.
ov
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t1edea will do; at 271 Creon, upon entering, describes Medea

as

S

ullen, with thumos roused against her husband--in this

11e ID

·

ust be re£erring to the threats he has heard she has

aaade against Jason; at 879 Medea attributes her previously
unreasonable, non-cooperative attitude toward Jason and his
new 1Darriage to her thumos; at 883 Jason praises the newly
cooperative Medea £or not £oolishly rousing her thumos in

ya in.

In short, in all 0£ these instances, Medea's thumos

iS the acknowledged origin 0£ action against others taken

to advance or

protect

her

own

interests.190

The £inal £our uses also show th umos as an organ 0£
self-assertion:

at 310 Medea attributes Creon's giving his

daughter to Jason as an act where his thumos led him; at
455 Jason describes how he tried to arrange £or Medea •s

staying when Creon's thumos was roused; at 639 the Chorus,
seemingly in re£erence to Jason•s bed-hopping, prays that
Cypris will not, through stri£e and wrath, drive their

l90There are, in addition, rive instances 0£
compounds 0£ thumos applied to Medea, none 0£ which
disprove the proposed de£inition 0£ thumos: at 91 and 691,
•he i~ described as duo9uµouµE:vti and experiencing
6uoeuµLas., both the result 0£ Jason•s treatment 0£
her~ at 176 the Chorus wish she would give up her
llapueuµov opyav at Jason's treatment 0£ her; at
and 485, Creon and Medea respectively relate Medea's
f1"umos to her sophia, which is shown to be, as elsewhere
n the Play, properly the agent 0£ the thumos in
competition: Creon asserts that it is easier to guard
aca
·
, •
p i.nst
an o~u9uµos
person than a
silent, sophos
Ter;son; Medea laments that she, in 'following Jason, was
.: 0 e~1.1os.
µa>..>.ov
~
oo•wTepa,
i.e.,
using
her
ex~~l.a_ to advance his interests rather than tending
usi. Vely to her own.

:l9

439
05
~-

1>e re
?iUS b

to other beds; at 1152 Jason urges the princess to

1eased £rom her th umos so that she can consider her

and's -friends her £riends.

Again, the thumos is what

operates to assert one's own interests over against those
release £rom the thumos' control signals
of others;
with

cooper a ti on

the

interests

others.191

0£

In line 1078, then, the disputed line, Medea can be

argued to be acknowledging the control 0£ her thumos, her
urge to sel£-assertion.

For indeed, whether we translate

Kreisson as •stronger than• or •master 0£, in control 0£ 1 •
the meaning 0£ the line is nearly the same.
Diller

argued

£or

the

latter

two

In 1966, Hans

meanings.192

I£

we

look to the text 0£ Medea, 0£ the seven uses 0£ kreisson
outside 0£ line

1078,

three

(123,

290,

301)

are

best

translated as the comparative 0£ aga thos, i.e., as
•better"; two 0£ the remaining £our (315 and 449) can
easily be argued to mean either "in control 0£• or
•stronger"; one (965) is awkward i£ translated anything
other than •stronger•; one (444), as Diller himsel£
argued,193
l9lsee
•self."

is

impossible

Wol££,

to

translate

"Euripides,•

p.

239,

as

anything

£or

thumos

other
as

l92Diller,
•auµ.05, 11
pp.
267-75.
Subseqently supported by Stanton, "Medea's Monologue," pp.
l00-101.
C£. Shaw, •Female Intruder,• p. 263; Foley,
•Divided Sel£,• p. 68 n. 30 and p. 71.
Vide contra M. D. Reeve, •Euripides, Medea 10211080.• CQ n.s. 22 (1972; herea£ter Reeve, •Medea 10211080•>. P: 59 n. 2, and :Kovacs, "Great Monologue,• p. 351
n. 12.
193 Diller

I

"auµ.os.·

p.

274.
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control

t11an
guriPid es

0£/master

o£.•194

Given

that

is aware enough 0£ this "obscure• meaning 0£

·sson to use it in this play, there is, as 'far as I can
~
195 no reason not to translate the kreisson of 1078
see,
•in control of/master of. 11
In any case, the distinction
1>etween •stronger than• and

11

in control of/master of" for

tJJ.iS 11ne•s translation is not apparent.
The controversy over bouleumata is a product of the
controversy over thumos and kreisson:
kreisson, so goes bouleumata.

as go thumos and

For, i£ one is translating

thumos as •passion• or some equivalent, and kreisson as
•stronger than,• then bouleuma ta must re£er either to
passion's

perceived opposite, i.e., •reason,• or to

fleeting plans to save the children•s lives.

Medea•s

But Albrecht

Dihle has argued that bouleuma ta here can re£ er to nothing
other than Medea•s plan to kill the children, since it is
so used twice previously in the monologue (1044 and
1048).196

Dihle's

interpretation

0£

bouleumata,

i£

not

his understanding of the con£lict Medea undergoes, has
194 symposi um 196d.2 offers a strong parallel.
I
am grateful to John Makowski for calling my attention to
this passage.
1951 do not find the argument of Reeve, "Medea
10 21 -l080,• p. 59 n. 2, convincing, since I cannot imagine
• h at his proposed translation of 444, •another queen
SUpe rior
·
to your bed, 11 could possibly mean.
196 Albrecht Dihle, "Euripides•
Medea,• SHAW 1977,
1977; hereafter Dihle, 11 Euripides• Medea•),

5
(Heidelberg,
Pp. 27-29.
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gained s

un

e

upport197

and

encouraged rethinking

0£

the

. g , 198 since
.
.
.
propose a
's meanin
one can in
no wise

reasO nable

argument in £avor 0£ thumos as "passion" or its
1

equivalent, and kreisson as "stronger than" with Dihle s

-

1>ou1euma ta

as

"revenge

plans"

ringing

in

one's

ears.199

The use 0£ bouleuma ta and related words elsewhere in

tbe play supports Dihle's interpretation; Foley lists other
occurrences and notes that " . . . every other use 0£
~uleumata

change

0£

and bouleuo in Medea re£ers to a precise plan or
plans. 11 200

While

I

agree

that

bouleumata

in

line 1078 must refer to the plans to kill the children, I
do not find a problem with leaving the translation of this
word

at

"considered

197see

especially

delibera tion, 11 201
Ohlander,

with

the

Suspense,

pp.

156-163.

198stanton, "Medea s
Monologue," pp. 103-106;
Foley, "Divided Self,• pp. 67-68.
Vide contra Kovacs,
•area t Monologue," p. 351 n. 12.
1

cf.

199This did not stop Dihle himself from proposing
that thumos is Medea's maternal instinct, and that line
1078 is a red herring, in which Medea proclaims her
decision to spare the children.
See Dihle, "Euripides ..
Medea,• pp. 12-13; c£. his "Euripides• Medea und ihre
Schwestern im europaischen Drama," A&A 22 (1976; herea£ter
Dihle, "Medea und ihre Schwestern"), p. 179.
Cowherd, "Ending,• p. 132, who sees thumos as
generalized emotion, argues that ta bouleumata must change
from Plans to kill the children to plans to spare them.
200 see Foley, "Divided Self," p. 67 n. 24, where
she also lists bibliography £or arguments in support of
Dihle.
201
b .
see Schlesinger, "Zu Medea," pp. 29-30, whose
Gri.e£ discussion of th umos in light of bouleuma ta ("die
v edanken, die Erwagungen, die Planungen, die im Dienst
erschiedener und sogar gegensa tzlicher Funk ti on en des
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1'ledgement that, in this context, the word without
ac1tno
question

re£ers to plans to Kill the children.

could nav e

Euripides

made Medea speaK quite explicitly here, but

cJlose not to.
'l'be translation I propose, then, is supported in all
1ts P

arts in the critical literature.

Medea says, "Hy urge

to self-assertion has control 0£ my considered
deliberation," and as she maKes this statement, she chooses
to relllain the zero-sum competitor she has been in all but a
few fleeting

moments,202 one

who

will

put her success

in competition above all else, who will jettison her
emotional attachments so as to e££ect a rationally planned
course 0£ action aimed at victory over all challengers.
And yet, ironically, even as Medea announces her
intent to carry out her plans, the struggle it took £or her
to arrive at this decision reveals to the Chorus and
audience that her victory is also a de£eat, that the
logical consequence 0£ all her preceding actions is

Seelenlebens stehen") avoids the usual pitfalls.
C£.
Rickert, "Akrasia,• p. 102, who argues that "bouleumata
represents at most competing claims on Medea.•
202 ohlander, Suspense, p. 116, points out that
harming children to get at their parents is Hedea"s modus
Qperandi; she merely returns to her old method, but, this
time, With di££iculty.
See also McDermott, Incarnation,
Pp. 81-93, who describes Hedea"s "mythic biography" as •a
relentless campaign to violate the parent-child bond." (p.
81).

443
eoaotionallY

repugnant--even

her.203

to

Indeed,

she

as much as she delivers these troublesome lines, for
safS
. des announcing her decision she likewise acknowledges

!)eSl

)ler

defeat--her reversal--and an if only momentary

recognition:
Oh soft skin and breath--sweetest of all!--of
children. Go away! Go away! I am no longer able to
look. at you, but am vanquished by harm (VlKwµ.aL
KaKOLS)·
In
fact
I
understand
(µ.aveavw)
what harm (KaKa) I intend to do, but the urge to
self-assertion has control over my considered
deliberation, which urge is the ca use of the greatest
harm
(KaKWV)
for
mortals.
(1075-1081).
Previously, Medea only feigned being "vanquished" to
gain an advantage over her enemies; at 315 she reassures
Creon that she will remain silent, since she has been
•vanquished by the stronger/those in control"
VlKwµ.evoL);

(1tp£Laaovwv

at

912

Jason

praises

Medea's

(phony) submission and cooperation, and describes her as
•recognizing

....

vu:waav
to Kedea:

the

prevailing

pou.>..fiv).

plan"

Victory

r igh tl y

>I

(eyvws
belongs

the Hurse (44-45) expects Medea will prevail

over her enemies, "Rot easily will anyone joining in
enmity with her turn out beautifully victorious
(1ta>.>.l.vLKov)•;

Medea

herself

(764-765)

gloats

over

her

e][pected victory after talk.in.g with Aegeus, "Oh Zeus, and
Justice of Zeus, and Ugh t of the sun, now I shall prove
203 Husurillo, "Reconsideration,• pp. 65, seems
a~noyed at what he considers the needless wavering "
• en the audience from the beginning is aware of what is to
take Place.•

444
1>eauti£UllY
>

,..

eµwv

victorious
>

over

.....

ex9pwv)."

my

enemies

"Being

(KaAAL VlKOl

vanquished"

is,

reserved £or Kedea•s enemies, like the princess, whom

tnen,

the Messenger describes as •vanquished by mis-fortune•
,..
(C1UIJ.•OPP

I

1195).

VlKWJ.LEV'I'),

•Being vanquished" is not, to be sure, what the evervigilant competitor, Medea, has worked to attain for
nerse1£.

Yet, at 1077-1081, she readily admits that she

nerse1£ is "vanquished by kaka," and that she is about to

-

do •kaka," 0£ which kaka her urge to sel'f-assertion is the
cause.

Does this mean that Medea is conscious 0£ being

about to commit morally reprehensible acts?
not.204

Instead,

what

these

lines

mean

is

has come to recognition of her own reversal:

Most decidedly
that Medea
she knows

that she is in the position she had hoped to visit upon
others, the position 0£ having outrage committed against
oneself and being able to do nothing about it, of being
under the constraint of others instead of being self-ruled
and ruling others.
All this can be ascertained 'from the word Medea uses
to describe

what

she

is

about

to

do:

,
KaKa.

I

have

Chosen to translate this as "harm," instead of the more
usual, morally-laden rendering, "evils" or "wrongs."

The

translation was chosen because, more o'ften than not in
d

~o 4 ~ Conacher, Euripidean Drama, p. 196, who

escri.bes Medea a'fter her decision as "now totally
colllllli t ted to evu.•

445

~·

Kakos in its various mani£estations, but especially

neuter singular and plural, can be de-fended as being
111 tne
used in the morally-neutral sense of "harm• or "hurt.•
such. usage is at tested elsewhere, from archaic times
tnrougb.

the

fi£th

century

B.

c.205

A.

W.

H.

Adkins

notes that in Homeric usage,
The neuter forms agathon and kakon have no such claim
[i.e., to be moral terms, as do the masculine and
feminine forms]:
to say of an action 'it is aga thon
{kakon) to do x• is simply to say that it is
beneficial {harmful) to do X, without passing any
moral judgement on the rightness or wrongness of

x

2

0

6

Adkins 'further argues that archaic age values persisted

well into the sixth and fi£th centuries B. C.,207 and
quotes as one of many examples Simonides• (5 Bergk) use of
asathos and kakos as de£in1tions 0£ one who •fares well, eu
prattein• or •fares badly, kakos.•

Hore recently, C.

w.

Willick has made a convincing case for reading what are
I

s. v.
206 Adkins,

Her it,

tcatcos,

p.

B.

31.

20 7 A. w. H. Adkins, however, claims in Horal
Values and Political Behaviour in Ancient Greece -from Homer
to the End 0£ the Fi£th Century {Rew York: W. W. Horton
and Co., Inc., 1972; hereafter Adkins, Horal Values), p.
ll5, that, at least inso£ar as use 0£ terms like kakos 'from
the negative end 0£ the continuum, a complete change in
Yalues (i.e., from emphasis on competition to emphasis on
~ooperation) is evident in Euripides and the later plays of
B0 P~o~les.
I am not convinced, especially in the case of
~r1.p1.~es, who in Medea at least seems to use terms like
- kos in their •older• senses to question the validity 0£
~ompetitive standards, which still held sway in Athens.
{;e also E. R. Dodds, The Greeks and the Irrational
D ~rkeley:
Univ. of California Press, 1971; herea£ter
0
ds, Greeks and the Irrational), pp. 28-63.
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regularly interpreted as ethical terms (kalos, kakos, and
tbe like) in Euripides• Hippolytus as neutral terms 0£
£ail ure.208

and

success

Kakos in Medea, then, need not connote moral wrong,
1>ut instead resides on the £ar side 0£ a continuum 0£
success

and

'failure,

bene£it

and

harm.209

It

can

be

argued that this meaning 0£ kakos predominates, and that in
fact translating kakos (in its various £orms) consistently
throughout the play as •bad• or •evil• or •wrong• is
an anachronistic transplantation 0£ value-laden language.210

A £ew

examples

must

su££ice,

£or

I

count

56

uses 0£ the adjective kakos (in its various forms), and 19
uses

0£

the

ad verb

......

KaKws.,

and

these are only the

two

largest categories of related words.
Actions taken against Medea, whether by Jason or
Creon, are termed kakon or kaka, and Jason himself is
labelled kakos £or his actions:

at 48, after describing

Jason's choice of a new bride, the Hurse remarks that the
children do not understand the kaka of their mother; at 62
20 8 c.

W.

Willink, •some Problems of Text and
in the Hippolytus,• CQ 18 (1968), pp. 11-43.
Wi.Uink's views on these terms are upheld by David Claus,
•Phaedra and the Socratic Paradox,• YCS 22 (1972; hereafter
Claus, "Phaedra"), pp. 223-238, who opposes psychological
~nd what he calls •con£essional" readings of Phaedra's
'famous speech.
I~terpretation

2 09Foley, •Divided Sel£," p. 70, apparently
agrees; she translates, without comment, kaka as "things to
He de a •s harm.•
210 c1aus,

"Phaedra,"

p.

231.
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tile 'l'11 tor

collle (her
agree

ne•

impending exile by Creon); at 78 the Hurse

s that this exile is a new kakon; at 84 she claims

Jaso n

uo

exclaims that Medea doesn't know 0£ new kaka to

has

been

caught

being

kakos

to

his £riends;211 at

she wonders what Medea will do, stung as she will be by
~ka.

----

Later, Jason cautions that exile brings many

pka (463); Aegeus likewise terms Hedea•s banishment a
~Kon

(705).

The things Medea plans £or her enemies are kakon or

---

kaka,

and

those

su££ering

them are

said

to

£are Katoa>s

or are themselves described with the adjective:

Creon

consistently uses the terms kakon and kaka (283, 285, 317)
to describe the harm Medea, £or all her skill, is likely to
do to his daughter and himsel£; at 805 Medea claims the
I

princess,

KQK'l'}V,

must

die

KQKWS;

at

1219

the

Messenger describes Creon in his death as no longer
victorious over kakon; at 1306 the Chorus caution Jason,
who is about to see his children dead, that he does not
know what sort 0£ kaka he has come to; at 1315 when he
learns what has happened, Jason himsel£ terms it a kakon.
Host

tellingly, in two lines, kakos

is explicitly used

as Part 0£ the vocabulary 0£ bene'fi t and harm:

at 293

Kedea complains to Creon that her reputation has •hurt•
»I

(ePAa•e)

her

and

done

her

great

kaka;

at

618

211
e..,·
Adkins, Merit, p. 190 n. 6, cites this
l.dence of a •quiet• use 0£ kakos.
I disagree.

He de a

line

as

448
. s tb.at tb.e gi£ts 0£ a kakos man like Jason "contain no
c1a1 111
>
0 \J IC

>I

1>enefit"

(OV'f)<JLV

>I

£X£L),

Tb.e b.arm done to Medea, a£ter being passed along first

to

O

tb.er people, ironically becomes harm she does to

nerself.

Sb.e, who more than once called Jason kakistos
1

(229 , 488, 690; c£. Jason s

remark at 452. and Kedea s
1

of E!lnkakist[e] at 465), is now hersel£ kake:

use

at 1046-

In an attempt to talk herself out 0£ killing the

1041.

cllildren, Medea asks, "Why must I, in ca using pain for
tlleir £a ther by the kaka against these (children), obtain
for mysel£ twice as many kaka?"; at 1361 Jason tells
Medea, "You yoursel£ £eel pain and are a companion 0£
[these] kaka. "; at 1363 he bemoans the fact that his
children met up with a kake mother.
I t is in this spirit, then, that we must understand

lledea s £inal lines at 1077-1081.
1

Medea is not morally

awakened to the "wrongness" 0£ her actions and her incontinence in the £ace 0£ what she knows is wrong; these
lines were not the impetus to Socrates
is knowledge,•2.12.

nor

do

they--or

1

dictum that "virtue

£or

that

matter,

212

The views to which I re£er are 0£ course those
: . Sneu, first put £orth in •zeugnis," pp. 12.5-34, and
1llhtly amended in Scenes, pp. 2.3-69.
Snell sees the
:nologue by Phaedra at Hippolytus 375 f£. as a close
Chrane1. SnelPs views have been both supported and
aUenged, and still generate response.
incl Supporters (some are predecessors) of Snell s views
Cit Ude Decharme, Euripide et 1 esprit, pp. 45-47, who
Pla~ss· many alleged anti-Socra}iC: sentiments in Euripides
llean. • E. R. Dodds, "The aLdws. of Phaedra and the
i.ng 0£ the Hippolytus,• CR 39 (192.5), pp. 102.-104
f

1

1

1

449
pbaedra

•s somewhat similar comments at Hippolytus 373-390--

--

c11a11enge

its

validity.

Quite

the

contrary.213

ipideS •emphatically denies that enlightenment can make
csur good"; see also his later "Irrationalist," pp. 97-104,
•e; hiS slightly more reserved agreement 0£ 1971 in Greeks
and the Irrational, pp. 186-187); Winnington-Ingram,
~ippolytus,".
174 (Snel~'s conclusions ~re "plausible,
if not certain ); Lesky, History, p. 370; Richmond
i.attimore, •Phaedra and Hippolytus," Arion 1 (1962), pp.
U-l2; T. H. Irwin, "Euripides and Socrates," CP 78 (1983),
P· 183-197, concludes that Euripides describes
rncontinence and is probably replying to the Socratic
paradox.
C£. McDonald, Happiness, pp. 49-54, who argues
that Medea £irst takes up Socrates-like positions, and then
a position that Socrates would certainly have rejected. T.
B. L. Webster, "Euripides:
Traditionalist and Innovator,"
in The Poetic Tradition. Essays on Greek, La tin, and
SnClish Poetry, ed. Don Cameron Allen and Henry T. Rowell
(Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins Press, 1968), pp. 37-38,
equivocates: Euripides makes his characters use Socratic
terminology and take a Socratic position, but there is no
intent by Euripides to debate Socrates.
Detractors now abound; see especially Barrett,
Hippolytos, p. 229 (who makes the point, which Snell in
Scenes, p. 66 n. 26, acknowledges, that a character does
not speak for the poet); Reeve, "Medea 1021-1080," p. 61
(Snell "manufactured" out of Medea 1078-1080 a debate
between Euripides and Socrates); Claus, "Phaedra," pp. 223238 (Phaedra's concerns are those of Homeric heroes, and
have nothing whatsoever to do with Socratic conceptions 0£
morality); Moline, "Euripides, Socrates," pp. 45-67; cf.
his Plato's Theory 0£ Understanding (Madison, WI:
Univ.
of Wisconsin Press, 1981; herea£ter Moline, Plato's
Theory), pp. 22-27 (Moline argues in both that neither
Medea nor Phaedra are credible polemicist mouthpieces £or
the poet, and that the polemicist view -fails to consider
the overall impression one gets £rom the play); Yank.ow,
Soc_ratic
E1flo1'!it.H),
passim
(E1flo1'!Jf..L"I
as
defined by Socrates is lacking in the main characters of
both plays).

i:.·

213 I

agree (but not only £or the reasons he gives)
!'ith. J~n Moline's bold statements on these passages in his
•s Uri.pi.des, Socrates," pp. 49 and 62, respectively:
r o~rates Pr_-ovided not the antithesis to Medea's words but
her their explanation."; "Phaedra's case then is less a
it'!.nter-example to Socrates' view than a con£irmation of
•
~f. Moline's Plato's Theory, p. 24.
Rickert, "Ak.rasia," pp. 103-104, argues that Medea is

C:
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AS Medea states that she knows what she is doing is

~·

but that her thumos has control over her considered

c:teliberation, she sounds remarkably like the interlocutor
in the early dialogues 0£ Plato.

This is the moment 0£

reversal and recognition 0£ that reversal, when the
tnterlocutor cannot help but admit that what he has
cnampioned

is

repugnant

even

to

himsel£.214

I

am

reminded 0£ that moment in the Symposium when Alcibiades
shamefacedly admits that he, again and again, pursues
policies he has agreed are not in his own best interests:
I have experienced at the hands 0£ this man alone that
of which no one would imagine me capable--being shamed
by anyone; I £eel shame be£ore him alone. For I know

not akratic because, even though she recognizes that her
deed is kakon, she nonetheless deems it better than other
possibilities, and there£ore chooses a kakon that is, by
her reasoning, the best course 0£ action. As Rickert
points out, Medea•s thumos has "ties to principles and
values as well as 'feelings."
Within Medea•s system of
values. I would argue. totally defeating and therefore
incapacitating the enemy is the best course 0£ action.
Michelini, "Heophron, 11 p. 133 n. 86, claims that Rickert •s
definition of akrasia is 11 0£ modern date," but I see no
proof 0£ this in Michelini •s citation of Rickert •s p. 96 n.
14.
214 Michelini. "Beophron.• p. 126. describes
dissonances which have built up by line 1060. and calls
them the "knot 0£ a problem around which the Euripidean
Play is built. 11
Burnett, "Tragedy 0£ Revenge." p. 22. sees Medea •s
struggle as one between her "masculine, honor-oriented sel£
and her 'feminine, hearth-oriented self."
C£. Foley,
~Divided Self," pp. 79-85, and Boedeker, "Medea," pp. 9900, Who points out that by using against herself •so£t
Words about her children,• Medea nearly undermines her own
revenge plot. This is, then, as Burnett acknowledges, a
~:-•in situ~tion for Medea, who "must be m_ade the au~hor 0£
r own misery• (p. 21), and who, by killing her children,
commits "an act 0£ violence against hersel£" (p. 22).
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"ell that I am not able to answer his arguments that
1 •ho whenever I depart am seduced by the esteem 0£
t'he masses, must do as he bids. So I skulk. away like
a runaway slave and £lee him, and then when I see him,
1 feel shame at the agreements to which we•d come.
(§_ymposi um 216a.8-b.6).
As an interlocutor, Alcibiades is atypical, as has
rgued (Chapter One, Part Three), because, by
1>een a
es:pressing his shame, he openly admits his reversal and
recognition.

Medea likewise openly admits her reversal and

recognition.

And since her actions represent the de£ini-

tions in this would-be dialogue, Medea•s admitted reversal
and recognition allow the Chorus and the audience to
witness the sel£-contradiction inherent in those de£initions.

Medea, however, is no Alcibiades, £or as a zero-sum

competitor, she can allow no room £or shame.

Shame,

recall, according to Gouldner, is at variance with the need
to maintain one•s reputation and exalted sel£image.215
Medea, then, in her open acknowledgement is atypical
and like Alcibiades.

But as she pursues actions that

mani£est the acknowledged -faulty de£initions 0£ arete,

m!,

and Sophia, She begins to £all into line With typical

interlocutors.

These consistently adopt tactics that allow

a more comfortable championship 0£ -faulty de£initions,
namely, projecting blame onto another and -fleeing.

Medea

engages in both, while the Chorus, as we shall see, are

215

Gouldner,

Enter

Plato,

pp.

94-95.

452
onlf

auowed the small com:fort o:f projection.
aecall that interlocutors in early Platonic dialogues

reaiularlY blame the demise o:f their :faulty de:finitions on
more speci:fically. on some capacity o:f his
socrates. Or •
for wizardry or magic or ob:fuscation.

In this. they

displaY the all-too-human trait o:f projection.
181

Projection

of course. the bailiwick o:f those interested in image-

aaintenance, and, as such, is a natural :for the zero-sum
competitor.

We should not be surprised, then. to see both

Jledea and the Chorus engaging in projection, £or, to
paraphrase Philip Slater, the need to surpass prevents
rational

appraisal

0£

one s
1

own

actions.216

In Medea, there is 0£ course no Socrates allegedly
wielding supernatural abilities, and so the blame is
(by Medea, only partially; by the Chorus, to a

greater

extent) projected onto those best 0£ all scapegoats, the
1ods.217

Medea

is

the

:first

to

do

so:

at

lines

1013-

Wt' where she explains her sadness and tears to the
befuddled Messenger, who has just reported what he thought
was the good news 0£ the children s reprieve £rom exile:
1

•the gods and I, thinking harm£ully. have contrived these
things.•

(Tau Ta

216 slater

•

Glory,

9£0l

p .

>

'

ic.ayw

40.

217
Gl
For the ancient Greek tendency, as Slater,
n~~·
p. 40. puts it, •to attribute behavior they could
0
accept to external in£luence (e.g .• divine agency)
see Gouldner, Enter Plato, pp. 103-105; c£. Dodds,
- eeks and the Irrational, pp. 1-18.

ai-" . .•
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With

this

statement,

as already begun the escape which, at the play•s
11edea h
end.

S he

makes actual.

Is it any wonder, then, that the Chorus, as they sing
ill lyric anapaests at 1081-1115, begin to express their
ria and to grope tentatively toward a new understanding?

!EO -

For theY have seen prevail the de£inition 0£ arete they
openly upheld:

they have seen Medea assiduously beat back

with the necessity 0£ executing a rationally conceived plan
every bit 0£ eroticism le£t in her; they have, in the end,
heard her resolve to go 'forth with the logical consequence
of her rational deliberations.

Yet they, the women 0£ the

Chorus, have also seen 'first hand the emotional unacceptability of this logical consequence.

In short, they have

witnessed the self-annihilation but nonetheless continued
advocacy of the definitions 0£ arete, eros, and sophia they
themselves espoused.
The Chorus, then, are con-fused, humble, and getting
the sense that the only thing they can know £or sure, is
that one can know nothing £or sure.

These are the same

women who, some 500 lines earlier, were crowing, assured 0£
their knowledge and de-fending the superiority 0£ women.
Row they are meek and hesitant about their sex•s claim to
know:
I have by now many times gone through rather subtle
J.
and have come to con£lict greater (lfpos
C:Zl-LL.>.>.as
~A9ov
IJ.Eltous)
than
the
'female
race
18 required to seek out.
For in fact we too have a
~a ters

454

which has intercourse
with Clus £or the sake 0£
JD Use t
,..
,
•isdom
(VpOO'OIJ.lA£l
O'Oq>lQS
£V£K£V)--not
with
o£
us,
to
be
sure.
But
among
the
many
you
would
11
:erhaps £ind a £ew; t!1e rafe ,0£ women is not entirely
•ithout
muse
(ouK
avoµ.ouoov).
(1081-1089).
Tbe role 0£ the muse, as well as the birthing imagery
1n t

hiS song, will be discussed below (Part Five); £or now

tre snould £irst notice the new hesitancy and humility
evident here:
find a £ew.•

•not with all 0£ us•; •you would perhaps
These are not phrases 0£ sel£-con£idence.

The sophia to which the women say some 0£ their sex can lay
claim is not the £irst ode s boast£ul revelation 0£ what
1

tras and what will be; instead what we £ind is a declarative
statement that comes down to this:

What we know is that

one simply cannot know a single thing.
This is the point 0£ their long digression on the
advantage 0£ not having children.

First, we notice again

the recurrence 0£ many questions (though all but one are
not, as previously at 846-862, direct questions):

is it

that children are a sweet thing or a trouble £or mortals?
(1095-1096);

how

is

one

to

bring them

up

well? (1101-1102);

from where is one to obtain an inheritable sustenance £or
one•s children? (1102); how can one know i£ children will
turn out bad or good? (1103-1104); how can one suppose that
it is pro£itable to have children i£ children, by their
dying, can ca use one the most distressing 0£ all grie£s?
(1112-1115).

The sheer, remarkable abundance 0£

interrogative words emphasizes the women's deep
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u

1111

Oll'WS

ertainty:
C

(1095.

~,, 0 eev

uo1.

uo2.

uo3-U04.

1112).

To

them.

there

is

no way 0£

powing the answers; they admit, in the question 0£
•he th

er children will turn out bad or good 1 "this is

.

,

,,

ad"l>.ov,

t:O'TlV

unknowable"

1104).

Still. their orientation as zero-sum competitors
reaaains, because their en tire disquisition on parenting
coaaes to the conclusion that it is better not to have
children because it puts one in a position 0£ being onedown as compared to those who do not have children, and it
151 quite

simply, not pro£itable.

Chorus claim:

At lines 1090-1093 the

"And I say that those 0£ mortals who have no

experience at all and who have not borne children, they
surpass

,

,

euTuxLav)

in

good

those

'fortune

who

have

their conclusion, at 1112 1 is:
profit

one?

onv

(ll'pocpepel v

begotten.•

,
t:LS

Furthermore,

how does having children

>.ut:l).

The

question

is

rhetorical, £or they have already shown that it does not
pay.
But it does cost, as it always costs, the zero-sum
competitor who must give up connection to others.

It costs

in that one is not allowed to experience the innocent
Pleasures of such association.

The Chorus signal their

awareness of this loss in twice re£erring to children as

•sweet•:

once,

as

potentially so, at

line 1095 ("the

456

.

cJllld

iess through their inexperience 0£ whether children
•

are swee

t

or troublesome to mortals

•

• ")i

again, at

where children are called a "sweet o££shoot" in

11ne 10 99 '

tile house.
gven as these women seem to waver between acknowiedging their sophia and their ignorance, as they teeter
between coldly deciding that being a parent does not pay
and yet signalling that the cost 0£ childlessness is
great, their 'final argument, that even i£ all else goes
well, the gods can suddenly take one•s children a way
unexpectedly to death, shows more than anything else their
position

in

this

elenchos.

For,

like

Medea

(1013-1014),

and like interlocutors who blame Socrates £or the demise
of their de£ini tions, the Chorus resort in the end to
scapegoating the gods:
Even i£ all turns out well, death can nonetheless take
clean away to Hades the bodies 0£ your children. How
then does it pay i£, in addition to all those other
things, the gods can still lay this grie£, most
distressing on behal£ 0£ children, on mortals? (11091115).

Critics regularly cite these lines as Euripidean nodding,
or indulging in escape, because the women 0£ the Chorus
obviously cannot think that they are singing about Medea
and her children.

A£ter all, no god is going to whisk

these Young ones 0££; their own mother will be to blame.
Or, if the women do pro£ess to be topical here, are they

457
t d
or
tbick-lfit e •

----

pulling

a

'fast

one

on us,

or

what?218

2 18yon Arnim, Medea, p. 23, notes that the Chorus ..
kS have no particular connection to the circumstances;
reaaa[he complaint 0£ Bongie, "Heroic Elements," p. 52 n.
cf· that the Chorus' song "seems rather banal and more than
50,bit cranky, contributing little to dramatic development
ab r than the necessary pause be£ore the £inal achievement
0
~ eHedea's goals."
McDermott, Incarnation, pp. 62-63,
~i dS the Chorus' remarks "somehow inappropriate, 0££-thep::.nt."
McDermott continues, "For, instead 0£ dealing
directlY •ith the problem that £aces them . . . , the
Chorus rambles 0££ into a prolonged catalogue 0£ the
yartous worries inflicted by children on their allconcerned parents." The women 0£ the Chorus, though, are
dealing directly with the problem that £aces them: the
destruction 0£ de£initions they hold dear. McDermott
aaisses the point 0£ the Chorus' "tax[ing] their brains"
bere because she consigns them to a passive role (p. 60 n.
38), and does not recognize them as quasi-interlocutors in
an elenchos, whose work is precisely to tax their brains.
Dunkle, "Aegeus Episode," p. 103 n. 6, terms this ode
•ironical," given that "[i]n this play parents are a plague
to their children.•
C'f. Michelini, "Reophron,• p. 131,
according to whom the Chorus employ the trope 0£ parental
suffering "in a naive and there-fore disturbing way."
llusurillo, "Reconsideration,• p. 62, 'finds this song
irrelevant, and sees Euripides as "gloss[ing] over• the
fact that "here it is no chance death that carries 0£ the
:babies to Hades, but the uncontrolled -fury 0£ their
mother.•
Dihle, "Medea und ihre Sch western,• p. 181, argues
that the Chorus' song is unintelligible unless they think
lledea has renounced her plan to kill the children. The
opposite is asserted by Stanton, "Medea's Monologue," p.
103 n. 15, 'following O. Zwierlein, "Die Tragik in den
Kedea-Dramen,• Literaturwissenscha£tliches Jahrbuch 19
(1978), pp. 35-37.
Wol££, "Euripides," p. 240, is one 0£ the -few critics
to appreciate the women•s stance in this song: "Here,
rationality is put in the service 0£ a purely private goal
of emotional sel£-su££iciency that simply ignores the
community's need to reproduce itsel£, a need apparently
:upported by the nonrational 'forces that move human beings
0
Produce and 'foster their children.• Wol££ 'further notes
~PP. 240-241), brilliantly, that this ode "oddly resembles
,,~:on•s -fantasy wish that men might produce children
aei!out ~o~en (574-575), making the male world essentially
co
sufficient.•
C£. McDermott, Incarnation, p. 69, who
thmpares the ode to Jason's wish that he d never begotten
e Children (1413-1414).
1
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The women, quite simply, are seeking an escape that
uow them to persist in holding the de:fini tion o:f
,,111 a
te to which they are attached, :for otherwise, they will

!!£nav e

to re-formulate their lives top to bottom.

They use

their sense o:f their own ignorance--newly acquired in the
~enchos--to

justi:fy the detachment :from children which

will soon be required o:f them (and o:f Medea) as they stand
l>Y (as every good Chorus must) and allow the action o:f the
plaY to proceed without inter:ference.

They distance

themselves and Medea :from the act o:f child-murder about to
take place by claiming that the gods can--and do-regularly visit parents with such a tragedy, whisk. their
children o:f£ to un£oreseen death.
To these women, though, these deaths, this mother
willing to kill her children, were in :fact un£oreseen, :for
they, like the typical interlocutor in elenchos, had never
sufficiently examined the consequences o:f the de£initions
informing the actions 0£ their daily lives.

To the Chorus,

the horrible logic o:f the zero-sum game remained hidden.
Reck.£ord, •First Exit,• pp. 345-346, recognizes the
women•s argument as a "tightly constructed but despairing
· · · demonstration [which] could have come from Antiphon
· · · ·" The argument "dramatizes . . . the divorce
between reason and feeling• and shows that "[r]ational
argument points to incalculable disaster."
t
Sim~n, Tragic Drama, pp. 75 and 89, sees this song as
T~e culmination 0£ an assault on the epic-heroic worldview.
• e declaration that it is better not to have children
th · · is both an abdication 0£ a major source o:f power in
c e struggle between men and women and at the same time a
rrYstaUiza tion 0£ another possibility in the struggle--to
efuse children."
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:it too

k guripides, in 'fashioning his Medea, to 'force this
·nto the open air 0£ its emotional unacceptability.

logic

J.

tne end 0£ the play, a£ter the 0££ stage demonstration
Sf
of thiS horri£ying logic, the Chorus will be in £ull-blown
!2°r~.

una ba

acknowledging their disorientation and ignorance as

shedly as

Keno (Keno 79e.7-80b.4).

The Messenger who enters as the Chorus 'finish singing,
and who reports to Medea the death 0£ the princess and
ereon, serves primarily in the maiuetic part 0£ the
elenchos, and his speech will there£ore be covered at
length below in Part Five.
two things:

For now, we need only consider

his description 0£ Creon•s £ate and his own

concluding remarks.
In the description 0£ Creon•s £ate we are treated to a
grisly representation 0£ the reversal 0£ Creon•s bid as an
autonomous competitor.

Creon•s one apparently e££ective

act as zero-sum competitor was, as Medea put it, to give
away his daughter to whomever his th umos led him
I

KOpT)V

u

OT«tJ

auµ.os

~YEV,

309-310).

Recall that we argued that Creon was not really £it or
eager £or competition, at least competition against the
likes 0£ Medea.
The last becomes apparent in the horrible death Medea
arranges £or him.

But in his demise we can see more than

his mere unsuitability as contender against Medea.

In it

is also the reversal 0£ Creon s one act as autonomous
1
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colllPe

ti tor, and the suggestion that competition, in

..,er form it takes, is the deadly game it in fact is.
•11ate
of these things are conveyed in the gruesome struggle
sotn
ereon nas with the corpse of his daughter:
aer poor father, ignorant of what had happened, came
unawares into the house and fell upon the corpse; he
groaned straightaway, and, folding her in his arms,
Kissed her and addressed her as follows, •Ky poor
cbild, which of daimones wrongfully killed you thus?
wno made me an aged tomb bereft of you? Oh, let me
die with you, child." And when he stopped his
lamentation and groaning, and wanted to lift his aged
flesh, he stuck to the fine gown, like ivy to the
stems of a laurel, and there was a terrible/clever
wrestling
(6£l
cS>
~V
'lfa).alOtJ.aTa);
he
went
to raise himself on his knee, she grabbed onto him.
>
'
'
,
If
he
took
to
force
(£l
6£
'lfpos
thav
ayol), she tore the aged flesh from his bones.
After a time the poor wretch extinguished his spirit
and died; for he was no longer on top of harm
(KQKOU
yap
OUKeT>
~v
uvepT£po5).
(1204-1219).

Va

Creon, whose self-assertion had dictated that he
should give away his daughter to a married man, now cannot
1et rid of her!
horrifying

He is engaged in a contest, here a

wrestling

match

with a

corpse,219

and

the

contest is, crudely speaking, to get rid of his daughter.
But he

cannot!220

Creon,

who

was

•one

up•

at

the

219 see Husurillo, "Reconsideration,• p. 70, who
also notes the athletic metaphor in lines 1181-1182.
Cf.
Kew ton, •Passionate Poison,• p. 18.
See also Kc Dermott,
~ncarnation, pp. 86-87. Ky discussion owes much to
cDermott•s superb analysis of this scene, with Creon cast
as the suddenly insincere elegiac lover caught in a
wrestling match with his daughter's reanimated corpse.
220

Dunkle, • Aegeus Episode,"
eath-scene as evidence of Creon's
ca·
·
l
d" iming that Creon "chooses to die
isregards his struggle against the
d

pp. 103-104, sees the
selflessness, and, in
with [his daughter],"
corpse.
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pla1

•s beginning, is no longer "on top"; kakon has

o"le r

,..helmed him (1219).

He dies in a contest he thought he

11ad already won, letting go 0£ his daughter.

grue

Their

some tussle graphically illustrates that, when one

plaYS the zero-sum game, proximity spells danger.
l(illS,

even

between

£or mer

Touch

intima tes.221

Ro wonder that the Messenger, as he departs, makes an
obviously aporectic statement:
This is not the £irst time that I have c:onsidered
mortal a££airs to be a shadow, nor would I hesitate to
declare that those mortals who think they are wise and
are concerned with explanations (Tous ao•ous
ppoTwv
doKouvTas
ecvaL
Kai
µ.epql.V'flTas
Aoywv) deserve the greatest > rebuke.
For no one 0£
,
mortals
is
£ort una te
(eudaql.wv);
when
prosperity £lows in one man•s direction, he is more
success£ul than another, but, £ortunate?--no. (12241230).
Such a sentiment is not so much anti-intellectual as it is
pessimistic; it betrays a deep insecurity about the ability
to maintain the status quo on even the most mundane level.
Gouldner is convinced that such pessimism and insecurity
are by-products 0£ the zero-sum game, where envy brings
success into association with peril and doom, which then
generates pessimism; pessimism in its turn breeds
insecurity.222

But

such

pessimism

and

insecurity

become operative only when the unexpected in £act arises;
this is precisely the situation Euripides has constructed
221 Flory,

"Right

222 Gouldner,

Hand,•

Enter

pp.

Plato,

70
pp.

and
58,

73.
69-70.
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..... e end 0£ his play. The perils 0£ the competitor are
at tu.
iscernible except in reversal 0£ -fortune, and reversal
11ot d
een arranged by the playwright not only £or the once
rias b
rialf-}l.eartedly competitive Creon and his daughter--not only
for tnese and, through them, Jason--but also for Medea,
he Chorus will soon witness effecting with her own
•bom t
}l.and the harm that she, as competitor, should visit upon
}l.er enemies, not, as she does, upon her "-friends" and
}l.erself.
The Chorus, upon hearing the Messenger s report,
1

express again their willingness to assign responsibility
for this horror elsewhere than upon Medea, who represents
all that they still uphold:
on

this

up from
1232).

day

a

below

daimon
much

"It seems," they remark, "that
rightly

has

harm

(KaKa)

>

,

(EVchKWS)

upon

Jason"

brought
(1231-

This remark is testimony to their continuing

support of zero-sum procedure.

At the same time, however,

they betray their growing discom£ort as, £or the second
time, they express sympathy £or the £ate 0£ the princess:
•Poor

thing

(Q

T>.'JJ.Lov),

how

we

pity

your

tune, daughter 0£ Creon, you who go to Hades
because of the

marriage

of

1

mis£or-

house

Jason" (1233-1235; cf. 978-990).

They are not, of course, the only ones discomfited.
Med.ea now once again displays her pain at what she £eels
She must do.
l"k
1

As has been argued (above, Part One), she is

e the hapless interlocutor near the end of elenchos, who
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s tba t sbe cannot a void the logical consequences 0£
41scern
finitions she has espoused and lived. And yet, these
tb.e d e
eonsequences, terrible/clever and necessary as they are,
are n

onetbeless kaka (1243):
hesitates

understandably,

harm, which she there-fore,
to

do

(µEU.oµEv,

1242).

as to such an extent lost her taste £or competition
s11.e b
th.at she must command hersel£ to go back into the £ray with
brusque imperatives:
c

,

come
on,
now,
heart,
arm
yoursel£
(01r>..ttou).
.
Come, wretched (Ta>.atva) hand 0£ mine,
take tbe sword, take it!, creep to the pain£ul
starting post 0£ your li£e (>.apf:
>.ap>,
~pll'E
vpos
pa>.p'loa
>.uv,,pav
PLou),
and
do
not turn weak, do not remember (µ.Ji KaKtae!ls µ,,o>
>
"'
avaµv,,a9!JS)
your children, how very dear they
were (ws •l>-TaCTaJ), how you bore them; but
-forget (>.aeou) your children £or this brie£ day,
and then lament (9pitv€t); £or even i£ you will
kill them, they nonetheless were dear (•L>.ot)--1
am an un£ortunate (dua-ruxits> woman! (1242, 12441250).

That Medea sees this as a competitive arena is clear
from

her

use

0£

•arm

yoursel£"

her

and

description 0£ the act as the pain£ul •starting post•
(fla>.p'loa)

0£

her

li£e

(see

above,

Part

One).

That

she is reluctant is obvious -from the abundance 0£
imperatives.
her

use

That she knows this is harm£ul to hersel£,
0£

,
KOKO

and

illustrate.

But this act is not merely competitive, taken on
reluctantly, in the knowledge that it is sel£-harming.
also consists 0£ doubly sel£-negating premises.

It

This is

unmistakable when one considers Medea's description 0£ the

464

and

as

..ust

For

not

only

Medea, in order to harm her enemies, harm hersel:f; she

•ust once again turn harm upon those dear to her.
done

She has

thiS be:fore, o:f course, in the case o:f her :father and

J>rother; the di:f:ference this time seems to be that these
c:tiildren are the only ones with whom Medea has allowed
:tierself to :feel real and enduring attachment.

They are the

onlY things she terms "dearest,• philtata, and she uses
t:tiis designation o:f them not only here, but £our other
umes:

at 795, when she -first reveals that she will murder

:tier children, they are philtata; twice, at 1071, their
bands and mouths are so described; :finally, at 1397 she
snatches away Jason•s description 0£ the children as
philtata with the response:

"To their mother, yes, but not

to you• (see -further discussion below, Part Five).
It

would certainly be much more com:forting to propose

that Medea does not--cannot--truly love her children, that
so much is obvious :from her ability to :kill them.

Such a

theory, however, de:fies what Medea hersel£ says, and robs
the play•s elenchos 0£ its pro-found reversal.

We must,

•1th Medea, contemplate the excruciating paradox that her
killing them does not negate their dearness to her.
reversal is unmitigated:

Her

she experiences :first-hand the

emotional unacceptability o:f the zero-sum game•s logical
consequences.

Otherwise, when Medea escapes, she escapes

•ith the de:finitions she represents unchallenged, that is,
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sne e
rea d

scapes unscathed.

That she does not, she hersel£ will

ilY admit in the exodos, as she does here, talking to
"For even i£ you kill them, they nevertheless

nersel£:

dear--! am an un'fortunate woman!" (1249-1251).

were

The Chorus, a£ter hearing Medea pronounce the agoniztne paradox in which she is embroiled, now sing their 'final
song (1251-1292).

It is interrupted by the cries 0£ the

c:tiildren, being killed by Medea within, and by the Chorus
own impotent

interjections

1

(1271-1281).

They begin with a prayer to the Earth and light 0£ the
sun, begging

them

whom

describe

they

to

look
as

down

dn

and stop Medea,223

"destroyed"

>

,

(oAoµ.Evav,

1253).

They see her crime as the work 0£ an Erinys (1260), and
appeal to Medea hersel£ to consider that she is rendering
her birth pains, as well as her trip through the Symplegades, in vain (1261-1264).

They 'finally try

to convince

her, as zero-sum competitor who care-fully weighs advantage
and disadvantage, that she will pay a heavy price (12671270).

They know no other appeals, £or they did not

foresee the logical consequence 0£ the competition they
themselves were so keen on; they there-fore can only ask, in
confusion, "Why has this heavy bitterness 0£ mind and harmd.ealing slaughter 'fallen upon you?"
.

223

H.

E.

Collinge,

•Medea

ex

They clearly see Medea
Machina,•

CP

57

~::2, hereafter Collinge, "Ex Machina"), p. 172, argues
1

t, by providing Medea transport, the Sun ironically
that he drive
Ked.ea out.

1 t-ants one part 0£ the Chorus 1 request:
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v-ictim of a perverse circumstance; their use of the
•• tne
-.rpoa1fL 'T'VEl (1266) suggests that the impetus for
fer:t> ·
_.edea is about to commit has been visited upon her
.nat p
tb.e outside.

frOID

It is partly £or this reason, their inability even now
to u nd

erstand the reasons behind the reversal their

definitions, manifested in Medea, have undergone, that
tnese women, after hearing within the cries 0£ the children
)>einS slaughtered, compare Medea--insensibly, it seems, at
first

glance--to

Ino

(1281).224

For

certainly,

had

they thought but a £ew minutes longer, some critics
intimate, they could have come up with a much better
parallel:

Agave or Althaea, :for example.

Procne.225

Al thaea

and

Procne,

at

Or better yet,

least,

killed

their

children knowingly; Procne, most like Medea, did so to
punish her husband.
Why then do the women 0£ Corin th insist that they have
2 24 Joseph Fon tenrose, "The Sorrows of Ino and of
Procne,• TAPA 79 (1948; hereafter Fontenrose, "Sorrows"),
p. 165, notes that both Ino and Medea are involved in the
Argonaut expedition; Collinge, •Ex Machina,• p. 172 n. 10,
adds that Ino is related by marriage to Jason. Fontenrose
also sees a similarity between Ino and Medea {with Theseus)
as Wicked stepmothers. See also Wolf-Hartmut Friedrich,
•Hedeas Rache," in Euripides, ed. Ernst-Richard Schwinge
~armstadt:
Wissenschaftliche Buchgessellschaft, 1968;
ereafter Friedrich, "Medeas Rache"), pp. 185-186, for
enumeration of the child-murders that occur in Attic drama.
A

225 see

Rick M. Newton, "Ino in Euripides
Medea,•
~ 106 (1985), pp. 496-502, who suggests that close
::raUels are suppressed intentionally by Euripides so that
c ~ non-parallel of Ino may make the point that Hedea•s
rune is unparalleled in its unmitigated heinousness.
1
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neard o£ the acts of one other. woman, Ino, to whom
01111
t11e1 c

patter

an compare Medea's?

Instead 0£ looking to the

ns of the myth that one may allege the audience could

pve "nown
~
, but which are nonetheless not expressed by
gurtpides,226
••

1

of Ino:

2) slle

was

let

us

instead

look

to

what

the Chorus do

1) she laid her hands on her children (1283);
driven

mad

by

the

gods

(1284);227

3) she

was

c1rtven out of her home and put to wandering by Zeus• wife
(l28 4-1285); 4) she

threw herself off a

cliff into the sea,

poor thing (1286-1288); 5) the leap followed hard on the
irreverent slaughter of her children (1286-1287); 6) she
died

along

with

her

children

(1289).228

The

Chorus

conclude Ino•s story by lamenting how much harm the "much226For this approach, see Fontenrose, •sorrows,•
pp. 125-167.
S. P. Hills, "The Sorrows of Medea,• CP 75
(1980), pp. 289-96 {hereafter Hills, "Sorrows•) makes
excellent use of Fontenrose•s evidence, by identifying
elements of the Ino/Procne myth that appear in Euripides•
atory of Medea.
227 Robert Eisner, "Euripides• Use of Myth,"
Arethusa 12 (1979), pp. 158-159, proposes that "[t)he focus
Of the comparison is Hera's crime in driving Ino crazy
• · · as opposed to Medea's crime in motivating her own
crime. Later we hear Medea will bring the children to
Rera•s temple (1379).
Euripides has chosen the Ino
P&radigm because Hera enters into Medea's crime. Medea
acts like a goddess, with the gods' tacit approval,
Upe .
ch. Cl.~lly the approval of the goddess of marriage and
l.ldbi.rth, who herself once made a mother kill her
c h ildren."
228Th
.
IOdd
ere is no mention that Ino later ,be~ame a
P.'lx e~s.
Maurice P. Cunningham, "Medea all'o
pP. ~v"ls,• CP 49 (1954; hereafter Cunningham, "Medea"),
Par- ~8 -159, argues that this unmentioned fact is the
el Euripides draws between Ino and Medea, who herself
Illes a faux-goddess by acting as deus ex machina.

bee:
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bed o-f women• has already done to mortals (1290troubled
In Ino•s case as described here, this lament must
t,293)·

refer

to Hera's action against Ino hersel£, not to any

actiO n

o£ Ino against her husband's paramours or other

.1-veS·

229

A £ew parallels immediately suggest themselves:
JDO

both

a nd Medea are made exiles; both were driven out (Ino

actually, Medea e££ecti vely) by another woman; both Ino and
Medea killed their own children; both have the Chorus•
sympathy.

Why?

Because both their crimes are, to the

Chorus, equally inexplicable.

Ino was driven mad by the

ps, that they know, and such a suggestion is merely an
expression 0£ the inexplicable.

Medea's action is

similarly incomprehensible to them.

They even go so £ar as

to suggest, in an interpretation which brings them
dangerously close to agreeing with Jason (569-573; c£.
1338), that sexual jealousy was the cause 0£ all
this.230

They

cannot

see,

despite

its

having

been

made more than su££iciently clear, that the ideas they
22 9see Fontenrose, "Sorrows," pp. 127-129, £or
other variants. One 0£ these, that involving the
maidservant Antiphera (or Halos), shows more obvious
similarities to the Jason and Medea story than the one
Ii ven in the text 0£ Medea.
23

°Foley, "Divided Self,• p. 77, notes that Creon
and Jason, as well as the Chorus, misinterpret Medea's
mot·
·
t
l.Vati.on
as jealousy. Foley sees Medea not as "the
o~~gedy o-f jealousy we expect" but "a tragedy 0£ gender.•
in ander, Suspense, p. 93, argues that the gods Medea
mo~~kes suggest lost honor, not sexual jealousy, as her
l.Ve.
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t11e111se1ves
rtse to
11edea's
t•Petus.
tnter

hold about competitive excellence have given

this repugnant act.

Therefore, they are at a loss.

act, like Ino's, they propose, had external
231

In

this

once

they

again

join

the

ranks

of

locutors who look outside their systems of beliefs for
of

tbe cause

these

beliefs'

reversal

in

elenchos.232

There is, however, one further, though less apparent,
parallel between the stories of Medea and Ino.

The Chorus,

bf comparing Medea to a woman who killed herself upon
killing her children, suggest again what they have already
binted at with their recent description of Medea as
>

,

1252):233

(o~oµ.Evav,

•destroyed"

namely,

that

lledea, like Ino, self-destructs after killing those most
clear to her.

This interpretation has been suggested

:before, in many different guises, but most of them psycho101ically

based.234

What

I

wish

to

propose

here

(see

also below, Part Five) is not that the Chorus foresee for
lledea a

psychological self-destruction, but instead, dimly

23 1cf.

Oblander, Suspense, p. 179, who claims the
Chorus use Ino as a parallel because she, like Medea, was
insane.
232 Perhaps

this is what Bongie, "Heroic Elements,"
p. 53, means by her claim that, in proposing Ino as
llYthological antecedent, the women "rationalize" their
experience.
l>l

, 233 ~ Cunningham, "Medea," p. 156, who considers
to

OJlEvav

• 'l'

234 see

ragedy

have

opt a t i ve

force.

Hills, Mythopoeia,
• e.g.,
of Revenge," p. 22.

p.

123;

Burnett,
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aod ten
uiat

tatively perhaps, they sense the destruction of all

she has manifested £or them:

the competitive ideal 0£

Indeed, that this is so is supported by their (as

~·

s :Medea's) reactions in the exodos and by their final
,,ell a

When Jason enters at line 1293 to announce the swiftcoming royal vengeance and to try to protect his children
from it, he has only the Chorus, who aided Medea in her
yeneeance against him, to face.
not revel in his misery.
old

vicarious

enemy,

But they, unlike Medea, do

Instead, they address him, their
as

TATi1.1.ov

("wretched,"

and acknowledge the harm he has come upon.

1306),

They have,

Yicariously through Medea, won; they have also, understandably, lost their taste for victory.
Ironically, even as the victorious Medea by contrast
tloats

and

exults,

she

too

acknowledges

de£eat.235

This victory has brought its harm upon her, too.

says as much to her, and she agrees:
suffer and

you

.

KQl

ri1ht."

are

a

KQKWV

(1361-1362).236

companion

.

ICOlVWVO~

And

again,

Jason

--"You yourself

0£

the

ec) •

at

harm."
--"You

1397,

>

,

(KaUT'll

are

Medea

235

See Michelini, "Heophron," p. 134:
"The 'final
:cene expresses th[e] union 0£ irreconcilables in drama tic
ex-~s: it is a triumph that is also a kind 0£
ann1hua tion."
236
fut
~hlander, Suspense, p. 172, sees in
Medea's
f Ure misery a basis for the audience's abiding sympathy
a:"l' her.
Mills, "Sorrows," pp. 295-296, detects in Medea
ever-sorrowing mother a pattern from the Ino/Procne
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. .serts

that the children were philtata to their mother,

to Jason.

11ot

Jason, however, has obviously lost too.
•enuone
a:bOU t

d already the Chorus

description of what he is

1

to see as k.ak.a (1306); to this may be added his own

concessions of the harm done to him:

•110•
1315

We have

>

destroyed

have

you

At 1310 he exclaims,

,

me,

(a vw>.£aa s.)

woman!";

at

, •open the doors, so that I may see the double harm

at

(itaicov)•;

1348-1350

he

uses

again

the

language

of benefit and harm, "I will

get no benefit from

(lw.ftaoµ.m)

nor

my

newlywed

bed,

the

children

begot

I

and reared will I be able to speak. to alive, but I am

destroyed

>

,

(a vw>.£aa )";

at

Jason

1395-1403

is

pa the-

tic in his grief, "I go, with no share of two children

Oh.
Alas,
kiss

the

dearest
I,

dear

wretch
(•l>.Lou)

that
mou tbs

I

,

(Q

children

am
of

TEICVQ

(Talas.),

my

want

to

children.

· . . Let me--by the gods!--touch the soft skin of my
children.•237
Pathetic as this scene is, neither Medea nor Jason
accepts that their actions are culpable or suspect.

Both,

there£ore, are like interlocutors who maintain their views
by Projecting the blame £or their definitions 1 failures

stories.
237

McDermott, Incarnation, p. 70, correctly points
that al though Jason is now pitiful, he is still not
•hr·f
.
1. t of his mediocrity.
out

472.
Medea, recall, previously laid

external object.

onto some

art 0£ the blame £or her actions on the gods
at ieast a P
")

once again she mitigates her reversal even as

(lOl3-t01-r ;
1 11e

iS acknowledging

•anY

For Medea

it.

£lees (1384-1385) like

interlocutors, and, like those who £lee, she must, at

ieast publicly, persist in disowning the blame.

For it is

onlY thus that £aulty de£initions can remain operational.
aecall seeskin's description 0£ the interlocutors who,
despite their stint at elenchos, depart £rom Socrates,
suspect de£ini tions still in heart and there£ore to hand,
only to dishonor themselves with (at least by the standards
of de£ini tions withstanding elenchos) ill-conceived and
shame£ul

actions.238

Such

a

£uture

0£

the

continued

employment 0£ £aulty de£initions is suggested likewise in
the case 0£ Medea, as a

£ew critics have pointed out, £or,

according to one version, Medea•s £uture tenure in Athens
includes an attempt on the li£e 0£ Theseus, Aegeus•
son. 23 9

Her

repeating

a

crime

like

the

one she

has

Just committed reveals, as did interlocutors" aborted
reformations, the £ailure not so much 0£ elenchos as a
failure of nerve and endurance in its reversed participants.

Scapegoating, there against Socrates, here

238 seeskin,

Dialogue, pp. 127-130.
See the
quotation in the discussion above, Chapter One, Part Four.
R

239

See

McDermott, lncarna tion, pp. 91-93; c£.
Poison,• p. 2.0; Foley, •Divided Sel£,•

p~~i~n, •Passionate
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. t anY convenient other. is a £ace-saving measure to
aia1ns
these failures.
41sotrn
And so in the exodos, Medea chooses Jason as
scapegoat. and he, similarly untrans£ormable, chooses her.
i.uten
!Pke a
fOU

first to her accusations, then to his:

•1 would

long reply to you if father Zeus did not know what

experienced from me and what sorts of things you did in

return (1351-1353) . • . . O children, you perished from
rour father's disease (1364) . . . . [It was not my right
)land,] but it was your insolence. and your newly mastered
aarriage [that killed them) (1366). • . . The gods Know
who began this torment (1372) . . • • You. pernicious

one

(KaKos>.

(11taKw5) 0

as

is

right,

struck on your

will

head

by a

die

in

harm

chunk 0£ the Argo,

and will see a bitter end 0£ my marriage to you (13861388). • • • What god or daimon listens to you, £orswearer

and deceiver

0£

How Jason:

outsiders?

(1391-1392).•

•You despicable thing, you most ha te£ul

thing to the gods and to me and to the whole race of men,
rou who dared to lay sword upon your children, whom you
bore. and you destroyed me, leaving me childless (13231326).

you

great

harm

(KaKoV

'
µ.eya,

1331)

· · · for the sake of pleasure and the bed you killed them
(1338).

• ..

I

married

you,

a

ha te£ul,

destructive

connection £or me, you lioness. no woman, who have the
savage nature 0£ the Tuscan Scylla (1341-1343). . . . Such
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audacitY

is natural to you.

Go to destruction, you who do

s)laJDeful things, you who are £oul with the murder 0£ your
cJlildren (1345-1346) . . . . Oh children, you met with a
)larJDfUl

(KaKTJS)

mother

It

(1363).

was

not

my

right )land that killed them (1365) . . . . You thought it
111

eritorious to kill them £or the sake 0£ the bed (1367).
All

things

are

harms

t.o

(KaKa)

you

(1369).

. . [The children] are, alas, curses against. t.he
pollution upon

your

[The gods] do, in

head (1371). . . .

fact, know--they know your despicable mind (1373).
y0u

revolting child-murderer (1393).•

Jason's

last

against Medea.

speech

(i.e.,

1405-1412)

In £act., the bulk 0£
is

an

accusation

In it he calls Zeus and t.he other gods

to witness what he has su££ered at the hands 0£ •this
repulsive and child-murdering lioness• (1406-1407) who has
killed

his

children

(1411).

Jason ends his speech in helplessness and despair,
wishing that he had not. ever begotten the children to see
them killed by Medea (1413-1414).

In this pronouncement,

he betrays a concession to the inevitability 0£ what has
happened (i.e., once begot. t.en, the children were on their
way to being murdered by Medea).

His solution is one born

Of a sensed impotence in t.he £ace 0£ t.his horri£ying

inevitability:

t.he children should never have been born.

He echoes the Chorus• earlier sentiment (1094-1115:

one

should not have children because one cannot predict or

475

contro 1

lf'n.at n.appens to them), and Medea's slightly

clifferen

t rendering of this, a lament on the vanity of her
the

children

(1029-1031).

Tlle n.opelessness and impotence of the major parties to
lenchos are a consequence 0£ their adherence at all
t:tliS e

cos ts

to definitions proven faulty.

Medea and Jason

•anifest those definitions and persist in their
application, even through the horrors that result from
t:tiem.

Similarly, the Chorus, despite their sense of

repulsion at the act Medea commits, never wholeheartedly
abandon their support of her.

Ho one therefore has the

sense that such crimes are preventable in the future.

And

indeed, given the across the board reluctance to abandon
faulty definitions, they are not.
The Chorus' departing tag echoes the despair of change
and acceptance, albeit reluctant, of the status quo they
and the principals feel.

It is at one and the same time a

prayer to Zeus and an acknowledgement of the women's
impotence in the face of their ignorance.
anything, full-blown

It is, more than

aporia:

Zeus on Olympus, controller (Taµ.ias) of many
things, the gods bring to pass many things beyond
an ticipa ti on
(aEAll'Tws).
In
fact,
the
expected
(Ta
60K'f)9EvTCaJ)
was
not
accomplished, and
god
found a , way
(ll'opov)
for
the
unexpected
(Twv
,
aooic'f)Tea>v).
So
it
went.
(1415-1419).
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aPP r

entiment,

despite

being

formulaic,240

is

an

S

opriate description of Medea 1 s Chorus 1 experi-

241 They had not expected what was logically
ence.
iJlevitable from priorities of the zero-sum game whose
player.

Medea,

they

cheered

on

from

the

sidelines.242

't'lleY therefore, upon witnessing in ffedea s escape the
1

salvation of their faulty definitions from submission to
another round of elenchos, again ascribe the outcome to
soaie other entity, like interlocutors who blame Socrates
for dispatching their surety.

In five lines, they credit

zeus with control, the gods for accomplishing, and god
with finding a way.

They themselves have lost the way

240The lines appear at the end of four other
Buripidean plays:
Alcestis, Andromache, Helen, and
Bacchae. In all of these, however, the first line instead
reads:
'lfoU.aL
µopcpaL
-rwv _ 6m.µov~wv,
"ffany
are
the shapes of the miraculous."
241pace Musurillo, "Reconsideration," p. 66 1 who
terms this tag "a trite, all but meaningless re£rain."
C£.
Barrett, Hippolytos, pp. 417 -418 at lines 1462-1466, who
deems the lines a "platitude" inappropriate to all but
Alcestis 0£ the plays to which it is attached.
It is
•crossly out o-f place" in Medea.
242 so

But trey, "Accident," p. 16:
"
without
•arning we have gone completely o-f-f the track, the play
Charges of£ in a direction which we did not expect and o-f
•hich we cannot approve. Like the chorus, we find
0
~selves struggling to be -freed of that to which we have
:e~ea~y given our allegiance. Seduced into approving
ob ea s revenge, we cannot approve it at all. . . . And we
~t. But neither chorus nor audience has now any
OWnU~ds -for objecting. Euripides has trapped us in our
actio labby reasoning, in the morality that justi-fies any
atup·~· be only the aggravation great enough. Our
l. i.ty has led logically to this conclusion . . . ."
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1418),

they

experience

aporia.2.43

McDermott sees the relevance 0£ this tag not only to
a

d
~·
1ncar

1fhiCh she in the subtitle 0£ her book calls •The

nation 0£ Disorder,• but sees in it an expression 0£

trbat Whitman alleges is Euripides

1

penchant £or the

unforeseen:
guripides purpose£ul achievement 0£ the unexpected is
not simply a dramatic trick, a device to create
suspense and keep the audience "on the hook..• It is,
rather, one 0£ the primary tools by which the poet
effects the play s £inal chaos. To the audience that
comes
to
him asking,
... z:"
or • y", 11
he
1
111
responds,
"Hot
•z:.
Hor
•y.
He
suggests
no
•z."
Worse than that, whether on the large scale
or the small, he repeatedly establishes (or seems to)
an either-or structure within the play, to all
appearances working
with "z:"s" and 11 y"s 11
easily recognizable by his audience. He th us seems to
be saying 114 Z:"
or •y 1 ?
I
will tell you
which." When he goes on to show that neither
alternative is viable or true, or when the •answer"
provided by the play s events is so ambiguous that the
audience must conclude that the posed alternatives
were simplistic or meaningless, this outcome is doubly
destructive 0£ the audience s sense 0£ classi£ication
1

1

1

1

24 3Aristotle is right, then, that Hedea s escape
in the chariot of the sun is..!. as a sort 0£ deus ex machina,
an
inadaqua te
>.uols.
Tou
µueou
(Poetics
1454a.36b.2). Hone 0£ the di£ficulties has been solved; Hedea s
•escape• does not cancel the aporia, but instead, as in the
case 0£ Plato s interlocutors, is its acknowledgement.
See
R. B. Appleton, •The Deus ex Hachina in Euripides,• CR 34
(l920), pp. 10-14, £or the argument that Euripides a t times
uses the deus ex ma china to complicate plots or "to remind
us that the problems 0£ li£e are not so easily solved as we
had been led to suspect . . . . 11
Euripides 1 Medea,
according to Appleton, "is allowed to point [her wrongs]
~ut for hersel£, with all the sanction and -finality that
elongs
to
the
J.L'f'IXav.fi.•
e
Even Plato indicates that the tragedian uses the deus
~machina a\ tim~s 0£ aporia: •tragedians, when they are
er a lo~s (avopwolv) in any way, have recourse to
anes with gods raised on high" (Cratylus 42.5d.5-6).
1

1

1
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and

order.244

While I would postpone judgment on whether Euripides

(l

ould add, "like Socrates") purposefully effects the

"
unexpected to reveal to his audience their ignorance, the

siJDilari ties bet ween the method used by Pla to s early
1

socrates and the method used by Euripides in this, and
perhaps other, plays, suggest that McDermott is wrong to
claim that

Euripides

"suggests

no

z," or that the

provided answer s ambiguity points back. only to the
1

simplicity and meaninglessness of the audience s
1

notionally

supported

alternatives.245

244McDermot t, Incarnation, p.
quotes Whitman, Full Circle, p. v.

112,

For,

as

where

in
she

also

245ohlander, Suspense, 187-188, who imagines that
the original audience -felt "purpose-fully misled• by
Euripides, nonetheless describes the sel-f-searching Medea
encourages:
"We are le-ft with sel-f-doubt, le-ft to question
the validity o-f both Jason 1 s and Medea 1 s world, both the
cavalier sophistry that can defend any decision and the
passionate demands of piqued honor that justifies the
brutalization of feelings and extremely venge-ful actions.
· · . If we are at all to be made more conscious from our
experience of the drama, we must question our own
motivations for action, examine our feelings and challenge
the authenticity 0£ our thinking.• See also Wol££,
•Euripides," p. 241, for the "uneasy, unresolved
Juxtaposition• at the end of the Ode to Athens and at the
end of the play, and the ambivalence Medea arouses in the
audience; cf. Walsh, "Public and Private," p. 300:
"The
Play does not, however, simply reflect what one might
:xpec~ to be the conventional judgment of its audience, nor
d~es it ~ffer its own single point o-f view.
Its
T i.scover1es are paradoxical and inconclusive."
Simon,
_!'agic Drama, p. 97, says that "this is a play that makes
:s Writhe, twitch, and feel uncomfortable." Of the quasifus ex machina, Simon remarks that it "does not clean the
c:ritants out of our system."
Goldhill, Reading, p. 114,
A mpares the end of Medea with those 0£ Bacchae and
._!U.igone, •where dissolution, aggression, and
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s

~·

so in this play:

once we begin to assault the

· s o£ the work, be it dialogue or play, we confront
J>Oundarie

reader-auditors or an audience 0£ theater-goers, who are

tbe u l

timate consumers and targets 0£ the philosopher's and

playwright's purpose in conducting elenchos, and in whom
success of that purpose is at least possible.

For as in

etenchos, the view £rom the outside provides to Euripides•

-

audience, as it did to Pla to•s reader-auditors, a

more

objective perspective from which to view the unfolding
!!enchos.

It is at this audience, then, as at Plato's

reader-auditors, that we can perhaps suspect maieusis to be
aimed, and in them we can theorize upon its operation and
consider its varying success at attaining elenchos•
ultimate goal:

the birth of truth.

To such theorizing and consider a ti on we now turn,
keeping in mind that, if there is truth born of elenchos,

it is neonatal, and that no one should expect full
development from an infant.

disappointment seem to stress the shattering tragic
0
PPosi tions
..

part Three:
~tenchos

Personal and Impersonal Aspects of

in Medea:

Pre-requisites £or Maieusis

ductorY Remarks
intro
Jn Chapter One, it was argued that interlocutors in

~
S

are led to philosophy and truth only when they are

engaged personally in the discussion.

At the same time,

theY must be allowed distance for objectivity.
provides both.

Socrates

He insists, on the one hand, that inter-

iocutors say only what they believe; on the other hand, he
maintains that the reversal of definition is nonetheless
impersonally effected.
estrangement,

The result is engagement and

attraction

and

repulsion.246

balancing act are dangers and potential gains.

In

this

For if

repulsion takes hold, the interlocutor £lees, denying the
reversal--truth is never born.

But if Socrates provides

the right distance from which the interlocutor can
simultaneously feel the pull of recognition and yet
maintain the comfort of objectivity, the interlocutor may
choose to stay through the painful process of birthing

246 It was argued in this study's original Chapter
Two, now set aside, that, in Aristotle's de£inition of
tragedy, pity operates comparably to the personal aspect
Of elenchos, £ear comparably to the impersonal aspect.
For
: discussion of pity as an engaging mechanism and fear as a
•ist~n~ing mechanism in Medea, see Pietro Pucci,
(l ur~pi.des: The Monument and the Sacri£ice," Arethusa 10
v·9 77 • hereafter Pucci, "Monument"), pp. 174-175; cf. his
-!!>lence, pp. 169-174.
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More

o-ften

than

not,

though,

pain

repels

the

trutll·

j.11ter1ocutor,

and the truth, conceived but unborn, makes

irritating presence in his memory 0£ the elenchos.

fOr a n

SOIDeone

·th more distance than the shame-ridden

Wl.

interlocutor is needed £or truth to be born; in the
cua1ogues o-f Plato, this is the reader-auditor.

But even

uie reader-auditor must sense proximity and yet be k.ept at
a distance.

In short, elenchos demands a balancing act, and
suripides in Medea per-forms one.

He provides his audience

with definitions, manifested primarily in Medea and Jason,
which are like those upon which they base their own
l>ehavior.

At the same time, Medea and Jason (and, to a

lesser extent, Creon) are depicted in such a way that the
audience cannot help but feel alienated from them, and
therefore from the definitions they manifest.

The Personal Aspect
At

Poetics

1460b.33-34,

Aristotle

reports

Sophocles•

claim to have depicted men as they should be, while
Buripides

,

depicted

µ. E:' v

GUTos

,
247

as

u

they were
.....

11'0lE:lV,

Ol OUS.

(:Eo•oK>.TJs.

,

,

EUpl'll'lO'l'IV

,

El<Jl V).

Yi

them

Pucci,

At

Frogs

"Monument,"

959-960,
p.

170,

Aristophanes•
stresses

the

t~lence and pain of Euripides" remedial song; I disagree
•m t the audience is brought into such engagement that they
de Ust Undergo the most distressing experience, a
se t-angement of the mind struck. by the brutality and
nseiessness of suffering."
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suriPi d e S •
assess111en

t

in describing his poetry, agrees with this
o-f his art:

1 enacted -familiar things, things we use, things we
live with, things on which I could be put to elenchos;
for the audience knew about these things
and could
>
,..
submit
my
cra£t
to
elenchos.
(OLKE:La
vpayµ.aT>
daaywv, 'lf\ ofs >
xpwµ.elt,
o'fs
~uveaµ.ev,
e~
,
,
'
@v
y>
av
£~,,AE:yXOIJ.,,V•
~\JV£lc50T£S
yap
otiToL
~Aeyxov
ll v
µ.ou
T°'1v
Tex v,,v).
I

A.re t hese assessments accurate, at least in the case 0£
guripides' Medea?

Kore speci-fically:

were the rules 0£

the zero-sum game by which Medea and Jason comported
the111selves -familiar to the largely male Athenian audience
of 431 B. C.?

Did they recognize behind the outrageous

acts of Medea and Jason the beliefs that in£ormed their own
less drastic actions?

While it can never with absolute

certainty be asserted that they did, there is evidence that
the zero-sum game depicted in Medea was a commonplace in
fifth century B. C. Athens.
Sentiments expressed by characters in Euripides• plays
correspond to sentiments expressed during events described
by Thucydides in his History of the Peloponnesian Wars.

John H. Finley, Jr. maintains that these correspondences
argue £or a realism in both Euripides and Thucydides rather
than a borrowing by historian -from dramatist:
As contrasted with Herodotus, Thucydides devotes his
whole work to analyzing the actual, and there£ore
o£ten the material, aspects 0£ the war, and Sophocles•
remark about Euripides could as well have been made by
the older about the younger historian, •1 make men as
they should be, he makes them as they are.• Kore
speci£ically, the £irst debate in the History, that
between the Corcyreans and the Corinthians, turns on
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tne same con£lict between expedience and justice that
nas been noted in the Medea. . . . The close parallel
resented by the debate in the Medea o££ers striking
p roo£ that these were the methods 0£ argument in use
~t the time in Athens, and, though that £act might be
taken to prove merely that Thucydides was in£luenced
as a writer by the tragedians, surely it proves more
tnan that. For the whole development 0£ Attic tragedy
was towards a greater naturalism, and Euripides in 431
would hardly have made his characters speak in this
waY unless the sophistic arguments were generally
known and practised.248
Finley is 0£ course not alone in noticing that
suripidean characters speak sophistically; indeed, they
speak so persuasively in this manner that as late as 1971,
when the third edition 0£ his Geschichte der Griechischen
Literatur was published, Lesky was still cautioning that
Buripides should be considered • . . . weder ein£ach Schuler
der Sophisten

noch

Propagandist

ihrer

Ideen

. . . .•249

'fhe theory that sophists were the mentors 0£ Euripides is
no longer promoted, even though it is acknowledged that
Buripidean characters express views identi£ied with the
sophists.250

But

did

such

views

£ind

popular

reception

248 Finley, Thucydides, p. 53.
General discussion
Of resemblances between sentiments expressed by characters
in the History and Medea may be £ound on pp. 46-57; c£.
also Finley•s earlier •Euripides and Thucydides," HSCP 49
(1938; herea£ter Finley, "Euripides"), pp. 23-68 passim.
249 Lesky, Geschichte, p. 409.
For Euripides•
1
: ays as critiques 0£ Sophistic rhetoric, see Robert
s:a1her, Mortal Vision: The Wisdom 0£ Euripides (Hew York:
· Martins Press, 1989), p. 23
250
Ja
see, e.g., Reck.£ord, "First Exi t, 11 p. 341, £or
fi::n:s sophistic arguments in Medea as a reflection 0£
in.fl h century Athenian intellectualism. An analysis 0£ the
lut"~e~ce 0£ sophistic argumentation and relativism in
Pl.des• Electra may be 'found in Fass, Tragedy, pp. 45-
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aoaong

Athenian citizens?

G. B. Ker£erd has recently argued

tb.eY did, pointing out that the sophistic movement

ttia t

,,ould

not have flourished without the encouragement

sophists received -from regular employment by £i£th century

s. c.

Athenians.

Social and politic al conditions created a

popular need £or sophistic teachings, and Pericles was in
tbe forefront of those who provided patronage £or
sophists.251

individual

It is arguable, then, that views o£ten expressed by
BUripidean characters, views Known to have been advanced by
sophists, were not just -familiar to, but used by the
Athenians in Euripides• audience.
called sophistic views are a

Moreover, these so-

part 0£ zero-sum ethics.

Kote, for example, the correspondence between elements 0£
the zero-sum game and what Finley cites as elements common
to Thucydides and Medea:

1) wide-spread rationalism; 2)

arguments advanced and action taken on the basis 0£
personal advantage/bene£it/pro£it/interest; 3) material
ends pursued at the expense 0£ natural ties; 4) sel£interest as destructive 0£ £ellow-£eeling, which is
considered

harm£ul

to

its

possessor.252

Finley

suggests au 0£ the above (which are elements 0£ the zero49.

251

Ker£erd,

252 Finl
'l'h
ey,
~.p.

Sophistic
•Euripides,"
51.

Hovemen t,
pp.

31-33,

pp.
47,

15-23.
and

65;
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,uJll ga JD

e as described by Gouldner) were commonplace to

century B. C. Athenians.
fiftJ:J.
zero-sum ethics are not, however, fully delineated by
recourse to views of the sophists.

There remains at the

care of the zero-sum game an agonistic bent, whereby
eolllPetition and self-advancement are more highly valued

tnan cooperation and preservation of community.

A high

yalue on competition is found in societies where warriors"
acnieveJDents on the battlefield mean the difference between
life and death, security and peril.

This hierarchy 0£

yalues was posited as characteristic of heroes of the
Homeric poems by (among others) A. W. H. Adkins and K. I.
Finley.253

Adkins

argued

£or

at

least

a

partial

survival of this hierarchy into the classical age and saw a
tension between the older, competitive virtues and what he
terms the •quiet,• cooperative virtues as the latter, in
the interest of civic cohesiveness and stability, began to
be given at least lip service in the last half of the fifth
century

B.

c.254

Finley,

though

not

concerned

in

The

World of Odysseus with the survival of competitive values
into the fifth. century, nonetheless viewed competition as
an enduring characteristic of the ancient Greeks:

"Nothing

defines the quality of Greek culture more neatly than the

10

253 Adkins,
Finley,

-21;

Keri t, pp. 1-60; c£.
World 0£ Odysseus, pp.

254 Adk-ins,

58 -147.

K eri t,

pp.

153-194;

Koral

Values,

pp.

108-141.

Koral

Values,

pp.
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.

tr8f

J. 0

'Which the idea 0£ competition was extended "from

ro•ess to the realm 0£ the intellect. to the
pllfsical P
poetry and dramatic composi tion.•25 5
feats of
Of late. scholars outside the "field 0£ classics or
trorI<ing beyond its boundaries agree. and posit that the socaUed Homeric conventions 0£ behavior survived into. and
perhaps beyond. the "firth century B. C.

Sociologist Alvin

aouldner's description 0£ the zero-sum game used in this
chapter is one example 0£ such work..

Gouldner acknowledges

that there was a tension that developed between the •quiet•
yirtues and the older competitive creed. but sees the
survival 0£ the older behavioral conventions as a result 0£
Greece's continuing need £or a

warrior class:

The •quiet• virtues. as Adkins terms them. stressing
cooperativeness or making cooperation £easible--such
as temperance. ci vie service. justice. and wisdom--in
time become more salient. The polis needed peace and
stability within. i£ £or no other reason than to
pursue its perennial wars abroad. Yet the newer
virtues never entirely displaced the older
implications 0£ agathos and arete that. as
generalized terms 0£ commendation. were encysted with
the older military traits. These traits formed a
concrete paradigm of propriety underlying the more
abstract usage. and they exerted silent inducements to
charge military or competitive achievement with a
special emotive "force.
The viability of the older military virtues in
the late classical period were not, however, an
anachronism; they must not be regarded as a vestigial
"survival" which continues simply through inertia.
The military paradigm of virtue persists because it is
actively reinforced by the continuing military
character and ongoing warlike activities 0£ the citystates.
There was. it seems. a fatal contradiction--one among all too many--in the situation. 1£
255

Finley

1

World

0£

Odysseus,

p.

120.
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constant warfare among the city-states required them
to emphasize their internal stability and i£ this, in
turn, contributed to the growing importance of the
quiet, cooperative values, nonetheless the very
continuance of the wars themselves, indeed their
lengthening duration and growing ferocity, also called
for fighting men and the old military virtues. Since
the citizenry were both the major fighting 'force and,
particularly during the periods of democracy, the
ultimate decision-makers of the state, they were
situationally constrained to maintain both sets of
values and could thus never give full rein to either.
It would have been fatal to the state, as then
constituted in war-ridden Greece, had the citizenry
lost all zest for the military virtues.256
Ve need only recall that Medea, produced in 431 B. C., £ell
at the beginning of A thens' longest and most devastating
military engagement, to see the special applicability 0£
Gouldner's argument to this play.
To Gouldner's arguments may be added the theories of
Philip Slater and the work 0£ John J. Winkler.

Slater

begins his book with Thucydides' Corinthian ambassador's
assessment of the Athenians (History 1.70) and elaborates
upon it.

After terming the Athenians first "difficult" and

then perhaps even "impossible,• Slater, using zero-sum
terminology, provides a sti£f antidote to the quite
contrary, idealizing depiction of the Athenians until so
recently accepted without question:
25
T
~Gouldner, Enter Plato, pp. 15-16.
Cf.
Rhorst~in Veblen, The Theory of the Leisure Class: An
ii;~omic Study 0£ Institutions (London:
Macmillan Co.,
ed 9 • repr. ed., Hew York:
Hew American Library, Mentor
P ·• 1953), p. 153:
"The temperament induced by the
s:edatory habit of life
makes for the survival and
ccess of the group i£ the group's life as a collectivity
18
also predominantly a li-fe 0£ hostile competition with
Other groups."
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rrneY were quarrelsome as friends, treacherous as
eighbors, brutal as masters, faithless as servants,
n nanow as lovers--all of which was in part redeemed
~y their intelligence and creativity. But the core of
:t>oth what is most admirable and what is most
"impossible" about them is a kind of grandiosi ty--an
ability not merely to conceive, but also to
entertain, in every sense of that term, an outrageous
idea, an outlandish scheme.257
s1ater's description can almost qualify as a thumb-nail
sketcb of the zero-sum competitor.

Winkler goes so far as

to posit a Mediterranean •type• that survives even today,
and senses in modern as well as ancient Greeks what he
terms •a

kind

of

controlled

aggression•258

that,

in

yery few words, cuts to the core of zero-sum ethics.
While it must be admitted that these reassessments of
the ancient Greeks can--given our strictly literary
evidence--no more be proven than the earlier idealizing
portrait, further persuasive evidence comes, oddly enough,
from early and middle Platonic dialogues.

In these,

characters (Polus and Callicles of Gorgias immediately leap
to mind) parade out--in their commitment to selfadvancement at the expense of others--values described by
257 s1ater,

Glory,

pp.

3-4.

258 Winkler, Constraints, p. 3.
Even if Winkler's
assessment of a peculiarly Greek aggressiveness is
unfounded, the act of taking vengeance, at least according
to Burnett, "Tragedy of Revenge,• p. 1, has universal human
;PPeal.. Cf. Ohlander, Suspense, p. 168, who cites
Hhu_cydi.des_' description of Athenian punishment of the
ell.ans (Hi.story 5.84 ff.) in arguing that the Greeks, and
:~~ecially the Athenians, would have identified strongly
J l. h the avenging Medea.
Mills, Mythopoeia, p. 68, sees
(:~on in Thucydides' description of change and upheaval
-!storz 3.82 ff.).
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aouldner

as basic to zero-sum assumptions.

It is hard to

. ve that Plato would pit his fifth century B. C.
J>eue
tes against vestiges of a bygone era; it is much more
socr a
u1telY that he set his mentor against men who, as they
tnemselves claimed, held beliefs common to men of their
tillles.
To return to the Euripidean corpus in general, one
other bit of evidence indicates that sentiments expressed
in Euripides' plays were familiar to his audience.

It is a

frequent charge against Euripides that he portrays characters in an anachronistic way, that is, that Euripides
draws characters from the mythic past who nonetheless
express sentiments of the present.

A. E. Haigh, for

example, terms Euripides "most modern in tone and
sentiment. 11 259

D.

W.

Lucas

agrees,

and

criticizes

Euripides for his piecemeal application 0£ modernity:
Euripides o£ten sets his plays in the Greece 0£ his
own day; we can put our finger on many passages with a
contemporary application and characters who were
suggested by types to be met in fifth century Athens.
But at times Euripides is all bits and pieces, because
he has broken away from a tradition and can no longer
use its language consistently. The characters of
Sophocles bring before us the ideals of a society
within the Athenian commonwealth, those of Euripides

2 59 A. E. Haigh, The Tragic Drama of the Greeks
(Ox£ord:
Clarendon, 1925). p. 217.
Cf. Arrowsmith,
•rdeas," pp. 37 and 51, who gives several examples of
Euripides' penchant £or translating "heroic• character into
•realistic £i£th century terms," and who argues that
Euripides •preferred to base his theater upon what he
actually saw as the prime reality of his time . . . ."
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restore

to

us

scraps

0£

the

reality .2.60

\lib.at we are de-fending in this study is something

.,e1on
•ttb.0

d Lucas• sense 0£ Euripides• contemporaneity .

ugb. one can certainly mine Euripides• plays £or •bits

and pieces•

0£

contemporary

in£luence,2.61

we

are

pasi ting that, in depicting the main characters 0£ Medea,
suripides was representing in particular and dynamic 'form
J>ebaviors and the belie£s that in£ormed these characters,
and tb.at their behaviors and belie£s were considered valid
!>Y many

i£ not all 0£

the

Athenians in the audience.262.

Finally, it may be argued that one choice made by
Buripides in composing Medea testi£ies to the poet's intent
to suggest the particular appeal 0£ the highly competitive
and autonomous Medea to his Athenian audience.

I re£er, 0£

course, to Euripides• decision--cri ticized since the time
of Aristotle

(Poetics

1461b.19-2.1)--to

include

in

his

text

260Lucas, Tragic Poets, p. 172..
There is clearly
unstated criticism in Lucas• contrast 0£ Sophocles and
Kuripides.
In this, he is 'following a long critical
tradition.
Michelini, Tragic Tradition, p. 9, traces the
history 0£ critics deprecating Euripides• use 0£ •-familiar
things,• which was sometimes attributed to the poet's
psychological instability (Sophocles, by contrast, had no
such problem); see Michelini's nn. 30 and 31 £or
bibliography and amusing quotes.
261 This

practice is now out 0£ 'favor in the
~:itical literature.
An annotated and categorized collec, ion of such minings may be 'found in Yankow, Socratic
!..!flOT!JJ.L'!),
pp.
18-38.
262 see

Easterling,

•1n£anticide,•

p.

180:

•1£

:~<lea is to be seen as a distinctively oriental type .
G Y does Euripides make her talk like a

Greek, argue like a
r-eek, and to all appearances £eel like a Greek'?•
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otherwise unmotivated appearance 0£ Aegeus.

By showing

tne
11edea

•s -friendship with the legendary Athenian king, and

•egeu

s' promise to accept her a£ter she leaves Corinth,

·ptdes provides his Chorus with an opportunity to

sur1

4esc r

ibe an idealized A thens in their third stasimon (824This is not merely any idealized A thens, but, as

865).

critics

few

have

1110 nths

noticed,2 63

it

is

the

Athens

described

a

a£ter the production 0£ Medea by Thucydides•

Pericles in his £uneral oration.

The Chorus are incredu-

lous that such an Athens would accept the likes 0£ the
child-killer, Medea.
careful to point out.

But they are wrong, as Euripides is
For as Medea makes her escape, she

informs Jason, •1 mysel£ am going to the land 0£
Brechtheus, to live with Aegeus the son 0£ Pandion• (13841385).

"The land 0£ Erechtheus• recalls the •Erechtheidae•

of the third stasimon and the ideal A thens they inhabit,
and, as myth melds with contemporary history, Athenians in
the audience are le£t to ponder their own notional
acceptance 0£ Medea and the possible consequences 0£ such
acceptance, given the consequences £or Aegeus known £rom
myth.264
As Medea announces her itinerary at the play•s end,
Euripides brings Medea and the de£initions represented by
263 e.g., Elliott,
Burnett, "Tragedy 0£
264 HcDermot t,

Medea, p. 89 at
Revenge,• p. 23.
Incarnation,

pp.

827-30,
105-106.

and

492

11er

actions

se seelll

tJ1ef,

s

to

quite

literally

suggest

that,

home
-for

all

to

his

a udience.265

their

idealism,266

like Jason and Aegeus, would be willing to bring

first to Greece and then to A thens Medea and what she
265ffewton, •Passionate Poison,• p. 20; McDermott,
carnation, p. 116.
McDermott (p. 117) is excellent in
1..!!- r analysis o-f the e££ect o-f Medea's journey to A thens:
~st his audience sit back. and presume that such things
happen only onstage, or only in the mythic past, or
1181
nlf when wrought by a barbarian witch, the allusive
:nsertion o-f Athens into the play intimates that the
confusion Medea embodies lives on to the present day and
touches them even on their sacred citadel, -for it is part
of the human condition.•
This last remark. recalls Seesk.in's description 0£ the
reader-auditors' sense o-f their own incompetencies as
comparable to those o-f interlocutors in elenchos (Seesk.in,
Dialogue, p. 15).
It is di-f-ficult, upon re-flection, to
feel smug about the Athenians' shamed recognition o-f their
complicity in basic human realities. The urge to sel-fassertion is, a-fter all, one that has allure -for all
humans.
2661 disagree with the critical opinion that holds
out hope for the idealized Athens o-f the third stasimon.
Burnett, •Tragedy o-f Revenge,• p. 23, -for example, compares
lleclea to the Furies at the end o-f the Eumenides and
nggests that •Medea might undergo a trans-formation and
Join the company of benevolent forces, since her promise to
Aeceus, like theirs at the end o-f the Eumenides, is one o-f
fruitfulness (714-15).•
Burnett blames Jason more than
Bedea for the pollution in the play, and likens Medea to
9emesis who may take re-fuge •at Athens, a city that is
healthy and virtuous still." (p. 24).
McDermott, Incarnation, pp. 105-106, by contrast, does
not forget that Aegeus• child will be attacked by Medea,
: d instead calls attention to the implication in the
Be oral song that Medea's presence will pollute Athens.
id:r~ott ~xtends this threat o-f pollution to the Athens
lllfb. h.zed in the minds o-f the the 431 B. c. theater-goers:
•ee e .clarity of the easy patriotism which the poet
eyomi.n~ly seeks to arouse with_ the Chorus's glittering
hauc~t.ion 0£ Athens's pristine beauty is tainted by these
lb.e ~ ing c:iuestions. One more revered truth is assailed as
Per-v u:i. enians are reluctantly drawn to see a chink. in their
asive assumption o-f virtue.•
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£or, provided she :further their interests. By
stands
. ng Medea literally home to his audience, Euripides,
1>ring 1
Socrates in elenchos, drew.. the Athenians, as £inal
like
tnterlocutors, into highly personal involvement with the
definitions presented (and ultimately re£uted) on stage.
But Euripides, like Socrates, did not only demand 0£

biS audience personal involvement.

He likewise a££orded

them a distance £rom which they, emotionally disengaged,
could see their own behaviors and belie£s in a new light.
The Impersonal Aspect
In an attempt to explain the £actors that contribute
to the extreme discom£ort one is likely to £eel as Medea
draws to a close, Bennett Simon remarks, "The portrayal 0£
character

. leaves us with no one to admire, no one

with whom we can make a com£ortable and sustained
identification,

let

alone

a

heroic

identification."267

Although Simon addresses his remark to a modern audience,
critics have long sensed that the Athenian audience of 431
B. C. would have found Medea, Jason, and, to a
extent, Creon, less than pa la table.

lesser

In short, Medea is a

267g·
I
imon, Tragic Drama, p. 98.
Cf. McDermott,
tf!arnation, p. 70: "The audience's sympathies can attach
Ja em.selves wholly to neither party [i.e., neither Medea nor
di:on]; li_ke the shades 0£ unburied souls, they must hover
llcDem.bodied, vainly seeking a £inal resting place."
l'epe~m.ott•s -final judgment is that "[b]oth characters
e • and so both sexes are indicted." (p. 114).
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1>ar1>arian
creon

and

a

woman,268

a Corinthian.

to tne

Jason

less

than

£ully

heroic,

By assigning zero-sum characteristics

likes 0£ these, Euripides gives his audience, in

SilDon's words, •no one with whom [they] can make a
coJDfortable and sustained identi£ication."
precisely

poet's

the

That is

aim.269

Medea's 'foreign background is something Euripides
geeps in his audience's mind.

Indeed, the 'first lines 0£

the play (6-12) describe Medea coming to Greece £rom
anotner land.

Medea hersel£, twice in her 'first speech to

the Chorus, calls to mind her 'foreignness:

she is, she

reminds the women, a special case because 0£ her status as
stranger and because 0£ having come £rom a barbarian land
(~£vov,

222;

,
EiC

Y"1S.

f3apf3apou,

255).

The

Chorus

268Hedea •s "otherness• is discussed by Goldhill,
Reading, pp. 116-117.
For Medea as a composite 'figure,
some of whose elements are meant to discourage emotional
involvement 0£ the audience, see Gellie, "Character," pp.
18-22.
See also Friedrich, •ffedeas Rache,• p. 236, £or
Euripides• artistry in bringing Medea into this world
Without ever taking her out 0£ the world 0£ myth. Hills,
Kythopoeia, passim, argues the thesis (p. 8) that "[Medea]
is both male and 'female, good and evil, Hellene (i.e.
Corinthinan) and barbarian (i.e. X:olchian); a Heliad
d.~scendant 0£ the Sun-god who is at the same time linked
•1th ch thonic powers."
K
~ 69 Foley, "Divided Sel£," p. 81, recognizes both
edea s barbarism and her £eminini ty as distancing
•echanisms exploited by Euripides to demonstrate "the
~ntradictions inherent in this heroic ethic and behavior."
e;rows~ith, "Ideas," p. 49, sees in Medea's barbarism the
Of Pression 0£ naked, uncivilized physis; "· . . a symbol
ha ~he. ter~ible closeness 0£ all human nature to
~h~i~m; in her inadequate sophrosune and her imper£ect
. ia is represented the norm 0£ Hellenic, and most human,
10
Cl.ety.•
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:t1edea's alien status, though, as cause for sympathy,
,
>
'
( € lfl
VQl€lS.
X80VL,
contempt

1 ee

The same cannot be said of Jason's attitude.

tb.rows

it up in Medea•s £ace that by marrying him she has
the great advantage of living in "Greece instead of

,a1ne d

barbarian

land"

yol'ov, 536-537).

Later

a

tb,at

iand

He

>

'

pappapou

aV1"l

in

the

play

he

bemoans

xaovos.
the

fact

he was the one to have brought her •from a barbarian
to

uBU"IV'

a

Greek.

home"

€s.

oCKov,

1330-1331),

&vO

(pappapou
be ca use

no

xeovOs.

"Greek.

woman" ever would have dared kill her own children (13391340).271

In

Jason•s

words

one

can

detect

the

prejudice against foreigners and xenophobia familiar from
other ancient Greek. texts; Medea thus understandably
suspects Jason abandoned her because of such prejudice,
i.e., that he realized his "barbarian marriage" would not
serve his reputation well in his old age (591).
27 °For

the Burse"s role in increasing audience
sympathy for Medea, see Pucci, Violence, pp. 32-58, and
Ohlander, Suspense, pp. 37-40.
271 Moline,

Plato's

Theory,

p.

24,

sees

Medea"s

~ck of the typical Greek. woman's sophrosune as one in a
ong list of factors which would alienate her from
•:dience sympathy. I would argue that Medea lacks this
rt.ue because Euripides has depicted her as a zero-sum
Shmpetitor, which depiction would win her some sympathy.
a aw, "Female Intruder," pp. 258-259, however, sees Medea
•=·~ typically Greek. woman in her moral values and her
lls, the latter of which differ from the average only in
de Bree.

:C,
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'l'b.e £oreignness 0£ Medea, then, creates a distance
J)et1feen
sree1<.s.

b.er and the audience, who, i£ they were typical
were prejudiced against non-Greeks (especially

gasterners)

and

xenophobic.272

For

although

they,

like

b.orus, would probably recognize in Medea •s isolation
ttie C

ttie

C ompetitor's

£amiliar plight, the males 0£ the audience

aonetb.eless would £eel more a££inity £or Jason than
lledea.273

For

they,

no

less

than

Medea

and

the

Chorus

(or anY 0£ us, £or that matter), could £ind in sex
difference an easy peg upon which to hang the ca use £or
all tb.e dissonance they sense in their own operational

J)elie£s.274

Recall

that

the

Chorus

were

eager

and

ready to blame men £or the oath-breaking and disregard £or
~

that are regular 'features 0£ the zero-sum competition

in which

they nonetheless engage (414-415, 439-441).

Should we be surprised, then, i£ Jason is sexist in
272page, Medea, pp. xv111-xix, describes the
nrious facets 0£ this prejudice and phobia. For
Euripides• amelioration 0£ Medea's barbarian status, see
llills, Kythopoeia, pp. 94-97.
273 Hurray, Euripides, pp. 53-54, claims 0£ Medea
that •the plain man thought that such women should simply
be thrashed, not listened to."
274
(
See Karylin B. Arthur, "Classics," Signs 2
197
Gr S), p. 390:
"The extreme sexual dimorphism 0£ ancient
-~eek society was both its most rigid rule and its most
~•orb·
1rr
. ing Problem. Inner and outer space, rational and
bea:.tiona1 forces, religion and politics, chaos and order,
•er lal and human, human and divine, death and li£e--all
bet: capable, in the imaginative li£e 0£ the Greeks, 0£
llaleg subsumed under and expressed by the relation bet ween
and 'female."
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. g to women negative aspects o:f zero-sum compeattril>U tl. 0
With Jason as their model, the audience is
af f or

ded the com£ort 0£ distance :from the more ne£arious

facets

0£

competi tion.275

Jason

is

smug

in

citing

11edea , s sex as the cause £or the heavy o££ence she takes at
being worsted (568-573).
female

sex

al together

When he proposes disposing 0£ the
(573-575),276

Jason

(and,

'f'icariously, the male audience) projects onto the opposite
275Hills, Hythopoeia, p. 65, sees in Jason's
misogyny that 0£ the Athenians.
Medea is not, however, entirely :female; she usurps a
male role in her aggressiveness and strength. This,
nonetheless, could still serve as a distancing mechanism in
a revenge play.
See Burnett, "Tragedy 0£ Revenge," pp. 39, who notes that al though :feminizing avengers tends to
make them appear weak.er, and their revenge there£ore
ethically more pa la table, Euripides eschews this mitigation
which would give his play "moral delicacy."
Instead, in
Medea, Euripides "embrac[es) the rudeness 0£ a simple
archaic revenge."
Even though Medea does become in some sense masculine,
she remains, nonetheless, :female, and this af£ords the male
audience objectivity.
Zeitlin, "Playing the Other," p. 67,
makes an important point on gender 0£ characters in the
ancient Greek. theater: "Even when :female characters
struggle with the conflicts generated by the
particularities 0£ their subordinate social position, their
demands £or identity and sel£-esteem are nevertheless
designed primarily £or exploring the male project 0£
selfhood in the larger world as these impinge upon men's
claims to knowledge, power, :freedom and sel£-su££iciency-not for some greater entitlement or privilege, as some have
thought, that the :female might gain £or hersel£, not even
for revising notions 0£ what £eminini ty might be or mean."
276 Hippolytus

begins his famous diatribe against
•omen (Hippolytus 616-668) with a similar suggestion. How
much audience sympathy he retains by the end of the
Presentation 0£ his belabored, excessive position is
questionable.
Theseus, at least (967-970), is not
~ontvinced by Hippolytus• projection 0£ sexual misconduct
n o women.
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5 es

the cutthroat retaliation inevitable for losers in

sero-su m

competition.

In so doing, the audience is allowed

·ew such behavior as being every bit as despicable

to~ l.

as

it

is.2.77

The audience, then, doubly identifies with Jason
against Medea, because he is Greek. and male.

They are

allowed by this identification an objective, and probably

277Moline,
"Euripides,
Socrates,"
p.
53,
emphasizes the maniacal aspects of Medea s cutthroat
competitiveness, and concludes that audience identification
with her was thereby precluded: "Medea was of course worse
than queer. She was a crazed, would-be child-murderess and
regicide who had already killed her own brother, as we are
reminded at 167, and had been responsible for Pelias dying
a horrible death at the hands of his daughters, as she
admits at 483-487. She regards herself as having betrayed
her own father and his house, an estimate certain to be
shared by a conventional Greek. audience. One would not
have to be a wor(l]dly rhetorician to recognize that
ordinary Athenians in the audience would not be at all
likely to identify with her."
Moline is of course correct; cf. Richmond Lattimore,
The Poetry of Greek. Tragedy (Baltimore and Oxford: Johns
Hopkins Univ. Press, 1958), p. 108 n. 7, for Medea as •preeminent cutter-up and boiler-woman."
Moline's observation,
however, aims to disprove the view that Medea can be
considered a mouthpiece for Euripides polemic against
Socrates. But rather than merely making Medea discreditable as a mouthpiece, through Medea s "crazed" actions
Euripides illustrates the emotionally repugnant, yet
nonetheless logical consequence of zero-sum objectives.
If, in fact, the object is self-advancement, and if it is
deemed acceptable to use other people as means to that end,
Medea should be considered a consummate player. Crazed she
is,. to be sure, but crazed also is zero-sum competition,
•hi.ch is Euripides point, as Moline would doubtlessly
aer-ee.
For Euripides care in dignifying Medea early in the
: 1ay, see Easterling, "Infanticide," p. 179.
Cf. also
(l~~nar-d Knox, "Euripides the Psychologist," Omnibus 8
p . 4-), p. 26, who notes that this •exotic" Colchian
n t-i.ncess and "awesome priestess, prophet and magician" is
onetheless presented in a "painfully realistic" context.
1

1

1

1

1

1
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·te critical, perspective on Medea and the definitions

qu1
5 11e

mani£ests.

In short, the audience mirrors the Chorus

1

while the Chorus are sympathetic with Medea

perspective:

and prejudiced against Jason, the audience is sympathetic
tritll Jason and prejudiced against Medea.

Yet Medea and

Jason manifest--at least by the play s end--the same
1

definitions.
The audience must surely have some sense of this,
especially because Jason, as hero, can hardly fit the bill.
It has been a critical norm that Jason leaves something to

1>e

desired.278

Some

behavior despicable.

critics,

in

fact,

find

his

Most of these comments, however, as

Robert Palmer has argued, betray modern sensibilities
anachronistically assumed to apply to the Athenian males
sitting

in

the

audience.279

It

is

true

enough

that

Jason is opportunistic and callous in his treatment of
Bedea and the children, but, after all, so much would be
ezpected

of

him

as

a

zero-sum

competi tor.280

If

he

is

278 Arrowsmi th, "Ideas," p. 37, describes
Ku.ripides Jason as •a vulgar adventurer" and terms his
characterization by Euripides a "deflation of traditional
heroism."
Mills, Mythopoeia, pp. 60-72, sketches Jason s
decline from "true consort of Medea" to "loser."
1

1

27 9Palmer,

"Apology," pp. 50-55.
See p. 49 for
amusing overview (with references) of critics and their
ridicule of Jason.

co t

280

Burnett,

"Tragedy

of

Revenge,"

p.

15,

an

expresses

Ofntemp~ for Jason s behavior; many of her criticisms are
1

acti.cs common to zero-sum competitors.
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tO 1fint

certain 0£ the •quiet• virtues must be shunted
In regard to his desire £or sel£-advancement, then,

.

j.t lS

put

on

unlikely that many 0£ the audience would be sorely
OU

t

bY

Jason's

behavior.281

It

is

his

tenuous

hold

t he status 0£ hero, or even 0£ mere winner, however,

tbat would win £or Jason an objective distance 'from
suripides' audience.
Jason's de£iciencies as a hero in Euripides' Medea
bJlVe not gone unremarked in the critical literature.

For

while Knox, Bongie, and others have compared Medea to Ajax
or Achilles, no one compares Jason £a vorably to other Greek
heroes.

This is no mere misapplication 0£ modern sensi-

bilities, £or there is evidence that, at least by the time
of Medea,282
attack.

Jason's

stature

as

hero

was

open

to

The reasons £or this are £airly obvious; the main

one is broadcast by Medea as soon as Jason gives her a
chance to speak.
and

A£ter welcoming him with the label
accusing

him

0£

>

•

avavdpla

(465-

466), Medea spells out what she claims every Greek on the
Argo knew, that she saved Jason and hersel£ per-formed all
281 Palmer,

•Apology," passim, argues that Jason's
treatment 0£ Medea would be considered reasonable by the
audience, who, given the Periclean citizenship law 0£
1/450, would sympathize with Jason's desire £or
1
nel~timate male heirs. Conacher, Euripidean Drama, p. 190
• O, counters that, had Euripides intended us to
:7•Pathize with Jason, he would not have •1et him cut such
sorry £igure in comparison with Medea in this scene."

::le
•tz

282

For bibliography on an earlier, healer and
ard Jason, see Hills, Hythopoeia, p. 60 nn. 4-6.
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esp lo

itS necessary for securing the fleece and trying to

·s
hl.

a1n
1
JaSO n

father's

throne

(476-487).283

And

although

denigrates Medea's role in his success, he feels no

qualJDS aboU t crediting Aphrodite as the "savior" of his
enterprise

(527-528).

These two claims together spell out the primary
obstacle to Jason's heroism.

He was, it seems, incapable

of great deeds without the help of others, most notably
women and

go dd esses. 284

Had

Euripides

wanted

to

suppress what was, even in his day, Jason's questionable
hold on heroic status, he would have omitted Medea's
belittling recollection of Jason's past impotence.

But

i.DStead, Euripides begins and ends his play with reminders
of the Argona u tic ex:pedi tion,285

and

makes

use of what

Roses Hadas has called, in his article by that name, "The
Tradition of a Feeble Jason," to increase distance between

283Mills, Mythopoeia, pp. 64-65, sees in the
nautical imagery the suggestion that Medea is a new
Ar1onaut, whose successes underscore Jason•s 'failures;
Jason, not even capable of navigating successfully through
the storm of his wi£e's verbiage (525), is henpecked.
284 Mills,

Mythopoeia, p. 60, 'further remarks that,
:~ the voyage to Colchis, other Argonauts outshone Jason by
•heir exploits.
Cf. Burnett, •Tragedy 0£ Revenge,• p. 16,
th 0 notes that "Jason had never been a hero according to
co e rute, for he had not set off alone (or with a single
IDPanion) but rather in a vast company
"
285
tha
Burnett, "Tragedy 0£ Revenge," p. 16, remarks
i-a· t "[t]he myth 0£ the Argonauts hangs like a great
lnted scene behind this play . . . ."
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Jason

and

au t
j.11

t

the

audience.286

besides being -feeble in past exploits, Jason has,

ne p1ay's present and -future time, another strike

against him.

He is once again no hero, no victor; even

..,orse, he is -finally a

total loser.

It is obvious to all

J>Ut Jason himsel-f that he is worsted by Medea in their
e9/erY encounter.

His attempts at sophistic argumentation

are callow and pathetic.
turned by the end:

His every a vowed aim is over-

he has no security, no position, no

children past and no hope o-f them in the -future.287
He is the very picture o-f impotence as he rages at the
suspended, out o-f reach Medea.

Medea's prediction o-f his

ignoble death--beaned on the head by a rotting hunk o-f the
Argo--is the death knell not just -for Jason, but -for his
heroic

stat us

as

well

(1386-1388).288

The

audience,

286Koses Hadas, "The Tradition o-f a Feeble Jason,"
CP 31 (1936), pp. 166-168.
Hadas argues -from the evidence
of an early -firth century B. C. crater, which shows Jason
puny and outclassed by the dragon, Athena, and another
Argonaut, and -from the limited evidence on the Haupactia
that Apollonius Rhodius' aµ..ftxavos Jason is not the
first helpless Jason, but instead a tradition (perhaps
comic) -from the -firth century. For Jason's extensive
reliance on Medea, see von Fritz, Tragodie, p. 332.
287 Burnett, "Tragedy o-f Revenge," p. 16, sees the
destruction o-f Jason's line, a detail o-f his story common
to au variations, as proo-f o-f his -failure to prove his
PUrity and thereby his right to rule. For such destruction
~s the right-ful punishment o-f perjurers, see Rickert,
Akrasia," pp. 106-113.

v·

288 Paul

Diel, Symbolism in Greek Mythology, trans.
,:ncent Stuart, Micheline Stuart, and Rebecca Folkman
OUlder and London:
Shambala Publications, Inc., 1980),
P. 155, interprets Jason's ignoble death as punishment -for
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•Jlose

sympathy £or Jason undoubtedly increases as their

al>ilitY
picture

to identi£y with Medea decreases, is le£t with the
o£ an aging never-was hero, as decrepit as his

•oldering ship.

1£, in £act, the Athenians 0£ Euripides'

tillle were as entrenched in zero-sum realities as we have
suggested, they would have had little sympathy £or such a
thoroughgoing loser.
811100

Plans and intentions do not count

g the competitive, a£ter all; only results are used to

•easure the

man.289

And

by

this

measure,

Jason

comes

up short.
so, too, does Creon, who espouses competitive virtues,
but lacks the detachment to remain aloof £rom the plight 0£
his competitor, Medea.

Creon there£ore also loses in his

contest, and dies in the offing.

But Creon has an even

stronger mark against him, at least in the eyes 0£ the
Athenian audience 0£ 431 B. C.

For Creon is a Corinthian,

and the Athenians had in the preceding year engaged in

his Spiritual paucity, his £ailure in the struggle against
banalization.
Similarly, Blaiklock, "Nautical Imagery,"
pp, 233-234, sees "decadence,.. as one 0£ Medea s themes, and
:oaunents that "[t]he £alling beam which did [Jason) to
c e:th but translated into physical tragedy the spiritual
aa astrophe 0£ a lost soul." C£. p. 236, where the Argo,
ccording to Blaiklock, "suggests the ship 0£ [Jason's]
Pe rson."
1

289Adk·ins, Merit,
.
p. 35, speaking 0£ the warrior
code .
in
the
Homeric
world:
"Success is so imperative that
Ollly
results have any value: intentions are unimportant."
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nostili ties

u.ite l Y
aroU

with

Corinth.290

It

is

therefore

tnat Euripides would have had to work. hard to avoid

sing bis audience's contempt for any Corinthian charTbe

acter.

Bf biS

poet

expends

no

such

effort

on

Creon.291

silence he leaves his audience to their prejudice

and res en tmen t.
Simon, then, is right:

Euripides indeed leaves us,

and bis original audience even more so, "· . . with no one
to admire, no one with whom we can make a comfortable and
sustained identification, let alone a
cation."

heroic identifi-

Like Socrates who claims the logos does the

refuting and thereby allows an objective distance from
which to consider the disputed definitions, Euripides, too,
prevents his audience from totally identifying with the
definitions manifested on stage by his characters.

For

290ohlander, Suspense, p. 64.
See Page, Medea,
p. xxv, for strained relations between Athens and Corinth
as evidenced by the rumor reported by Parmenisk.os that the
Corinthians had bribed Euripides to shift the murder of the
Children from their ancestors to Medea. McDermott,
Incarnation, pp. 98-99, adds that Creon •s more tyrannical
•ode upon his entrance would have contributed to his being
stereotyped as an unsympathetic Corinthian.
291 r

do

not,

however,

agree

with

Burnett, "Tragedy

~ Revenge," pp. 15 n. 27, 18 n. 40, and 19, who finds
hieon culpable and therefore somehow deserving of his
J deous fate.

Burnett involves the Corinthian king in

c::on·~ cri_me of not respecting oaths and incriminates

.
Wit on in his daughter's greed and vanity. Creon cannot win
•h h Bur~et t; she criticizes first his exiling Medea before
Re~l co_mmi ts any crime because it "viola te[s] ordinary
and enic ~ractice• (p. 15 n. 27), and then his being •weak.
be• (a traitor to his own definition of what a ruler should
p, 18 n. 40) when he grants Medea a reprieve.
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.

reason he has drawn Medea, Jason, and Creon so that no

tlJ.lS

eolDP

etitive Athenian could consistently empathize with any

of them.
.

IJ.lS

In this, he leaves space in which he can practice

maieu tic art, in which he, lik.e Socrates, can subtly

suggest the truth through analogy.

Part Four:

The Art o:f Midwi:fery:

Euripides• Maieu tic Analogies

111 tro

ductorY Remarks
In chapter One it was acknowledged that Socrates, as

•J."d,,i.·fe' more

o£ten than not is unable to bring the truth

to birth 'from his interlocutors, who :flee to avoid another
round o£ elenchos.
~nchos,

The reason interlocutors want to avoid

it was argued, stems :from Socrates• habitual use

of analogies to technai.

These analogies subtly impose

upon the proposed de:finitions a consistency and logic
whereby the end, an acknowledged benefit, in-forms the
aeans, and not vice versa.

The subtle imposition is made

overt when Socrates, near the end o:f elenchos,
1yllogistically applies

de:fini tions

conceded

within

analogies to the particular actions put :forth as
definitions

by

interlocutors.

Interlocutors

:flee,

then,

when they realize that analogies to cra:fts render the
particular actions proposed inde£ensible as de:fini tions
because those actions do not result in bene:fit.

Truth is

not born because interlocutors are too emotionally invested

•

in their belie:fs to allow them to be reformulated by
analogies to cra:fts.

Such re:formulation would render their

beliefs no longer recognizable as their own, and, as i:f
that were not enough, interlocutors would then be le:ft with
lhe messy job of adjusting all actions informed by those

beliefs.
506
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'l'lle elenchos is not, then, brought in early dialogues
·ts true termini, the birth 0£ truth and the moral
to 1
ilDProvement concomitant with that birth. Instead,

ana l

ogies are le-ft, suspended alongside the £ail ure to

acnieve de£inition, to work. suggestion on the ultimate
interlocutor,

Plato s
1

reader-auditor.

These

analogies

encourage the reader-auditor to "fiddle with the premises"
in an attempt to arrive at de£initions that will withstand
!tl_enchos, i.e.,
crafts.

that

will

not

collapse

under

analogies

to

In the end, the truth is only a £a int suggestion,

an unsolved riddle with intriguing clues.
Euripides, in constructing his elenchos in Medea,
similarly draws analogies to crafts, which suggest to his
interlocutors in the play (the Chorus) and to the ultimate
interlocutors in the audience the truth that remains unborn
at the

end

of

the

play.292

By

applying

the

analogy

0£

the craft of music to the definition 0£ arete, Euripides
suggests that the arete of the zero-sum competitor does not
2 92w. G. Arnott, "Red Herrings and Other Baits:
A
Study in Euripidean Techniques," MPL 3 (1978), pp. 14-16,
lives examples (but not from Medea) 0£ Euripides technique
of Using "linked images . . . to deepen our understanding
of complex situations by making us see the implications 0£
startling relationships and unexpected patterns 0£ events."
:;nott th~n. (pp. 16 ff.) goes on to illustrate what he
rms Eur1p1des use 0£ •symbolic analogy,• whereby the
P~et presents " . . . . at a relatively early stage of a
p ay, wen before the details of the climax can be
:~~dieted, a mythical parallel to one 0£ the events that
1
l belong to that climax."
h
Both techniques are related to the one argued for
b ere:
use of analogies to cra£t to suggest a solution
eyond the effected reversal.
1

1
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... ieV'e its proper end, but instead produces music's
aC,µ

itnesis, dissonance and disharmony.2.93 Then, by
an t
applying the analogy 0£ the era £t 0£ medicine both to the
de f

. ni tion 0£ arete and to sophia, Euripides suggests that

J.

"'J.. a

~·
111

informed by competitive arete, does not achieve

edicine's proper end, health.

Such a sophia is in £act

destructive, whereas its potential is curative.
Euripides' elenchos, like that 0£ Socrates, is not
content to stop at suggestion that comes £rom subtle
tmposi tion 0£ the analogies.

Instead, as will be argued

below (Part Five), Euripides drives home the logic 0£ the
benefit 0£ health derived £rom the analogy to medicine by
syllogistically bringing it to bear in the realm 0£ the
definition 0£ competitive eros.

Here, the stark contrast

between life-bestowing benefits that are readily identified
with eros, procreation and flourishing, and the produce 0£
eros in zero-sum competition, destruction and death, jolts
the audience out 0£ complacent acceptance 0£ zero-sum
definitions.

It leaves them with a windegg, impels them

toward the hard work 0£ rede£inition, and, ultimately,
toward bringing truth to birth.
!!'ete and Music:

The Virtue 0£ Harmony

Music in Medea is -first heard, and only later de-fined
293 Pace

Kusurillo, "Reconsideration," p. 73, who
~~~Siders Euripides' treatment 0£ music a "minor moti£"; a
•Risc~urse on the origins 0£ music" is something -from which
Uri.pides cannot -forbear."
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era-ft with analogous bearing on arete.

as a

she

e..,er

tne

(µ.e~ vel,

"sings"

Be-fore Medea

150)

offstage,

Chorus remark shortly after their entrance.

sne

as

And indeed

is "singing," for the Chorus• use of this verb is no
metaphor. 294

IDere

responsively

to

Medea--and

her--uses

the

lyric

Hurse

who

anapests

sings

(96-130, 139-147),

a digni£ied meter appropriate to the lamentation she
herself

describes

,
""
(odupµ.wv,

singing

as

112).295

But hers is a disconcerting song, and not because of the
cries

of

,,

and

lW

,

""

regularly

These

alal.

punctuate tragic lament and would not sound as unnatural to
the Greeks

as

they

do

to

us.296

Medea •s

song

is

disconcerting because it careens from mournful lament to
explosions of violence.

As such, it is the antithesis 0£

one of music's -fundamentals, the melding 0£ two or more
elements in to harmonious union.
Medea's song is disturbing to both the Hurse and the
Chorus.

It is too violent and estranging to quali£y as the

lament suggested by the anapestic meter.
expresses

suicidal

desires

(96-97,

That Medea twice

144-147)

is

not

294 Pace Page, Medea, p. 81 at line 150, who
ack
T nowledges
that "such a use 0£ the verb is very rare in
ragedy."
295

Simon
Tragic Drama, p. 7 4, sees Medea •s
'
ns, curses, and shrieks" as evidence 0£ the Nurse's
allegation (190-200) that traditional song is not able to
cure Pain.

•moa

296

Elliott

• Medea,

p .

75

at

line

96.
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essarilY strange in a lament, but that she hates her

11eC

cnildren, curses them along with their -father, and wishes
destruction upon the whole house (111-114) is.

The Nurse

iS t:nerefore understandably concerned £or the children's
safetY (89-94,

98-105),

£or

Medea's lament

tnan sorrow:

it reveals deep alienation.

reveals

more

Medea •s song

signals dissolution 0£ all social ties, or so the Nurse
cautions the solicitous Chorus:

there is no home (140) £or

them to be -friends to, and besides, Medea will not respond
to comforting words 0£ -friends (143-144).

The Nurse

attributes Medea's alienation to "the moods 0£ tyrants"
(119-130),

whose

propensity

£or excelling

as

opposed

to

living "on equal terms" is the hallmark 0£ the play•s most
highly approved individual--the zero-sum competitor (see
above,

Part

One).

Given the disturbing content 0£ Medea's song, it is no
wonder that the Nurse takes time to ponder the use to which
song should be put:
You would not err calling men of times ago bumbling
and not smart in any way, those men who devised songs
Cuµ.vous)--the
delight£ul
(Tep11'vas)
sounds
of li£e--£or use at £easts and banquets and at
dinners; but no one -found a way, with music and with
~tr~ins
0£ many strings (µ.ouo!I
Kat 11'0>..uxopooLs
ltldaLs),
to
stop
hate£ul
pains
(oTuylous
· · . >..uvas), £rom which death and terrible/clever
chance trip up (ocpaU.ouol) houses.
And yet it
would be gain £or mortals to cure these things with
song (µ.o>..val'oL); but where there are luxurious
feasts, why strain the voice in vain? For the readyto-hand £ul£illment 0£ the £east in itsel£ holds
delight
(TEP1'l v)
£or
mortals.
(190-203).

So111e

of the Nurse's remarks must await comment; here we

511

the preponderance of musical terms, signalling the

11ote
111 tro

duction of the musical analogy in full force.

•urse

The

suggests that song be used to stop hateful

LotJS)

(a1'V Y

pains

that

lead

to

the

overthrow

of

She describes such an "overthrow" in competitive
terins:

houses are "tripped up" as are wrestlers by a

throw.
Indeed, in the house of Medea antagonism reigns over
cooperation.

(cr1"uyel'

children
nature

Medea, according to the Hurse, "hates" her

is

1l'aLda5,

"hateful"

very

Medea's

36).

'

(crTuyepav

103);

cpU<HV,

the Hurse has, in addition, heard Medea call herself
•nateful"

(crTuyepas.

•nateful"

(fll01"clV

'
µaTpos.,
I

o1"uyepav,

113)

147).

and
All

her

life

this

hate

results from Medea's strife with Jason and the assault on
her status as successful competitor.
The Hurse proposes that song could, given the chance,
cure such

hatred,

strife,

and

antagonism,297

all

of

29 7 Easterling, "Infanticide,• p. 191, notes that
•[o]ne of the play's recurrent themes is that of song and
the Muses . . . • and lists the Nurse's speech, along with
the first stasimon and the Ode to Athens, as expressions of
this theme. Easterling offers that these passages "draw
attention to the ambivalence of human intelligence and
creativity, which is potentially a so,urce of beauty and
harmony, but liable, too, to break out in destructive
Violence under the influence of passion.•
To Easterling,
Medea's heroic seli:-image is used by Euripides to increase
the sense oi: tragedy, and is not itseli:, as I propose, the
Ultimate source of the violence.
Cunningham, "Medea," pp. 153-154, argues that the
Hurse's speech is meant by Euripides to suggest •a mode oi:
analysis• of the play; Medea's perpetuation of the strife
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. h are absent :from the situations in which the Hurse

1'hlC

finds so

ng unnecessary, "at :feasts and banquets and at

dinners. 11

reP as

ts

This is because the sharing o:f elaborate
as

•

Finley

explains,

itself

promotes

solidarity:

Through the sharing o:f :food--in substantial
quantities, it should be noted, not just symbolically
--a bond was instituted, or renewed, in ceremonial
fashion, tying men and gods, the living and the dead,
into an ordered universe o:f existence. It was as i£
the constant repetition o:f the :feast were somehow
necessary :for the preservation o:f the group, whether
on the oikos level or on the larger scale o:f the
class, and also :for the establishment o:f peaceful
relations across lines, with strangers and guest£ r i ends. 298
But Medea, :far :from sharing :food with others, is alone and
Her dissonantly violent lament

•ues without eating" (24).

is the antithesis o:f the Nurse's definition o:f song, the

•delightful"

(Tepvvas.,

194)

sounds

o:f

Song's

li:fe.

delightfulness explains, according to the Hurse, why it is
extraneous at the :feast, :for the :feast in itself holds
•delight"
Song as sung in Medea, the alienating song o:f the
zero-sum competitor, will be shown to contain its own
twisted "delight."

At 1135, Medea informs the Messenger

that i f he reports that Creon and his daughter died
horribly,

"you

Tooov

will

delight

me

twice
c

"'
av

as

....

-riµ.a s.).

much"

Medea

likewise

llUsic should end marks her as excessive and therefore
unsympathetic.
298

Finley,

World

o:f

Odysseus,

pp.

125-126.
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. es that she has, by killing her children, th warted

j.lllag1n
Jason

•s chance "to live a

delight£ul li£e, laughing at me"
>

'
(fe;p1fVOV

,...

>

eyyeAwv

f)LOTOV

,

€JJ.OL,

These are the perverse delights £rom the song 0£

!355).

strife:

,,ne n

c5LCsl;€LV

joy taken at the su££ering 0£ others, especially

that su££ering has put the other into the one-down

positiOD one sought to escape.

It is no coincidence, then, that, just as Medea "sang"
at the play's beginning her song 0£ pain, so, near the
play's end, another voice li£ts a

similar song.

The death

scene 0£ Creon's daughter is heralded by a servant who
•sang

responsively
>

a

great

wail

0£

grie£"

,

,...

oAoAUY'l'JS.

KWKUTOV,

>

,

(a VTLJJ.OA ll'OV

1176-1177).

This horri£ying scene is the second chorus 0£ competition's

discordant song, the answering round to Medea's opening
lament.
The Chorus, however, even a£ter hearing Medea's
disturbing lament and the Nurse's opinion that song be used

to cure, themselves choose to sing the stri-fe-ridden song
of the zero-sum competitor and express their initial

impression 0£ song's £unction:
superiority.299

The

it is to be used to attain

Corinthian

women's

enthusiasm

£or

299
im
Whether the songs upon which the women hope to
ar-Prove are epic songs, as Boedeker, "Medea," p. 108 n. 53,
Ar-~~~s, or lyric, speci£ically the misogynistic iambs 0£
(foll l.l~chus, Hipponax, and Semonides, as argues Page
ilap owi.ng Verrall), Medea, p. 104 at line 423, is less
Of ~r~ant than that the women do not question the validity
si.ng song to bene£it the individual, i.e., to get and
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colDPetition and their "us vs. them" posture in the first
stroP

:ne-antistrophe pair 0£ the £irst stasimon (410-430)

already been discussed. Since these women are the
118.,e
's primary singers, the beginning 0£ their £irst formal
plaf
· important in setting song's definition. What they
song is
suggest is contrary to the Nurse's opinion:

song's proper

subject-matter is competition; furthermore, since control
of song is the mark 0£ superiors, they, now that they have
the opportunity, are determined to use song to their
advantage:
honor will come to the £emale race; no longer
will
an
ill-sounding
(duaKe>.aoos)
reputation
hold us.
The
muses {µ.ouoaL) of ancient singers
>
,...
c
,...
(aoLdwv)
will
cease
to
hymn
(uµ.vEuoaL)
my £ai thlessness.
For Phoebus, lord 0£ songs
(µE>.ewv), did not bestow on our mind inspired
lyre-song
(>.upas
aoLdav);
otherwise
I
>
,
would have sung in response a song {av-rax'f'lo>
J\
Cl
av uµ.vov) to the race 0£ men.
The long stretch
of time has much to say about our part and the part 0£
men. ( 421-430).
Again, the preponderance 0£ musical terms is remarkable.

The Chorus• complaint is that they, as women, had in

the past no access to song, and, therefore, men were able
Wl.th impunity to destroy their reputation.

have turned:

The tables

women now are the singers and intend to

return tit £or tat to men.

The "ill-sounding" reputation

that once applied to women will now sound discordant in
songs about men.

They do not £or a moment entertain using

keep
su
Power, rather than using it, as the Hurse has
ggested, to bond opposing £actions.

515
5ong

to remedy the woes 0£ competition, as the Hurse has so

recen

UY suggested.

The women's use 0£ song will continue

competition and stri£e.

tbe

The play's next mention 0£ song £inds it again in the
colll P

eti ti ve arena.

This time it is Jason who, in describ-

illg to Medea his competitor's pre£erence £or reputation

above all else, unwittingly recalls the song analogy and,
111

tbe process, like the Chorus, rejects the Nurse's notion

ttiat song be harmonizing:
. . . besides, all the Greeks perceive you as smart
and you have a reputation {do~av); but i£ you
lived on the outermost boundaries 0£ the earth, there
would be no word {.>.oyos) 0£ you.
As £ar as I'm
concerned, I'd rather have no gold in my house or no
song
to sing £iner than Orpheus (>op.E:ws Ka.>..>.LOv
C
.....
uµ.V'l"IO"al µ.e:.>.os) than have no remark.able success
{E11'lO"'l')IJ.OS
'I')
"t'UX'I')).
(539-544).
I

)

C

I

I

Jason clearly vies £or advancing his reputation £or success
above all else, and, in this, de-fines his priori ties as
competitive rather than cooperative.

Particularly telling

in this regard is Jason's rejection 0£ Orpheus' song, £or
by this

rejection

he

chooses

stri£e

over

concord:300

The cosmogonies sung by Orpheus, by rehearsing the
origin 0£ the universe, promote order. When Orpheus
sails with Jason and the Argonauts, £or example, the
very 'first song he sings £or the heroes, to calm the
stri£e arisen among them, is a cosmogony. This song
has a cosmic signi£icance £or the cosmic journey 0£
the Argonauts. In addition, it demonstrates one 0£
the commonest -features 0£ cosmogonies: they are
intimately related to the restoration 0£ order in
300g·imon,

Tragic Drama, p. 73 n. 8, sees Orpheus
ere1y
as
singer
and, as such, the instrument 0£ £ame
J a son
in t
so desires.' He notes that Jason disparages this
s rument, but o££ers no explanation.
111

516
situations

0£

st.ri£e.301

. g that Jason chooses an anti-Orphic st.ri£e does not

sa11n

that he chooses chaos and anarchy, but instead st.ri£e
oaean
tnat fuels competition.
Orpheus, according to Freiert,
·ects "logos

reJ

-

'speech,

argument.,

reason,'

the

discursive

system of the polis"--the very logos t.ha t. Jason cit.es as an
advantage Medea has gained £rom her tenure in Greece (541,
In short,

quoted above).

Orpheus st.ands £or the removal 0£ argument. and st.ri£e
in the secular sphere . . . . [He] appears as
nonheroic, alien to the warrior-hunt.er et.hie, and
alien to the poetry 0£ praise (k.leos) and blame t.ha t.
legitimizes heroic behavior in the archaic Greek.
societ.y.302
'l'he Orphic song that. Jason rejects, then, is the sort 0£
tune that would appeal to the non-competitive Hurse, who
praises living "on equal terms" with others, and wants to
•grow old

in

not.-grea t.ness"

(122-123).

This

sort

0£

song,

however, has little appeal to anyone else in the play,
certainly not to Medea, the Chorus, or Jason.
It does, however, make its appearance in the third

stasimon, the Ode to At.hens (824-865).

Here, a£t.er having

heard Medea and Aegeus £ollow up his "overture" 0£ wishing
his friend well--"Medea, may you be well!

For no one knows

a finer overture than this £or addressing 'friends"
301 William K. Freiert., "Orpheus:
A Fugue on the
POlis" ·
II.
.' in Myth and the Polis, ed. Dora C. Pozzi and John
~lckersham (Ithaca and London: Cornell Univ. Press,
199
l, herea£ter Freiert, "Fugue"), p. 33.
302 Freiert.,

"Fugue,"

pp.

3'7-39.
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KaH.lOV

663-664)--W i th

ession a£ter expression 0£ solicitous concern £or each

otne r ,

the women 0£ the Chorus can now sing imaginatively

of narmony.

As they begin to sing, they describe Athens as the
place where "the nine holy Pierian Muses produced golden
c

•

(ayvas.

aarmonY"

i;avaav
83 4).303
15 not

The

Mouoas.

cApµoviav

connection

traditiona1304

metaphorical.

>
'
EVVEQ

cpUTEUOal

between

and

the

thus

must

830-

Muses

and

Harmonia

be read as

This concocted connection £its in well with

the spirit 0£ the £irst hal£ 0£ the ode, where nearly
everyone is connected, either genealogically or through
shared action, with everyone else.
has been noted above (Part Two).

The cooperative milieu

Here we can add that the

303 The

line could, 0£ course, be translated,
•golden Harmony produced the nine holy Pierian Muses,"
pace Page, Medea, pp. 132-133 at line 831, who terms
this •a meaningless and absurd idea• but explains that
•cA P~OVLa
'
here denotes the Union 0£ the nine Muses:
Where these are together, they create a tenth essence, the
Child 0£ none alone but 0£ all together." As metaphor or
a~legory, however, I £ind it impossible to explain the
difference between the two translations. Though I lean
toward Page•s pre£erence, two considerations call it into
question:
1) the verb, cpuTeuw, is used elsewhere in
~he Play to mean "beget, give birth to• (878, 1078). It
~s h.ard, at least £or me, to imagine nine Muses laboring
Ho give birth to one Harmony.
2) Euripides mentions
s:r~onia's "true• mother, Aphrodite, two lines later in the
btsunon, which would seem an awkward intrusion upon the
rthing Muses.
304see

Page,

Medea,

p.

133

at

line

831.
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eoo P

era tion seems natural, given the implied and expressed

ealogical connections between participants:305 in
gen
lines 8 24-825, inhabitants 0£ Athens are "the descendants
arechtheus"
of .,.

and "children 0£ the blessed gods," i.e.,

duallY descended, as Elliott explains, £rom Erectheus and

the river god Cephisus, Erectheus• relative, who is
aten tioned

in

line

835.306

In

830-833,

lines

the

Hus es

are said, contrary to received tradition, to have been the
parents of Harmonia, whose traditional mother, Aphrodite,
iS mentioned in line 836.

Finally, the Erotes 0£ line 844

recall Eros, who is Aphrodite's traditional cohort, or who
is sometimes even considered her son.
In short, this song depicts "harmony" in the nontechnical sense 0£ the word.
Comotti, harmonia's
connection,

According to Giovanni

original meanings

adaptation•

(c£.

Hom.

Od.

'joint,

are "·
5.248),

and

therefore

'pact, convention,•• out 0£ which its musical senses
trew.307

What

the

Chorus

present

in

the

first

strophe-

3 05simon, Tragic Drama, pp. 84 and 100, following
Pucci, Violence, pp. 122-123, senses a paucity 0£ men and
stress on chastity and parthogenesis in the ode. Simon
suggests that this song encodes a wish by the Corinthian
•omen £or separation £rom men.
306 Elliott,
C

307 Giovanni

Medea,

p.

Comot ti,

89
Music

at
in

lines

825-856.

Greek.

and

Roman

~·
trans. Rosaria V. Hunson (Baltimore and London:
0

If.

ns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1989), p.

24.

By contrast,

s~s~riUo,. "Reconsideration,• p. 60, sees harmony in this
reasi.mon in terms 0£ domination and control:
" . . . it
th.Presents the enlightened and sophisticated discipline 0£
e Passions, the avoidance 0£ extremes, and the elevation

519
an t

istrophe pair as they describe the cooperation and

~nection

cov

dsitants

between the mythological inhabitants and
0£

Athens,

is

a

song

0£

harmony,308

the

antithesis to the songs 0£ stri£e sung by Medea o££stage,
tnet11se1ves in the £irst stasimon, and pre£erred by Jason in
eJ·ection 0£ Orpheus.
biS r
When, then, in the second strophe-antistrophe pair,
tbeY imagine Medea the child-killer, the mani£estation 0£
the song 0£ competitive stri£e, rejected £rom this
nar 111 onious environment at Athens, they are, as interiocutors in elenchos, £or the £irst time sensing how the
music-analogy imposes its logic upon the particular
definition 0£ arete they have supported, Medea s ethic 0£
1

competition.

The two modes 0£ song do not £it; there can

be no joint, no connection, no harmony born £rom the second

of these musics; the only hope is that Medea s song 0£
1

strife will change its tune.

The Chorus propose that Medea

Will be unable to engage in the violent slaughter 0£ her
of What is best in man to the highest degree 0£
excellence."
It is obvious that, to Musurillo, the Erotes
here are not equal partners, but untrustworthy elements
that must be brought under control.
. 308 see Synnj!Sve des Bouvrie, Women in Greek. Tragedy
0
~ slo. Norwegian Univ. Press, 1990; herea£ter des Bouvrie,
~), p. 232, who suggests that the Harmonia 0£ this ode
Bevokes the Harmonia 0£ well-ordered society."
C£. Wendell
(Serry, "The Specialization 0£ Poetry," in Standing By Words
an Francisco:
Horth Point Press, 1983). p. 17:
"Song
is a_ £orce opposed to specialty and to isolation.
It
•o ~ testimony 0£ the singer s inescapable relation to the
rd, to the human community, and also to tradition."

i.a' ·

1

520

(S61) that her strife-ridden song forewarned.

sons

'#hen, however, the Chorus are forced to realize that
for a change in Medea's "song" is gone, they begin to

nope

cna ng

e their own tune in response to a growing sense of

·r own ignorance.
the l.
40

Instead of singing brashly of putting

,.. 0 their competitors, as they did in the first stasimon,

the Chorus• song is now one of humility and acknowledged
perplexity.

And this is the first and only time they lay

claim, haltingly, to having a

muse:

r have many times by now gone through rather subtle
C

I

matters and I
have come to conflict (aµ.LH.as)
greater than the female race is required
to seek.
out.
>I
.....
For in fact we too have a muse (EOTlV µ.ouoa
'
c .....
Kal 'fllllV), which has intercourse
with us for
n
.....
the sake
0£
wisdom
("I
vpoooµL.>.El
oocplas
eV€K€V)--not with all of us, to be sure.
But
among the many you would perhaps find a few; the race
of women is not entirely without muse (ouK
all'oµouoov).
And I say that those of mortals who have no
experience at all in and have not born children, they
surpass in good fortune
(11'pocpep£l v
ELS
euTuxLav)
those
who
have
begot ten.
(1081-1093).
I

)

I

I

)

,

I

The Chorus• new humility, uncertainty, and perplexity as
indicative of aporia has been discussed above (Part Two);
the concern here is with the role of song in contest.
Oddly enough, just as the women of the Chorus acknowledge
their aporia, they redefine both con£lict and song.

These

are to be put to the service of philosophic musings which
lead to sophia.

The conflict they describe is an internal

one, not a conflict designed to put them on top of the heap
of other contenders; the muse they claim is one who, like
SOJJle

lover, leads them after intercourse through labor to

521

.a

~

Suddenly, the analogy to

nas work.ed its suggestion, and a reorientation 0£

d

5orh.
con f

(see below, Part Five).

lict and sophia has tak.en place.

Ho longer is sophia

tbe means to success in con£lict; success in con£lict is
defined as arriving at the bene£icial terminus:

sophia.

In this sense the women can rightly claim to being
•Jllused."

The competitive stri£e 0£ the old de£inition 0£

arete has momentarily been laid aside.

=--

In their new£ound

nesitation and uncertainty the women sing a uniquely noncompetitive song.

Their song, lik.e the song 0£ Medea at

the play•s beginning, is again in anapests; but this song,
instead 0£ veering wildly between lament and threats 0£
yiolence, instead

0£

signalling

dissolution

o:f

all

social

ties, recognizes that the pain brought on onesel£ by loss
of those connections is inescapable.
The women o:f the Chorus, instead 0£ proposing as had
Medea in her opening song, a wish £or the destruction 0£
one's own children, outline in detail the pain that comes
•hen one must endure such a loss.

Theirs is a proper

lament, one that in its subject matter de-flates the will£ul
Violence in Medea's stri:fe-ridden lament.

For what the

•omen in their :final lines (1097-1115) describe as the
resu1 t of their "musings"--their awareness o:f the
•olici tous concern £or those one loves the most, and the
Pain of loss that comes :from death 0£ those loved ones--is
•hat unites all mortals and there-fore de-fies the

522

colllPeti ti ve creed:
µ111en t.
9

1ar's

true lament springing from loss.

ironically, unites even Jason and Medea at the
end.309

'l'hiS song, then, counteracts the pseudo-lament o:f
t1edea's song of stri:fe at the play•s beginning.
it.

By singing

the Chorus betray their dawning recognition that grie:f

and mortality connect all humans, encourage cooperation and
the •quiet" virtues, and discourage competition and sel:fadvancement at the expense o:f others.

The Chorus, like the

audience, have come under the spell o:f the :first o:f
Buripides• analogies.

-

The analogy to song has in:formed

arete; virtue lies in harmony, cooperation.
not all:

But that is

this virtue o:f harmony is also, as the Nurse more

than once suggests, curative.

Arete and Medicine:

The Virtue o:f Harmony as Remedy

Euripides wastes no time establishing in Medea an
ana~gy

between the craft o:f medicine and the de:finition o:f

commendable behavior.

He again :first uses the Nurse to

establish the analogy verbally, while Medea is again the
one •ho gives the analogy its physical mani:festation.

In

this analogy, however, the Nurse leads the way and Medea

alth 309so B oedeker, "Medea," pp. 108-109, who,
J
ough she can hear the Chorus• la men ts at 976-1001, and
t 0ason•s lament at the play's close, does not, however, seem
t hear Medea's as the play begins. Boedeker argues that
hese ct .
fx-om
. osing 0P'11VOl signal the change 0£ story.
epic to tragic, ef:fected by Medea hersel:f.

523

oaanifests the analogy shortly after the Hurse has
established

it.

In lines 11-16 of her prologue, the Hurse contrasts
tne

time be-fore stri£e erupted between Jason and Medea with

tbe present.

She describes two types 0£ Medea's behavior,

cooperative and conflictive, and classifies the first of
tnese as healthy, the second as diseased.

Her long

negative wish against the chain of events leading to the
present ends as

follows:

. nor would she [i.e., Medea] be living in this
Corinthian land
with
her husband and children,
c
,
gratifying
(avoavouoa)
the
citizens
to
whose
land she came in exile, and herself agreeing with/in
harmony with (i;uµ.cpepouo£a1) Jason in all things;
which very thing is the greatest preservation
(oWT'l1Pta), when a wife does not stand apart
from/disagree with (6Lxo0Ta1~) her husband.
But
now all things are enmity. and the dearest things are
,...
>
"'
diseased
(vuv
cP
ex9pa
iravTa,
ic.aL
vooe:L
Ta
cpt.>.Ta1a).
I

"'

The contrast, between a gratifying, agreeable/harmonious
Medea, who does not create stasis, and one who does, in
whose world enmity presides, is for the Hurse analogous to
the contrast

between

health

and

disease.310

The

former, the cooperative state, is "the greatest
Preservation, "311

while

the

latter,

the

conflictive

state, results in "disease" of the dearest things.

As we

3101

do not agree with Newton, "Passionate
Olson," p. 13, who diagnoses the disease as Medea's
~erverted love, and thus, the poison as that which
ecrea tes this "diseased love" in her victims.

P .

311 By
the
second
century
A.
D.,
co111.es to mean "bodily heal th"; see LSJ9.

,

O"WT'r)pLa
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will see, the Rurse s description of this disease of "the
1

dearest things• will later be picked up and made
horrifyingly 1iteral by Medea.
It is no wonder, then, that this Hurse opines that
song

should

be

used

to

•cure•

>

......

(aKEla0al)

those

things which •trip up houses• like thrown wrestlers (197199).

For the Hurse, health results from the virtue 0£

harmony, not in competition and strife.

Ro "cure• is

needed at elaborate repasts, where the bonds between £ellow
humans are symbolically renewed.

Row, however, in the

play s present, where "the dearest things are diseased• and
1

the unity 0£ the oikos has dissolved (140), a cure, a new
song,

is

needed.312

For

not

only

does

Medea

"sing•

a

lament discordant because 0£ its outbursts 0£ hatred
against the closest ties of £amily, she also, as described
by

the

Hurse,

lies

ill

abed.313

The motif of the description and appearance of an
"ill• protagonist is not peculiar to Medea.

Hippolytus and

Orestes open similarly; according to F. D. Harvey, the
motif may have been so familiarly Euripidean as to have
occasioned Aristophanic parodies of it in Wasps, Peace, and
Birds.

In Medea, Harvey notes, "Euripides does not use the

312pucci, Violence, pp. 45-58, detects Euripides
voice behind the Burse~. talking about the potential
curative powers of his own song. Cf. Wolff, "Euripides,"
p. 240.
313For Medea in the prologue described as a
sacrificial victim, see Oblander, Suspense, p. 40.

1
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VOCJOS.

or

I

cognate
or
the
ol>"ious
s bU t there is no need for him to do so; they would
words

µavLa

.,erl> •
11e

redun d an t . "314-

•urse a

strictly

E uripi
· · d es
medical

d oes,

term315

h owever,
to

.
give

describe

th e

Medea's

· n as she speculates on her mistress• future
condit10

actions:

"What

[JLt:YCl AoCJ11' >.a yx vos.,

ever
as

will
a

she

do,

medical

high-spirited

term,

"with

enlarged

abdomen/viscera"], impetuous in spirit, stung by harm as
she's

been?"

(108-110).

Beyond her momentary recourse to care£ul diagnosis,
though, the Hurse goes on to describe Medea more generally
as a sick. woman:

". . . she keeps to her bed, she re-fuses

food, her gaze is perpetually downcast, she weeps and
rages,

she

may

do

something

desperate."316

But

not

every sick. woman "rages" and "may do something desperate,"
like harming her own children.

Such symptoms are peculiar

to the disease described by the Hurse in line 16:

the

epidemic 0£ enmity which has infected even "the dearest
things.•
The spread 0£ enmity is a £act 0£ zero-sum competition
314-F. D. Harvey, "Sick. Humour:
Aristophanic
Parody o£ a Euripidean Moti£?," Mnemosyne 24- (1971;
hereafter Harvey, "Sick. Humour"), p. 363.
315

Harold w. Killer, "Medical Terminology in
ragedy," TAPA 75 (194-4-; herea£ter Miller, "Medical
;~rminology") p. 161. C£. Mills, Mythopoeia, p. 106 n.
0
follows Page, Medea, p. 76 at line 109.

T

316

Harvey,

"Sick.

Humour,"

p.

363.

30,
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described by Gouldner, and the ill effects on intimacy
as

of

C

oropetition's prime directive of self-advancement have

a1rea

dY been described.

ana 1o gy '

Here, by drawing a medical

Euripides skillfully and economically shows how

deadlY this game 0£ cutthroat competition really is.
iS patently sick..

Medea

And with her glowering and threats, she

puts the healthy continuance of her children in jeopardy.
The Nurse, and doubtlessly at this point the audience,
cannot understand how the children have become implicated
in what their father has done:

"Why do your children share

in the offense of their father?," the Hurse asks; "Why do
you

hate

(ex9ets.)

them?"

(116-117).

The

question

is

a logical one, but the answer's logic is beyond the k.en of
buman understanding.

Disease spreads without regard for

the connections between people; it spreads, in fact, most
rapidly among those who are "close."

In this way, the

enmity that is epidemic in zero-sum competition is like a

disease:

it too respects no ties, not even those of

family.

But Medea is not the only one infected with this
disease, for she is not the only zero-sum contender in the
Play.

Jason, too, is sick., al though Euripides does not

have him manifest his disease as a physical disability.
Instead, Euripides uses Medea to diagnose Jason's illness:
This is not courage or boldness, to look. friends in
~he £ace when you're doing them harm, but instead it
i.s the greatest of all diseases among men, shamelessness.
(a>.~.>
~
µeyto-r..,

-rwv

ev

52.7
,

voowv

&vapw1tolS

,

)

"
11aowv,

aval<St:llal).

(469-472.).

s:naroelessness is the stock-in-trade 0£ the zero-sum
coropeti tor, £or, as Gouldner argues, shame becomes an
tneffecti ve tool 0£ social control when the need £or high
self-esteem

outs trips

all

other

opinion. 317

s:naroelessness allows one to do to another whatever one
pleases in order to advance one s own ca use; it allows
1

ruthless engagement in zero-sum competition.

It is 0£

shamelessness that Achilles accuses Agamemnon in Iliad
U49 after hearing Agamemnon threaten that he will take
away some other man s prize to replace the one he for£eits.
1

This well-known incident -from the beginning 0£ the Iliad in
fact succinctly illustrates the zero-sum reality 0£ someone
winning only at the expense 0£ another s loss (£or, as
1

Achilles himsel£ notes, there is no stock.pile 0£ prizes
awaiting distribution), zero-sum mentality and ethics (on
the part 0£ Agamemnon), and the human costs 0£ zero-sum
competition.

Here,

too,

perhaps

only

disease spreads, -first literally as a

coincidentally,

plague sent by

Apollo, then metaphorically, as Greeks continue to die

317 Gouldner,

Enter Plato, pp. 94-97; c£. Adkins,
~rit, pp. 43-46, who argues that aidos spans both
competitive and cooperative excellences, but that aidos
felt at de-feat would be stronger than the aidos which could
restrain competitiveness. Adkins tellingly remarks that it
~onetheless must have been aidos that held Homeric society
~gether, "· . . £or a society of agathoi with no quiet
~lrtues at au would simply destroy itself." (p. 46).
This
18
What happens in Medea.

528
1>eca
tne

use the strife between Agamemnon and Achilles causes
tatter to remove himself -from the -fighting, leaving the

Gree Ks

more vulnerable to death on the battle-field.

A comparison between Iliad 1 and Medea is instructive,
for

J.·n

both cases innocent bystanders die as a result of

ruthlessly shameless self-advancement.

Just as innocent

GreeKs died there, so in Medea innocents die from the
•disease" of competitiveness.

In Medea, the innocents are

cb.ildren, both the children 0£ Jason and Medea as well as
tne

child

0£

Creon. 318

If even children must die -from the disease 0£
competitive disharmony, it must be considered rampant.
Euripides does, however, give one glimpse 0£ health, and
strengthens his analogy bet ween competitive arete and
disease by showing a healthy climate as one 0£ cooperation,
where harmony is in £act born (834).

I refer, of course,

to the A thens 0£ the -first half 0£ the third stasimon (824845).

Wilhelm Nestle argues that in these lines Euripides
portrays, with nearly clinical precision, Athens as an
ideally heal thy climate.

Nestle in fact cites these lines

from Medea, together with a few Euripidean -fragments, as
evidence that Euripides was not only acquainted with the
medical literature of his time, but that he may even have
had it in front of him as he composed.
3l8see

further

discussion

below,

In lines 824 £f. of
Part

Five.

529
d a

~·

Kestle points to Euripides• depiction 0£ the "most

t>rilliant air," the abundance 0£ water, and "mild, so-ft
?>re e

zes" as poetic paraphrases of the descriptions of

nealth-bringing climates in the Hippocratic treatise, "On
J.irS,

Waters,

and

Places. 11 319

It

is

no

coincidence

that this healthy Athens is a place where Harmony is born
where cooperation is the modus operandi (see
,
ll'apedpous
and
.;uvepyous
844-845),
Of
especially
(B 3 4),

and arete of every sort the final outcome (845).
This, however, is a

utopia.

The real world, the

strife-ridden, competition-crazed world of Jason and Medea,
is by. contrast

heavily

diseased.320

Even

the

Chorus

seem to realize this as they comment after hearing Medea
and Jason's first words to each other, "Terrible/clever is

31 9Wilhelm Kestle,
(1938), pp. 24-25.

"Hippocra tica,"

Hermes

73

3201 would argue that Burnett, "Tragedy of
Revenge," pp. 23-24, is perhaps more optimistic than
Euripides in seeing in the Athens 0£ the central ode a
chance for Medea's regeneration and transformation into a
benevolent -force. The hope for such is there, I would
maintain, but in the Chorus or the audience, not in Medea
herself, who at the end 0£ the play has, as every Athenian
would know, unfinished future business in Athens.
Boedeker, "Medea," pp. 110-112, suggests instead that
Euripides has created in Medea a cautionary tale £or
~the:riians. The idealistic Athens 0£ the central ode puts
n high relie£ the strife enacted on stage between Jason
:~d Medea, whose domestic dispute hints at the political
isaster awaiting Athens, should she, like Jason and Medea,
111
is_use language, especially the language of trust which
111
ai.n ta ins
bonds
bet ween
lf'l>.ol.

530

tne

..,rath

friends

and

engage

hard
in

to

stri£e

with

"'EPl V)
~

and Medicine:

{ch.J<Jla T05), 321

cure

£riends"

when

Cl

(oTav

(520-521).

Knowledge as Cure

aard to cure the disease indeed proves to be, £or
although Medea seeks a "cure," the disease continues to
spread, bringing pain and death.

Euripides, by describing

Medea's attempts to -find a "cure• in the language 0£
medicine, applies the medical analogy which has served to
redefine arete, in rede£ining sophia as well.

Sophia,

recall, is Medea's primary means to achieve victory over
her competitors.

The sophe Medea is the "smart•

contender, the one whose "total commitment rationality"
gains her success.

This sophia, then, in terms 0£ the

medical analogy, is the skill and knowledge necessary £or
diagnosis 0£ disease and prescription £or a cure.
As we have seen, both the Hurse (108-UO) and Medea
(471-472)

have

displayed

diagnostic

both set prescriptions £or cure:

abilities.

Similarly,

the Hurse prescribes an

unheeded cure 0£ song (199-200), while her mistress'
Prescriptions £or cure are -filled and administered without
delay by Medea hersel£.

Medea's prescriptions, however,

are not meant to cure the disease 0£ competitive stri£e.
Instead

• Medea, who hersel-f is clearly ill and yet

321The word is cited
terms• by Miller, •Medical

among "semi-technical
Terminology,• p. 165.

medical

531

par

adox:icallY the diagnosing physician, prescribes cures
will only alleviate, and then only -for hersel-£, the

tl:J.3 t

disea

se's symptom:

the pain o-f being the loser in

colDPeti tion.
Medea's -first choice is to try to -feel better by
seeing her enemy, Jason, in pain.
11

She accomplishes this by

urling at him what she imagines will be stinging words:

•You have done well in coming; I
,

(itO\JflO' 9'f)O oµ al

ill of

you,

(~u11'"1o~)."

)32.2.

my

in

and you

by

by

spirit

listening

Medea

(472.-474).

will be alleviated

then

will

speaking

£eel

pain

proceeds

to

use

co 111 peti tor's sophia to win a verbal competition.

her

So much

is clear :from her remarks at 579-585, where she criticizes
the speaker (she is o-£ course insinuating Jason} who is
•smart"

at
AEY€l v

aocpos

speaker
'

11'€cp\JK€,

"is

aocpo5,

583),

With

only

585).

speaking
,
not
and

so
then

"one

yet

smart"

OUK

to

"lay"

'
yap

>

"'
WV

a6lK05

Jason
>

>I

(€0Tl

promises

word"

(00Tl5

assures

580-581),

>I

Cl

"unjust"

such

a

>I

ayav

Jason

€K T€V€l

"£lat"
>I

€11'05,

The implication is that she, Medea, is the truly

•smart" one, and that with this sophia 0£ hers she will
deliver to her opponent the knockout punch.
322 Hiller

~

"Medical Terminology," p. 161, cites
43 and Philoctetes 735 as the only other uses 0£

Koucpltw with "medical :force" in tragedy· according
'
h ~ ler the verb is, however, •very common in the case
lstories of Epidemics 1 and 3; also Aph. 2.27."
Vide
~ Page, Medea, p. 106 at line 473, who is not
onvinced the verb is a medical term.
K·1

to
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'l'bUS, Medea hopes during this verbal interaction to

•alleiria te" her pain by recourse to competitive sophia.
gedea acK.nowledges the pain caused by the disease 0£
colll P

etitive strife when she tells Jason that she will have

nothing of the brand of happiness he has hoisted off on to
ner, and which she describes as a "painful happy life"
>

,

eudaq.1.wv

'

(Atrirpos

598).

earlier remarked to Medea on this pain:
(AU11'~)

at

having

been

deprived

had

Creon

of

"you feel pain

your

husband's

bed"

(286); Aegeus later sympathizes that it is understandable
for

Medea

"to

feel

pain"

(>.u11'e'lo0al,

703)

at

her

situation.
Medea, however, does not stop at using her competitive
sophia to choose stinging words and thus administer pain to
her enemy.

This is probably because Medea's words have no

visible effect on the callous Jason.

She resorts then to

feeling more pain herself so that she can cause pain for
Jason,32.3

thus

one down.324

effecting
Jason's

a

"cure"

statement

£or

and

her

pain

Medea's

at

being

acknowl-

edgement at 1361-1362. give telling evidence of the nature

Cf,

323 see
Medea's
use
0£
>.ull'ouoav
at
the Chorus on Medea's a>.yo5 at 997.

1046-1047;

324 see Oblander, Suspense, p. 115, on Medea's
•willingness to suffer and harm herself .
"
Hore to
the Point, Pucci, "Monument," p. 189, remarks, "In
sacr·f·
l icing her sons, Medea destroys the otherness, as it
~ere, of her suffering by actively inflicting suffering on
e:self. She should gain control over the otherness 0£ her
P a1n."
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of tnis
(A\J

"cure":

--"You yoursel£ in £act £eel pain

,,.!;) and are

my

.

•

EC)."

KOL VWVOS

pain

111eJ.

,.

>I

in

--"You

a>.yos)

(AUEL

pays

companion

i£

harm
are

you

[su££ered]

right.
cannot

But
laugh

the
[at

Medea has prescribed the zero-sum competi tor s
1

colllmon "cure":

winning.

Medea, like every other

coJDpetitor, has only two ways to e££ect this "cure," and
since she can not raise hersel£, she must lower Jason.

The

cuJDulative e££ect, however, is the unchecked progress 0£
the disease, marked by an increase in total pain.
That this is no cure at all, Euripides
analogy makes obvious.

1

use 0£ the

First, the cure is "sick." because

it is an already ill Medea who takes the role 0£ at tending
physician.

Second, the cure is one that assumes the

disease 0£ competitive stri£e is established and unassailable, and the best one can do is su££er its pain£ul
symptoms less than or-- in a worst case scenario--along with
one 1 s £ellow contenders.

And while Medea 1 s prescription 0£

a Pain£ul remedy is not unknown among medical practitioners (c£. the £amiliar and dreaded "this will only hurt
a lit tie bit"), increasing pain is not,
Prescription s aim.
1

as

it is here,

Physicians use pain£ul procedures and

Potentially harm£ul medications to lessen pain and curtail
or cure disease.
roai, and remains.

The potential £or cure is the assumed
Such is the case in true medical

Practice I but not in the context 0£ zero-sum competition,

534
.nere
111eans

the goal is disabling one's opponents by whatever
necessary, even if these be pain and death.

The analogy to medicine, then, suggests an al terna ti ve
to the predictably destructive outcome of zero-sum
coinpeti tion.

The al terna ti ve is nowhere more strongly

suggested than in Medea's choice to use pharmaka as her
111

eans to achieving victory.

She makes this choice because

the use of pharmaka is the means at which she is
•especially

,

sophe"
>

'

QUTOUS

ll'EcpUKaµEv
c

,..

EAELV,

'

oocpaL

384-385).

µa.hoTa,

Medea s
1

competitive sophia marks her as "smart," or, in Gouldner's
terms, as one who practices "total commitment rationality"
to gain one's ends.
By establishing an analogy between Medea's competitive
sophia and the use of pharmaka, then, Euripides suggests
that competitive sophia is a poison used to spread
destruction

from

the

disease

of

disharmony.325

And,

indeed, it is the sop he Medea who so arouses the Chorus'
ire at their status as losers that they agree to remain
silent.

It is the sophe Medea who persuades the suspicious

Creon to give her the one day she needs.

It is the sophe

325 Pace Newton, "Passionate Poison," p. 14, to
Whom Medea's love is the disease and the poison. Newton
notices that Medea "smears" poison on the gifts, just as
?YPris "smears" arrows with longing (789, 634); the diadem
~~ gold,_ as are Cypris' shafts (786, 633).
I would argue
at ~ is, indeed, diseased, as is sophia in zero-sum
~~mpetition. These, however, are symptomatic of a larger
s lsease: discord and disharmony, which distort eros and

~-
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J(e d e

a -who manipulates her £riend Aegeus• desire.

It is the

ne Medea who hoists her gullible husband with his own
~
petard and wins his agreement to let their children deliver
tn.e poisoned £aux-conciliatory gi£ts.
poison, as was argued above (Part One), cannot be
administered openly, but requires proximity.

This Medea

gains through verbal manipulation, the mani£esta tion 0£ her
claim

to

be

called

sophe.326

Spreading

pharmaka

on

the

bait 0£ lovely gi£ts is merely the culmination 0£ Medea's

art as poisoner.

Through her poisonous sophia, she is able

to Kill Creon's daughter and, perhaps not merely coincidentally,

Creon

himsel-f.327

And,

by

then

killing

her

own children, she is able £inally to destroy their -father.
She wins the palm 0£ sophe in zero-sum competition:

she

has e££ectively destroyed or brought to her level 0£ pain
every other contender on the £ield.

She has "won."

She

has poisoned and killed.
But pharmaka does not mean merely "poisons."

It can

326on the association 0£ knowledge with drugs, see
Petroff, Medea, p. 72: "The person who uses drugs and
herbs is di££erent. He or she is someone special--a witch
or a doctor. The something special which characterizes
this type 0£ person is knowledge--speci£ically knowledge 0£
drugs."
t

~ 27 At 788-789 Medea speaks 0£ all dying who touch

he gi.rl; perhaps she anticipates the scene which in £act
~~curs. Further support £or this interpretation comes -from
C e fact that Medea never renounces her intention to kill
Preon, and yet proposes no way 0£ accomplishing his death.
Cetroff, Medea, p. 108 n. 69, cites another version (0£
p~~ 0 Phylus; schol. in Eur. Med. 264) 0£ Creon's death by
ison at Medea's hands.
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"drugs" that cure.

111ean

related to it, sophia, are, like pharmaka, ambigu-

p.oun

0us.

328

5UID

iS

U

Similarly, sophe, and the abstract

P

sophia

can

-

be

the

"smartness"

0£

the

zero-

layer, or it can be something else, the "wisdom" that

nwitnessed

in

this

play.329

By

using

the

analogy

of tbe craft 0£ medicine to in£orm the de£ini tion of
~·

Euripides suggests redefinition 0£ sophia only

binted at in this play.

Sophia can be like a curative

drug; it can mean "wisdom," it can be the means to

obtaining the health that is the virtue of harmony.
Twice in Medea it is hinted that sophia can be a drug
of cure instead 0£ a lethal poison.

In the Ode to A thens

(824-865), the abstract noun sophia is used twice, first at
line 828, and again at line 842.

In the 'first instance,

sophia is described as the 'food 0£ the prehistorical
Athenians; they are "nourished by most renowned sophia"
(tEPfJoµ.evol

K>.ElVOTaTav

aocptav).

Attending

to

proper nourishment was one 0£ the mainstays 0£ ancient
medicine;

in

£act,

the

verb

cpeppw

chosen

here

by

Buripides occurs twice in the Hippocratic corpus, although

1t is a

verb

of

otherwise

in-frequent

occurrence.330

328
•
See Buxton, Persuasion, p. 165, for Medea's
.magical-erotic sophia as "ambivalent."
Cf. Pucci,
Honument," p. 193 n. 13.
329si mi· 1 arly, Medea's potential as "a formidable
.. 1end" .
•fo
is, in this play, less obvious than her stat us as
rmidable enemy"; see Ohlander, Suspense, pp. 20-22.
f ... ·

330g ee

537
·ttedly, in the Ode to Athens sophia is not used as a

,\dJlll

But whether as a source of nourishment, as it

drug per se.

iS described at line 828, or as a semi-anthropomorphized

attendant upon the Erotes who assist sophia in bringing on
all sorts of arete, sophia in the Ode to A thens is
undoubtedly an important element in a health-promoting
environment.

As an ingestant or as an assistant in a

bealthY locale, sophia's use in this ode suggests, if only
faintly, its function as a

curative "drug."

The second hint that sophia can be a drug of cure
comes just before the occurrences of sophia in the Ode to
Athens discussed above.

In this instance the analogy drawn

between sophia and pharmaka is again subtle, but perhaps a
bit more direct.

I

refer to the Aegeus episode (663-823),

where the king of A thens explains that he has sought from
the oracle o-f Apollo advice about how he may produce
children (669).
form of a
(oo,wTepCaJ)

The advice, however, has come in the

pronouncement, in "words more clever
than

a

man

can

interpret"

(675).

Aegeus

therefore welcomes Medea's hearing the pronouncement, -for
interpreting
mind" (677).

it

requires

a

"clever /smart

(aocp:fls>

But Medea does not offer Aegeus her sophia

in the form he has requested.

She may well be able to

interpret the oracle, but withholds interpretation and
instead holds forth the promise that Aegeus will have
access to that at which she has said (384-385) she is
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oiost

~ph~:

J.egeus,

administration 0£ pharmaka.

•I will stop your

Medea assures

being childless, I

will make

you sow t.he offspring 0£ children; I know 0£ such drugs
(717-718).

(fapi.J.aKa)."

In all other instances, pharmaka in Medea are clearly
oieant as a means to destruction, and must therefore be
Only here can pharmaka be

translated as "poisons."
trans 1a t e d as "drugs.•
of life.

What Medea promises is the creation

And al though the audience would know that one

version 0£ the myth had Medea s pharmaka not only not
1

responsible £or the Aegeus

1

renewed potency, but nearly the

cause of his only son s death, Euripides nonetheless
1

reminds his audience 0£ the potential curative powers 0£
Medea's

pharmaka

and,

by

analogy,

0£

her

sophia.331

I say •reminds" instead 0£ "suggests,• £or the
ambiguity 0£ Medea s pharmaka and sophia is a part o:f the
1

mythological tradition.
depicted Medea s
1

preserving,332

In £act, early tradition may have

skills as largely life-promoting or

al though

Euripides'

predominantly

331 Mills,

Mythopoeia, pp. 15-18 and 20-21, shows
how Medea's ambivalent sophia is similar to that of her
relative, Circe.
332 This

a part 0£ the Petro££'s thesis in his
Petro££ is convincing on this point, less
~o When he argues that Medea was originally a goddess. O:f
~!erest to the Aegeus episode are Petro££'s parallels
De ween Medea on the one hand and Artemis, Aphrodite,
In in;ter,_ Athena, and Hera on the other hand (pp. 137-149).
Of J rawing this parallel, Petro££ interprets the exploits
as ason to win the :fleece as evidence :for Medea's status
a goddess 0£ £ertili ty (pp. 146-147).
Such a goddess

~d~, passim.

is
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ti ve cast gives little indication of this tradition.
pd a
anY case, the audience doubtlessly would have been aware

lP

t least some of the stories about Medea •s res tor a ti ve
of a
curative powers: how she proved her powers of
an d
rejuvenation on Aeson (Jason's father). the nurses of
Dionysus and their husbands, and Jason himself; how, though
she failed to do so, her intent was to immortalize her
children; how she salved wounds the Argonauts suffered and
cured

Heracles

of

madness.333

But besides Medea herself having a reputation for
restorative and curative powers, the names "Medea" and
•Jason," as well as Jason's early history, may be evidence
the couple's historical association with healing.
is

etymologically

related

counsel, plan, intend"),

to

µ..ftooµ.aL

("to

"Medea"

take

which suggests Medea's status as

could 0£ course insure the future potency 0£ the desperate
Aegeus.
33 3Ancient sources for these and other incidents
in the life 0£ Medea may be found conveniently summarized
and chronologically arranged in Petro££, Medea, pp. 4-41.
The sources cited by Petro££ are as follows:
Nostoi £r. 6
~inkel = Hypoth. ad Eur. Med. (Aeson); Aesch. £r. 50
auck 2 = £r. 426 Mette = Hypoth. ad Eur. Med. (nurses
~f Dionysus and their husbands); Simon. £r. 548 Page =
YPoth. ad Eur. Med. (Jason); Eum. £r. 2 Kinkel
~~araphra~ed by Paus. 2.3.10) and schol. in Pind. 01.
(A· 7 'lg (children immortal); Diod. Sic. 4.48 and 4.55
p rgonauts• wounds, Heracles• madness).
All sources
~edate
Euripides•
version
with
the
exception
Diodorus
8ulcuius, whom Petro££ argues (pp. 157-159) may 0£
himself have
sed sources predating Euripides.
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8

professional

eiaowv.

"wise

"healer").

woman"-334
•

and

his

the

early

name

"Jason"

association

with

cbeiron. at least since the time Of Pindar's Fourth
suggest

~·

curative

powers.335

But in Jason's case, and for the most part in Medea's,
guripides chooses to ignore this tradition of healing
potency.

Instead, he emphasizes the destructive powers of

thiS deadly pair.

Medea may have the skill, the sophia,

and the formulae to effect cure, but instead, herself ill,
she spreads cure's antithesis, destruction, by the use of
her wits and her pharmaka.

Similarly, Jason, who may have

been reared a healer, is too busy infecting those around
him ever to consider that a cure is needed.
was

,,

ayav

right
,

oocpos,

to

describe
583).

He

him

as

has

not

"not
the

so

Perhaps Medea

smart"

>

(O\JK

diagnostic

let

alone curative powers of Medea, misguided as these may be.
Jason instead believes that everything is fine the way it
334Bibliography on this point may be found in
Petroff, Medea, p. 118 n. 2.1 (pp. 2.19-2.2.0), and in Erich
Segal, Pindar's Mythmaking: The Fourth Pythian Ode
(Princeton, NJ:
Princeton Univ. Press, 1986; hereafter
Segal, Pindar's Mythmaking), p. 19 n. 11.
Petro££, pp.
118, 118 n. 19, and 127, adds the supportive evidence that
Medea's mother's name is Iduia (Hesiod, Theogony 959-960)
or Eiduia (Apollonius Rhodius 3.2.43), both of which mean
•the knowing one."
335 see Segal, Pindar's Mythmaking, p. 19 and 19 n.
11 for bibliography.
Petro££, Medea, p. 134 n. ,82, cites
~~hol.
in
Ap.
Rhod.
1.554:
>Iaowv
11'apa
1·rw
laolV.
Mills, Mythopoeia, p. 60, on Jason s
name as
meaning "healer," remarks, "[o]nce upon a time, Jason in
lllYth must have been the true consort of Medeia."
1

541

iS·

I

"Surely

pe~ou>.euµ. at

have

KOKWS,

not
567),

planned
he

injuriously?"

inanely

Medea, though, is able to e-f-fect a
cure of a zero-sum competitor:

winning.

asks

(µ.wv

Medea.

cure, but it is the
This she gains by

using her wits, her competitor's sophia, whether this takes
the form of dishing out verbal abuse, or using pharmaka, or
being willing to increase her own pain so as to bring her
enemy down to her level.

She wins, but so does the

disease, which if before was rampant, is now a plague.
What is needed, but never found in this play, is
suggested by Euripides' use of the medical analogy.

True

sophia would entail finding a cure for the disease, not
just its unpleasant symptoms.

This, however. would require

the pursuit o-f cooperation and harmony instead o-f competition, i.e., the complete overhaul o-f belie-fs and values
manifested in the play, and a painful reformulation of
actions along those lines.
never pursued.

The true cure is therefore

Instead, the "cure" to which Medea resorts

is bringing death--no cure, but an end suitable when, as
here, disease runs unchecked.

Part Five:

The Tragedy 0£ the Wind-egg:

The Perversion 0£ Eros and Stillbirth 0£ Truth
It is not surprising, there-fore, that truth is not
}>orn in Medea, £or nothing is born in this dark play.
fact, quite the opposite:

instead 0£ birth and growth,

tnere are destruction and death.
are targets.

In

The young, especially,

What Euripides gives his audience is pre-

dictable in a world where eros is put to the service 0£
vanquishing enemies.

The generative :force doubles back on

itsel£, and, instead o:f taking the older generation be-fore
the younger, takes the younger -first; it even attacks hope
for the unborn.

What is depicted, in short, is war brought

into the domestic sphere.
This depiction, then, is the culmination 0£ Euripides'
art 0£ midwi£ery.

He delivers his elenchos to its syllo-

gistic conclusion by bringing the analogy to medicine to
bear upon competitive eros, thereby showing this eros :for
what it is:

the antithesis 0£ nature's eros, a

death instead 0£ a -force 0£ li:fe.

:force 0£

Euripides shows how

competitive eros, desire manipulated to serve winning, a
desire Primarily to vanquish enemies, reverses nature's
order.
By his -final application 0£ the analogy to medicine,

Euripides -forces recognition 0£ the truth that competitive

~. and ultimately the competitive sophia which at tends

it and the competitive arete that de-fines them both, o££end
542
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tne most basic human sensibilities about the continuation
of nuuian

li£e

through

mating

and

child-rearing.336

By

51110 gistically applying to the arena 0£ competitive eros

an etb.ic 0£ bene£i t, derived £rom the analogy to medicine,
guripides £orces the stark. realization that instead 0£
benefit (li£e), competition breeds harm:

death and

destruction. 3 37
For, as Euripides shows his audience, competition
perverts eros.

In Medea, as in the lives 0£ Euripides•

audience members, procreation is the bond 0£ marriage, and
yet, ironically in the competitive world 0£ Medea, marriage
is synonymous with mourning.

This is because birth takes a

336Arrowsmith, "Ideas,• p. 48, likewise assigns
pedagogic intent to Euripides• contrast between
destructiveness and creativity in the play: •Jason's
calculating, practical sophia is, lacking eros, sel£ish and
destructive; Medea •s consuming eros and psychological
sophia . . . are, without compassion, maimed and
destructive. They are both destroyers--destroyers 0£
themselves, 0£ others, 0£ sophia and the polis--and it is
this destructiveness which above all else Euripides wants
his audience to observe: the spirit 0£ brutal sel£interest and passionate revenge which threatens both lire
and culture, and which is purposely set in sharp contrast
to life-enhancing Athens where the arts -flourish, eros
~ollaborates with sophia, and creative physis is gentled by
Just nomoi. Behind Jason and Medea we are clearly meant to
see that spreading spirit 0£ expedience and revenge which,
unchecked by culture or religion, finally brought about the
Peloponnesian War and its attendant atrocities."
337 Burnett, "Tragedy 0£ Revenge," hersel£ uses
medical terminology in describing the ills that erupt at
Co ri.nth
·
(see, e.g., p. 19, where Burnett describes Jason
~nd the Corinthian palace as "a malady that has spread" and
.~ °t been quarantined"), but attributes the cause for those
l. s to Jason and the Corinthians.
She seems nearly to
e:onerate Medea as the avenging erinys, the natural result
0
Jason's violation 0£ oaths (p. 13).

1
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'!'he first of the symbols of promise is the marriage
Euripides
and

J.f~ "tpOV,

uses

three

.>..E:xos.

words

for

Al together,

tnirty-£our times in 1419 lines.

>

"bed":

"bed"

I

EUV'l'l,

occurs

These words serve a

double duty, for while on the one hand they can merely be
taKen as a concrete symbol £or "marriage," on the other
nand, the word "bed" summons up a vision o:f sexual
intercourse.

The audience is thereby encouraged to think

of marriage as a bond :formed primarily :for procreation, a
notion

not

alien

to

:firth-century

B.

C.

Athenians.338

Indeed, Medea and Jason appear to have considered procreation marriage's purpose, :for Medea claims she could
nave accepted Jason's abandoning her i:f their union had
been childless (489-491), and

Jason, despite his protests

to the contrary (557-558), when he thinks 0£ his new
marriage, imagines the new children that will be born of it
(563-564;

596-597;

917).

Alongside this impression o:f marriage as a potential
for new li:fe, Euripides places another image o:f marriage,
as
and

a

death-knell.
the

This

related

words

he

does

by

K'l16Eµ.wv,

using

ic:floos

i<:.fioEuµ.a,

and

,
, 338 see,
e.g.,
Xenophon,
Oeconomicus
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ic"1<5euw

to

signi£y

"marriage"

and

the

Euripides

like.

tnerebY suggests that the perversion 0£ eros in zero-sum
coJD.peti ti on is a perversion 0£ the £irst magnitude:
life-force

becomes a

the

dea th-£orce.

J(edos and related words are ambiguous; their
associations

suggest

connection

gaining

both
and

marriages

losing

it

and

£unerals,339

£orever.340

The

words

occur eight times in the play, and only in one case (the
first instance, at line 76, where the Tutor is speaking)
can use be argued to be strictly unambiguous.

In their

second and third occurrences, however, the ambiguity 0£
these words is purpose£ully exploited.
boasts:
no

At 366-367 Medea

"There are con tests ahead £or those newly wed and

small

toils

£or

the

bridal/£uneral

party"

(TOLOl

339yet ano,ther word suggesting both marriages and
death is µ.aic:apLos,
"blessed."
See Hills, Hythopoeia,
p. 144.
C£. McDonald, Happiness, p. 47, who elaborates
that µ.aKapLOS is used "as an epithet £or a bride or
as an epithet £or a person who is dead." McDonald further
notes that the adjective in Medea is applied only to Medea
(509, where Medea sarcastically imagines hersel£ "blessed"
by her marriage to Jason) and to the princess (957, by
Medea, as she is instructing the children to take the
fatal gi£ts to the princess); Euripides in other plays
exploits the word's ambiguity to suggest that a person will
be dead by the end 0£ the play.
3 40The ambiguity 0£ these words has been noted,
but not £itted into the pattern 0£ related moti£s I am
:r~posing.
See Collinge, "Ex Hachina," p. 172 n. 6; c£.
Klhot, Medea, p. 90 at lines 884-888, and Kills,
~thopoeia, p. 144.
Newton, "Passionate Poison," p. 14,
~oes ~ug~est that the ambiguity is carried over into the
( escription 0£ the death 0£ the princess, whose wedding
Pel"'versely consummated with her £a ther) becomes her
f unel"'al.
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Again,

icfl~e.UaaaL v).

at

Medea •s

399-400,

t>ring out the ambiguity 0£ kedos:

threats

"I will make the

inarriage painful £or them and mournful, painful the
inarriage/mourning

(K:r}oos.)

and

my

exile

'from

the

1and."
While Medea •s next use 0£ one 0£ the words seems
innocent enough--at 700 she explains to Aegeus that Jason's
desire

is

£or

a

"marriage

connection"

(K:r]oos.)

with

royalty--the meaning 0£ the word is colored by the previous
exploitation 0£ its ambiguity.
at

885

£ollowed

In the next two uses
quickly

by

at

888), the 'first, apparently innocent, use at 885 is undermined by a sinister and undeniable ambiguity at 888.
Medea is talking to Jason, and it becomes obvious that the
only reason she does not openly exploit the words' ambiguity is that she does not wish Jason to sense that her
repentance and mildness are a sham.
nonetheless

The ambiguity is

there:

So now I praise you. To me you seem prudent in having
taken on this marriage (K~oos.), and I was
st up id, I, who should have shared in these plans,
should have taken part in the wedding, and stood
beside
the
bed (lfapt:o-ravaL
).ex£l)
and
been
delighted to tend to/bury (K'r)oE:uoav) your bride.
(884-888).

Medea has previously, i£ as here only notionally, been at
the side 0£ Jason's new marriage bed.

At lines 379-380,

Medea brie£ly entertained the thought 0£ sneaking with her
dagger

in to

the

house

"where

the

bed

is

made"

cYv•
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>.exos).341

To

have

her

now

imagine

n.erself standing beside this same bed, taking delight in
•tending to" the bride, brings with it a

chilling picture:

tbe blood 0£ murder drenching the marriage bed, where, i£
tbere is to be blood, it should be the result 0£ an
entirely different act.

The picture, which juxtaposes

procreation and killing by making them eerie bedmates,
speaks volumes about the reversals of nature that occur in
zero-sum

competition.

The Chorus seem to get this message, for they are the
next to use one 0£ the words 0£ this group.

As they sing

their £ourth stasimon, they address Jason with these words:
And you, poor wretch, harm-ridden groom
(KaKovuµ.cpt:), connected by marriage with/attender
of the dead of (K'l'lot:µwv) kings, you do not know
that for
your children
you bring destruction to their
>I
......
life (oAt:9pov fJLOT?) and hateful death to your
wife.
(991-994).
The juxtaposition here of life and death, hope and despair,
is excruciating.
antithesis:

This marriage is marriage's true

instead of bringing to life new children, it

destroys that hope for the future and then doubles back,
bringing death to children already alive.
~Jason,

in despair at finally coming to know the

destruction, if not its source, is the last to use one of
the words £rom this group.

He blames Medea alone, and

341 At 40-41 the Hurse speaks the same lines,
~hich both Page and Diggle consider to have been
interpolated from 379-380.

54-9
terms his marrying her a •connection by marriage/mourning
and

nateful

destructive
>

T,

0Af:9pLOV

I

to

,

'

exBpov

me"

134-1).

Eµ OL,

Jason, however, is not the one £or whom this l<.edos has
been literally destructive.

By laying destruction on the

bed of marriage, Euripides portends the trans£orma tion 0£

children, the customary result 0£ procreation, into
corpses, destruction s

ultimate issue.

it that

a

1

children

are

'focus

Euripides sees to

throughout

the

play.34-2

Children are, i£ not literally, at least imaginatively on
stage in every episode, and they are the subject 0£ £our 0£
the Chorus• songs.

These symbols 0£ new lire, lil<.e the

marriage bed as a symbol 0£ procreation, are used by
Euripides in another shocl<.ing counterpoint.

Children,

life's very beginning, brought repeatedly be£ ore his
audience s
1

mind s
1

eye,

become

corpses,

li£e s
1

end.

Words £or "children" appear more than twice as many
times

as

alone

occurs

eleven. 3 4-3

words

The

£or

in

the

marriage

seventy-one

majority

0£

Children 0£ Medea and Jason.

bed.

lines,

these

The
,

TEKVOV

re£erences

word

"
ll'OLS

in
are

to

the

There are, in addition, seven

34 2The centrality 0£ the theme 0£ children has
been o£ten noticed, but little examined.
See, e.g.
:ch~esinger, "Zu Medea," pp. 4-8-4-9.
C£. Conacher,
._E.r1pidean Drama, p. 192.
343 A summary 0£ the context 0£ the occurrences may
b
(1~ found in Leon Golden, "Children in the Medea," CB 48
7 1), PP. U-12.
C£. des Bouvrie, Women, p. 224-n. 2.
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.cerences to other, prospective children (0£ Jason and the
re;i.
princess,
ten

597,

805;

of

Aegeus,

669,

674,

715,

717,

721);

miscellaneous references (to children 0£ various

otners, three referring to adults quasi-patronymically,
487 , 665,

684,

(29 5, 574,

825,

1092,

1096,

bride

Jason's

new

1207,

1210

1289);

as

five

1114);

a

to

and

child

children
nine

(19,

in

general

references

283,

329,

344,

to
554,

783,

1220). 34 4

By these constant references to children, Euripides
Keeps children in his a udience•s minds.

And while ideas

about children and child-rearing have certainly changed
since fifth-century B. C. Athens, and differences between
modern and ancient notions may be difficult to discover, it
is clear that the play depicts the death 0£ children as
traumatic.

This can be argued from the reactions 1) of

Medea herself at the prospect of killing her children (791796; 1056-1058; 1069-1077);

of

2)

child dying (1204-1210); 3) of

Creon

at

the

sight of

his

the Chorus at Medea•s

raising her hand against her children (846--865; 976-977),
at the imagined reaction 0£ Jason and Medea to this act
(990-1001;

1306-1307),

and at

the

thought

of losing a

child

in any way (1090-1115); and 4) 0£ Jason at the news and
sight

of

his

children

344 McDermott,

dead

(1310;

1315;

1361;

1377;

1397;

Incarnation, p. 85 n. 5, notes the
namelessness of the princess, and suggests that it may be
~SCI"ibed to Euripides' " . . . effort to emphasize her role
in a significant parent-child relationship."

551
1399-1400;

1402-1403;

1405-1414).

It

is

hard

to

imagine

tnat Euripides would have presented adults so consistently
traumatized by child-death and expected them to be symAnd

patnetic to an audience indi££erent to such loss.

indeed, Hark. Golden has argued that the ancient Athenians,
despite high child mortality rates and the possible
exposure 0£ unwanted in'fants, were hardly indi££erent to
tb.e

loss

0£

children. 3 45

Furthermore,

it

seems

sa'fe

to

assert that children represented, among other things, to
the ancient Athenians what they represent now:

new li'fe.

It is £or this reason that Euripides• turning children to

corpses

e££ects

a

power'ful

reversai.346

For

i£

children cannot thrive, but instead must die horribly, the
world must be disease-ridden.
The world 0£ Medea is, in £act, disease-ridden in all
of its parts--wi th one notable exception:
Athens 0£ the third stasimon (824-865).

the idealized

This is a healthy

34 5see Hark. Golden, Children and Childhood in
Classical Athens (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopk.ins
Univ. Press, 1990; herea'fter H. Golden, Children), p. 89,
•. · · the weight 0£ the evidence seems overwhelmingly to
favor the proposition that the Athenians loved their
Children and grieved £or them deeply when they died."
Evidence 'follows, on pp. 89-99.
McDermott, Incarnation, p.
27 • cites Hesiod's Work.s and Days 185-188 £or the
assumption that trophe will be given by parents to children
:nd sho~ld there'fore be returned. McDermott argues that
the ancient Greek.s attributed parental philia particularly
0
females, and that Euripides especially shock.s his
audience by showing a mother who k.ills her children.

c:.
0

346 Nussbaum,

Fragility, pp. 397-399, is excellent
the e££ect created by Euripides• use 0£ an already dead
lld, Polydorus, in the prologue 0£ Hecuba.
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. ..,e

ell ... •

and, as such, one in which children are born,

nurtured, and thrive.

As was noted above (Part Four), the

first strophe-antistrophe pair contributes largely to this
The £irst strophe begins by twice designating

picture.
tn.e

"children,•3 47

Athenians

£irst

by

a

patronymic

and then by terming them "children 0£ the blessed gods"

aewv
These

825).
826)

bY wisdom.

birth

to

"children"

I

µaKapwv,

are

•nourished"

824-

(cpeppoµevol,

The strophe ends with the Muses giving

(cpu-reuaal)

Harmony,

whose

more

usually

designated mother, Aphrodite, is mentioned in the succeeding antistrophe.
The contrast between these lines and the rest 0£ the
play is stark..

Children do not thrive here; instead, they

are born only to become corpses be£ore they can grow up.
This turning 0£ chi.ldren into corpses is the £inal
extension 0£ the medical analogy, and Euripides' most
power£ul weapon in reversing his audience's complacent
acceptance 0£ de£ini tions encouraged by zero-sum competilion.

What the poet gradually reveals is that the Nurse's

remark. at line 16, "the dearest things are diseased"
'
Ta

Within the analogy.

Pr

was

unwittingly

prophetic

Ta philtata, "the dearest things," to

347
. Ohlander, Suspense, p. 124, notes the
edominance 0£ words £or children in the stasimon.
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Medea,

in

one

her

children:348

-five

times

text she re-fers to them as such, at 795 ("-fleeing

ifl tne

tne

are

tnurder 0£ my dearest children"); twice at 1071 (where
Of

the children's hands and then his mouth is termed

•dearest");

at

1247

(both children

are "dearest"); and

finallY at 1397, where, upon hearing Jason call the
,
TEKVa

"dearest"

ctiildren

cpt.>.-ra-ra),

Medea

counters, "To their mother, but not to you."
can we be surprised, then, that the children, these
•dearest things,"
,

,

died

(11'a1"p<t>{l

voa<t>,

1364 ),

end 7349

There

is,

in

"o-f their
as

Medea

this

-father's disease,"
claims

unhealthy

at

the

climate

play' s

0£

competitiveness, no place £or children to thrive; at best,
they must grow up quickly so that they can enter the
competition in which their parents can no longer take
part.

Jason proudly describes this scenario to his

children as he contemplates their 'future:
3481

there-fore disagree with the meaning 0£ line
by Hew ton, "Passionate Poison," p. 13, who
translates -ra .pt.>.1a1a as "what was the greatest
love," Which he equates loosely With eros.
This
translation is then used in his interpretation 0£ the rest
Of the play.
16 proposed

3 49That Medea's re-ference to her killing the
Children as a "sacri£ice" (1054) may not be a "mere
metaphor" has been considered by Walter Burkert, "Greek
Tragedy and Sacri£icial Ritual," GRBS 7 (1966), p. 118.
Although Burkert earlier (p. 112) claims that
•[e]xtraordinary situations 0£ emergency, £amine, disease
may again and again lead to human sacri£ice," he does not
consider that the impetus £or Medea's "sacri£ice" may be
the disease, i£ only metaphorical, rampant in the play.

554
For I imagine that you will yet be -first (Ta
11 pw-rla1) o-f the Corinthian land with your
brothers. You just grow up; the rest your -father and
lfhatever gods are -favorable will accomplish. May I
see you thriving, coming to the £ul£illment 0£ your
youth, victorious over my enemies (ex9pwv
uvep-repous>.
(916-921).350

-rwv

eµwv

1111

agining that his children will be absorbed in his

coJDpetitive struggle the moment they come to maturity,
Jason has £ailed to imagine a worse, but, given the
coJDpeti ti ve milieu, -fully possible case:

that they will

sooner be taken down by that struggle, that he will not
ever see them £ull grown, but only as child corpses.
Jason is not, 0£ course, alone in serving his
children's lives up to competitive stri£e.

In this he is

anticipated by Medea, who does not wait £or the -future to
throw her unwitting children into the £ray.

We should be

astonished at such activity in most mothers, but certainly
not in a mother who pre£ers thrice over the -front line 0£
battle to giving birth (250-251).

Such a

mother takes

battle very seriously; so seriously, in £act, that
children

are

used

as

pawns351

to

clear

the

-field

0£

350Jason•s words 0£ course recall Hector's to
Astyanax at Iliad 6.476-481.
There is a di££erence,
however: Hector imagines his child in a purely ci vie
context, returning £rom war a£ter killing an enemy not
~P~ci£ied
as Hector's personal enemy (EK vo>.eµou
QlOVTQ
•
•
•
K1"€lVQS
6°'1lOV
av6pa,
6.480-481).
For a good discussion o-f this passage as indicative o-f the
~ormative ancient Greek parents• expectation that a child
is not only theirs but "a child 0£ the state," £or whose
:otential loss they must prepare themselves, see Rick M.
~~ton, "Oedipus• Wi-fe and Mother," CJ 87 (1991), pp. 36-

3

351 see

Boedeker,

"Medea,"

p.

99.
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difficulties standing in the way o:f ultimate victory.

For

!(edea, in addition to using her pharmal<.a 0£ sophia, her
cornpeti ti ve savvy, uses the appeal o:f children to manipuiate Creon into giving her the time (340-347) and Aegeus
into providing her a

Finally,

place o:f re£uge (714-722).

sne uses a pretense o:f concern :for her children's wel:fare
to require mal<.ing an appeal to the royal -family on their
bellal-f (939-940), and the persons o:f her children as
bearers

o:f

:falsely

making

them

conciliatory

accessories

to

gi:fts

(956-958),

thereby

murder.352

we shudder to consider parents so hard, but these are
competitors

:first,

parents

second.353

As

competitors,

they must be hard; Winl<.ler quotes Xenophon's Memorabilila
3.7.1 as a sort o:f thumb-nail sl<.etch o:f competitive disdain
of

so:ftness:
--"Tell me, Charmides, i:f a man is capable o:f winning
a crown at contests and thus being honored in his own
person and mal<.ing his :fatherland more renowned in
Greece but does not wish to compete, what l<.ind 0£
person do you think. this man would be?" --"Obviously
a so:ft (malal<.os) and cowardly one."354

Medea -follows this creed o:f esteeming hardness and disdaining so:ftness.

She l<.nows that being "hard" wins her

352 Easterling,
"Infanticide,"
p.
187.
Shaw,
emale Intruder," p. 260, sees Medea's poison as symbolic:
"It represents the ability to create, destroy, or pervert
the bonds between -father and child."
"F

35 3simon, Tragic Drama, p. 92, sees Medea's
~nstrumental use o:f the children as an extension o:f Jason's
instrumental attitude toward them (565).
.

354 Winl<.ler,

Constraints,

quoted

on

p.

50.
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tne
•so f

so f

1110 st

renown (809-810) and rebukes hersel£ £or being

t" (1052) except in instances where she uses sham

tness to manipulate her enemies (291, Creon on Medea's

seeIIlingly "so£t" words; 776, Medea's plan to use "soft"
,,ords to Jason).
realizes

that

Even the hal£-heartedly competitive Creon

"being

soft"

leads

to

regret

(316).

Is

it

anY wonder, then, that such disdain 0£ softness would
eradicate children, among whose most prominent
characteristics to the ancient GreeKs was the very
softness355

so

disdained

by

competitors?

Both

Medea

and Jason remark. on their children's "soft" sKin (1075,
1403).

Such remarKs signal not only the desirability 0£

children, but their vulnerability in the contest as well.
The softness 0£ children seals their death on a field of
hardened and hard competitors.
In short, competition is innately deadly to children,
especially to the children of those who engage in it.
death of Creon's daughter illustrates this.

The

She, too, liKe

Medea's children, had the mis£ortune 0£ being labelled
"dearest" (if

only

indirectly; see

halfheartedly) competitive parent.

line

329) by

her

(albeit

Predictably, then,

Creon's daughter also dies--and she almost literally--of
the play's disease, in a hideous competition with her
father, with whom she is described by the Messenger to be
"wrestling":

"There
Golden,

was

a

terrible/clever

Children,

p.

8.

wrestling,"
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Poor

ever the reluctant competitor, is £inally pinned,

er eon.

He is, according to the Messenger, no longer

"anquished.
"Oll

1214).35 6

11'a~alaµ.a-ra,

o'

0£"

top

c

,

(u11'ep-repo5,

1219)

harm.

The princess• death scene abounds in grisly details
that are not merely gratuitous; they serve a serious
.

func t ion.

357

The

scene

iDJ.press the audience:
her

in to

a

ghastly

is

doubly

meant

to

shock.

and

£irst, it tak.es a child and turns
corpse;358

second,

tinges death with a hint o-f the erotic.

its

culmination

In short,

Euripides gives -first a graphic depiction o-f the horrors o-f
the conjunction o-f young li-fe and death, and then makes it
356see McDermott, Incarnation, p. 87, who also
notes that the men . . . de construction 0£ lines 1215-1216
"succinctly re£lects the change in this particular parentchild relationship £rom reciprocity to antagonism."
Cf.
Rewton, "Passionate Poison," p. 18.
357Browne, "Interpretations," p. 78, suggests that
Euripides uses "drama tic economy" in keeping Medea silent
about the e£fects of the magical apparel so as to exploit
"vivid, articulate horror" in his description here.
Gellie, "Character," p. 21, suggests that the grisly death
scene interrupts the audience's emotional involvement with
Kedea•s "racked motherhood" and cautions them •to stand
aloof."
Husurillo, "Reconsideration,• pp. 62-63, by contrast,
finds the scene's descriptions "nauseating," and comments
that the "destruction o-f the innocent Glauke seems
gratuitous and waste£ul: it serves merely to demonstrate
Kedea•s awe-inspiring power and the -force o-f her
vengeance."
In this, "Euripides reveals himself as a
master of pure horror" and "betrays his morbid streak."
358 see Buttrey, "Accident," p. 12:
"1£ you do not
~nderstand the meaning of a child's death, an example is
lmmedia tely at hand: the second part of the episode is the
messenger's relation 0£ the death of Creusa."
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doublY

repugnant 35 9

by

casting

this

conjunction

as

procreation. 360

per-verse

That Euripides intends the audience to consider
Creon's daughter a child is not di££icult to de-fend.
,...

iS

called

ll'OlS

because,

technically

speak.ing,

She
she

is a child, as was every girl 0£ her era until marriage.361

And

although

this

particular

girl

can

be

argued to have given up the stat us 0£ child by her recent
marriage

(see

especially

betray her as childish.

1178),

her

actions

nonetheless

She may not be described as so£t

in sK.in as are the children 0£ Jason and Medea, but she has
the other so£tness typical 0£ children:

she is so-ft 0£

character.

Variable as the weather, she is, malleable, and

greedy,

ancient

as

Greek.s

thought

children

were.362

Within £our lines (1146-1149) she goes -from eagerness to
disgust, -from an intent gaze to eyes covered by her hands
and head turned away.
Perhaps the princess is momentarily the adult in the
3 5 9Pace Ohlander, Suspense, p. 167, who argues
that Euripides guards against Medea's losing the audience's
sympathy by k.eeping the princess 0££ stage.
3 6 0see Newton, "Passionate Poison," pp. 16-19, on
Whose superb analysis 0£ the erotic elements 0£ this scene
my discussion depends. I depart, however, -from Newton on
several points, which mak.es our assessments 0£ what is
communicated by this scene radically di££erent.
361M. Golden, Children, p. 15; see his n. 81 on p.
187 £or ancient sources.
C£. Dunk.le, "Aegeus Episode," p.
lOq.

n.

7.

Golden,

Children,

pp.

8-9.
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presence 0£ her new husband; Burnett's description 0£ her
as "touched by lust (1146)" and "haughty and filled with
10 athing

£or

Medea's

sons"

is

not

without

merit.363

aer actions can be understood as those 0£ any adult but
young bride confronted with evidence 0£ her husband's
forrner sexual attachments.

The princess' presumably adult

disdain £or the children and sti££ resistance to her
husband's appeal to be reasonable immediately melt,
however, in the £ace 0£ pretty baubles that are dandled in
front

0£

her.3 64

Burnett

finds

in

the

princess'

greed

evidence 0£ Corinthian sensuality, 0£ moral weakness and
culpability.365

It

takes

a

determinedly

stern

attitude, though, to require adult sensibilities and a
corresponding accountability from the likes 0£ this girl,
whose lust quickly subsides (did she £eel lust, or merely
act it out?), who can barely wait £or her husband's and his
children's departure before she dons the dress and tiara
3 63Burnett,

"Tragedy

0£

Revenge,"

p.

18.

36 4Mills, Mythopoeia, p. 85, sees in Medea's gifts
to the princess the -folktale motif 0£ •a jealous -fairy or
nymph [who] uses the gift 0£ a magical belt in an attempt
to destroy her rival." Furthermore, Medea, by dressing up
the princess in her [Medea's] clothes and then destroying
her, creates a double 0£ herself and destroys her mortal
aspect.
(pp.
121-122).
365 Burnett, "Tragedy 0£ Revenge," pp. 18-19.
C-f.
~hlander, Suspense, p. 167, who acknowledges that
~Uripides presents the new bride in a scarcely winning
tlght" _but adds: "There can be no denying, however, that
he Princess dies horribly and could hardly have sinned
enough in her short life to merit such punishment."

1
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{U 5 6-1158),

playing

a

little

girl's

dress-up

game

as

she

priIDPS in :front o:f the mirror and prances about the room,
too

0

ver joyed at

the :fall o:f

the gown (1161-1166) to recall

tnat she has abandoned her adult disdain.

In :front o-f our

eyes, Euripides has begun to turn the newly adult bride
))aCK into the little girl she so recently has been.
Euripides completes this trans:forma tion :from young
adult to child even as he is turning the princess into a
corpse.

First, her childish glee is momentarily inter-

rupted by a chilling :foreshadowing:
reflection,366
•lifeless
owµ.aT05,

which

image

o:f

her

The

1162).

Euripides
body"

moment

is

she smiles at her

describes
(a-.vuxov
ghoulish

as
>

the
'

€lKW

and

disturbing,

coming as it does in the midst o:f her dress-up game.

Then

the princess is beset by what at :first seems to be some
kind

0£

£it:

she

pales,

£alls

into

a

chair,367

'foams

at the mouth as her eyes roll bacK, and 'finally bursts into
flames

(1167-1189).

headlong

flight

Her childish prancing gives
(1164,

1190); the

tiara

way

to

once set on so

care-fully arranged tresses now cannot be hurled :from the
3 6 6 Hewton, "Passionate Poison," p. 16, sees this
act, as well as the princess• extreme joy and repeated
looking at her outstretched cal£ (1165) as autoerotic (see
his n. 12). Similarly, Hewton argues that the dainty step
Of the princess echoes the "tender-£ooted Eros" described
~y Agathon in Plato's Symposium 195d-e; the "li:feless
image" recalls a symptom o:f eros in Archilochus 104W.
367 The princess• change of sK.in color and
trembling limbs remind Hew ton, "Passionate Poison,• p. 16,
of symptoms of love described by Sappho 31LP.
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:nair

o£

£rantically

a

shaken

(1160-1161,

head

gelpless to save hersel£, the girl £alls into a

1191-1192).

But

heap.

finallY, and all the while increasing the horror almost
:beyond our endurance, Euripides turns the princess once and
for all time back into a child.

He does this by bringing

ber £ather upon the scene.
A parent, as Euripides is care-ful to have his
111essenger

note, is probably the only one who can identi£y

tbe young girl:
bard

to

she was "

recognize

,

at

sight"

,..

l0€l v,

us behind

her

£ather's

except to a
(v)..fiv

1196).
eyes,368

parent, very
'

T<t>

T€KOVTl

Euripides
and

it

is

thus
with

puts

these

eyes that we see the de£ormities the princess has su££ered
(1197-1202).
position.

Her eyes have shi£ted -from their normal
Her whole £ace has lost its £ine con£ormation.

Blood mixed with £ire drips -from the top 0£ her head.

The

poison still gnaws away -from inside her; her -flesh oozes
off her bones like sap 0££ a pine tree.
macabre,

revoltingly

dis-figured

A

child becomes a

corpse

(veicpou,

1203).
We are no more -finished beholding her with a parent's
eyes,

than

in

falls

upon

the

comes

her

corpse

£a ther

(ll'aT.fip,

1205),

1204),

twice

who

calling

it

3 6 8 Euripides has, in £act, immediately be-fore the
messenger's speech prepared the audience to view as parents
by having the Chorus sing about the travails 0£ those who
rear children (1190-1115).
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( '5'

•cnild"

.....

0

,

1207;

11'aL,

1210).

IEICVOV,

l{iS -vrish to die with her, expressed in extreme grie'f, is
granted a£ter his grie£ has abated (1210-1211), and we
,,itness rather and child in a grisly struggle.

Time seems

to stand still as she appears to come alive only to Kill
:tiiID.369

And,

in

the

end,

it

does

stand

still

regard a bizarre and un£orgettable tableau:

as

we

"They lie, the

corpses, both child and old rather, close together, longed
for--in
,..

tears--the

IE

1fQLS

.

IC al

disaster."

,

ouµ.cpopa,

.

El Vial

VEKPOL

11'09El v.fi

veAas,

YEPWV
I

I

c§aKpUOLOl

(IC

1220-1221).

The description or the child and parent lying together
dead is not, however, merely pathetic.
suggestive.

The physical closeness or the child and £a ther

is stressed
third

It is erotically

in

element

VaT.fip

father, close

the
in

Greek.

an

text

by

alliterative

11'09EL v.fi,

i.e.,

"

together, longed 'for

veAas, which is the
chain:
child

"

The chain or

words is itsel'f somewhat suggestive, but becomes even more
so by the emphatic placement or "close together" at the
line's beginning, and hard upon the word £or "longed 'for"

36 9 McDermott, Incarnation, p. 87, argues
convincingly that Euripides, by using the £eminine pronoun
·~he" <11. 1216) to describe the corpse's struggle
~lth Creon, seems to revivi'fy the daughter only to cause
e:r- father's death.
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"£Ull

longing").370

0£

surely one can consider neither the striking
alli tera ti ve chain nor the doubly strategic placement 0£

11'£>.as

accidental,

especially

when

one

re£lects

upon

tnis line's status as climax 0£ a scene in which other
erotic elements abound.
ff. Newton

These have been duly noted by Rick.

in his article, "Medea's Passionate Poison."

Although I disagree with Newton's £inal assessment 0£ the
meaning conveyed here, he is correct in arguing £or this
scene's eroticism.

Newton cites an impressive list 0£ loci

classici to illustrate that all 0£ the £ol1owing can be
interpreted as erotic:
(1162),
skin

autoerotic
color

and

the princess• delighted laughter

sel£-gazing
trembling

(1162-1165),

limbs

and

(1168-1169);

change

Creon's

0£

lover-

like desire to merge with his daughter in death (1210), and
the subsequent melding 0£ his £lesh with that 0£ his
daughter

a£ter

their

"wrestling

match"

(1214).371

370Newton, "Passionate Poison,• p. 19, notes the
emphatic position 0£ the adverb 1l'e>.as at the line's
beginning, but does not remark. upon its proximity to
Vo9eLv.fi.
This last word is not, 0£ course, i tsel£
erotically suggestive.
Indeed, as the line progresses into
tears
and
disaster
(c5atc.puoLol
ouµ.cpopa),
sexual
suggestiveness yields to horror.
This does not, however,
Obliterate the line's eroticism, much as one would pre£er
that it did.
371 Newton, "Passionate Poison,• pp. 14-19.
Newton
:rgues that other details 0£ the scene are likewise erotic;
he ones I have cited are those which I £ind most
convincing. Newton gives many citations to ancient texts
Wh·
lch I will not reproduce here.
To the re£erences on
;restling as love-making, however, I would add one, called
0
my attention by James G. Keenan:
Cassandra •s
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This last, the "wrestling match," deserves further
coIDIDent, for it is here that I depart from Newton.

As has

aireadY been noted (above, Part Two), "wrestling" denotes
coIDPeti tion.

It also, as Newton argues, connotes for the

ancient Greeks love-making, a connotation undoubtedly
suggested by the close physical proximity the two acts have
in common.

Denotation, however, predominates over con no-

tation in the messenger's description, because the
norrifying

details

of

this

"match"

(1212-1217)

depict

death so graphically that the erotic undertone is
increasingly eclipsed.

By the end, when Euripides has his

messenger reveal corpses of father and daughter lying close
together, the depiction, despite erotic undertones, ends
with

tears

and

disaster

,
ouµcpopa,

(daKpUOlOl

1221).

To be sure, an incest ual tryst is suggested by this
•wrestling."

In the context of the whole scene, though,

where a child becomes a corpse that literally wrestles her
father

to

a

gruesome

death 372

•

while

he

is

all

the

While fighting her, the perversity is not only, and not
Primarily,

sexuai.373

description of Apollo
her at Agamemnon 1206.

as

"wrestler"

(11'a>.ato1Tis>

with

3 72simon, Tragic Drama, p. 78, interprets the
melding of flesh in this scene as one more example of the
Violence and torture resulting from touch.
373 Pace Newton, "Passionate Poison," p. 18 n. 18
and p. 19, where he suggests that Creon loved his daughter
excessively and suffered an ironically fit ting end.
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rn short, the -father-daughter relationship is more
grossly distorted by the overt struggle between the corpse
and her -father than it is by the sexual suggestiveness 0£
tne

scene.374

There

is,

indeed,

perversion

0£

eros

in

Uiis scene, but the perversion is 0£ eros by competition,
.., 11 ich, in its extreme, turns love, even the love 0£ a

father £or his daughter, into a struggle that ends in
death.
Medea's "delight" as she anticipates hearing the
details 0£ the death-struggle indicate how Euripides
intended the perversion 0£ eros in this scene to be
understood:
(1'epvelaS.)

(1134-1135).
related

"How did they die?

us

twice

The

as

verb

much

i£

,

-repirw

noun

For you will delight

she

and

they
here

died

horribly"

uses,

adjective

and

its

(-repirvos.)

are largely concerned with sensual pleasures, whether these
be -food, drink, song, stories, or, as the observation 0£
Kimnermus

(5.3)

reminds,

the

delights

0£

Aphrodite.375

Here, delight is again sensually aroused, not by hearing
song, nor partaking 0£ rood, nor engaging in sex, but by
hearing the grotesque details 0£ a £a ther and daughter
brought together in deaths that parody love-making.

This,

i.e., by hearing the destruction 0£ one's enemies, is what
374on this point,
McDermott Incarnation,
•
375L;:;J9,
Tepirvos..

s.v.

see the excellent
pp. 86-89.
,

-repirw,

discussion

0£

and
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delight.

gi ..,es

Medea, then, is true source 0£ the perversion.

For,

e..,en though the Messenger tells the tale, it is £rom the
perspective 0£ the competitive Medea that the
trans-formation 0£ a child into a corpse has erotic
undertones, as, in turn, does the trans£orma tion 0£ that
..,erY corpse into a force of destruction against its own
father.

Even the -father is hideously trans-formed by

Medea •s eros rendered perverse by competition:

Creon

changes -from one who, lover-like, wants only to die with
his child (1207-1210) to one who struggles mightily to get
rid

her.376

of

But -from another perspective, that 0£ the Messenger
who

is

con-fused

at

Medea's

initial

glee

(1129-1131),

is more horri£ying tragedy than incest ual tryst.

this

So much

his last descriptive line (1221) and the regret£ul tone 0£
his closing

remarks

(1224-1230) suggest.

has borne terrible issue:

Competitive eros

a dead father locked in the

perversion 0£ a loving embrace with a corpse recognizable
only to him as his own beloved child.
There is, as we shall see, a

similarly perverse issue

3 76McDermott, Incarnation, p. 86, suggests that
Creon's wish " . . . is revealed as a standard elegiac
topic, not literally meant.
However, with grim irony, it
Will be literally granted . .
"
See also Simon, Tragic
~. p. 98: "The movements conveyed by the messenger's
description 0£ Creon trying to save his tormented daughter
are a hideous combination 0£ excessive closeness and
excessive separation."
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:frOIIl the eros 0£ Medea and Jason.

As they single-mindedly

:follow their true desire, to attain competitive arete,
tneir children, no less than Creon's child, are rendered
corpses.

As we are treated to the vision 0£ Medea, Jason,

and the child corpses in the 'final scene, we are shown the
epitome 0£ the perverse issue 0£ competitive eros:
death.

young

And as we think. back. to the young death that was

the princess', two truths begin to dawn:

that young death

is, contrary to what is suggested by a competitive creed
that rewards high stakes, anything but beauti£ul, and that
such a death sucks into its vortex 0£ horror the parent 0£
the

child.
The idea 0£ the beauty 0£ young death is an epic moti£

that expresses all 0£ the idealism 0£ competitive arete.
In order to attain glory and honor, one must set the stakes
high, must put one's lire on the line; doing so does not
insure (except in the case 0£ Achilles) but certainly
increases the chance that one will die young.
is

beau ti£ul,

it

is

a

k.alos

thana tos.377

Such a death
Euripides

has, in describing the death 0£ the young princess,
exploited this moti£ and exposed it to reductive
absurdity.
The princess, like the children 0£ Jason and Medea, is

377 Identi:fied by Vernant, "Beautiful Death," pp.
~0-83.
C:f. Michelini, Tragic Tradition, pp. 169-170, £or
he exploitation 0£ the epic moti£ 0£ the youth£ul death in
Rur-ipides• Hecuba.
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roung. and therefore by this fact alone a candidate for
}C.aios thanatos.
::;;----

on

the

She, like they, is not, however, a

battle:field,378

but

a

:frivolous

young

warrior

girl.

furthermore, she is hardly allowed to die with any beauty.
instead, she is grotesquely deformed by the pharmaKa on the
gown and tiara, and dies the pa the tic death o:f the disfigured corpse.

O:f the three types o:f hideous death, o:f

outrage (aiKia), Vernant has identified as possible :for a
warrior to su:f:fer--dis:figurement, dismemberment, or
decomposi tion--379

the

princess

su:f:fers

the

:first:

One Kind o:f cruelty consists in defiling the bloody
corpse with dust and in tearing his :flesh, so that the
enemy will lose his individual appearance, his clear
set o:f :features, his color and glamor; he loses his
distinct :form along with his human aspect, so that he
becomes unrecognizable. When Achilles begins to abuse
HeKtor, he ties the corpse to his chariot to tear off
its skin, by let ting i t--especially the head and the
hair--drag on the ground in the dust: "A cloud o:f
dust rose where HeKtor was dragged, his dark. hair was
:falling about him, and all that head that once was so
handsome [paros charien] was tum bled in the dust" (IL
2.2..401-3).
By dirtying and disfiguring the corpse,
instead o:f purifying and anointing it, aiKia seeks to
destroy the individuality of a body that was the
source o:f the charm o:f youth and life. Achilles wants
HeKtor to be like Sarpedon: "Ho longer could a man,
even a Knowing one, have made out the godlike
Sarpedon, since he was piled :from head to ends o:f :feet
under a mass o:f weapons, the blood and the dust" (Il.
16.637-40).380
3 7 8 christopher H. Dawson, "Random Thoughts on
Occasional Poems," YCS 19 (1966), pp. 51-55, discusses how
Tyrtaeus (:fr. 7 Diehl, 19-32) stresses that being dead is
only beautiful i:f a man has died on the :front lines in
defense o:f his country.
37 9vernant,

"Beautiful

Death,"

pp.

380 vernant,

"Beautiful

Death,"

p.

70-72.
70.
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we now can better understand the detail Euripides has
ia"lished on describing the princess• death.

The young girl

suffers nearly every aspect 0£ dis£igurement alluded to
abo"fe.

She is all but unrecognizable (1196), her £eat ures

and beauty destroyed (1197-1198), her hair is de£iled with
blood and

£ire (1198-1199),

ing her 0£ human aspect:

her

'flesh is

torn

0££, depriv-

she brings to mind a pine tree

(1200).

such gross dis£igurement is actualized in epic, but in
the most signi£icant cases it is countermanded by the gods,
who protect the hero's glorious status by preserving the
body

from

allowed

to

harm.381
view

the

Furthermore,
death

0£

the

parents

are

hero;382

rarely

they

are

instead brought in only notionally by the poet, by £lashback or £lash-£orward, and then to increase the pathos or
to begin the mourning that will doubtlessly ensue at such a
tragic

and

beauti£ul

sel£-sacri£ice.383

But

no

such

divine preservation and no such re-fined pathos occur in
Medea; instead the princess is le£t a hideous mass 0£
flesh, ultimately lying next to the equally dis-figured
corpse 0£ her 'father, who has died with the memory 0£ the
3 8 1vernant,

"Bea uti:ful

Dea th,"

p.

7 4.

3B2charles Segal, The Theme 0£ the Mutilation 0£
!.!!_e Corpse in the Iliad (Leyden:
E. J. Brill, 1971;
herea£ter Segal, Mutilation), p. 17.
3 8 3Jasper Gri££in, Homer on Lire and Death
(O:x: ford:
Clarendon Pre s-s-,--1-9_8_0_)_,_p_p-.--1--2-3___1_2_7_____
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grotesque thing his daughter has become.
If there was, before this scene, any con-fusion
:relllaining that the code of the zero-sum competitor is a
~ile

perversion of the heroic creed, no such confusion can

1f'ithstand the view with which the spectator is left at the
end of this scene.

There is here no glory, no honor, there

iS no beauty, no victory.

Furthermore, there is no mention

of anyone to bury these two; they are abandoned in a parody
of procreation, an embrace that has brought grotesque
death.
With this image in mind38'l we are led into what
can now only be considered paradox:

Medea's decision to

proceed with killing her own children.

The juxtaposition

of birth and death is nowhere more violent than in Medea's
formulation of that decision:
kill

Will
)

[them]"

c

"'

("l'llJ.ElS

•we who gave [them] birth
"'
KTEVOUlJ.EV

Cl

Olll'Ep

I

e~ecpuaaµ.ev,

1063).

The

decision

to

kill

the

children, logical :for the zero-sum competitor, becomes
repugnant by the juxtapositon of birth and death.

Deftly,

as if through the sleight-of-hand of some shell game,
Euripides has indeed brought us to paradox, a mother who
must kill the children she has borne into life.

For what

else is paradox than inexorable, yet emotionally

38 '1Buttrey, "Accident,• p. 12 n. 11!:
•
the
murder of Creusa is a sort of prologue to the death of the
Children. She is just as they, without :form, without
Character, without even a name in the play.•
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unacceptable,

logic?385

The paradox of a mother who kills her young is brought
discomfortingly into physical manifestation in the final
encounter between Jason and Medea.

Here, in the little

bodies Medea carries aloft with her in her moment of
seeming triumph, is the visible evidence of this perversion
of nature, the withdrawal of life from its soft, sweetsmelling, fresh,

young

receptacles.

Here, again,

and this

ume not merely described but made visible, are corpses of
children.

And here, with these corpses, is their mother

385ohlander, Suspense, pp. 14-3-14-5, has a good
appreciation 0£ the paradoxical nature of Medea •s decision;
cf. Pucci, "Monument," pp. 186-187, for the paradox
becoming apparent and projected into the future at the
play•s close, where Medea announces the ritual to
commemorate her children, upon which Pucci remarks, "The
unresolvable tension will continue forever."
See Burnett,
"Tragedy of Revenge," p. 19, for Euripides• use in Medea of
a "reversal of nature motif" whereby "· . . a mother is to
bring death instead of life to her children .
"
Cf.
Kills, Mythopoeia, p. 107.
Similarly, Michelini, "Neophron," p. 131, explains,
"Kedeia's particular dilemma and the solution she chooses
involve her in interlocking contradictions."
Cf. p. 134-,
where Michelini terms Medea " . . . . an absurdity, a
paradox, in which conflicting forces are held forever in
opposition."
I do not, however, agree with Michelini's
later assertions (p. 133):
1) that the Medea's dilemma
"resembles the complex picture of moral responsibility that
we find in Aristotle more than it does a Sophistic or
Socratic paradox," and 2) that "· . . Medeia, who feels
mother love most keenly at the moment of her decision to
murder, recognizes the irrational force guiding her
rationality."
It is her mother love that is "irrational,"
and her decision to murder that is "rational," within the
dictates of the established definitions. The paradox, by
stressing the emotional unacceptability of seeing a
decision to murder one's own children as "rational," forces
the recognition that it is the definitions, not the logic,
that is wrong. As in elenchos, one must discard the
Proposed definitions and begin anew.
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.... no Killed them.

But, as Creon's death has suggested, the

parent cannot survive the death 0£ the child, £or death
ina1<.es no such discrimination.

Parents, whether willing or

not, cannot but die when their children die.
The women 0£ the Chorus have already revealed that to
parents the loss 0£ a
(i113); so distressing

child is the "most distressing grie£"

that not having children maKes one

:nappier than having them (1090-1093).

We can now, a£ter

:naving witnessed Creon's death with his child and Hedea•s
killing 0£ her own children, understand 'further why it is
that the women 0£ the Chorus can think only o-f Ino as a
parallel to Medea •s situation.
children
her two
a hint

died:

and

"

dying

with

children she was destroyed"
that

Medea

should

is a recognition 0£ a
parents

Ino, too, died when her

die

when

£act:

their

kill

(ouveavouoCa1)

(1289).

hersel£;386

This is

not

instead,

it

whether literally or not,

children

die.387

386Pace Hugh Parry, The Lyric Poems 0£ Greek
Tragedz (Toronto and Sarasota:
Samuel Stevens, 1978), p.
198.
C-f. the suggestion o-f Cunningham, "Medea," pp. 156157, that the participle o>.oµ.E:vav at 1253 has
optative £orce, and that the Chorus• attitude toward Medea
after the murder is one 0£ revulsion.
3 87 So Conacher, Euripidean Drama, p. 197;
Conacher, however, does not notice the parallel suggested
by the scene between Creon and his daughter, and thus
dismisses the Chorus• Ino analogue as an in tima ti on that
Medea's continuing to live and -flourish annuls.
Hills,
~thopoeia, p. 123, sees Ino•s death as a parallel to
Medea's in that Medea has to destroy a part o-f hersel£, her
maternal instinct, in order to Kill the children.
C£.
~haw, "Female Intruder," p. 262, who asserts that earlier,
in Medea's second scene with Jason, "her [Medea's]
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Neither Jason nor Medea literally die, but both su-f-fer
ttie death o-f their glory and honor, their status o-f
attaining competitive arete.
foretold

Jason's ignoble death is

by an exultant Medea (1386-1388); he himsel£

acKnowledges that he has been destroyed (1350).

Medea,

111 eanwhile, is likewise destroyed along with her children.
A.s Jason and modern critics are quick. to point out, her
act has in some sense assaulted her status as human
being.388

Her

victory

0£

not

being

laughed

at

pales

by

involuntary outbursts or grie£ reveal that a part 0£
hersel-f is su££ering and dying."
388The mode 0£ Medea •s escape in the sun-chariot
is regularly cited as evidence or her loss or humanity.
For Medea's trans-formation into a -faux-goddess, see
Cunningham, "Medea," pp. 158-160; er. Schlesinger, "Zu
Medea," p. 51:
"Der Mensch Medea is tot; an ihre Stelle is
die siegreiche Rachegottin getreten."
Knox, "Medea," pp.
303-306, points out Medea's similarities to other
Euripidean gods -from the machine, but concludes that she is
meant to represent "· . . something permanent and power£ul
in the human situation . . . ."; Cowherd, "Ending," p. 135,
asserts that this "irresistible power" is thumos, which
Cowherd interprets as generalized emotion. To Conacher,
Euripidean Drama, p. 198, Medea has been trans-formed into
"the folk.-tale fiend of magic powers."
Burnett, "Tragedy
of Revenge," p. 2.2., sees Medea as "slough[ing] o-ff" her
humanity to become "a truly impersonal alastor."
Boogie, "Heroic Elements," p. 54-, casts Medea's
trans£orma tion in a positive light: she has become "
something more than human, in a sense, puri£ied by the
cleansing £ire o-f her own passion." Furthermore, she is
"godUk.e": "The gift or the chariot -from her grand-father
the Sun symbolizes the recognition, the glory she has won
in the eyes 0£ the gods." Boogie is forced by her analysis
of Medea as "heroic" into such ill-considered
P:ronouncements.
Mills, Mythopoeia, p. 93, by contrast,
sees as evidence o-f Medea's duality the £act that "·
She, a polluted murderess, is rescued by the Sun-god, the
very incarnation of purity and light."
Contra Bongie's optimism, see H. P. Stahl, "On Extrad:ramatic Communication in Euripides," YCS 2.5 (1977), p.

57.q.

comparison with the destruction o:f her glory and honor that
Killing her children has brought upon her; liKe the corpses
of the princess and Creon, Medea has been dis:figured to the

point where she is no longer recognizably human.

LiKe

Jason, Medea can no longer be the object o:f approval she
once was.

She is hideously trans:formed, and in the

description o:f her trans:forma tion, we are allowed to see
that the human status she has lost is that 0£ the hero.
We have already witnessed Medea's pro:fessed delight at
hearing the report o:f the princess' and Creon's deaths, and
we recall that these deaths entailed grotesque dis:figuring
of a corpse, and that Medea had been care:ful to arrange

just such a death (784-788).

Medea has thus become that

which the epic hero--with one notable exception--only
threatens to become:

one who not only Kills his enemy, but

proceeds to outrage the enemy's corpse.

The notable

exception

whose

is,

o:f

course,

Achilles,389

vile

treatment o:f Hector in Iliad 22 is the climax in a rising
170, who cautions, "We should not minimize the horrors
Euripides 'finds inherent in human nature by saying that
Medea here substitutes £or the not human deus ex machina."
See also Ohlander, Suspense, p. 185, to whom Medea is "a
wrecKed mortal."
A very balanced discussion 0£ the many aspects 0£
Medea's airborne escape can be 'found in Mills, Mythopoeia,
Pp.
109-118.
389one could argue that Odysseus serves as
another, and, on one point, an even more appropriate
comparison. Odysseus allowed, even as Medea arranged :for,
the mutilation 0£ one 0£ his enemies, Melanthius {Odyssey
22.474-477).

575
crescendo

0£

threats

0£

corpse

mutilation390 __ threats

•hiCh veil an even more hideous threat:

raw-ea ting the

corpse.391

enemy's

The case 0£ Achilles and that 0£ Medea are, then,
strangely exceptional, and there-fore comparable.
desecrate the corpses 0£ their enemies:

Both

Achilles by boring

a hole in Hector's heels and dragging his body (Iliad
22.395-404), Medea by arranging the hideous devastation her
poison's

e££ect

(1167-1203).

bY the enemy's parent(s):

Both

outrages

are

witnessed

Hector's dragging is viewed from

afar by Hecabe and Priam as well as Andromache (Iliad
22.405-436,

462-515);

Creon's

mis-fortune

is

worse,

and

yet

it has only begun, when he stumbles in upon the hideous

mass that once was his daughter (1204-1210).
But there the similarities end.
relents.

Achilles so£tens and

Al though Hector's corpse has been outraged, the

outrage is in some sense mitigated by the gods' alleged
protection

0£

the

corpse

(23.184-191;

24.18-21),

by

the

decreasing detail in descriptions 0£ the mutilation
(22..395-405;

23.24-26;

24.14-18),392

and

by

Achilles'

both seeing to the repair 0£ damage he has done the corpse
390segal,
33-47.

Mutilation,

passim,

but

especially

pp.

391James M. Red£ield, Nature and Culture in the
!!iad: The Tragedy 0£ Hector (Chicago and London: Univ.
of Chicago Press, 1975; Phoenix BooKs, 1978; herea£ter
Red-field, Nature and Culture), pp. 193-203.
3 92segal,

Mutilation,

pp.

42

and

57.
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and Keeping it out 0£ Priam's sight until it is so repaired
(24.581-586).
This last is but one example 0£ Achilles• respect£ul
treatment 0£ the grieving Priam.

When Priam -first enters

.Achilles• tent, the hero submits to the old man's touch 0£
supplication, gently removing Priam's hand only a£ter
bearing out his appeal £or the return 0£ his son's body
Achilles

(24-.475-480; 508-509).

agrees

to return the

body

for burial, and himsel£ attends to some 0£ the details 0£
tbe return (24.571-591).
secure a

Furthermore, he promises to

moratorium to give time £or burial (24.656-670).

But this is not all the hero Achilles does.

He shares with

Priam both the wisdom he has gained £rom his own grie£
(24.523-551,

596-620)

(24.601-627).393

and,

This

more

last

importantly,

a

mani£ests

the

act

meal
communion

of Achilles and Priam £rom their shared experience 0£ loss.
It is no wonder that at this juncture the poet describes

the respect these two ostensible enemies £eel £or one
another (24.628-632).

The violence latent between them

(24.567-570, 583-586) never detonates;

they

instead part in

peace, with Achilles using touch to reassure the old man
(24.671-672).

This

is

the

hero's

£inal

act

in

the

Iliad;

When the poet withdraws him -from our vision, he is asleep
beside

Briseis

393see
feasting.

(24.675-676).

above,

Part

Four,

£or

the

signi£icance

0£
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How di££erent are Medea •s 'final acts!

As was noted

above, the princess• corpse was a££Orded no divine protection, and the outrage visited upon it is described in
unremittingly brutal detail.

Furthermore, the desecration

of this corpse is never repaired, and, in £act, the
corpse's parent, instead 0£ being kept at a

distance, is

made the unwilling instrument of the its -further humiliation.
The princess' death-scene, as has been argued, serves
as an analogue £or what -follows:

the second turning o-f
·i

children into corpses, the killing 0£ Medea's own children.
And in the scene where Medea displays their bodies -from
afar to their grief-stricken father, her actions again show
how f'ar -from the heroic Achilles is Medea, the zero-sum
competitor.

There is here no possibility for actual

supplication:

Jason cannot touch Medea (1320).

There is

no return 0£ the bodies to the father, and there will be no
burial
not

be

of

them

allowed

at

his hands

even

to

touch

(1377-1378;

them

1410-1412);

(1402-1404;

he will

1411-1412).

Al though Jason and Medea do share grief (1361-1362), and
one even more common than that of' Priam and Achilles, there
is no quieting here, no re solution, no parting in peace
with a reassuring touch.

That is because there is no hero

here, and the transformation 0£ Medea described by Jason
makes it clear that she, no less than he, has lost any
association she may have had with the approval given to one
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of heroic stature.
In short, Jason is unwittingly on-target when he
describes Medea's transformation into a
K.illS

her

cubs

(1407),394

a

wild

beast,

lioness (1342) who
a

monster

like

scylla (1343) who is no less befouled with the blood 0£
slaughter (1346) than that monster who ate the raw £lesh 0£
men.

What all 0£ these descriptions suggest is the

degenerated hero, which is precisely what the zero-sum
competitor

is.

The comparison 0£ a warrior to a lion is a £avorite in
Homeric epic; the struggles between man and lion, and
between the lion and other beasts serve as comparisons £or
man's

struggling

with

man

in

war.395

The

lion's

awesome power as king 0£ beasts makes him the perfect
comparison £or a warrior engaged in successful battle.
That is not to say that the lion is regularly depicted as
having an easy time 0£ it.

He is o£ten, i£ set against

helpless herds or £locks, equally matched by the men and
dogs

who

come

to

de£end

the

domesticated

animals.396

Comparison with lions, then, is engineered to highlight a
warrior as perseverant and brave in a contest in which he
394HcDermot t, Inca rna ti on, p. 67, po in ts out
Medea's transformation -from lioness protecting her cubs
(187-188) to child-murdering lioness (1407).
C£. Simon,
!!'agic Drama, p. 89 n. 28.
395Red£ield,

Ha ture

and

Culture,

p.

191.

396Red:field,

Hature

and

Culture,

p.

192.
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IDaY £all.

Lion similes celebrate the strength and bravery

of the warrior.
There is another reason why the lion is a £a vored
comparative to the warrior, and that is because the lion is
imagined to be driven by blood-lust.

As such, this animal,

often

depicted

(e.g.,

5.782,

7.256,

consuming

15.592,

raw

-flesh

18.582-583;

Odyssey

Iliad

3.23-25,

9.292-293),

serves as the external mani-festation o-f war s latent
1

threat:

that the heroic warrior may violate those

boundaries o-f civilization his role -forces him to brush
against and at the same time protect.

For the heroic

warrior must act lil<.e the predatory lion but never partal<.e
of the l<.ill.

Doing so would trans-form him -from human into

beast, -from hero into horror.
The Iliad, as Segal and Red-field have argued, depicts
a world where just such a trans-formation o-f the hero is
ever menacing, in the thrill o-f battle that overtal<.es even
the best, in threats to leave bodies unburied -for carrion,
in threats o-f corpse mutilation, in actual mutilation, and
in the threats and suppositions that someone or another
wants to eat or is capable o-f eating the enemy s
1

flesh.397

What

Euripides

has

done

in

Medea

is

to

show

Medea as a warrior who has given in to the dark.est
impulses:

she is termed a

lioness, but not so as to

3 9 7 segal, Hu tila tion, passim;
2-_ulture, pp. 167-169, 189-203.

Red-field,

Nature

and
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bighlight her strength and bravery.

She is a warrior, but

not the hero whose reason £or doing battle is protection 0£
tbe vulnerable and the young; Medea is instead a horror who
Kills her own, who, lion-like, eats raw 'flesh.

This is the

trans-formation Euripides e££ects by having Jason describe
Medea as he does:

as lioness (134-2) who kills her young

(1'!07), and as one 0£ a

nature wilder than Scylla's (134-2).

As lioness who kills her young, Medea loses every
positive association the lion simile holds £or the heroic
warrior.

Instead 0£ engaging in battle with equals, she

attacks those whose weakness in the £ace 0£ her strength
precludes their sel£-de£ense.

She £irst killed a

£ri volous

young girl, and now has killed two other children.

Killing

the de£enseless may be lion-like, but it is not one 0£ the
positive associations between heroic warriors and lions.
In Homeric epic, comparisons describing lions who all too
easily take their prey are, whether to lion or to prey,
clearly

meant

Odyssey

as

4-.335-34-0

insults
[=

or rebukes

17 .126-131]).

(Iliad 21.4-81-4-88;

Furthermore,

heroic

warriors are ennobled when compared to lions (and other
animals) who de£end their own and £eel keen loss when their
Young
322);398

become
heroic

the

prey

warriors

0£

others

do

not,

(Iliad
as

17.132-136; 18.318-

Medea

has,

turn

on

398Red£ield, Nature and Culture, pp. 50 and 191.
See also Emily Vermeule, Aspects 0£ Dea th in Early Greek
!:£t and Poetry, pp. 87-88, on lions as protectors 0£ the
Weak, and on Heracles as "the preeminent lion-soldier."
The contrast between the child-killing 0£ Heracles and that
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and Kill their own.
As Scylla, Medea becomes the raw-eating savage beast
that lion similes suggest the warrior is capable 0£
Scylla s 3 99

becoming.

1

brie£

biography

in

Homeric

epic

is a one-pointed meditation on the horri£ic savagery
entailed in the raw-eating 0£ human £lesh (Odyssey 12.85259, passim).
pitiable

Odysseus calls her eating his men the "most

sight"

>I

(OLKTlOTOV

lOOV,

Odyssey

12.258) 0£ all he has seen in his long journeys.

Blood-

lust is to be expected £rom both heroic warrior and lion,
but raw-ea ting £le sh, to be expected in Scylla and
accceptable in a lion, constitutes £or the heroic warrior a
boundary-crossing that robs him 0£ his humanity.

So much

is clear £rom Apollo's criticism 0£ Achilles' much lesser
savagery--dragging

Hector's

Apollo compares Achilles to a
herds:

ocoe:v,

Achilles
24-.ll-1);

"Knows

his

mind

body--at

24-.39-54-.

lion that £easts on domestic

savage
is

Iliad

not

things"
intent

(aypla

on

justice

(24-.ll-O); he has destroyed pity and has no aidos (24-.ll-ll--ll-5).
In short, Achilles has crossed the line 0£ civilization and
become the savage beast; justice, pity, and aidos are
values

0£

civilization

that

war

threatens

to

destroyll-00

0£ Medea is another indicator 0£ her anti-heroism.
399 As even her name suggests, Scylla is part dog
(Odyssey 22.86).
For the dog as the representation 0£ the
uncivilized in man, see Red£ield, Nature and Culture, pp.
193-203.
ll-OOsegal,

Ku ti la ti on,

p.

58.
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and that the gods--with the exception of Hera and Poseidon
(24-.25-30)--are

now

eager

to

protect. 401

such civilized values must be protected by the heroic
warrior whose actions, ironically, most threaten them.
111 ust

He

only be comparable to a lion, and not become the lion,

for lions do what Scylla does--and what humans must never
do.

A final contrast to the lioness and Scylla Medea is

the lion Odysseus.

At Odyssey 22.401-406, Homer gives a

highly detailed description of Odysseus as Eurykleia found
him after the slaughter of the suitors:
a

kill,

1c.al.

he

).u9p<t>

is

spattered

ire:ira).ay1.1.evov,

his cheeks (22.403-404).

with

blood

22.402)

up

like a lion after

and
to

gore
his

Cl

(aq.1.aTl
chest

and

But Odysseus, for all the gore of

his enemies that is spattered upon him, has not become the
lion.

He remains the human:

he checks Eurykleia •s

hooting glorification of slaughter as impious, and reminds
her that the slain men died because of their mal treatment
of

others

(Odyssey

22.407-416).

Medea, however, can in no way distance herself from
the horrible comparisons to lioness and Scylla Jason in
his descriptions of her has made.

The bodies of the slain

over which she stands are her own children, helpless and

401The poet gives the judgment of Paris as Hera •s
reason for not stopping Achilles• maltreatment of the
corpse. A better reason may be her depiction as savagery
incarnate, as the one with lus·t for raw-eating flesh; see
Joan O'Brien, "Homer's Savage Hera," CJ 86 (1991; hereafter
O'Brien, "Savage Hera"), pp. 105-125. -
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innocent victims.

She earlier arranged the death 0£

another child by hideous mutilation.
are correct:

Medea is a

Jason's descriptions

lioness who has killed helpless

innocents and she is capable, like Scylla, 0£ eating raw
numan £lesh--i£ only metaphorically.

For, as zero-sum

competitor, Medea, like Jason, rejects harmony and
cooperation £or discord and stri-fe.

Metaphorically, then,

neither partakes 0£ the £east 0£ meat, ritually sacri-ficed
and roasted; each is, metaphorically, an eater 0£ raw human
flesh, £or "[t]he lust £or raw-eating or omophagia

. . is

epic's primary image 0£ moral degeneration, just as a meal
roasted and shared with others is the primary metaphor £or
the

best

0£

human

behavior."402

The zero-sum competitor, one who pursues sel£ad vancemen t at the expense 0£ all others, is no heroic
warrior like Achilles or Odysseus, but that hero
degenerated, like Agamemnon, who -feeds on his own people
(Iliad 1.231).

The degenerated hero who

-feeds, i£ only

metaphorically, on human -flesh, is an inhuman human and,
as such, a

perversion 0£ nature itsel-f.

Medea, as she escapes, is just such a perversion.
as she -flies 0££, we begin to recognize that even as a
her grand-father Helios, conspires to save her, the very

402o•Brien,

"Savage

Hera,"

p.

106.

And
god,
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mode

of

her

salvation

signals

a

profound

reversai.403

yor as the chariot 0£ the sun carries Medea and the child
corpses that are her trophies from Corinth to the "land o:f
grectheus" (1384), the city o:f Athens, her very journey
traces the cataclysmic reversal 0£ nature e££ected by the
opera ting defini lions o:f zero-sum competitors:

the sun

travels :from west to east, the reverse 0£ its accustomed
course.404
That is not all that has been reversed in nature.

By

403ohlander, Suspense, p. 175, suggests that a
reversal o:f the natural order is anticipated by the Chorus
at 1251-1260, when they call Earth and Sun to stop Medea.
For Medea's mode 0£ transport as empowering her position,
see Arrowsmith, "Ideas," p. 43 (cf. pp. 49-50), who
discerns in Euripides• use of the sun chariot a "savage
moral oxymoron"; Medea's escape in it lends her
"elemental" eros "the power of sacred physis."
Hills,
"Sorrows," pp. 294-296, sees in Medea's airborne escape the
recurrence of a pattern from the Ino/Procne stories, i.e.,
it is "a kind of avian metamorphosis."
404see the Chorus of Euripides' Electra (699-750),
who disbelieve the story that, when Thyestes deceived and
betrayed his brother Atreus, Zeus turned the course of the
stars and the sun.
Their disbelief is, of course, called
into question when, after Orestes and Electra have deceived
and killed their mother, the celestial Dioscuri come down
from the sky (1233 ff.).
Collinge, "Ex Hachina," pp. 171-172, however, sees no
thematic signi£icance to Medea •s journey on the chariot 0£
the sun. He accuses Euripides throughout the play of
hinting that Medea has ready transport from Corinth, and,
by strategic re:ferences to the Sun, suggests that Medea's
celestial ancestor will play some role.
Euripides thereby
" . . . plays a game with his audience and indulges in an
intellectual exercise which is detached from the course of
the tragedy, and on another mental plane from its
appreciation as tragedy, much as he so readily introduces
sophistic disquisitions of startling dramatic
irrelevance."
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naving bedded down eros, the power to create li£e, with the
cnoice to kill, Euripides has £orced zero-sum logic to a
conclusion that strikes the Chorus and his audience as
preternatura1, 405

and

there£ore

emotionally

repugnant

to an extent that annuls the logical cogency 0£ killing the
cl'lildren.

The image 0£ the cosmos• £orces reversed, 0£ the

blood 0£ murder on the marriage bed, 0£ the corpses 0£
cllildren at the side 0£ their mother who killed them,
reverses £or all time Euripides• audience's easy acceptance 0£ zero-sum ethics.
In the train 0£ Medea's escape chariot are other
reversals.
monster.

Arete has been claimed by a cannibalistic
So much should be expected, however, in a world

where song, the celebration 0£ the zero-sum competitor's
arete, is a

twisted and dissonant lament, not the cele-

bration 0£ glory con£erring immortality that is the reward
of heroic excellence.

It is logical in this world, where

destruction is rampant, where it is the action 0£ choice,
that children become corpses.

For nothing can thrive in

such a sick reversal 0£ natural order, where sophia is
defined as having the savvy to catch one's enemies o£f
guard, and eros, generative desire, is trained to e£fect
ll05McDermott, Incarnation, pp. 109-111, sees in
the anti-:familial and anti-civic individualism and sel:finterest o:f Medea a comparison with the Cyclops Odysseus
encounters in Odyssey 9. Medea, however, outdoes the
Cyclops:
she is actively hostile to family and state,
While he merely exists in a place where such institutions
are as yet not established.
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destruction.
As Medea escapes, drawing along with her these now
reversed because newly repugnant de£initions, Jason, lik.e
the Chorus earlier (1090-1115), suggests that

it would be

better £or children--here, Jason speci£ically re£ers to his
own children--never to be born only to die (1413-1414).
The way he expresses it, however, -further indicates that
the de£initions with whtch Medea escapes are not truths,
but stillbirths 0£ truth, natures ghastly wind-eggs.

For

as Jason tells it, in his world, in the realm 0£ zero-sum
arete, children are dead even be£ ore they are begot ten to
die:

his children, whom he can neither touch nor bury,

are, as Jason cries to Medea, "· . . corpses whom I ought
never to have begotten to have to die at your hands"
(ve:Kpous,

.

oou

ttpos

1 4 1 3 )

n

ous
ip9q.J.EVOUS

. ipuoas
.
oipe:>.ov
,
.
1412e:ll'loe:oBal,
,

e:yw

4 0 6

Jason, driven as he is by the perverted eros 0£ the
zero-sum competitor, is powerless to beget anything but
child-corpses.

Furthermore, since zero-sum arete in-forms

and de-fines sophia as well as eros, competive sophia

406aoedek.er, "Medea," p. 104, notes that this
"impossible wish" 0£ Jason, along with the Nurse's initial
and equally impossible wish that the Argo had never sailed,
"frame the action 0£ the play [and] hint that the Medea
deals somehow with a negation 0£ its own myth." Cr.
Ohlander, Suspense, p. 189.
Simon, Tragic Drama, p. 89,
suggests that Jason here repeats Medea's :Killing 0£ the
Children by :Killing them be-fore they are ever conceived.
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ensures such issue.

No wonder the Chorus, only lately

eager competitors, must, in the £ace 0£ such a

stillbirth,

acKnowledge that the gods have accomplished things beyond
e~pectation
~oria

and that gods alone can £ind a way out 0£ this

(1415-1419).

nature,

have

All

£or

things, even the

them

been

very

course 0£

reversed.407

The Chorus could themselves come up with only one
never

solution:

have

children

(1090-1115).

This

is,

0£

course, Jason's solution--one born 0£ despair when £aced
with the lioness, the Scylla, Medea.

But even as Jason's

hideous descriptions betray a germ 0£--surely unwitting-wisdom, so too in the Chorus' dire solution is there some
small hope that live-birth may still be possible, that
truth has, i£ not been born, at least taken embryonic £orm.
The evidence £or this claim is at 1085-1086.

There,

the women 0£ the Chorus tentatively lay claim to sophia,
and one that is newly generated:
"intercourse":

by a muse, and through

"For indeed there is even £or us a muse,

who holds intercourse [with us] £or the sake 0£ wisdom
'
yap

>I

.

Cl

€V€1C.€V).

OO'f'lOS.
11'pocroµ.l~t:l'

one

other

ofiTos.

c
0

is

µ.ouoa

€01"lV

its el£

time:

uncommon.

in

oaLµ.wv

fragment
[i.e.

ic.

c

al'

The

'r)µ.lv,
word

Euripides
897.3

uses

it

only

(lfpoooµ.l~t:l'v

.

ll'OV1"WV

Cl

'r)OlOTOS.

407 The deus ex ma china is not here, as elsewhere,
See George Gellie, "Tragedy
meant to suggest a resolution.
and Euripides' Electra," BICS 28 (1981), p. 8.
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~cpu

where

9v'l')TOLS.),

it

has

obvious

sexual

conno-

tations.

Here also there is a sexual undertone to the

word, 4 08

al though

it

is

admittedly

subtle.

By

their

use of this word, the women of the Chorus hint at a
connection bet ween eros and sophia, a connection suggested
more openly once before in this play, in the first
antistrophe (835-845) of the Ode to Athens.
Erotes were assistants to Sophia.

There the

Here again, and this

time even more explicitly, eros is not put at odds with
sophia, not put, if one knows best, under the vigilant
control of a

rationally deliberated plan.

Here, in fact,

eros is the generative force employed by a muse to produce
sophia.409
The Chorus' new sophia, never to have children, is
surely not the final wisdom, but it is the best they can
do, burdened as they still are with defective definitions
they cannot quite bring themselves to discard.

But we

should not expect from them, any more than we should from
408Evidence for use of the compound
vpooo1..Ll>.ew in an explicitly sexual sense is, besides
the Euripidean fragment mentioned, confined to texts later
than Medea, according to LSJ9, which cites, in addition
to a sixth century A. D. papyrus (PMasp.153.6, al.),
Lucian's Amores 17, and the third century A. D. novelist
Heliodorus 4.8.
Use of the uncompounded 01.u>.E:w in
a sexual sense is, however, not unknown to the fifth and
fourth centuries B. c., again according to LSJ9, which
Cites Xenophon, Anabasis 3.2.25, Memorabilia 2.1.24, etc.;
and Sophocles Oedipus the King 367 and 1185.
409The relationship between eros and
to resemble that -found in Plato's Symposium.

sophia

seems

589

the interlocutor in Socratic elenchos, truth to be born.
It

is

instead someone

p1ato•s

else•s--Euripides•

reader-auditor's,

in

short,

audience's,

our--job

to

"£iddle"

with the premises, even as the Chorus seem to have begun
to do, to try to bring truth to birth, to arrive at true
sophia,

true

eros, and,

£inally,

true

And what might those truths be?

arete.
The clues lie in the

maieutic analogies Euripides has drawn, and in the essence
of bene£it upon which those analogies rely.
have been given?

What clues

The harmony 0£ song, the healing £rom

medicine, the li£e-giving power 0£ generative desire.
Somehow, with these in mind, we must--or so it ever seems!
--be able to £ind our way out 0£ discord, sick.ness, and
death.
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